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Abstract 
 
The courts in South Africa have an important role to play in securing the 
democratic society envisaged by the Constitution.  One way that this can be 
realised is through their power to make decisions which influence the daily 
administrative practices of government. Despite this important role, little is known 
about the courts’ influence on bureaucratic decision-making. As a contribution to 
filling that gap, this thesis sets out the findings of an empirical study on three 
environmental departments’ responses to judicial regulation during the first fifteen 
years of democracy. 
This thesis is located within an emerging body of judicial impact studies. It 
is structured around a set of hypotheses which aim to examine the effect that 
certain factors have on enhancing or impeding receptivity to judicial control. In 
the absence of a model for conducting judicial impact studies, the thesis draws on 
Halliday’s analytical framework, with some important methodological and 
contextual exceptions.  
The results of the research reveal that the conduct of the courts themselves 
has significant consequences for the manifestation of impact. In addition, complex 
non-routine decision-making in the context of an immature public sector system 
generates a particular set of positive and negative dynamics. Challenges of 
stabilising consistency, ensuring quality of decisions and developing capacity have 
a strong competitive effect with receptivity to judgments. The absence of a 
systemised approach to the management of judgments has resulted in relatively 
low levels of knowledge and responses often being implemented unevenly 
amongst officials. However, officials’ high levels of legal conscientiousness create 
a clear potential for the courts’ current impact to be enhanced.  
The thesis also highlights the importance of studying the interrelationships 
between different factors. The findings show that there are differences in the way 
that such factors operate and provide a basis for adding a new dimension to 
Halliday’s analytical framework. By categorising factors as being either 
conditions or variables, it is suggested that impact studies can be approached as a 
two-stage enquiry. Such an approach may facilitate a more nuanced understanding 
of the dynamics involved in impact and may have relevance for future research 
that aims to identify methods for enhancing impact.
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In 1994 South Africa elected its first democratic government, signalling the 
formal end of apartheid. The transition to democracy involved far more than 
enfranchising black South Africans. Since apartheid had pervaded every aspect 
of South African life, the new government inherited a myriad of distorted 
policies and practices. In the environmental context the effort required to realise 
the opportunities presented by the change in government and an entirely new 
Constitution were acknowledged by former President Mandela, prior to the 
elections, in the following statement – 
Environmental concerns can unite South Africa, going beyond racial, 
political, and economic barriers. In addition to the crises in education, 
housing, employment, and a host of other problems, the new democracy 
will be left with apartheid’s environmental legacy.1 
Dealing with this legacy required a complete overhaul of government. 
Although politicians steered these transformation processes, the task of 
implementing new approaches necessarily fell to officials. The pressures that 
officials faced cannot be overstated - particularly in light of high public 
expectations and political promises of delivery.  
At an institutional level, the four provincial administrations and the 
separate homeland structures were reorganised into nine provincial departments.
2
 
Many officials accordingly had to adapt to new institutional structures and new 
institutional cultures. There were also considerable challenges at an operational 
level. The Constitution expanded the environmental function of the provinces 
from conservation matters to the full ambit of environmental management. The 
newly formed departments therefore had to accommodate environmental 
                                                 
1
 Nelson R. Mandela, 15 August 1993 as quoted in Anne V Whyte (ed) Building a new South 
Africa. Volume 4: environment reconstruction and development (1995). 
2
 The structure of these institutions has also been cited as a cause of distorted administrative 
practices. For example, Seidman et al state that ‘...South Africa’s deplorable record of 
administration resulted not merely from the character of individual administrators, but from 
the very structure and processes of state institutions. An administrative structure that served 
the apartheid regime can only by an extraordinary accident serve the aims of an anti-
apartheid regime.’  See ‘A theory and methodology for investigating the function of law in 
relation to government institutions: the case of the Development Bank of South Africa’ 1993 
Acta Juridica 263. 
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management functions with which incumbent officials had no experience. 
Furthermore many new officials, who were appointed to fulfil these functions, 
had no experience in and of government administration. In addition, existing 
substantive and procedural administrative practices had to change to reflect the 
rights-based values enshrined in the Constitution.  
There are several indicators which can be used to assess how successfully 
the public administration has met these challenges. Many yield observations at a 
macro level. Judgments, however, provide a particular insight as to how officials 
make administrative decisions on a daily basis. They accordingly offer some 
indication of the extent to which the constitutional values have penetrated 
operational activities of the public administration. 
In addition to presenting a unique window on daily administrative 
practices, judgments create case law - a potentially useful resource to 
government. The systematic analysis of judgments can, for example, provide 
guidance on the implementation requirements of legislation and the conduct 
required by officials to give effect to good governance. A review of case law can 
also assist government departments to identify the need for law reform, to redress 
‘non-compliant’ practices and to obtain certainty around the acceptability of 
decision-making practices. Whilst this may be true in any jurisdiction, judicial 
oversight assumes particular relevance in an emerging democratic context like 
South Africa. In its capacity as overseer of administrative conduct and as role-
player in the compliance and enforcement cycle,
3
 the court has an opportunity to 
steer the transformation of the public administration and contribute to the 
evolving environmental jurisprudence; an opportunity which is greater than other 
jurisdictions with settled democracies.  
Despite this important role, almost nothing is known about the courts’ 
effect on bureaucratic decision-making in South Africa.
4
 The findings of this 
thesis are based on an empirical study on three environmental departments’ 
                                                 
3
 The courts’ role in civil compliance and enforcement matters is different from its role in 
judicial review as the court is often involved during the dispute where it authorises or 
determines approaches to enforcement. 
4
 The beginnings of interest in judicial impact assessment are suggested by articles such as T 
Roux ‘Pro-poor court, anti-poor outcomes: explaining the performance of the South African 
Land Claims Court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 511 and M Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV 
transmission in South Africa: background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment Action 
Campaign case against the Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 SAJHR 278. 
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receptivity to judicial control during the first 15 years of democracy and are 
intended to make a contribution to the development of that understanding.  
For some there are questions as to whether studies of this nature are over 
ambitious or whether any value can be derived from their outcomes. Concerns in 
this regard relate either to what Halliday and Hertogh describe as ‘impact 
agnosticism’ or to the realistic expectations that can be placed on the courts’ 
ability to produce social and administrative change.
5
 With regard to the former, in 
the absence of an accepted model for undertaking judicial impact studies, or even 
uniformity regarding what we mean by impact, writers such as Cane believe that 
the complexities involved in judicial impact studies mean that such studies will 
only yield modest results.
6
 With regard to the latter, a number of researchers are 
somewhat pessimistic about the courts’ ability to have an impact on bureaucratic 
approaches. For example, in her overview of impact studies in the United 
Kingdom, Richardson concludes that the ‘instrumental potential of judicial review 
should not be overestimated’7 whereas Adler notes that too few disputes are 
subjected to judicial review to be effective in securing administrative justice.
8
 
There is merit in both types of concerns. However, when the democratic 
architecture of a country is founded on the rule of law and the separation of 
powers, a curiosity arises regarding whether that architecture is effective and 
whether it fulfils its intended purpose. A key role of the courts in this framework 
is the oversight of administrative approaches and holding officials accountable for 
behaviour that complies with the law. Although the courts usually exercise their 
powers in relation to an individual dispute, resulting judgments may have broader 
implications for decision-making and, in some circumstances, profound 
implications for many people’s quality of life. Where judicial impact studies 
attempt to penetrate bureaucratic thinking and responses to judicial direction they 
provide an opportunity to understand, not only officials’ acceptance of the 
democratic architecture, but also the alignment between the myriad of 
                                                 
5
 Hertogh and Halliday ‘Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future’ in Hertogh and 
Halliday (eds) Judicial review and bureaucratic impact (2004) 30 at 270.  
6
 Cane op cit at 15. 
7
 Genevra Richardson ‘Impact studies in the United Kingdom’ in Hertogh and Halliday (eds) 
op cit at 114. 
8
 M Adler ‘A socio-legal approach to administrative justice’ (2003) 25 Law & Policy 323 at 
323-324. 
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administrative decisions and the spirit and substance of the law as interpreted by 
the courts. This understanding is seldom revealed by other accountability 
reporting mechanisms.  
In a young democracy like South Africa, judicial impact studies also serve 
as an indicator of the extent to which a rights-based approach has been 
internalised by officials, a subject on which there is a paucity of information. In 
such situations judicial impact studies that are conducted over periods of time can 
be used as barometers for monitoring whether democratic governance is 
increasing or decreasing. 
Judicial impact studies therefore have much to offer regarding our 
understanding of democracy in action by revealing administrative practices and 
influences which are otherwise largely invisible. In the short term approaches to 
the studies may have deficiencies but methodological obstacles ought to invite 
further, not less, research. 
 
1.2 Scope of the study 
Questions regarding the courts’ ability to influence bureaucratic decision-making 
cannot be answered by doctrinal reference to its constitutional authority alone. 
As several researchers point out, the court is institutionally weak and has limited 
ability to secure compliance with its judgments.
9
 It must therefore rely on both 
deference and responsiveness by officials to its authority.  
In practice receptivity to court rulings by officials is affected by numerous 
factors. These factors arise from different sources, including the conduct of the 
court; the attributes of the decision-makers who must give effect to the 
judgments and the pressures which are exerted by the decision-making 
environment. Wasby, for instance, lists 33 hypotheses which argue that the type 
and number of cases, clarity of the judgment and extent to which the ruling is 
controversial influence responses.
10
 Halliday on the other hand notes that a lack 
                                                 
9
 Charles A Johnson and Bradley C Canon Judicial policies: implementation and impact 
(1984) 78 and Gerald N Rosenberg The hollow hope: can courts bring about social change? 
(1991) 3. 
10
 Stephen L Wasby The impact of the United States Supreme Court (1970) 246 – 251 
(hereafter referred to as ‘Wasby’). 
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of knowledge or legal conscientiousness on the part of decision-makers inhibits 
judicial impact.
11
 Research conducted on the decision-making environment by 
Duncombe and Strausman and Lo et al points to factors such as the effects of 
resource constraints.
12
 
The inevitable presence of various contextual factors in any situation 
means that the relationship between judicial authority and administrative 
responses cannot be properly understood without considering how such factors 
influence officials’ receptivity to judgments. Researching this issue is laden with 
challenges and it is unsurprising that much of the existing research acknowledges 
that there is a great deal that is unknown and many gaps that need to be filled. 
Most of these gaps can only be filled by empirical research because, unlike 
normative approaches which examine what responses ought to occur, empirical 
approaches facilitate insight to what responses actually occur and the conditions 
under which judicial impact is most likely to manifest.
13
 The penetrating 
perspective that empirical studies can yield is evident from Halliday’s research 
on the implementation of homelessness law in the United Kingdom. His study 
makes an important contribution to knowledge about the conditions that affect 
judicial impact which would not have emerged from a non-empirical analysis. 
This thesis responds to Halliday’s call for further empirical research on 
the implications of his analytical framework for other contextual settings. It also 
seeks to shed further light on whether and why the courts have an impact in 
South Africa by exploring the interplay between certain contextual factors and 
the acceptance of judicial control amongst decision-makers in the three 
departments.  
The study is structured around five hypotheses which were designed to 
test the extent to which selected factors contribute to, or impede, judicial impact 
ie -  
                                                 
11
 Simon Halliday Judicial review and compliance with administrative law (2004). 
12
 William D Duncombe and Jeffrey D Strausman ‘The impact of courts on the decision to 
expand jail capacity’ 1993 Administration and Society 267 and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo et al 
‘Effective regulations with little effect? The antecedents of the perceptions of environmental 
officials on enforcement effectiveness in China’ (2006) 38 3 Environmental Management 388 
(hereafter referred to as Lo et al 1). 
13
 Johnson and Canon op cit at 185 –188. 
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i. Where the underlying legislative requirements for public 
administration change from an undemocratic approach to a rights-
based approach, the potential for the judiciary to have an impact is 
high because approaches to the new requirements of public 
administration have not yet calcified. 
ii. In order for the courts to have an impact on environmental 
decision-making it is necessary for decision-makers to have 
knowledge of – 
a. the full range of environmental judgments and trends in 
judicial approaches; and 
b. the implications of judgments for non-routine decision-
making. 
iii. In order for the courts to have an impact on environmental 
decision-making, decision-makers must, in addition to having 
knowledge of judgments, be legally conscientious with regard to 
their respect for the role and status of the courts.  
iv. There is a greater potential for judicial impact on public 
administration where an organisation has formal or coherent 
mechanisms for analysing judgments, determining responses to 
judgments and disseminating information on thereon than where 
there is not an organisational approach which is consistently 
applied and the reception of judgments is left to the discretion of 
individual officials.  
v. Judicial control is undermined where decision-makers perceive 
judgments to be impractical. 
The two hypotheses relating to knowledge and legal conscientiousness are 
closely aligned with those formulated by Halliday. Both are concerned with the 
attributes of the decision-maker. The remaining three hypotheses focus on 
political and institutional influences.  
Although the approach to the study draws on Halliday’s framework it has 
important variations. Firstly, the study is underpinned by four major contextual 
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differences. The significance of contextual differences has been noted by several 
writers. Cane, for example, argues that constitutional context is a relevant 
consideration in impact studies because it both informs the direction that the 
impact enquiry should take and has implications for the extent to which findings 
of a particular study can be generalised to other countries.
14
 Cane’s views are 
supported by others, such as Meyers, who has noted certain caveats that should 
be considered when comparing the role of judicial review of environment 
decisions between different jurisdictions.
15
 The importance of the four contextual 
differences noted below therefore lies in the opportunity which they provide for 
assessing the extent to which findings in other research apply in varied situations. 
The first contextual difference relates to South Africa’s transition to 
constitutional supremacy. The incorporation of justiciable human rights, 
including administrative justice, in the Constitution reshaped and expanded the 
scope for judicial intervention. It also empowers the courts to contribute to the 
realisation of a more just society by authorising them to adjudicate on whether 
government policies, programmes and decisions are adequate to meet the 
requirements of the constitutional rights. The courts’ function therefore has a 
more pronounced public interest dimension than in some other jurisdictions. 
The second contextual difference arises from South Africa’s economic 
situation. Most studies have taken place in the context of developed countries 
which have markedly different socio-economic circumstances from developing 
countries.
16
 South Africa is a developing country whose Gini coefficient scores 
have resulted in it being reported as ‘the most unequal society in the world’.17 
                                                 
14
 Peter Cane ‘Understanding judicial review and its impact’ in Hertogh and Halliday (eds) op 
cit 30.  
15
 Gary D Meyers ‘Meeting public expectations – judicial review of environmental impact 
statements in the United States: lessons for reform in Western Australia?’ (1996) 3 2 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law. Available at www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw [accessed on 
20 March 2006]. 
16
 Exceptions include Jeffrey K Staton ‘Judicial policy implementation in Mexico City and 
Mérida’ (2004) 37 1 Comparative Politics 41 and Anthony B L Cheung and Max W L Wong 
‘Judicial review and policy making in Hong Kong: Changing interface between the legal and 
the political’ (2006) 28 2 The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 117. 
17
 Donwald Pressly ‘South Africa has widest gap between rich and poor Business Report 28 
September 2009. Available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5181018 
[accessed on 5 August 2010]. The Gini coefficient is used to measure inequalities in wealth in 
a country. Different scores have been given for South Africa at different times. The study 
which was discussed in the Business Report found that South Africa’s Gini coefficient was 
0.679 – a figure which was queried at the time by government. A 2003 United Nation’s report 
indicates that the Gini coefficient was 0.596 in 1995 and 0.635 in 2001. (See United Nations 
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Such inequalities have important implications for environmental decisions where 
a perceived tension emerges between the need to alleviate poverty and the 
protection of the environment.  
The third difference relates to the nature of environmental decisions. The 
majority of studies conducted in respect of the influence of judicial review have 
focused on the courts’ impact on routine decision-making. Halliday’s study, for 
instance, was concerned with housing decisions and Machin and Richardson’s  
with mental health decisions.
18
 Environmental decisions are regarded as being 
non-routine for the purposes of this study because they lack certain 
characteristics of routine decision-making and relate to an extremely complex 
area of law and decision-making. The fourth difference relates to the functional, 
institutional and legislative transformation that has characterised environmental 
governance since 1994. The extent of these changes has created challenges for 
officials that are unlikely to be experienced to the same extent in countries with 
mature institutions and legislation. 
In combination, the texture of these differences provided a basis for 
testing Halliday’s analytical framework under varied conditions. The discussion 
that follows in subsequent chapters demonstrates the utility of applying his 
framework in South African-based research. It also reveals that the contextual 
differences in the study feature prominently as enhancers or barriers to impact 
and merit assessment in future studies that are undertaken in developing 
countries.  
Apart from the contextual setting, the study also differs from Halliday’s in 
certain methodological aspects. Halliday, like most other administrative law 
researchers, focused on judgments involving judicial review. Judicial review, by 
its nature, is a defensive process for officials. Other types of litigation, such as 
enforcement proceedings initiated by departments, are often more proactive or 
neutral experiences. This study included a broad range of civil judgments which 
were handed down by the superior courts on environmental matters from 1994 to 
                                                                                                                                            
Development Programme South Africa Human Development Report 2003, The Challenge of 
Sustainable Development in South Africa: Unlocking People’s Creativity (2003) at 4). Even if 
there is a basis for disputing the 2009 score, it is clear that South Africa ranks amongst the 
most unequal countries and that the gap between rich and poor is growing. 
18
 David Machin and Genevra Richardson ‘Judicial review and tribunal decision-making: a 
study of the Mental Health Review Tribunal’ 2000 Public Law 494. 
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2007. By expanding the category of judgments it was possible to explore whether 
the way in which factors operate varies in response to the type of exposure that 
officials have to the courts.  
The study also adopted an expanded approach to the consideration of 
factors that influence decision-making. Halliday was concerned with identifying 
the influences on decision-making that were in conflict with case law and 
accordingly describes his study as ‘an empirical work of non-compliance’.19 This 
thesis extends his approach by including a discussion of the influences which 
enhanced responsiveness. 
The variation in methodological approach contributed to important 
findings regarding the way in which different factors operate. As a result it was 
possible to make suggestions regarding the augmentation of Halliday’s 
framework that may be of benefit for future research which aims to identify 
methods for enhancing impact. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four parts namely contextual and methodological 
issues; jurisprudential norms which ought to have resulted in impact; findings of 
the empirical study; and concluding observations and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
1.3.1 Part 1: Context and methodology 
Judicial impact studies are atypical as they attract researchers from diverse 
disciplines. Notwithstanding the interdisciplinary appeal of judicial impact 
studies, there is no generally accepted theory on how these studies should be 
undertaken.
20
 This is illustrated by the fact that there is no unified approach 
regarding what impacts are assessed, how impact is established or which 
underlying theoretical approach is optimally suited for such studies. In order to 
contextualise the study, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the debates 
                                                 
19
 Halliday op cit at 19. 
20
 Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday ‘Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future 
research’ in Hertogh and Simon (eds) op cit 269. 
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surrounding impact studies. It also highlights some methodological difficulties 
and describes the approach which was adopted.  
Chapter 3 discusses the far-reaching changes that have occurred in 
constitutional, administrative and environmental law so that the requirements of 
judicial and environmental decision-making, which are analysed in subsequent 
chapters, can be understood. The first part of the chapter describes the 
implications of these changes for the scope of the judiciary to adjudicate on 
environmental disputes that arise in respect of government’s exercise of power 
and the way in which decisions on those disputes must be made. The second part 
of the chapter focuses on the implications of these  changes  for the departments’ 
execution of the environmental function.  
 
1.3.2 Part 2: Case analysis 
The study adopts a top-down approach in so far as the enquiry was focused on 
responses to judgments. At the time of the study there was very little academic 
analysis of environmental case law, especially in respect of the implications of 
judgments for administrative decision-making.
21
 It was accordingly necessary to 
undertake a review of environmental judgments as part of the study in order to 
understand the court’s contribution to environmental jurisprudence and to create 
a foundation for the empirical enquiry.  
The results of the case analysis are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 
4 sets out findings in respect of certain statistical trends. Chapter 5 provides a 
discussion of some norms that have emerged and describes the potential impact 
on public administration. In addition to being an important component of the 
                                                 
21
 Some articles have recently been published which discuss environmental judgments. These 
articles generally consider specific cases rather than judicial trends. See Tracy Field ‘Public 
participation in environmental decision-making: Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-
General: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism’ (2005) 122 4 SALJ 748 and 
Loretta Ferris ‘The socio-economic nature of section 24(b) of the Constitution – some 
thoughts on HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(HTF)’ (2008) 23 SAPR/PL 194. Possible exceptions are R Paschke and J Glazewski ‘Ex post 
facto authorisation in South African environmental assessment legislation: a critical review’ 
(2006) (1) PER 1; L Britz and Willemien Du Plessis ‘The filling station saga: environmental 
or economic concerns’(2007) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 26;  T Murombo 
‘Beyond public participation: the disjuncture between South Africa’s environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) Law and sustainable development’ (2008) 3 PER and Tracy Humby ‘The 
Biowatch case: major advance in South African law of costs and access to environmental 
justice’ (2010) 22 1 Journal of Environmental Law 125. 
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study, the findings of the case analysis are set out in some detail as they may be a 
resource for other researchers in the environmental field. 
 
1.3.3 Part 3: Empirical investigation 
The empirical findings and implications for the hypotheses are set out in 
Chapters 6 – 8. The first hypothesis regarding the context of transformation 
relates to all aspects of the decision-making environment. Where the investigation 
of the hypothesis related to knowledge or legal conscientiousness it was woven  
into Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 6 the investigation is considered by reference to 
the effect of five political and institutional factors on judicial impact. The first two 
– accountability and the political status of environmental departments – are 
external to the departments. The remaining three, namely the nature of 
environmental decisions, time pressures and capacity, are internal factors.  
These factors are not exhaustive and could be complemented by others. 
Because of this, the influence of additional factors not considered as part of the 
study cannot be discounted. Notwithstanding this limitation, the results of the 
research suggest that complex non-routine decision-making in the context of an 
immature public sector system generates a particular set of positive and negative 
dynamics. Challenges of stabilising consistency, quality of decision-making and 
developing capacity appear to have a significant competitive effect with the 
reception of judgments.  
Chapter 7 addresses two of the hypotheses, namely the requirement that 
knowledge must be present in order for impact to eventuate and that the potential 
for impact is increased where there are formal institutional mechanisms for 
analysing judgments, determining responses to judgments and disseminating 
information on judgments. By conceptualising knowledge as a communication 
process in which information is transferred from the court to officials, several 
enhancers and barriers which have affected levels of knowledge amongst officials 
are revealed. Significant barriers include the way in which judges formulate 
judgments and the absence of a well established mechanism for dissemination of 
information about judgments. 
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Chapter 8 explores the hypothesis regarding legal conscientiousness 
amongst officials from two perspectives. Firstly it analyses officials’ perceptions 
of the courts - including the extent to which they believe that they ought to defer 
to the court’s authority - and environmental legislation. Secondly it examines 
reactions to different types of judgments. By adopting this hybrid approach it was 
possible to make tentative findings about the relationship between legitimacy, 
conscientiousness and actual responses. It also confirms that, alongside 
conscientiousness, a number of other factors exert an influence on the 
determination of officials’ responses to judgments (the acceptance decision). 
 The courts’ effect on impact that emerged in the consideration of 
knowledge also featured in the application of legal conscientiousness. In 
particular the findings show that the court has a direct effect on the level of 
intensity that is required to reach an acceptance decision. The findings also reveal 
that high levels of legal conscientiousness can result in substantial efforts to 
overcome barriers that arise from the courts’ conduct. In consequence the fifth 
hypothesis that judicial control is undermined where decision-makers perceive 
judgments to be impractical was not proved. 
 
1.3.4 Part 4: Conclusion 
Chapter 9 draws the specific findings set out in Chapters 6 – 8 together and sets 
out overarching conclusions. It also provides a different perspective on how 
conditions affecting impact can be approached and explored. In the final part of 
the chapter some suggestions are made for future research. 
 
1.4 Personal location in the study 
The discussion on the background to the thesis would be incomplete if I failed to 
mention my context and relationship with the three environmental departments 
and any potential influence this may have on the content thereof.  
I embarked on a legal career with the intellectual belief that law is the 
cornerstone of democracy and that justice could be found through the law. In the 
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years predating democracy this belief was supported by theory rather than 
practice.  
My exposure to environmental law prior to 1994 was largely limited to 
voluntary non-governmental organisation (NGO) activities, much of which 
involved campaigning against government policy and practices. During the period 
of transformation following 1994, the new government’s approach to civil society 
was markedly different from its predecessor. This was particularly true in the 
period from 1994 to 1998 during which government adopted a highly participatory 
approach and actively sought to include NGOs, community-based organisations, 
trade unions and business
22
 in processes that it initiated to redefine South Africa’s 
approaches to environmental management.
 
This participatory approach was 
possibly most evident in the development of new environmental policy and 
formulation of national stances on international conventions.
23
 
Project steering committees, comprised of multi-sector representatives 
and chaired by the Deputy Minister of Environmental Affairs, were established 
for both the Consultative National Environmental Policy Process (CONNEPP) 
and the Integrated Pollution and Waste Management (IP&WM) Policy process.
24
 
In some instances the multi-sector approach to participation in policy 
development, was extended to the composition of the drafting teams, as was the 
case in CONNEPP. Government also established multi-sectoral committees to 
inform the country’s negotiating position at several United Nations conferences.  
From 1995 to 1997, I participated in several of these policy processes, 
mostly as a volunteer. I was appointed subsequently as the community-based 
organisations’ representative on the CONNEP drafting team.25 NGOs nominated 
me to represent them both on the IP&WM Policy project steering committee and 
the committees which provided input to the negotiating positions on several 
                                                 
22
 References to ‘business’ includes industry. 
23
 Commitment to these participatory processes amongst civil society was high. For example, 
during the national environmental policy process some women travelled from rural areas for 
up to three days to participate in workshops. Personal knowledge, facilitator at CONNEPP I 
and CONNEPP II workshops.  
24
 The IP&WM steering committee also oversaw the development of the National Waste 
Management Strategy and provided significant input to the development of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Regulations, 1997. 
25
 Where the process is referred to, the abbreviation is CONNEPP; where the policy output is 
referred to the abbreviation is CONNEP. 
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international conventions. I was also afforded the opportunity of being the NGO 
representative in the government delegation to the Basel Convention Conference 
of the Parties. As a result of my participation in these processes my theoretical 
views of law were supplemented by experiential insights regarding how different 
standpoints and resources, in an uncertain terrain of largely negotiated 
approaches, influence the form that policy and legislation ultimately takes. 
From 1998 I took on an increasing amount of public sector work in a 
consulting capacity for all three spheres of government. During 2001 I accepted 
an offer from the Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment to contract against the post of Director: Legal Services for a period 
of almost two years. My initial acceptance of this contract was based primarily 
on the opportunity provided to establish a compliance and enforcement system 
for the Department. However limited legal resources at that time resulted in my 
becoming involved in a range of other activities, including institutional 
restructuring, development of tools to guide application processes, review of 
applications for authorisations, and the development of guidelines.
26
  
Since the conclusion of that contract, I have continued to operate as an 
independent consultant. The maj rity of my work has been for the public sector, 
including the three departments discussed in this study. This work has included 
drafting legislation, legislative implementation programmes, opinions on 
applications for authorisation and appeals, and compliance and enforcement 
strategy development.
27
 I have always felt privileged to be afforded the 
opportunity to draft legislation which aims to redress environmental injustice and 
to provide a basis for sustainable development. I have been equally appreciative 
of the opportunities to take part in projects involving the implementation of law. 
                                                 
26
 One of the guidelines which I finalised for the Department is the EIA administrative 
guideline: guideline for the construction and upgrade of filling stations and associated tank 
installations (2002) which was the subject of several cases discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
27
 For the Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment I continued 
work on the development of the compliance and enforcement strategy and was involved in 
policy development and authorisation procedures. In the Eastern Cape I drafted a provincial 
environmental management Bill and furnished opinions on applications for environmental 
authorisation as well as appeals against decisions on such applications. I was appointed by the 
national department to draft several pieces of legislation including the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Regulations, 2006 (GNR 385, 386 and 387 GG 28753 of 21 April 2006), the 
National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 and the National 
Environmental Management: Waste Act 59 of 2008. I was also involved in implementation 
projects for the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations and waste management as well 
as training in compliance and enforcement.  
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In combination these experiences have enabled me to reflect on the extent to 
which law itself has real transformational potential and I consequently became 
increasingly interested in the relationship between law, the people who 
implement or who are affected by it, and the realisation of environmental 
democracy. 
My exposure to the environmental departments has given me direct 
knowledge of many of their policy processes and operational activities. Perhaps 
more importantly, it has given me practical insight of existing challenges and 
opportunities. This, I believe, is a benefit for the study. It has enabled me to ask 
questions which others may not have known to ask.  
However, some writers like Suttner acknowledge that research may be 
met with scepticism where the researcher has been directly involved in the 
subject matter. Discussion on the extent to which my experience may affect the 
study is therefore merited.
28
  Many of the judgments discussed in this thesis, 
consider policy and legislation to which I made substantial drafting 
contributions. Sometimes these support government and at other times they do 
not. Without doubt my experience with the departments has influenced my views 
on the judgments. So too does my background as lawyer and NGO member.  
There is also another factor which has influenced me. That is the context 
of change which has characterised South African life in the last 15 years. Earlier, 
I indicated the extent to which officials are required to develop new approaches 
in pressurised environments. Law reform is one example. The urgency of the law 
reform process, and the rapid drafting pace of legislation in which I was 
personally involved (sometimes as little as ten days) often limited the 
opportunity for detailed research and increased the scope for unintended 
consequences. Furthermore, the officials’ requirements as well as input from 
public consultation and political processes, all influenced the form in which the 
legislation was ultimately enacted. Judges do not, and should not, take such 
factors into account when they interpret legislation.  
However, if one accepts the constraints that are imposed by 
transformation, then judgments can provide a welcome opportunity for reflection 
                                                 
28
 R Suttner The ANC Underground in South Africa to 1976 (2008) 9. 
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and learning. As a result, my views on legislation with which I have been 
involved are neither static nor inflexible. Although I hold a particular set of 
policy preferences, my findings are based on the empirical data and strive to 
ignore my personal bias. To do otherwise would defeat the potential value of the 
study. 
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2. Methodology 
 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that there is no accepted theory for undertaking judicial 
impact studies. This thesis does not attempt to remedy that deficiency. Instead it 
aims to provide insights on a largely unexplored aspect of judicial impact ie the 
influence of the court on non-routine decision-making in a developing country. 
Employing Halliday’s analytical framework in respect of only one aspect of 
judicial impact has inevitably resulted in some of the limitations which he 
identified also being present in this study. For example, it only considers 
bureaucratic responses and then mainly in relation to judgments.  
At the same time certain of the approaches adopted in this thesis differ 
from those adopted by Halliday, particularly in respect of the way in which some 
of the empirical data was analysed. Following Johnson and Canon’s suggestion 
that judicial impact studies could benefit from existing theories, communications 
theory and legitimacy theory were incorporated in the analysis of knowledge and 
legal conscientiousness.
29
 It is therefore necessary to locate this study within the 
emerging body of impact literature so that its congruency or departure from 
other methodological approaches can be understood. The sections below begin 
this discussion by setting out a review of previous approaches and explaining the 
approach adopted in this thesis. (Other aspects are identified in subsequent 
chapters). 
 
2.1 The meaning of impact  
One of the first challenges that arise in judicial impact studies is identifying what 
is meant by impact. At a macro level, all such impact studies are concerned with 
understanding the influence that courts have on political, judicial, bureaucratic or 
social behaviour. In other words, they consider the extent to which the authority 
of the courts is  accepted. Nonetheless, a review of the relatively small body of 
literature shows that there is no common approach to the specific ‘impact’ which 
is assessed. The meaning ascribed to impact in any study is significant as it 
guides researchers toward a preference for a methodological approach. 
                                                 
29
 Op cit at 189. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
19 
 
The scope for divergent approaches arises from the latitude which is 
created by the definition of ‘impact’, as well as the objective of each study. With 
regard to the former, the dictionary defines ‘impact’ as ‘a marked effect or 
influence’.30 Whilst all judicial impact studies entail a consideration of the 
courts’ effect or influence, they do not necessarily consider the same types of 
effect or influence.  
For the purposes of this study, impact studies can be divided into two 
categories.
31
 The first are those studies – primarily undertaken in North America 
- that assess the extent to which the courts are effective agents of social change 
(policy studies). The second category relates to studies – primarily conducted in 
the United Kingdom - which investigate whether judicial review is an effective 
tool for controlling the exercise of government power (administrative studies). 
The distinction is significant because the parameters of the impact which are 
assessed in the two categories differ.  
In studies which consider the ability of the courts to influence social 
policy, or act as a catalyst for social change, the impact of a milestone judgment 
or line of judgments on a particular issue is considered.
32
 Because these studies 
are issue-specific, they tell us something about the influence of courts on those 
issues in question. This is usually achieved by reference to the policy changes 
which occur, or do not occur, in response to the selected judgment. Becker and 
Feeley’s proposal that impact, in the context of these studies, means ‘all policy 
related consequences of a decision’ is accordingly accepted.33 However as 
                                                 
30
 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002). 
31
 Judicial impact studies which fall outside these two categories include J Hartshorne et al 
‘“Caparo under fire”: a study into the effects upon the Fire Service of liability in negligence’ 
(July 2000) 63 4 The Modern Law Review 502 which considers the impact of delictual liability 
on the fire services and J F Spriggs ‘The Supreme Court and federal administrative agencies: a 
resource-based theory and analysis of judicial impact’ (November 1996) (40) 4 American 
Journal of Political Science 1122 which discusses judgments in the context of government’s 
allocation of financial resources.  
32
 Examples include those on prison reform. See S Ekland-Olson and S Martin ‘Organizational 
compliance with court-ordered reform’ (1998) 22  Law and Society Review 359; Duncombe 
and Strausman op cit; B Chilton Prisons under the gavel: the Federal Court takeover of 
Georgia prisons (1991). Researchers who consider a broad range of impacts include Wasby 
op cit, who analyses social impact on religion and school desegregation, amongst others and 
Rosenberg The hollow hope: can courts bring about social change? op cit who undertook an 
expansive study on civil rights.  
33
 T L Becker and M M Feeley The impact of  Supreme Court decisions 2
nd
 ed (1973) 212 as 
quoted in Riddell op cit  at 10 and M McCann Rights at work (1994) who undertook a study 
on employment rights. 
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Rosenberg points out, the parameters of these studies are relatively narrow and 
the results seldom lend themselves to extrapolations about the general 
relationship between courts and bureaucracy.
34
  
Many administrative studies, on the other hand, seek to understand 
whether legal mechanisms, such as judicial review, are effective in influencing 
bureaucratic behaviour. These studies assess responses to a range of judgments 
involving judicial review in respect of a particular topic, such as homeless law.
35
 
Although they are based on a specific topic, the topic provides an anchor for the 
study rather than being part of the primary purpose. As their emphasis is on 
understanding the court’s influence on daily administrative practice, the meaning 
of ‘impact’ in these studies does not fit comfortably with the visible policy 
consequences contemplated by Becker and Feeley. ‘Impact’ in these studies is 
more accurately interpreted as meaning subsequent administrative responses to 
related decision-making or administrative processes.  
 The distinct purposes of undertaking judicial impact studies in these two 
categories are inextricably linked with the meaning which is ascribed to impact. 
Owing to the macro commonality of purpose of the studies, there is of course an 
overlap between the categories.  However it is the disparity of purpose between 
the categories which leads to varying meanings. Administrative studies, for 
example, may be confined to administrative or bureaucratic responses. On the 
other hand if the purpose of the study is to understand the courts’ impact on 
social issues, it is usually relevant to consider responses from a range of affected 
parties, including politicians, bureaucrats and affected members of the public..
36
  
                                                 
34
 G Rosenberg ‘Hollow hopes and other aspirations: a reply to Feeley and McCann’ (1992) 
17 Law and Social Inquiry 762. 
35
 Examples include Halliday op cit; R Creyke and J McMillan ‘The operation of judicial 
review in Australia’ in Hertogh and Halliday (eds) op cit at 161; M Sunkin and K Pick ‘The 
changing impact of judicial review: the Independent Review Service of  the Social Fund’ 
winter 2001 Public Law 736;  David  Machin and Genevra Richardson ‘Judicial review and 
tribunal decision-making: a study of the Mental Health Review Tribunal’ (2000) Public Law 
494; H Koenig and A Kise ‘Beginning to understanding  the sources of influence on the 
management of local government’ (1996) 6 Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 443 and D Cooper ‘Local Government Legal Consciousness in the Shadow of 
Juridification’ (1995) 22 4 Journal of Law and Society 506. 
36
 Johnson and Canon’s research op cit is based on studying the actions between five groups, 
namely, the Supreme Court, the lower courts, the bureaucracy, affected individuals and others 
who are indirectly affected. 
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The impacts described above relate to primary impacts. Canon and Levine 
indicate that secondary impacts may also be considered.
37
 Secondary impacts 
relate to effects, or consequences, which are a step removed from the objective of 
the judgment. For example, commenting on Levine’s discussion of secondary 
impacts, Riddell explains that a secondary impact may be that the crime rate 
increases in response to liberal judgments.
38
 Secondary impacts may well merit 
assessment. However, Riddell suggests that a study of secondary impacts is not 
preferable as it would ‘overburden the concept of “impact”’.39  Given the 
complexities of defining and measuring impact (discussed below) and the 
limitations inherent in any study, Riddell’s views are implicitly reflected in most 
studies falling within the two categories described above. Secondary impacts are 
also not incorporated in the scope of this study. 
Some attempt is made to explore the courts’ effect on the substantive 
aspects of environmental management in South Africa. However the emphasis is 
on assessing the impact of the court on the administrative application of the new 
constitutional rights-based approach. In that sense it is more closely aligned with 
studies conducted in the United Kingdom than in North America. The study 
seeks primarily to understand the extent to which the courts are influential in 
defining the application of the new democratic system and in changing individual 
behaviour and organisational responses. 
 
2.2 Measuring impact – measuring the impossible?  
In addition to the difficulties concerning the nature of the impact to be assessed, 
a second equally challenging question presents itself – can impact be measured?  
Researchers have adopted different indicators to the measurement of 
impact. Creyke and McMillan, in their study on the efficacy of judicial review in 
Australia, analysed the number of times that a department changed its decision 
                                                 
37
 Canon ‘Courts and policy: compliance, implementation, and impact’ op cit as cited in T 
Riddell Legal Mobilization and Policy Change: The Impact of Legal Mobilization on Official 
Minority-Language Education Policy outside Quebec (2002) Doctoral dissertation, McGill 
University 13 and J Levine ‘Methodological concerns in studying Supreme Court efficacy’ 
(1970) 4 Law and Society Review 583. 
38
 Op cit at 13. 
39
 Op cit at 12. 
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after judicial review proceedings were decided in favour of the applicant.
40
 By 
contrast, Machin and Richardson considered, amongst other factors, observable 
compliance and how many times particular judgments were referred to in mental 
health review tribunal proceedings.
41
 The majority of studies, particularly policy 
studies, evaluate the extent to which there is compliance with a judgment.  
For many researchers, however, there is a high level of discomfort 
regarding the defensibility of approaches to impact measurement. Krislov states 
that – 
Even conceptually, the problem of impact measurement presents grave 
difficulties hardly resolved by the usual efforts at studying the immediate 
aftermath of some dramatic event or decision. (Even the most careful 
study cannot establish whether alleged changes were not merely 
coincidentally but actually consequentially related).
42
 
Rosenberg provides a pragmatic point of departure. He states that – 
the mechanisms or links of influence must be clearly specified … then, 
second, the kind of evidence that would substantiate them must be 
presented … [then] other possible ex lanations for change must be 
explored and evaluated.
43
  
In terms of Rosenberg’s approach, measuring impact should start with an 
analysis of the ‘before’ and ‘after’. For impact studies that analyse the effect of 
the courts on social policy, Lempert suggests that this can be addressed through 
the use of his rival hypotheses theory.
44
  
However, it is Rosenberg’s third requirement which especially plagues 
attempts to establish impact. Judgments do not exist in a policy or social vacuum. 
A failure to recognise other factors which may influence consequential 
behaviour, can result in inaccurate findings, particularly where the general 
relationship between the courts and a bureaucracy are the focus of a study. One 
factor that could influence impact is the frequency of litigation on the same issue 
– does this result in a higher or more hostile cumulative impact? Another may be 
the overall experience that officials have with the courts. If, for example, a 
                                                 
40
 Creyke and McMillan ‘The operation of judicial review in Australia’ op cit at 168. 
41
 Machin and Richardson op cit at 500. 
42
 S Krislov The Supreme Court and political freedom (1970) 5 1 Law and Society Review 44  
as quoted in Wasby ‘The Supreme Court’s impact: some problems of conceptualization and 
measurement’ (1970) 5 1 Law and Society Review 44 at 166. 
43
 Rosenberg The hollow hope: can courts bring about social change? op cit at 108-109. 
44
 R Lempert ‘Strategies of research design in the legal impact study: the control of the 
plausible rival hypotheses’ (1966) 1 Law and Society Review 111.  
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department has a high success rate, does this make them more willing to accept a 
negative judgment? Other factors may relate to media coverage or community 
opinion.  
The relevance of external factors is illustrated by Duncombe and 
Straussman who identified several factors, in addition to court orders, which 
influenced responses. In their study on the expansion of jails they conclude that 
whilst judgments have an impact, other ‘jail-specific factors, such as the level of 
overcrowding, and the age of the facility, have an independent impact on 
expansion that may be stronger than the mere presence of a court order.’45  
Accepting the relevance of external factors, consideration of every 
conceivable external factor in a judicial impact study, is impractical. Apart from 
the problem of excluding external factors, the indicators themselves suffer from 
limitations. If one considers this by reference to the use of compliance as an 
indicator, the difficulties become apparent. Wasby points out that compliance 
may not always mean that the courts have had an impact, as the affected party 
may have intended to follow that route before judgment was handed down. He 
also points out that a focus on compliance limits the assessment to a single 
element of impact.
46
 Compliance tells us whether a judgment was given effect to, 
but does not yield information regarding the range of reactions that occur in 
response to a judgment. In addition Wasby states that time is a factor that ought 
to be considered in the measurement of impact.
47
 In the ordinary course of 
implementation practices, there may be a delay between a judgment being 
handed down and implementation. A delayed response is not the same as non-
compliance.  
Apart from the concerns raised by Wasby, compliance indicators cannot 
measure the effect of judgments which confirm existing approaches. (The effect 
in these instances may be, for example, to increase confidence resulting in more 
use of an approach or an increased willingness to approach the courts to resolve 
disputes).  Furthermore, the point of departure of the compliance approach is that 
                                                 
45
 Duncombe and Strausman op cit at 276. 
46
 Ibid at 46. 
47
 Ibid at 55. 
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there ought to be full implementation of a judgment.
48
 It is trite that the courts 
have a particular authority which must be respected. However, it also needs to be 
borne in mind that judges are individuals who are called on to make a decision in 
a dispute based on the arguments which are presented to them. Judgments may at 
times be vague, resulting in difficulties for determining what impact they ought 
to have. In the worst case scenario, the judgment may simply be incorrect, a 
situation which is contemplated by the appeal system. Total compliance with all 
administrative judgments all of the time is described by Halliday as ‘a ludicrous 
notion of judicial review’s potential influence.’49 
In view of the difficulties of using compliance as an indicator, Wasby 
commented that it might be that ‘we can isolate impact effectively only where 
there is direct and obvious (visible) resistance to a court decision, and that the 
only impact we can study precisely is clear non-compliance.’50 The result is that 
there is no accepted approach to the precise measurement of impact, and most 
findings on impact must be qualified.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to resolve the conundrum. This thesis 
seeks to explore receptivity to judgments and the way in which judgments have 
influenced behaviour. Underlying that purpose is also the desire to know whether 
officials respect the role of the courts, have internalised democratic approaches, 
and strive to align their practices with the dictates of judgments.  
Precise measurement of impact is not necessary to achieve that objective. 
Rather, the study aims to provide a qualitative perspective on whether the court 
has some effect on officials.  Accordingly, the thesis identifies a range of 
responses that follow judgments. The establishment of general impact is based 
on the following propositions – 
i. if there is no institutional knowledge of judgments, there is no 
widespread organisational impact; 
                                                 
48
 Ibid at 43. 
49
 Halliday op cit at 16. Note that concerns regarding the adoption of compliance as an 
indicator of impact do not imply that compliance indicators have no place in impact 
measurement. Rather, it is argued that compliance should be considered as an indicator, rather 
than the indicator. 
50
 Wasby op cit at 35-36. 
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ii. if there is limited individual knowledge of judgments, there may be 
localised impact;  
iii. if there is knowledge of judgments and there is no change or 
consequence that can be identified, or defiance is identified, then 
there is either neutral or negative impact; and 
iv. if there is knowledge of judgments, and some form of influence or 
response related to judgments is identified, there is positive 
impact.  
This qualitative approach reduces the need to identify precise cause and 
effect relationships because officials’ articulation of responses and formal 
evidence – to the extent that it exists – is sufficient to tell us something about the 
courts’ influence on behaviour and why officials respond as they do. For the 
purposes of the fourth proposition, the types of responses that were considered are 
set out in the table below. 
 
Table 2-1 Potential Responses to Judgments 
 
POSITIVE / LAWFUL 
RESPONSES 
NEGATIVE 
RESPONSES 
OTHER 
   
 Law reform 
 Policy change 
 Decision-making 
changes consistent with 
judicial requirements 
 Administrative responses 
 Institutional changes 
 Delayed responses ie a 
‘think twice’ approach is 
applied to subsequent 
decisions 
 Improvement in quality 
of decision-making 
 Appeals 
 Law reform 
 Policy change (or no 
policy change) 
 No change to decision-
making 
 Administrative 
responses 
 Institutional changes 
 Creative compliance ie 
there is formal 
compliance but the 
intent of the judgment 
is not given effect to 
 No change as a result 
of defiance 
 Misdirected 
response through 
misinterpretation 
 No change as a 
result of lack of 
knowledge 
 No change as a 
result of inertia 
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2.3 Underlying approaches to judicial impact studies 
Apart from differing views on the concept of impact, judicial impact studies 
have also been underpinned by diverging theoretical approaches. Most studies 
have been based on positivist theory or interpretative theory. The preference for 
using either approach appears to have been influenced by the academic discipline 
of the researcher and the focus of the study. Most legally-orientated researchers 
who conducted administrative studies adopted a positivist approach; whereas 
many social scientists have opted for an interpretative approach to their policy 
studies.
51
 The sections below describe the key considerations and constraints 
which emerge when adopting either methodology.  
 
2.3.1 Positivist approaches  
Sunkin states that proponents of the positivist approach aim objectively to 
establish patterns and causal relationships between judgments and government 
responses.
52
 The focus of positivist-based studies is on determining whether 
judgments have an impact by comparing the approach of government before and 
after a judicial decision. Impact is therefore only established when a clear causal 
link between the judgment and the actions of the bureaucracy is demonstrated. 
Positivist studies are accordingly referred to as being ‘top-down’ or ‘court-
centred’ as the point of departure for the research is the identification of one or 
more judgments which are used to determine a benchmark against which impact 
can be assessed. 
One of the most comprehensive early studies which followed the 
positivist approach is Rosenberg’s,53 whose work sparked a debate about the 
limitations of the positivist approach. Critics of the positivist approach such as 
Feeley and McCann, argue that the court-centred approach is flawed. McCann 
perceives a key weakness of the court-centred approach to be that it assumes that 
causality is initiated by the courts.
54
  He argues that causality is in fact initiated 
                                                 
51
 Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday ‘Introduction’ in Hertogh and Halliday (eds) op cit 1.  
52
 Maurice Sunkin ‘Conceptual issues in researching the impact of judicial review on 
government bureaucracies’ in Hertogh and Halliday (eds) op cit 64-68. 
53
 The hollow hope: can courts bring about social change? op cit. 
54 This criticism is explained by McCann in ‘Reform litigation on trial’ (1992) 17 Law and 
Social Inquiry 731.  
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by litigants and that judgments are a response to social struggle or a dispute, and 
not the source of causation.  
A second criticism of the approach is raised by Feeley. In his review of 
Rosenberg’s book, Feeley comments that the court-centred approach is 
vulnerable to the ‘gap problem’.55 He argues that where the formulation of the 
goal of a judgment is misinterpreted and exaggerated, the judgment may appear 
to have  less impact. This occurs where the benchmark against which 
government action is measured is higher than it ought to be. Feeley illustrates his 
point by reference to Rosenberg’s analysis of Brown v Board of Education 
(Brown).
 56
 He contends that the objective of the judgment was to remove the 
legal sanctioning of desegregation in schools, as opposed to securing actual 
integration at schools. In view of this, Feeley argues that Rosenberg’s approach 
to measuring the impact of the decision by determining the percentage of black 
children attending mixed-race schools is not appropriate when assessing whether 
legal segregation had been addressed. Feeley concludes that this flaw may have 
resulted in an interpretation that the impact of the judgment was less than it 
would have been had the goal been correctly identified.
57
 
McCann and Sunkin also argue that the objective approach of establishing 
causal relationships between judgments and government responses ignores the 
range of factors that may contribute to the impact of a judgment.
58
 If the example 
of Brown is used to illustrate this argument, a reliance on the percentage of black 
and white children attending mixed-race schools to determine impact would not 
be appropriate because other factors, such as geographic location and the desire 
of parents to take up the right that was afforded to them by the courts, may result 
in a different interpretation of the extent of the impact.
59
  
                                                 
55 M M Feeley ‘Hollow hopes, flypaper, and metaphors’ (1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry 
745 at 748. 
56
 347 US 483 (1954). 
57
 Garrow supports Feeley’s views on the basis that Rosenberg failed to take social responses 
and comments from community leaders into account. See David J Garrow ‘Hopelessly hollow 
history: Revisionist devaluing of Brown v Board of Education’ (1994 80 Virginia Law 
Review151. 
58McCann ‘Reform litigation on trial’ op cit at 731 and Sunkin ‘Conceptual issues in 
researching the impact of judicial review on government bureaucracies’ op cit at 68. 
59
 See Rosenberg’s response to these criticisms in ‘Hollow hopes and other aspirations: a reply 
to Feeley and McCann’ op cit. 
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The limitations of the positivist theory, insofar as it fails to take into 
account the range of factors that may influence the responses of government to a 
judgment, are accepted. This limitation is particularly relevant where the 
intention of the study is to move beyond examining compliance to understanding 
why there is, or is not, an impact. It will also impede the effective identification 
of solutions for improving impact.  
It is not accepted, however, that the use of a court-centred approach is 
inherently flawed. Where the objective of a study is to understand how 
government responds to judgments in general, the use of a court-centred 
approach provides a useful entry for understanding what government needs to 
respond to. Focusing impact studies on an assessment of a range of empirical 
experiences without an emphasis on judgments is unlikely to provide a clear 
enough framework for assessing the extent to which impacts have occurred. 
 
2.3.2  Interpretivist approaches 
Contrary to the positivists, interpretivists believe that the influence of judgments 
cannot be understood unless the context within which they are handed down is 
analysed.
60
 Interpretivist-based studies accordingly adopt a so-called ‘bottom-up’ 
approach which focuses on understanding the experiences of people, mostly 
outside of the judiciary, who are engaged in a conflict involving societal 
relationships.
61
  
Studies that are based on an interpretivist approach therefore attempt to 
establish how a range of factors influence a social struggle. Intrepretivists derive 
findings and causal links from research based on the experiences of key role-
players.  The consideration of judgments may be one element of such studies, but 
is usually not pivotal.  
As with the positivist approach, the use of the interpretivist approach is 
subject to criticism. In commenting on McCann’s use of the interpretivist 
approach, Rosenberg raises a concern that the validity of McCann’s findings 
cannot be confirmed and that the study does not adequately explain the 
                                                 
60 Sunkin ‘Conceptual issues in researching the impact of judicial review on government 
bureaucracies’ op cit at 68.  
61
 Feeley ‘Hollow hopes, flypaper, and metaphors’ op cit at 731. 
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significance of the court to the outcome.
62
 Riddell raises another concern. He 
states that ‘[b]y emphasizing context and contingency, interpretivist studies are 
limited in developing explanations or predictions that may be put to use in other 
settings’.63 Riddell’s concern is echoed by Halliday who notes that since the 
primary focus of interpretivist studies is to derive meaning from the experiences 
of people, as opposed to directly establishing impact, judgments are not the focus 
of the study. In view of this, he states that ‘[i]f one’s aim is to explore the 
complex ways in which meaning is achieved and the overlapping contexts in 
which social action is performed, then the “impact” of judicial review simply 
cannot be captured.’64 
Halliday’s observation is supported. The interpretivist approach has 
resulted in useful insights regarding the understanding of particular conflicts, 
such as prison reform.
65
 However, where the purpose of a study concerns 
whether judgments impact on government decision-making, a strict adherence to 
the approach is unlikely to provide a clear result because the norms that ought to 
have resulted in an impact, are not necessarily established.  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, there are benefits of adopting the 
approach. In particular, the consideration of factors which influence the reception 
of case law provides a basis for knowledge that is not obtained through the 
positivist approach. This knowledge is necessary to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of impact and to provide informed suggestions regarding changes 
to existing institutional arrangements and practices.  
 
2.3.3 Alternative approaches 
The inadequacies of both the positivist and interpretivist approaches are captured 
by Rosenberg’s comment that ‘[w]hile McCann (and others) find my approach 
too much on the positivist side, I find his approach too much on the interpretivist 
                                                 
62
 G Rosenberg ‘Positivism, interpretivism, and the study of law (1996) Law and Social 
Inquiry 446. 
63
 Riddell op cit at 26. 
64 Hertogh and Halliday ‘Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future research’ op cit  
275 
65
 See, for example, Chilton op cit. 
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side.’66 Some writers like Riddell attempt to avoid the challenges posed by the 
two approaches by adopting a new institution methodology. Others, recognising 
that both approaches have limitations and yet have much to offer, suggest that 
the two approaches need not be mutually exclusive.
67
 For example, Hertogh and 
Halliday state that – 
… the basic methodological approach for future research [means] that 
interdisciplinary, a combination of approaches and some level of 
methodological pluralism, is required to undertake a comprehensive 
enquiry about judicial review and its impact on bureaucracies.
68
  
In his own research Halliday adopted an approach which relied on aspects 
of both the positivist and interpretivist theory and accordingly describes himself 
as an interpretivist conducting a court-centred research project.
69
 Whilst the point 
of departure for his study was based on judgments, he adopted an interpretivist 
approach to assessing the factors that influenced housing departments’ 
approaches to routine decision-making.  
The primary purpose of Halliday’s study was to provide a framework 
which can be used for researching the effectiveness of judicial review as a 
regulatory mechanism for governmental decision-making. By adopting a 
combined approach, Halliday was able to establish how decisions are made in 
practice, and the interrelationship between judicial review and other influences. 
He was accordingly able to test five hypotheses regarding the conditions that are 
required for impact and to provide some explanation of the barriers to acceptance 
of judgments.   
Halliday’s work illustrates that the use of a combined approach to judicial 
impact studies is an effective methodology for clarifying the reasons behind 
objective findings. The approach yields an additional dimension to the 
knowledge which is required to understand the courts’ impact. Since the 
objective of this study was to determine not only whether the court has had an 
impact on government decision-making, but also why it has - or has not - had an 
impact, it was necessary to both establish a benchmark against which impact can 
                                                 
66
 Rosenberg ‘Hollow hopes and other aspirations: a reply to Feeley and McCann’op cit at 
455. 
67
 McCann ‘Reform litigation on trial’ op cit at 743. 
68
 Hertogh and Halliday ‘Judicial review and bureaucratic impact in future research’ op cit 
277. 
69
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be assessed and to understand the range of factors that influence government’s 
responses to judicial control. Halliday’s combined approach was accordingly a 
convenient point of departure and had the benefit of enabling certain of his 
hypotheses to be tested in non-routine decision-making situations and in the 
context of a developing country with a legal system that has recently been 
transformed. 
There are, however, a number of variations in focus and methodology 
apart from those identified in Chapter 1. Halliday readily admitted that his 
research was not exhaustive and that other barriers could be considered. This 
thesis similarly does not claim to consider all relevant factors that may have an 
influence on impact. However, it does identify and explore further barriers such 
as language and institutional experience. In addition, the techniques used in 
analysing empirical data in this study are influenced by systems thinking. The 
underlying systems thinking perspective resulted in the enquiry being expanded 
from a primary focus on the consideration of barriers, to a focus on both barriers 
and enhancers of impact. It also resulted in greater emphasis being placed on 
identifying the way in which different factors operate and the multidirectional 
pressure which they exert on responses to judgments.  
A further point to be made on approach is that, although several writers 
have pointed out that the nature of impacts that occur in response to judgments 
may vary,
70
 the literature review revealed no significant attempts to describe the 
range of potential impacts on the basis of empirical analysis. This thesis 
accordingly includes a preliminary identification of the types of impacts 
contemplated in table 2.1 above that occurred in response to judgments. 
 
2.4 Selection of judgments  
A consideration only of milestone judgments that find against existing 
government practices would not meet the requirements of the study since it is 
unlikely to result in an understanding of the response of the environmental 
departments to judicial control as a whole.  That is because so-called milestone 
                                                 
70
 McCann ‘Reform Litigation on Trial’ op cit at 715 at 733 and Simon Halliday ‘The influence of 
judicial review on bureaucratic decision-making’ Spring 2000 Public Law 110 at 122.  
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judgments tend to have bigger implications for government and the response to 
the judgments is therefore likely to be more pronounced. Whilst reactions to 
these judgments result in findings in respect of the impact of the judgment in 
question, they are not necessarily representative of the overall impact of judicial 
control on a government department. The case analysis in this study accordingly 
considered a broad range of civil environmental judgments that were handed 
down by the superior courts from 1995 to 2007, including those that found in 
favour of government and against government.  
In order to identify relevant judgments, a preliminary identification of 
cases was done by searching for obvious references in the South African Law 
Reports, Juta’s Statutes of South Africa and by sourcing judgments in respect of 
which there had been personal knowledge. This search yielded a relatively small 
sample of judgments. The search was then systematically expanded on the 
Butterworths Lexis Nexis and Sabinet databases to include additional unreported 
judgments (including those marked not-reportable). The number of search 
criteria was also increased.
71
 A limitation of the expanded search was that 
unreported judgments are only captured in these databases from 1997.  
The expanded search increased the number of identified judgments 
substantially. A screening exercise was then performed. Several of the cases that 
fell within the search could be considered to be environmental matters on the 
basis that they dealt with water issues and pollution from mines. However, the 
primary legislation regulating water and mining was not administered by 
environmental departments at the time and follows a different regulatory 
regime.
72
 These cases were accordingly excluded from the scope of the study 
unless reference was made to legislation which was administered by the 
environmental departments.  
Litigation between private parties was included, as a preliminary review 
of these judgments indicated that they often relate to issues for which the 
                                                 
71
 See Donald R Songer ‘Case selection in judicial impact research’ (1998) 41 3 The Western 
Political Quarterly 569 at 569 – 582 for a discussion on considerations that should be taken into 
account in the identification of relevant case law. 
72
 Since the conclusion of the fieldwork, the national environmental department has been 
combined with the Department of Water Affairs. At present, the two components still operate 
largely independently. 
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environmental departments had regulatory authority. The outcome of these cases 
was therefore potentially relevant to the departments. Judgments which related 
only to departmental operational aspects, such as the awarding of tenders, were 
also excluded because these judgments do not have direct implications for the 
administration of substantive environmental matters. 
The final number of judgments that was identified for inclusion in the 
study was 81.
73
 Of these, two a quo judgments could not be sourced.
74
 They were 
however included in the statistical analysis because there was sufficient 
information in the appeal judgment to extract the relevant statistics.
75
 
 
2.5 Choice of research subjects 
Environment is a concurrent governmental function, shared largely between 
national government and the nine provinces. The inclusion of the national 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (‘national department’ or 
‘DEAT’) and all of the nine provincial environmental departments was 
impractical. The study is accordingly geographically limited by confining the 
assessment of impacts to three government departments, namely, DEAT, the 
Gauteng Provincial Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment 
(Gauteng environmental department) and the Eastern Cape Provincial 
                                                 
73
 A full list of the cases is set out in the Table of Cases.  
74
 The two judgments were M&J Morgan Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Pinetown 
Municipality & Others and Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association & Others v Minister of 
Public Works and Others. In  two instances separate applications were combined in one 
judgment, namely Muckleneuk/ Lukasrand Property Owners and Residents Association v The 
MEC Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Others and Muckleneuk/ Lukasrand Property Owners and Residents 
Association v The HOD: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Others [2007] 4 All SA 1265 (T) and Thomas t/a Elandskraal 
Garage v Head, Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Tourism, North 
West Province  and Thomas t/a Elandskraal Garage v De Gouveia and Others (TPD) Case No 
27858/06 and 36972/06 24 October 2007, unreported. The separate applications were not 
counted individually. 
75
 Where the date of a judgment of the court a quo was not provided estimates of the year of 
judgment were made, with a reasonable confidence of accuracy, on the basis of knowledge of the 
minimum timeframes required for an appeal to be processed. 
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Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (Eastern Cape 
environmental department).
76  
 
2.5.1 Motivation and criteria for including the national department in the 
study 
The inclusion of DEAT in the scope of the study is considered to be important 
because the department has certain characteristics and functions that differ from 
the provincial departments. Apart from being responsible for making 
environmental decisions, DEAT has the power to set national environmental 
norms and standards for the country. It is also responsible for co-coordinating 
environmental matters between the other spheres of government and has an 
obligation to support other spheres of government in their execution of 
environmental functions.  
The way in which DEAT responds to judicial control in its development 
of legislation and support to the different spheres of government therefore has an 
influence beyond the activities of the department. In addition, DEAT provides an 
opportunity to assess the implications of a mature institutional system on the 
approach to judicial control since it has been responsible for discharging an 
environmental function for many years prior to 1994, albeit in a different form.  
 
2.5.2 Motivation and criteria for including provincial environmental 
departments in the study 
Provincial departments are included in the study because the majority of 
environmental cases in which a government department was a party during the 
study period involved the provinces. It was initially speculated that this increased 
exposure to litigation might result in greater awareness of judicial requirements. 
If correct, the study would benefit from this awareness as it would increase the 
potential for an exploration of the range of factors that influence the reception of 
case law by the departments.  
                                                 
76
 The names of the national department and Gauteng environmental department have 
changed. For convenience, the names by which they were known during the study period are 
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Some of the provincial departments also process a far greater number of 
applications involving non-routine decisions than DEAT. For example, during 
the period July 2006 to September 2008 DEAT received 641 applications for 
EIA authorisation compared to the 1 528 which were received by the Gauteng 
department.
77
 There is accordingly more opportunity for the departments to apply 
the requirements of case law in their decision-making. Also, since the provincial 
environmental departments were only established in 1994, an assessment of these 
departments provided insights regarding the ability of relatively new institutions 
to respond to judicial control.  
Three criteria were considered in selecting the provinces to be included in 
the study. The overarching criterion related to the need for a high level of co-
operation and participation by the departments. The second criterion related to 
the capacity and environmental pressures of the departments. The capacity and 
environmental pressures between the provinces differ substantially. Inclusion of 
departments in the study with different capacity constraints potentially facilitated 
the greatest insight to the factors which influence the reception of judicial control 
in the provinces.
78
  
Finally, consideration was given to the provincial departments’ exposure 
to litigation. The depth and range of information that can be obtained from 
departments with no direct exposure to litigation would be limited and would 
afford less opportunity for understanding the factors that influence government 
responses to judicial control. It was accordingly decided to exclude provincial 
departments that had no direct exposure to litigation from 1995 to 2007. 
The Gauteng and Eastern Cape departments met these three criteria.  Both 
departments have been involved in litigation and both offered their co-operation 
in the research process. Furthermore, the institutional pressures and 
environmental issues differ between the departments.  
                                                 
77
 E-mail communication received from the national department dated 13 January 2009. 
78
 See Aynsley Kellow and Simon Niemeyer ‘The development of environmental 
administration in Queensland and Western Australia: why are they different’ (1999) 34 2 
Australian Journal of Political Science 205 where the research revealed that geographical, 
socio-economic and cultural factors contributed to differences in institutional and policy 
approaches.  
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Gauteng is the smallest province in South Africa. It is also the most 
industrialised province and contributes 33,3 per cent of the gross domestic 
product – more than double that of any other province. Its population of 
approximately 9.5 million people is highly heterogeneous and is 97 per cent 
urbanised.
79
 (Gauteng is expected to become one of the largest metropolitan 
settlements in the world by 2015).
80
 The Gauteng environmental department is 
institutionally compact and operates from one centralised office. The primary 
environmental issues facing the department relate to the impact of increasing 
urbanisation (often informal housing) and industrialisation and depletion of 
natural resources.
81
  
By contrast, the Eastern Cape  is the second largest province in South 
Africa and  is mostly rural . The province is the poorest in the country, 
contributing only 8.1 per cent of the gross domestic product.
82
 Its population of 
nearly seven million people is homogenous with the majority (83 per cent) 
speaking Xhosa.
83
 The Eastern Cape environmental department has faced 
different institutional challenges to Gauteng because the public administration 
incorporated structures from the previous Transkei and Ciskei homelands as well 
as the eastern part of the Cape Province. The geographical extent of the province 
has resulted in the department establishing one head office and several regional 
offices. Some of the department’s environmental priorities, such as soil 
degradation, relate to the legacy of the homelands policy and ensuing poverty.
84
 
Others relate to the province’s extremely high biodiversity significance - it has 
the highest number of biomes (seven) of any of the provinces.
85
 The province is 
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 Statistics South Africa Mid-year population estimates, 2007 (Statistical Release P0302). 
Available at  www.statsonlibne.gov.za/publication/P0302/P03022007 [accessed 19 January 2010]. 
80
 Ndaba Dlamini ‘Gauteng on track to global city-region’. Available at 
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not identified as an area of concern for industrially related environmental 
issues.
86
  
 
2.6 Interview process  
The gathering of data necessary to understand responses to judicial control was 
primarily obtained by means of an interview process. Interviews were chosen 
over other methodologies such as participant observation for pragmatic reasons. 
Most environmental decisions are made in a series of staccato steps involving a 
number of officials over a period of up to two or three years. It would therefore 
have been difficult to obtain a clear and comprehensive sense of how judgments 
were, or were not, considered in the context of individual decisions from 
participant observation within the time available for the field study.  
A potential limitation of choosing an interview process over methods such 
as participant observation was that it would yield less reliable information because 
the subsequent findings rely on the interviewees’ articulated responses rather than 
an assessment of their actions. In this instance the potential significance of such a 
limitation was diluted by two circumstances directly related to the context of the 
study. Firstly, many of the questions were aimed at eliciting responses regarding 
how officials had (already) responded to judgments rather than how they would 
hypothetically respond to such judgments. It was therefore possible to conduct 
some verification by considering the consistency of responses amongst 
interviewees to those questions. It was also sometimes possible to verify responses 
by reference to documented material. 
Secondly, my previous experience in the departments’ policy and decision-
making activities is relevant. For example, my involvement in reviewing EIA 
decisions for the Gauteng environmental department and training officials on the 
implementation of the EIA Regulations and compliance and enforcement 
requirements gave me an intimate understanding of the decision-making process, 
including many of the debates and dynamics involved in decision-making, and the 
capacity constraints of officials. In addition, there were occasions where a 
judgment was handed down at a time when I was actively involved in a project for 
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one of the departments. In these instances I was exposed to the ensuing 
discussions about the judgment. Whilst this experience could not be raised in the 
interview sessions without influencing responses, I was able to draw on it in the 
analysis of the data to add perspective where necessary.
87
  
Interviews were sought with at least 15 officials in each department. Two 
criteria for participation were identified. Firstly, the official had to have at least 
two years experience in an environmental department. Secondly, the final 
selection of interviewees in each department needed to be representative of 
different ranks. The first criterion presented difficulties because of high staff 
turnover rates. Apart from this resulting in the total number of interviews being 
reduced to 39, it also undermined the intention of getting a consistently 
representative selection of interviewees from different ranks across the three 
departments. This constraint impeded the ability to undertake a comparative 
analysis of responses by officials between the departments. Such an analysis may 
have provided additional information about how different factors influence 
acceptance decisions. 
Because much of the litigation discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 related to 
EIA decisions and compliance and enforcement, the selection also focused on 
officials involved in those processes. Officials who were ultimately interviewed 
were selected through the use of both purposive and snowball (referral) 
techniques. In this regard, requests were made both for interviews with specific 
officials who were known to have had exposure to litigation and to senior 
management to identify additional officials who met the interviewee criteria.  
The interview process was not intended to be a neutral survey but an 
exploration of both the subjective and objective factors that influence officials’ 
reception of judgments. With the relatively limited time available for each 
interview, the objective of the interviews would not have been achieved without 
knowledge of the judgments and the administrative processes. I accordingly 
elected to conduct the interviews myself.  
That decision presented some risk that my presence in the interviews could 
unintentionally influence some official’s responses because of my relationship 
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with the departments.
88
 In practice the effect of the risk on the reliability of the 
data was mitigated by several factors. The high turnover of officials at junior 
levels, which is discussed in subsequent chapters, meant that few of those officials 
were aware of my relationship with the departments. For example, in the Gauteng 
environmental department none of the junior officials was incumbent at the time 
that I acted against the post of Director: Legal Services in the department. They 
also gave no indication that they knew about my involvement in the development 
of the guideline which became the subject of several cases discussed later in this 
thesis.  
By contrast, I have had a relationship with many of the senior officials for a 
number of years. They are undeniably aware of both the work that I have done for 
the departments and my views on law and policy. In interviews with these officials 
I found that, precisely because I had a previous relationship with them and 
because many of the questions sought their opinion as opposed to what they 
understood the legally correct position to be, they were comfortable to point out 
where they disagreed with what they assumed to be the ‘correct’ response as a 
continuum of previous debates. They also often exhibited a clear interest in 
ensuring that I understood the difficulties of reconciling legal requirements with 
practical constraints. In addition, possibly because of the history of interactions 
that I had had with the senior officials and my understanding of the institutional 
dynamics, they were very candid in supplying information about weaknesses and 
dynamics that they may have been tempted to present in a more sanitised way – or 
not at all – to an independent interviewer. It is therefore likely that my relationship 
with the departments had more positive implications for the depth of information 
that was obtained than negative. 
Interviews and follow-up discussions took place between October 2008 
and February 2009. Only cursory information about the purpose of the interview 
was given to the officials beforehand.
 89
 At the beginning of each interview the 
official was advised that the interview results were confidential. Although 
several officials volunteered to waive this protection, I decided to retain it. As a 
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result each interview transcription was coded with a unique reference number. 
Those numbers are not referenced in this thesis because the distinctive language 
and views of some officials, coupled with the fact that there is much interaction 
between officials in the different departments, would sometimes make it possible 
to deduce the source of the comment.  
A questionnaire (attached as Appendix I) was developed to guide the 
interviews. It comprised of a mixture of Likert-scale type questions and open-
ended questions. Responses to the Likert-scale type questions were captured into 
a database using SPSS software and analysed by means of descriptive statistics. 
Responses to open-ended questions were analysed using qualitative methods.  
The aim of the Likert-scale type questions was to collect data on a range 
of issues in a form that facilitated analysis of trends amongst officials. For 
example, in Chapter 7, responses to Likert-scale type questions were used to 
make findings regarding the levels of knowledge that officials had of judgments 
and in Chapter 8 responses were used to assess the alignment of officials’ values 
and perceptions with the rights-based approach required by the Constitution. In 
addition, such questions were also used to record the attitudes and perceptions of 
the interviewees before the discussion in response to the open-ended questions 
commenced so that the relationship between the interviewees’ expressed values 
in an abstract context and their reactions in response to a given situation could be 
explored. This approach revealed many areas of consonance. It also revealed 
some dissonance which resulted in findings regarding how factors involved in 
the decision-making process can be more persuasive than the decision-maker’s 
personal preferences.
90
  
The findings referred to above demonstrate the benefits of including 
Likert-scale type questions in an interview process. However such questions also 
have limitations. They generally provide little information about why 
interviewees select the responses that they do. Apart from this limiting the depth 
of the analysis, it can also result in misleading findings where a particular 
question is interpreted differently by interviewees as it is difficult to detect that 
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the responses arise out of varied interpretations.
91
 In view of these limitations, 
the Likert-scale type questions were supplemented with open-ended questions 
and interviewees were also offered the opportunity to explain their answers to the 
Likert-scale type questions.  
I conducted all of the interviews in English – a second or third language 
for many interviewees. It was anticipated that this would have a negligible 
influence on responses because English is widely used in government business. 
However, during the interviews proficiency in English was sometimes found to 
be lower than expected. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The preceding sections outline some of the complexities involved in 
judicial impact studies as well as the approach and consequential limitations of 
this thesis. An aspect that has not yet been discussed in detail is the bearing that 
the judicial and legislative context had on the approach. As discussed previously, 
Cane argues that in judicial impact studies judicial review must be ‘studied in a 
contextualised way’ because the objectives and functions of judicial review differ 
between jurisdictions and affect both the types of questions which are explored 
and the approach which is adopted.
92
 Whilst Cane’s comments were made in the 
context of judicial review, his comments are equally applicable to the expanded 
types of legal actions considered in this study. The next chapter accordingly 
provides an overview of the constitutional and legislative changes that occurred in 
South Africa after its transition to democracy.  
 
 
                                                 
91
 This limitation may be particularly evident in situations where questions are posed in a language that 
is not the first language of all interviewees. See the discussion in Chapter 8.2.3 for an example of a 
question being interpreted differently by officials. 
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3. Environmental public administration 
redefined: the emergence of rights-
based environmental legislation and 
judicial decision-making 
 
Since 1994 both environmental law and the way in which judges must make 
decisions in South Africa have changed significantly. The introduction of the 
rights-based approach in the Constitution and the requirements of subsequently 
promulgated legislation have had far-reaching implications for the way in which 
government departments execute the environmental function. They have had 
equally significant implications for the scope of the judiciary to adjudicate 
environmental disputes that arise in respect of government’s exercise of power 
and the way in which judges must make decisions on th se disputes. The 
sections below provide a brief explanation of the scale of these changes as 
background to the analyses that are set out in the following chapters.  
 
3.1 Transformation of the judiciary 
South Africa had a relatively consistent superior court structure from 
1910 until 1994.
93
 For some time after 1910 there was a strong perception that 
the courts acted independently and were effective in controlling the abuse of 
state power - especially where it intruded on individual freedom. Judgments by 
the Appellate Division in the 1950’s which struck down certain apartheid 
legislative and executive acts certainly contributed to this perception.
94
  
However, this perception was incrementally eroded after the National 
Party came to power in 1948, after which government undermining of judicial 
independence increased steadily.
95
 It vigorously pursued the implementation of 
apartheid and sought to control all sources of potential hindrance, including the 
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 H Corder ‘Judicial authority in a changing South Africa’ (March 2004) 24 1-1 Legal Studies 
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1952(2) SA 428 (AD) in which the AD declared legislation removing coloured males from the 
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 For an overview of the courts’ conduct during this period see Dennis Davis and Michelle le 
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courts. An important aspect of this control was that the courts had to exercise 
their powers within the context of parliamentary sovereignty. This limited the 
courts’ powers of review, especially where Parliament included so-called ouster 
clauses in legislation which prevented the courts from reviewing executive 
actions.
96
  
Unsurprisingly in the circumstances, most writers who analysed the 
attitude of the judiciary under National Party rule concluded that a perception of 
the judiciary as an independent protector of people’s rights was flawed.97 Corder, 
for example, states that from the 1960s onwards there was ‘ever more abject 
abandonment by the courts of the basic tenets of justice in the face of legislated 
injustice and tyranny. 
98
 Far from being rights-based, the attitude of the judiciary 
during the apartheid era was generally pro-executive and restrictive in respect of 
individual freedom.
99
 
By the time constitutional negotiations started in the early 1990’s 
negotiators faced the challenge of providing a basis for a credible and independent 
judiciary. The constitutional principles set out in Schedule 4 of the interim 
Constitution
100
 show that the negotiators of the interim Constitution were clearly 
aware of this. The principles reflect the need to provide for a separation of powers 
between the different branches of government as well as the transformation of 
both the court structure and attitude of judges. 
101
 
Both the int rim Constitution, which operated from 1994 until early 1997, 
and the final Constitution (the Constitution)
102
 give effect to these principles. The 
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 Corder ‘Judicial authority in a changing South Africa’ op cit at 255. 
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 See, for example, H Corder Judges at work: the role and attitudes of the South African 
Appellate judiciary, 1910-50 (1984) and C Forsyth In danger for their talents: a study of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa from 1950-80 (1985). 
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 Corder ‘Judicial authority in a changing South Africa’ op cit at 256. 
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 M Olivier ‘The role of judicial officers in transforming South Africa’ (2001) 118 SALJ 457 and 
R Wacks ‘Judges and injustice’ (1984) 101 SALJ 266. Submissions by several judges to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission show that they believe that perceptions of the bench as being 
executively minded are overly harsh. See, for example, J S Smalberger et al ‘Submission on the 
role of the judiciary’ (1998) 115 1 SALJ 42. 
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 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
101
 Principles V, VI and VII. 
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challenge of addressing the independence of the judiciary is underpinned by a 
change from parliamentary supremacy to the supremacy of the Constitution.
103
 
The Constitution is now the highest source of control over the structure and 
conduct of the judiciary.  
Both Constitutions also reinforce the requirement for judicial 
independence. For example, section 165 of the Constitution
104
 states that judicial 
authority is vested in the courts
105
 and that the courts are independent and subject 
only to the Constitution and the law ‘which they must apply impartially and 
without fear, favour or prejudice.’106 An additional safeguard is provided in 
subsections (3) and (4) which prohibit any person or organ of state from 
interfering with the courts and require all people to assist and protect the courts’ 
independence.
107
  
The interim Constitution also prescribed a superior court structure which 
is confirmed in the final Constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), is 
the highest court of appeal on non-constitutional matters.
108
 Its decisions are 
binding on the provincial divisions and the lower courts. The provincial 
divisions, renamed High Courts, comprise of ten provincial divisions and three 
local divisions. Perhaps because f cynicism about the conduct of the SCA in the 
past, or perhaps simply to emphasise the importance of the Constitution, the 
interim Constitution added a new court, the Constitutional Court, to the superior 
court structure. The Constitutional Court is the highest authority on all 
constitutional matters, including on whether a matter is constitutional or not. 
109
 It 
is entitled to both hear appeals from other courts and matters brought to it 
directly. The court’s decisions are binding on all other courts .110  
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 Sections 1(c) and 2 of the Constitution. 
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 Section 96 of the interim Constitution.  
105
 Section 165(1). 
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 Section 165(2).  
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 The Constitution also provides for the redress of the representivity of the judiciary and provides 
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The changes imposed by the Constitution lay a foundation for re-
establishing the credibility of the courts. In particular, the reassertion of 
separation of powers is constitutionally protected from interference by the 
Executive and Parliament. 
 
3.2 Changes in the scope for judicial intervention 
Apart from affirming the independence of the judiciary, the interim and final 
Constitutions also expanded the potential for judicial intervention. This 
expansion arises from the new powers and duties of the courts, a reformed 
approach to access to the courts as well as the scope of environmental matters 
that may be taken to court. 
The change in the power of the courts stems from the Bill of Rights set 
out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.
111
 The rights include a range of substantive 
rights which have a bearing on the administration of the environment, including 
the environmental right itself
112
 (discussed below), the right to property,
113
 the 
right to healthcare, food, water and social security
114
 and the right to equality.
115
  
These rights apply to all law and actions, and bind the legislature, 
executive, judiciary and organs of state.
116
 Not only does this mean that the court 
has the power to assess whether legislation is constitutional, it also means that it 
can review the conduct of government against the requirements of the rights. For 
instance, activities by government which pollute the environment or decisions by 
government to authorise pollution of the environment are now a constitutional 
matter which can be tested against the environmental right. 
The application of the Bill of Rights also has implications for the way in 
which the courts exercise their judicial function. The courts are obliged to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any 
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legislation or when developing the common law.
117
 In other words, the common 
law and ‘…all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the Bill of 
Rights.
118
 The court must now make decisions on environmental matters in the 
expanded context of the environmental right. 
In addition to the substantive rights, the constitution contains several 
procedural rights which are relevant. The most important of these relate to the 
legal standing (locus standi) to initiate legal proceedings and to administrative 
justice. These rights are discussed in more detail below because of their 
importance to environmental litigation. 
 
3.2.1 Legal standing 
In order to bring an action before the courts, the person bringing the action must 
be able to demonstrate that they have the requisite legal standing to do so. Under 
the common law an applicant established locus standi by demonstrating both the 
legal capacity to litigate and a direct interest in the relief that was applied for.
119
 
The interpretation of locus standi requirements by the courts has traditionally 
been very narrow and presented a significant obstacle to environmental litigants 
as people were not able to bring an action purely on the basis of the public 
interest. The public therefore had no capacity to bring an action on the basis that 
it was in the public interest to stop a contravention of a law.
120
 
The Constitution changed the approach to locus standi. Section 38 
dramatically expands the potential range of litigants who can approach the courts 
to enforce the environmental right. In addition to entitling any person to enforce 
the right on their own behalf, it provides for class actions and litigation purely in 
the public interest.  A theoretical constraint of the section is that it only applies in 
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 L Baxter Administrative Law (1984) 649. 
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 R Fuggle and M Rabie Environmental management in South Africa (1992) 132 - 133. The 
President’s Council, which was commissioned to consider environmental management in South 
Africa, described the courts’ narrow approach as effectively excluding or at least discouraging 
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respect of actions based on an infringement of one of the constitutional rights.  
However, the constraint should not apply to environmental legislation as all 
environmental legislation is linked to the environmental right. To the extent that 
the constraint does exist in respect of legislation, it is addressed by the National 
Environmental Management Act, 1998
121
 (NEMA) (discussed below) which 
contains a specific provision on legal standing.
122
 That provision grants locus 
standi to the categories of people listed in the constitutional right as well as to 
anyone acting in the interests of the environment
123
 who initiates litigation with 
the purpose of enforcing any environmental legislation.
124
 In other instances 
where the common law principles of locus standi apply, the courts are obliged to 
develop the common law in accordance with section 38.
125
  
 
3.2.2 Administrative justice 
Prior to the interim and final Constitutions administrative law was based on the 
common law. Although audi alteram partem
126
 and the powers of the court to 
review administrative decisions were part of the common law, the common law 
was subordinate to Parliament. Parliamentary supremacy was a serious obstacle 
to securing administrative justice as Parliament could decide the extent to which 
the common law should be accepted or curtailed.
127
 The exercise of these powers 
by Parliament through numerous Acts resulted in a pervasive culture of secretive 
and unaccountable public administration.  
This position changed with the inclusion of a right to administrative 
justice in the Constitution.
128
 Section 33 provides that every person is entitled to 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action as well as written 
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reasons for decisions which adversely affect them. Mureinik describes the 
importance of the Constitution  as follows – 
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it 
is clear what it must be a bridge to. It must lead to a culture of 
justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected 
to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on 
the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions; not the fear 
inspired by the force at its command. The new order must be a 
community built on persuasion, not coercion.
129
 
The operation of the right to administrative justice was subject to 
transitional arrangements.
130
 In terms of these arrangements alternate wording of 
the right applied until the promulgation of specific legislation to give effect to it. 
The envisaged legislation was promulgated in the form of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (PAJA).
131
  
PAJA establishes minimum requirements for fair administrative 
procedures and the furnishing of reasons. As constitutionally mandated 
legislation, these provisions prevail over the administration of other legislation 
which is silent on process or which is incompatible with PAJA.
132
 The 
application of PAJA to government decisions affecting the environment 
increases the ability of the public to challenge those decisions through the courts. 
Such challenges are facilitated by the grounds on which the courts can review an 
administrative action, namely where – 
(a) the administrator who took it – 
(i) was not authorised to do so by the empowering 
provision; 
(ii) acted under a delegation of power which was not 
authorised by the empowering provision; or 
(iii) was biased or reasonably suspected of bias; 
(b)  a mandatory or material procedure or condition prescribed by 
an empowering provision was not complied with; 
(c) the action was procedurally unfair; 
(d) the action was materially influenced by an error of law; 
(e) the action was taken – 
                                                 
129
 Mureinik, E ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
130
 Schedule 6, s 23. The right of access to information was also subjected to similar transitional 
arrangements. 
131
 Act 3 of 2000. 
132
 PAJA permits other legislation to prescribe fair but different procedures if they are compatible 
with the right to administrative justice. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
49 
 
(i) for a reason not authorised by the empowering 
provision; 
(ii) for an ulterior purpose or motive; 
(iii) because irrelevant considerations were taken into 
account or relevant considerations were not considered; 
(iv) because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of 
another person or body; 
(v) in bad faith; or 
(vi) arbitrarily or capriciously; 
(f)  the action itself – 
(i) contravenes a law or is not authorised by the 
empowering provision; or 
(ii) is not rationally connected to – 
(aa) the purpose for which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator; 
(g)  the action consists of a failure to take a decision; 
(h)   the exercise of the power of the performance of the function 
authorised by the empowering provision, in pursuance of 
which the administrative action was purportedly taken, is so 
unreasonable that no person could have so exercised the 
power or performed the function; or 
(i)  the action is otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.133 
The inclusion of elements of reasonableness and rationality in the list of grounds 
widens the review powers of the court. They come close to empowering the court 
to consider the merits of an administrative decision – an area in which the court 
has traditionally shown deference. (Prior to 1994 the courts refused to consider the 
reasonableness of a decision unless it was grossly unreasonable ‘to so striking a 
degree as to warrant the inference’ that the decision-maker abused his or her 
discretion).
134
 
The extensive list of grounds also makes it difficult to contemplate any 
administrative action which is not capable of being reviewed by the courts. 
PAJA’s requirements in respect of public participation and the certainty of the 
scope of the courts’ powers of review accordingly facilitate environmental 
litigation. Challenges to environmental decisions based on PAJA carry 
potentially significant consequences for government as section 8 entitles the 
courts to ‘grant any order that is just and equitable’. Such orders may include 
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setting aside, correcting and substituting decisions as well as interdicts and 
declaratory orders.
135
  
South Africa’s current constitutional setting reflects elements of more 
than one of the constitutional models described by Cane. The scope of the right 
to administrative justice, for example, suggests an approach which is more 
closely aligned with that of the United Kingdom than Australia.
136
 However the 
constitutional imperative to redress the imbalances of the past and to create a 
more just society results in the role of the judiciary also assuming a pronounced 
public interest dimension. To the extent that it supports a more interventionist 
judiciary, it has some commonality with India.
137
 
 
3.3 The reform of environmental law 
Historically, environmental laws were passed reactively in response to perceived 
problems and focused on issues such as hunting, agricultural practices and public 
health matters.
138
 Environmental legislation consequently developed in a 
piecemeal manner. It was nevertheless prolific and by 1991 was contained in 
more than 140 Acts.
139
 Despite the vast number of laws, the legislation lacked a 
cohesive environmental jurisprudence.
140
 The emergence of an environmental 
jurisprudence was impeded by several factors, including the fact that 
environmental concerns did not enjoy a high political priority and that the 
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 Cane op cit at 17 – 30. It is not suggested that the courts routinely depart from the principle 
of judicial deference. Furthermore, although Australia has several administrative law review 
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administration of environmental legislation was spread across most government 
departments, including those whose primary mandate often conflicted with 
environmental protection.
141
  
Apartheid policies further retarded the development of environmental law. 
During the 1970s and 1980s when environmental law was developing rapidly in 
the international context, South Africa was politically isolated. It was, for 
example, excluded from United Nations General Assembly meetings and did not 
participate in United Nations Environment Programme activities until 1994. As a 
result, the influence of international trends on national environmental law was 
limited and by 1992 this isolation resulted in environmental law being up to 
twenty years behind developed countries.
142
 
Apartheid also directly distorted the realisation of environmental objectives 
for the majority of South Africans.
143
 Legislation, albeit outdated, was in place to 
provide for conservation and management of pollution from industry. But during 
the period of economic and technological sanctions much needed revenue and 
foreign currency was generated by some of the most polluting mining and 
industrial operations. In these circumstances the government favoured income 
over enforcement of serious envir nmental contraventions.
144
  
Discriminatory administrative practices and legislation such as that 
regulating land tenure, also directly contributed to severe environmental 
injustices. Black townships in urban areas were often inappropriately located 
adjacent to significant sources of pollution such as factories, mines and waste 
                                                 
141
 For example, the department responsible for mining had a mandate to promote mining which 
usually conflicted with the requirements of environmental protection. This often resulted in severe 
environmental degradation. Many mining activities led to the over exploitation of water resources. 
In Gauteng this resulted in numerous farms becoming unviable. Government, however, placed a 
higher priority on mining and did not prevent this over exploitation. See E Van Eeden 
‘Waterkwessies, met spesifieke verwysing na die uitwerking van wateronttrekking op die 
landboubedryf in die Oberholzerdistrik (Carltonville-gebied), 1959 – 1972’ (August 1996) 39  
New Contree 78. 
142
 P Steyn ‘The greening of our past? an assessment of South African environmental 
historiography’. Available at  - environ/histiography/safrica.htm [accessed 
on 22 January].  
143
 The environmental consequences of apartheid also affected neighbouring countries. See 
Alan B Durning Apartheid’s environmental toll (1990) Worldwatch Paper 95 for a discussion 
on the consequences of South Africa’s military activities in Angola and Mozambique. 
144
 Phia Steyn ‘The lingering environmental impact of repressive governance: the 
environmental legacy of the apartheid-era for the new South Africa’ (2005) 2 3 Globalizations 
391. 
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disposal facilities.
145
 These areas were crowded and lacked adequate basic 
services such as water, waste collection and electricity. In 1976 only 15 per cent 
of black townships had waterborne sewerage
146
 and by 1994 more than 57 per 
cent of black South Africans did not have piped water.
147
 Residents of black 
townships accordingly often experienced a double environmental burden through 
exposure to both pollution which they generated, owing to the lack of 
infrastructure, as well as pollution from neighbouring sources. In many instances 
negative health consequences manifested because of this exposure.
148
  
In rural areas black people also experienced environmental hardships. 
Apart from a lack of access to basic services, in some areas forced removals 
occurred to enable the establishment of conservation areas.
149
 In addition the 
homelands were located in environmentally poor areas. Forced overcrowding 
resulted in severe erosion which undermined subsistence activities.
150
  Qwa Qwa, 
which had an agricultural carrying capacity for less than 5 000 people, was home 
to more than 500 000 by 1990 and the Ciskei was estimated to have nine times 
more inhabitants than the land could support in subsistence agriculture.
151
 
Notwithstanding the direct relationship between apartheid policy and 
environmental hardships which the majority of South Africans experienced, 
                                                 
145
 See J Cock and E Koch Going green: people, politics and the environment in South Africa 
(1991) for a discussion on the environmental experiences of black South Africans. See also 
Discussion document towards a white paper on integrated pollution and waste management (1997) 
at s 2.1.4.8 which noted that ‘[t]here is a low level of public trust in waste management decisions 
taken by industry, waste companies and the regulatory authorities. Most waste sites are perceived 
to have been badly located, inadequately designed and poorly operated and controlled.’ 
146
 Peter-John Mason ‘The environment of poverty and the law in South Africa: suggestions to 
solve this urban malaise’ (1994) 5 WUSLR 68. 
147
 Water Supply and Sanitation Policy White Paper (November 1994) 3. The limited access to 
piped water by black South Africans is in stark contrast to other groups who had nearly 100% 
access to piped water. 
148
 See Clive van Horen Counting the social costs: electricity and externalities in South Africa 
(1996) for a discussion on the health impacts associated with air pollution. 
149
 Farieda Khan ‘Environmentalism in South Africa: a socio-political perspective’ (2000) 9 
11 Macalester International 156 at 171. 
150
 Government introduced a policy of ‘betterment planning’ which was aimed at combating 
erosion and protection the environment by changing agricultural practices. The objective behind 
this policy was to limit black urbanisation. See W Beinart ‘Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas 
about development: a Southern African exploration 1900 – 1960’ (October 1984) 11 1 Journal of 
Southern African Studies 52 for a full discussion on the impacts of apartheid policy on soil 
erosion. 
151
 Durning op cit at 13. 
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environmental issues rarely featured in political activities. To the contrary, 
environmental issues often met with hostility because of the traditional focus on 
conservation of the natural environment at the expense of people.
152
 
By the 1980’s there was a shift in government’s approach to 
environmental legislation. In 1982 government promulgated the Environment 
Conservation Act
153
 with the purpose of providing a co-ordinating mechanism 
for the management of all actions that could affect the environment.
154
 For the 
first time, government had adopted framework legislation which reflected the 
need for an expansive approach to environmental management. However, 
contrary to Parliament’s claims that the Act was the most important conservation 
intervention in almost 40 years, the Act could contribute little to changing the 
approach to the public administration of environmental matters.
155
 The potential 
of the Act as an instrument of change was undermined by a provision which 
rendered the Act subordinate to all other national legislation. This provision 
curtailed the ability of officials to use the Act to check environmental 
degradation arising from the continued implementation of apartheid planning or 
the approval and inappropriate siting of polluting activities by other government 
departments.  
Shortly after the promulgation of the Act government began drafting a 
new Environment Conservation Act and subsequently promulgated a second Act 
by the same name in 1989 (discussed below). Government clearly recognised 
that the second Act alone was insufficient to address current environmental 
issues as it requested the President’s Council to make recommendations on 
approaches to environmental management.
156
 
                                                 
152
 Whyte op cit at 12 and Khan op cit. There was an irony to such approaches as it is now 
commonly accepted that alleviating poverty is an important strategy for addressing environmental 
issues. See, for example, Lester R Brown Plan B 3.0: mobilizing to save civilizations (2008) 131 – 
149.  
153
 Act 100 of 1982. 
154
 Preamble to the Act. 
155
 N L Brauteseth An overview of environmental law (1992) 1.4. 
156
 Op cit. The report was the most progressive official document produced at the time and 
contained many recommendations for aligning existing approaches to environmental management 
with international trends. 
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At the same time that government was expanding its policy and legislative 
approach, environmental matters were becoming part of the mainstream political 
struggle.
157
 In the decade leading up to 1994, activism by the so-called rainbow 
coalition of NGOs, trade unions, communities and academics in respect of 
environmental injustices intensified. These efforts tended to shy away from 
conservation issues and focused on raising awareness of issues and impacts that 
people were exposed to routinely in their daily lives.
158
  
The combination of government’s changing attitude, the expansion of the 
environmental agenda to include ‘brown issues’ and the lobbying efforts of the 
rainbow coalition resulted in a prominence being given to the environment in the 
constitutional negotiations.  
 
3.3.1 The constitutional impact on environmental administration 
The Constitution is both a source of environmental law as well as the ultimate 
authority in terms of which environmental law must be developed. The most 
significant provisions for the purposes of this thesis are the environmental right 
and the allocation of functions to the different spheres of government. The 
environmental right states that – 
Everyone has the right - 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that – 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
                                                 
157
 Cock and Koch op cit.   
158
 During this period two specific campaigns were significant. Firstly, NGOs and trade unions 
campaigned against Thor Chemicals’ incineration of waste containing mercury which resulted in 
the death of several workers and extensive contamination of a river that was used by local 
communities for drinking. Secondly, NGOs and community members campaigned against the 
establishment of a hazardous waste site in Chloorkop, a black township. Personal knowledge – 
representative of the trade unions in the Thor Commission of Inquiry and representative of the 
municipality at the Chloorkop townplanning tribunal. See Peter Lukey Health before profits- an 
access guide to trade unions and environmental justice in South Africa (1995) for an overview of 
the rise of the rainbow coalition. 
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development.
159
 
Paragraph (a) of the right confers a substantive entitlement which is 
independent of paragraph (b). It provides a performance criterion against which 
public administration can be measured. Paragraph (b) compels government to 
ensure that ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ are in place to protect the 
environment. Such legislation must be consistent with the right, including the 
requirements of paragraph (iii) which requires the promotion of ‘justifiable 
economic and social development’ ie the principle of sustainable development.160  
Most environmental legislation which existed when the Constitution came 
into effect was thirty or more years’ old and required reform because it had been 
drafted before sustainable development became the accepted approach to 
environmental management. As the legislation was also largely administered at 
the national level of government it was further affected by the constitutional 
allocation of environmental functions.  
In terms of the Constitution, government is comprised of three spheres, 
namely, national, provincial and local government.  Each sphere of government 
has the right to pass and administer environmental law on a matter for which they 
have competence.
161
 Functions related to the environment fall within the 
jurisdiction of all three spheres of government. For example, environment, 
pollution control and soil conservation are matters of concurrent national and 
provincial competence and air pollution and solid waste removal fall within the 
jurisdiction of local government. The administrative fragmentation of 
environmental matters created by the Constitution is undesirable in many 
                                                 
159
 Section 24. (Section 23 of the interim Constitution). 
160
 Sustainable development is an internationally accepted principle of environmental 
management, the objective of which is to establish a balance between development and 
environmental protection. 
161
 The functional areas of competence of the different spheres are set out in Schedules 4 and 5. 
Schedule 4 details those areas which fall within the concurrent competence of national and 
provincial government. Schedule 5 sets out the areas of exclusive provincial legislative 
competence. Both Schedules are divided into Part A and Part B. Part B sets out functions which 
are the responsibility of local government. These functions are subject to certain override and 
monitoring provisions which are not detailed here. 
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respects.
162
 Nevertheless, the supremacy of the Constitution requires that 
environmental legislation is aligned with the functional areas of competence and 
existing legislation had to be reformed to reflect the responsibilities of the 
different spheres of government.  
 
3.3.2 New policy approaches 
After the adoption of the Constitution, the new government embarked on 
numerous policy processes to define its approach to environmental management 
and legislation. The first of these was CONNEPP which was officially initiated in 
1995.
163
 The purpose of CONNEPP was to develop a general environmental 
policy which would provide a platform for new legislation and approaches to 
public administration. As noted in Chapter 1, the process adopted in the 
development of the policy was a substantial departure from past approaches and 
was characterised by extensive participation which aimed to solicit the views of all 
sectors of society. In the Green Paper titled Towards a New Environmental Policy 
for South Africa,
164
 for example, the drafting team comprised of representatives 
from national government, provincial government, business, labour, NGOs and 
community based organisations.
 
 
CONNEPP culminated in the publication of the White Paper on 
Environmental Management Policy for South Africa in May 1998.
165
 The White 
Paper sets out new approaches to environmental management that are underpinned 
by the principle of sustainable development. This is evident from the overarching 
goal of moving ‘from a previous situation of unrestrained and environmentally 
insensitive development to sustainable development with the aim of achieving a 
stable state economy in balance with ecological processes.’166    
                                                 
162
 For example, important ecosystems may straddle more than one political boundary with the 
consequence that different authorities with potentially different approaches are both responsible 
for the administration thereof.  
163
 Some preparatory work had been done prior to 1995. For example, the IDRC (Whyte op cit) 
prepared a background report on environmental issues. 
164
 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism April 1996. Green Papers are discussion 
documents that are used to stimulate input on policy approaches. Final policies are published as 
White Papers. 
165
 GN 749 GG 18894 15 May 1998. 
166
 Ibid at 22. 
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The White Paper identifies a number of principles
167
 that must guide 
government’s implementation of the policy as well as specific activities that are 
required to give effect to the policy. These activities include the reform of 
environmental legislation to address existing deficiencies.  (Deficiencies identified 
in the Green Paper are the fragmentation of legislation, lack of coordination of 
legislation and the need to give effect to the provisions of the Constitution). 
168
 
Sectoral policies were subsequently also developed. The purpose of these 
policies is to amplify the provisions of the White Paper and to determine specific 
policy on integrated pollution and waste management, biodiversity, and coastal 
management. These policies also identified the need for law reform.  
 
3.3.3 Changes to existing legislation 
The adoption of the new policies signalled the eventual demise of the 
Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (ECA). While new legislation was being 
drafted, ECA continued to be a significant source of environmental legislation. 
For example, section 20 created a permitting requirement for the operation of 
waste disposal facilities and prohibitions against dumping which was the primary 
mechanism for regulating waste management until July 2009. ECA also contains 
an important civil enforcement mechanism in section 31A which authorises 
officials to issue directives in respect of activities which have, or may have, a 
significant detrimental impact on the environment.
169
 
ECA was, however, primarily framework legislation and required 
regulations to become fully effective. Since very few regulations had been passed 
by 1994, significant gaps existed in the regulatory framework. A key example was 
the failure to utilise the powers contained in sections 21, 22 and 26. Section 21 
empowered the Minister to identify activities which could have a substantial 
detrimental effect on the environment.  Once an activity was identified, section 22 
required any person who wanted to undertake one of those activities to obtain the 
prior permission of the competent authority (the national or provincial 
                                                 
167
 Chapter 3. The principles include many internationally accepted principles such as cradle-to-
grave responsibility, environmental justice, the precautionary principle and polluter pays. 
168
 Op cit at 22–25. 
169
 At the time of writing this section was still in force. 
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environmental department) after conducting an EIA. Section 26 authorised the 
Minister to make regulations setting out the requirements of the EIA process.   
Together these sections provided an important environmental management 
mechanism as they enabled officials to assess all the environmental impacts of an 
activity before the activity commenced. In the absence of identified activities and 
EIA regulations, officials had no powers to manage all environmental impacts of 
an activity proactively or in a co-ordinated manner. 
Addressing this legislative gap assumed a priority in the law reform 
process and in 1997 the Minister published a list of activities and EIA 
Regulations.
 170
 The EIA Regulations established the process for ensuring that the 
potential impacts and mitigation measures of a proposed activity as well as 
alternatives to the activity were identified and assessed prior to a decision on an 
application.  
In summary the process involved the following steps
171
 - 
1. appointment of an independent consultant to manage the 
process by the applicant; 
2. submission of the application; 
3. consideration of the application by the competent authority and 
a request for the consultant to submit a plan of study for 
scoping or a scoping report without a prior plan of study;
172
  
4. submission and approval of plan of study (if a separate plan was 
requested); 
5. submission of the scoping report; 
6. consideration of the scoping report by the competent authority 
and a – 
                                                 
170
Regulations regarding Activities Identified under Section 21(1) GNR1182, 1183 and 1184 GG 
18261 5 September 1997. 
171
 The Act also contained an exemption provision that was used extensively to adapt the process 
in practice. 
172
 A plan of study for scoping sets out the steps that will be taken in the EIA process. A scoping 
report contains issues and impacts that have been identified.  
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a. decision on the application, if the scoping report 
contained sufficient information to make a decision 
without further investigation; or 
b. request to conduct an EIA and submit an environmental 
impact report; 
7. submission of environmental impact report (if an environmental 
impact report was requested); and 
8. a decision on the application by the competent authority. 
Once the competent authority made a decision on the application, the 
applicant or a member of the public could appeal the decision to the Minister or 
provincial Minister (MEC), as the case may be.
173
  
The EIA Regulations were a watershed in environmental law. Unlike other 
environmental legislation at the time, the EIA Regulations required the public to 
be consulted as part of the application process. They also required the competent 
authority to issue a record of decision to the applicant or to any interested party on 
request. The requirements regarding public participation and transparency of 
decision-making and public participation together with the Bill of Rights increased 
the possibility for challenging decisions. 
 
3.3.4 The development of new framework legislation 
Once the EIA Regulations were finalised, the focus of law reform shifted to the 
development of overarching framework legislation. After less than a year 
Parliament promulgated NEMA which repeals parts of ECA on an incremental 
basis.
174
 
The objective of NEMA is to provide the general approach to 
environmental management, protection and enforcement. Although much of the 
                                                 
173
 Section 35. 
174
 For example, s 50 states that regulations and notices issued pursuant to sections 21 and 22 will 
be repealed with effect from a date determined by the Minister, provided that they have become 
redundant because similar regulations have been passed in terms of section 24 of NEMA.  
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Act was initially dedicated to intergovernmental co-ordination mechanisms,
175
 it 
contains important provisions regarding the discharge of the environmental 
function. The first of these is the inclusion of a set of principles in Chapter 1, most 
of which emanated from CONNEPP.
176
 The principles reflect the changes in the 
approach to public administration which the public identified as being necessary 
to address poor practices of the past. They were included in NEMA to address the 
public’s concern that officials would operate in a business-as-usual manner unless 
the principles were made legally binding.
177
 In addition to listing the principles, 
NEMA stipulates that the principles apply to all significant public administration 
activities involving the environment. Decision-making on applications, 
enforcement, the development of policies and strategies and interpretation under 
any environmental legislation all fall within the scope of application of the 
principles.
178
 The principles accordingly provide the basis for reviewing the 
defensibility of official’s decisions.179 
During CONNEPP the public also raised concerns regarding compliance 
and enforcement practices. NEMA addresses these concerns in Chapter 7 which 
introduced a new and expanded approach to compliance and enforcement. Of 
relevance to this thesis are the provisions relating to civil enforcement. Section 28 
introduced a duty of care to prevent, or where authorised, minimise environmental 
degradation. Where a person fails to comply with the duty, government may issue 
a directive indicating steps that must be complied with.  Failure to comply with 
the directive can be enforced through civil mechanisms such as interdicts and 
mandatory orders.
180
 Because the duty is phrased broadly, government can rely on 
the provisions of section 28 to secure good environmental management on a range 
of activities that are not specifically regulated. In addition to the duty of care, a 
                                                 
175
 The institutions established to facilitate co-ordination were ineffective and the relevant 
provisions of the Act were repealed or amended by the National Environmental Laws Amendment 
Act 14 of 2009.  
176
 These include the principles of ‘sustainable development’, ‘polluter pays’, ‘integration’, 
‘environmental justice’ and ‘participation’. 
177
 Personal knowledge, member of the Green Paper and NEMA drafting team. 
178
 Section 2(1)(b), (c) and (e).  
179
 Reference to the principles is made in the sectoral legislation discussed below.  
180
 The section was amended by National Environmental Laws Amendment Act 14 of 2009 to 
make unlawful, intentional or negligent violation of the duty or the failure to comply with a 
directive a criminal offence.  
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power to issue compliance notices for the violation of legislative obligations was 
added to Chapter 7 in 2004.
181
 These notices can also be enforced by civil 
mechanisms. 
Chapter 7 also seeks to strengthen the watch dog role that the public can 
play in securing compliance with environmental objectives. It expands locus 
standi (discussed above) and authorises the court not to award costs against a 
person who initiates legal proceedings with bona fide motives.
182
 In addition 
section 28(12) provides a broad cause of action for public interest litigation as it 
empowers the public to enforce a violation of the duty of care where the state has 
failed to act. 
Chapter 5 contains the only substantive regulatory provisions in the Act. 
The purpose of the chapter is to promote the application of environmental 
management tools in order to ensure integrated environmental management. 
Although the scope of the chapter is broader than the EIA provisions in ECA, until 
recent amendments the majority of the provisions related to the authorisation of 
activities on the basis of EIAs.  
At the time NEMA came into force the 1997 EIA Regulations passed in 
terms of ECA were still in effect. The Regulations were retained, but section 
24(3)(o) of NEMA modified implementation practices of the Regulations by 
stipulating that the minimum process requirements set out in NEMA applied to the 
processing of ECA applications. This transitional measure clarified some of the 
procedural requirements for conducting EIAs. However it did not address many of 
the administrative challenges which emerged from the implementation of the 
Regulations. In 2006 the Minister accordingly passed new EIA Regulations (2006 
EIA Regulations) and notices of listed activities which replaced the EIA procedure 
that operated under ECA.
183
 The new regulations had the same purpose as the 
ECA regulations but contained far more detail regarding the contents of reports 
and the competent authorities’ powers. They also established an alternate shorter 
                                                 
181
 Act 46 of 2003, s 31L. 
182
 Section 32. 
183
GNR 385, 386 and 387, 21 April 2006. Technically some of these issues did not require 
legislative intervention. However, they were included in the Regulations because of the 
inexperience of many officials and the need for certainty. Personal knowledge, drafter of the 
Regulations. 
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assessment process for certain listed activities called basic assessment.
184
 (These 
Regulations in turn were replaced in 2010).
185
 
 
3.3.5 The development of new sectoral legislation 
NEMA provided a new framework for environmental management but lacked 
sector specific provisions. Government accordingly developed further legislation 
to provide for the more focused regulation of waste, air, biodiversity and coastal 
management. The development of these Acts took significantly longer. The first, 
the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act was promulgated 
in 2003.
186
 The National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act
187
 and 
National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act (AQA) followed in 2004. 
In 2008 the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act
188
 and National Environmental Management: Waste Act (Waste 
Act) were promulgated.  
These Acts also adopt a framework approach to the different sectors and 
accordingly require regulations and notices to become fully operationalised. 
Because of this; delayed commencement dates or the time that lapses between 
applications and decisions, litigation during the study period was still based on old 
provincial conservation ordinances, ECA and the Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention Act, 1965 (APPA).
189
  
 
                                                 
184
 The basic assessment procedure is a more limited EIA that is applied to activities where the 
impacts of the activity are generally known and only socio-economic and geographical factors 
need to be considered.  
185
 Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 2010 GNR 543 GG 33306; Listing Notice 
1: List of Activities and Competent Authorities Identified in terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D 
GNR 544 GG 33306; Listing Notice 2: List of Activities and Competent Authorities Identified 
in terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D GNR 545 GG 33306 and Listing Notice 3: List of 
Activities and Competent Authorities Identified in terms of Sections 24(2) and 24D GNR 546 
GG 33306. 
186
 Act 57 of 2003. 
187
 Act 10 of 2004. 
188
 Act 24 of 2008. 
189
 Act 45 of 1965. 
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3.4 Implications of judicial and legislative transformation  
The changes brought about by the Bill of Rights and subsequently promulgated 
legislation have significant implications for the public administration of the 
environment. The introduction of sustainable development as the objective of 
environmental management activities has made decision-making more complex.
190
 
Decision-making has also become more contentious in some respects because the 
constitutional rights mean that government has to confront a number of tensions 
regarding access to resources which had previously been quashed by apartheid 
policy.
191
 Some of these - such as access to basic services, the allocation of fishing 
rights and the use of resources in protected areas - have the potential to result in 
violence, or have already resulted in violence.
 192
 
 In addition, not only has government been required to change the way in 
which it conducts its administrative practices, but its application and interpretation 
of the rights-based approach in decision-making are more open to legal challenge. 
The expansion of the scope of what legally falls within environmental 
matters and greater access to the courts creates the potential for the courts to 
consider an increased number of cases on environmental issues. Coupled with the 
change in judicial powers, the courts have a greater ability to develop norms 
which impact on government’s administration of the environment than in the past. 
However, like officials, this increased scope and new approach presents 
challenges for the judiciary. Past approaches meant that judges had no opportunity 
                                                 
190
 Discussed further in Chapter 6. 
191
 See Stephan Klasen ‘Social, economic and environmental limits for the newly enfranchised 
in South Africa? (2002) 50 3 Economic Development and Cultural Change 607 for a 
discussion on environmental limitations that posed a challenge to the government after 1994.  
192
 Challenges in respect of the allocation of fishing rights between commercial and 
subsistence fishermen have been the source of numerous court cases in recent years. See Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC); Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal Management and Others [2005] 1 All SA 
531 (SCA); Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism v Atlantic Fishing Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd and Others [2004] 1 All SA 591 (SCA); Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and Another [2003] 2 All SA 616 (SCA); 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Another v Scenematic Fourteen (Pty) Ltd 
[2005] 2 All SA 239 (SCA); Surmon Fishing (Pty) Ltd and Others v Compass Trawling (Pty) 
Ltd and Others [2009] 2 All SA 176 (SCA) and Langklip See Produkte (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Minister, Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (C) Case No 986/99 23 April 1999, 
unreported.  
The tensions and associated violence that can arise in respect of access to protected areas is 
illustrated by the recent judgment of  Isimangaliso Wetland Park Authority and Others v 
Mthembu and Another (KZN) 15 July 2010, unreported.  
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for gaining experience in the interpretation and application of sustainable 
development. Similarly, they had little experience in fulfilling the expanded role 
envisaged by the Constitution and international declarations such as the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development which requires the courts to play a 
more active part in securing environmental justice and sustainable development.
193
 
Kakakhel describes this new responsibility of the courts as follows -  
The judiciary therefore becomes a crucial partner in balancing the 
interests that we, the present generation value and cherish and the 
interests to be sustained for the benefit of many unable to speak for 
themselves either because they are not yet born – the future generations – 
or because of the inability to pursue these rights for a variety of reasons, 
not least of which are inherent legal or procedural constraints and 
inhibiting poverty and other socio-economic factors.
194
 
Responses to these challenges are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
193
 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992). 
194
 Shafquat Kakakhel ‘Message’ at the opening of the Southeast Asian Justices Symposium in 
Southeast Asian justices symposium: the law on sustainable development (1999). 
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Part 2: Case Analysis 
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4. Environmental case law – statistical 
trends 
  
The courts’ potential influence on bureaucratic behaviour does not start (nor end) 
with the handing down of a judgment. As Gambitta and Sunkin point out, threats 
of litigation and the litigation process can also influence officials’ decisions.195 
The effects of pre-judgment activities are touched on in Chapter 8. However this 
thesis focuses mainly on responses to judgments because the culmination of a 
dispute in a judicial decision provides the most scope for setting a benchmark of 
administrative practice requirements against which responses can be considered. 
Furthermore, the formal record that follows a judgment creates a greater 
possibility for widespread knowledge - and hence impact - amongst officials. 
Judgments are accordingly the instruments through which the court ‘exerts its 
greatest formal influences.’196 
The nature of this potential influence is multidimensional and can be 
considered from different perspectives. As noted in Chapter 1, Halliday focuses on 
areas where administrative practices were in conflict with judicial review 
decisions.
197
 Machin and Richardson on the other hand divide judgments into 
three categories which, they argue, reflect the roles ascribed to judicial review, 
namely statutory interpretation, powers of administrative bodies and procedural 
requirements.
198
 Others have elected to look at the effects of particular landmark 
decisions on soc al policy.
199
 
In this study the primary aims of the case analysis were to understand the 
courts’ contribution to the development of an environmental jurisprudence and to 
                                                 
195
 Richard A L Gambitta ‘Litigation, judicial deference and policy change’ (1981) 3 2 Law & 
Policy Quarterly 141 and Sunkin ‘Conceptual issues in researching the impact of judicial 
review’ op cit at 47 – 51. See also Genevra Richardson and Maurice Sunkin ‘Judicial review: 
questions of impact’ 1996 Public Law 79. 
196
 Lucinda Platt, Maurice Sunkin and Kerman Calvo ‘Judicial Review Litigation as an 
Incentive to Change in Local Authority Public Services in England and Wales’ (2009) 
Institute for Social and Economic Research. Available at 
http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/research/impact-of-litigation-on-the-quality-and-delivery-of-
public-services/ [accessed on 12 May 2010]. 
197
 Halliday op cit at 19. 
198
 ‘Judicial review and tribunal decision-making: a study of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal’ op cit at 495. 
199
 See Wasby op cit and Gates and Johnson (eds) American courts: A critical assessment 
(1991). 
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establish a platform for exploring officials’ knowledge and responses, or degree of 
legal conscientiousness, to judicial control. As noted in Chapter 2, because the 
study was also concerned with the relevance of contextual differences, the analysis 
was not confined to landmark judgments or judgments involving judicial review, 
but included various types of civil judgments.
200
 Some of these relate to the 
court’s oversight role on the acceptability of administrative practices and 
legislative interpretation. Others relate to the court’s collaborative responsibilities 
to secure the environmental right.  
The analysis of the 81 judgments was conducted in two phases. In the first 
phase a statistical analysis was undertaken of five aspects viz the time dimension 
of the judgments; the geographical spread of litigation; the types of environmental 
issues that were litigated on; the types of relief sought by parties and the profile of 
different types of litigants. The results of this phase are discussed below.  
In the second phase of the case analysis the content of the judgments was 
considered in respect of certain procedural and substantive issues. The selection of 
issues for analysis focused on those which could have implications for good 
governance and the implementation of the rights-based approach. The results of 
the second phase are set out in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 The number of judgments considered annually 
The statistical case analysis began with an assessment of the number of judgments 
that were handed down each year. This exercise was undertaken in order to assess 
whether litigation has increased since the adoption of the rights-based approach 
and whether it occurs in response to the commencement of legislation. To ensure 
consistency in approach between reported and unreported judgments, the date 
used for categorisation purposes was the date of judgment. This is because in 
some instances judgments are reported several months after being handed down 
and are reported in the following year. The number of judgments handed down per 
year during the study period is illustrated in Figure 4-1 below. 
                                                 
200
 The omission of environmental actions that were initiated during the period but not adjudicated 
on means that the study is not indicative of the extent to which litigation is used to settle 
environmental disputes.  
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Figure 4-1 Number of Judgments per Year 
 
 
The graph shows that there were relatively few judgments until 2001. The 
amount of judgments increased overall from 2004 to 2007, with the number rising 
sharply in 2005. The number of judgments handed down in the four year period 
2004 to 2007 (50) was substantially higher than the total number of judgments 
handed down in the preceding nine years (31). 
The sharp rise in judgments from 2004 is attributable to litigation involving 
a single issue, namely decisions to authorise the construction of filling stations. If 
the 13 filling station related judgments are discounted, the increase is much less 
pronounced. (The impact of the filling station litigation on the amount of 
judgments handed down is unlikely to continue in view of three appeal decisions 
handed down by the SCA and Constitutional Court which have largely settled the 
issues). 
The increase in judgments during the 2004 to 2007 period suggests that the 
commencement of two pieces of legislation triggered additional litigation. The 
1997 EIA Regulations came into effect incrementally during 1997 and 1998. 
Given the time delay which occurs between the commencement of legislation and 
decisions that are taken in terms of that legislation, there is a correlation between 
this delay and the increase in judgments that occurred. In addition to the 
commencement of the Regulations, PAJA came into force in November 2000. The 
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requirements of PAJA were relied on by approximately half of the litigants to 
build their case in respect of EIA decisions. The effect of new legislation does not 
appear to follow the trend of, for example, the American experience where a wave 
of litigation in environmental matters typically occurred within two years of the 
legislation coming into force and tapered off thereafter, because the number of 
judgments is consistently higher from 2004 onwards.
201
  
Recourse to the courts from 2004 shows an increasing willingness to 
litigate on environmental matters. The trend may continue upwards when more 
decisions are made in terms of AQA and the Waste Act as both Acts provide for 
expanded consultation in licensing processes.
202
 Nevertheless, the number of 
judgments handed down annually was relatively small, particularly if regard is had 
to the number of decisions that the environmental departments make each year.
203
 
This had potentially positive implications for officials’ levels of knowledge about 
case law because the number of judgments is sufficiently small that it is feasible 
for officials to become familiar with the content of the judgments.  
 
4.2 Judicial exposure to environmental litigation 
After establishing the time dimension, an analysis was undertaken of the 
geographical spread of judgments amongst the different courts in order to 
ascertain how much exposure the courts have to environmental litigation and 
whether some areas are more litigious than others. The purpose of the assessment 
was twofold. Firstly, it would provide an insight to how much opportunity judges 
have had to acquire experience in environmental matters. Secondly, if certain 
areas were found to be more litigious, it would provide a basis for testing findings 
in other studies that legal conscientiousness is affected in heavily litigated 
agencies because officials react more conservatively or defensively when making 
decisions.
204
 
                                                 
201
 L Wenner The environmental decade in court (1982) 22. 
202
 The licensing provisions of the Acts came into force on 11 September 2005 and 1 July 
2009 respectively. Very few decisions were made in terms of AQA during the study period. 
203
 By way of example, across the country 4656 applications based on the ECA and NEMA 
EIA Regulations and 1325 applications for rectification in terms of section 24G of NEMA 
were finalised in 2007. E-mail communication from DEAT, 13 January 2009. 
204
 See, for example, Derek Obadina ‘The impact of JR on homelessness decisions (judicial 
review)’ (1996)  Judicial Review 244 where his study shows that officials in conservative 
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 The divisions of the courts are still structured along the political provincial 
boundaries that existed prior to 1994. For ease of reference, the courts and their 
current geographical jurisdiction are summarised in the table below.
205
 
 
Table 4-1 List of Courts and Geographical Areas of Jurisdiction 
 
COURT GEOGRAPHICAL 
JURISDICTION 
Ciskei High Court (Ck) Parts of the Eastern Cape Province 
Cape Provincial Division (CPD) Western Cape Province 
Durban Coastal and Local Division 
(DCLD) 
Parts of the KwaZulu-Natal Province 
Eastern Cape Division (ECD) Eastern Cape Province 
Northern Cape Division (NCP) Northern Cape Province 
Natal Provincial Division (NPD) KwaZulu-Natal Province 
South East Cape and Local Division 
(SECLD) 
Parts of the Eastern Cape Province 
Transkei High Court (Tk) Parts of the Eastern Cape Province 
Transvaal Provincial Division (TPD) Gauteng, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and 
North West Provinces 
Witwatersrand Local Division (WLD) Parts of the Gauteng Province 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) National  
Constitutional Court (CC) National  
 
The number of judgments handed down by each of these courts is indicated 
in Figure 4-2. 
                                                                                                                                            
authorities were ‘noticeably more sensitive to the possibility of judicial challenge’ than 
officials in liberal authorities who had not been exposed to litigation.  
205
 The names of the courts changed from 1 March 2009 with the commencement of the 
Renaming of the High Courts Act 30 of 2008. For convenience the court names that were 
applicable during the study period are used. 
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Figure 4-2 Number of Judgments per Court 
 
The graph shows that the majority of the courts pass judgment on less than 
one environmental matter every two years. Exceptions are the TPD which hears, 
on average, two environmental matters a year and the SCA and CPD which hear 
on average one case a year. The highest development, population and number of 
provinces fall within the jurisdiction of the TPD. The number of cases adjudicated 
by it is therefore not indicative of a more litigious community. With the exception 
of the CPD, litigation trends reflect a geographical consistency.
206
  
The limited exposure that the different courts have to environmental 
matters suggests that judges are not able to develop a specialised skill on the basis 
of litigation alone. In view of the complexity of environmental decisions, the 
judiciary is accordingly faced with a considerable challenge in ensuring that case 
law reflects the requirements of sustainable development and other objectives of 
environmental legislation and policy. This is compounded by the fact that limited 
guidance has been handed down by the Constitutional Court on the environmental 
right. (Although the Constitutional Court handed down five judgments which were 
underpinned by environmental disputes, two of these related solely to requests for 
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 Few of the CPD cases, however, involved the environmental department. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
72 
 
direct access to the court).
207
 Judges’ limited dealings with environmental matters 
stimulated two enquiries in the study, namely the effect of such limited dealings 
on the judicial oversight of environmental decisions and the implications for 
officials’ views of the court and legal conscientiousness.  
 
4.3 The nature of environmental issues considered by the 
courts 
Once the time and geographical dimensions of the judgments were understood, 
information regarding the types of issues that were litigated on and the legislation 
that was relied on was collated. The purpose of this component of the analysis was 
to determine whether specific issues or legislation were litigated on more than 
others.  
With regard to the types of environmental issues, the judgments were 
considered in two ways. Firstly the judgments were coded as falling within one of 
six categories. Only one coding was allocated per judgment. The first category 
was proposed developments which might have an environmental impact ie 
typically matters in which the application of the EIA Regulations had been 
argued.
208
 The second and third categories were existing air and waste pollution 
disputes respectively. A fourth category for existing environmental impact issues 
was created to capture judgments in which the complaint referred to detrimental 
environmental impact which was not limited to air or waste. The fifth category 
provided for all matters relating to biodiversity and the natural environment, other 
than proposed developments affecting the natural environment. The final category 
was a catch all category of issues that were not captured by the other categories.  
The data of the first exercise are reflected in Table 4-2. 
                                                 
207
 De Kock v Minister of Water Affairs & Forestry 2005 (12) BCLR 1183 (CC) (De Kock) and 
Hekpoort Environmental Preservation Society and Another v Minister of Land Affairs and Others 
1998 (1) SA 349 (CC) (Hekpoort Environmental Preservation Society). 
208
 This category included developments that had taken place without authorisation. 
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Table 4-2 Number of Judgments per Issue 
 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF JUDGMENTS 
Proposed developments 47 
Air 4 
Waste 1 
Environmental impact 10 
Biodiversity & the natural environment 12 
Other 7 
Total 81 
 
In the second phase, data on the legislation which underpinned the 
judgments was captured in order to assess which provisions have been subjected 
to judicial scrutiny the most. The results are set out in Table 4-3.  
 
Table 4-3 Environmental Legislation Cited in Judgments 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION  TIMES RAISED 
Constitution – environmental right
209
 
 
 7 
APPA 
 
 5 
ECA  
 Environmental policy (sections 2 and 
3) 
 Boards of investigation (section 15) 
 Protected natural environment (section 
16) 
 Waste management (section 20) 
 EIA provisions (sections 21, 22, 26 
and including 28A, 35 and 36) 
 Powers where environment is 
damaged, endangered or detrimentally 
affected (section 31A) 
 
 45 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
0 
 
38 
 
 
12 
NEMA 
 Principles (sections 2 -4) 
 EIA provisions (section 24) 
 Duty of care (section 28) 
 Emergency incidents (section 30) 
 Access to information (section 31) 
 Regulatory powers (section 44) 
 Compliance and enforcement (Chapter 
7) 
 34 
13 
12 
3 
2 
 
1 
1 
2 
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 Includes references to the interim Constitution and final Constitution. 
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National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act 
 
 0 
National Environmental Management: 
Protected Areas Act 
 
 0 
Provincial Nature Conservation Ordinances 
and legislation 
 
 10 
Other  31 
 
The collation of the data reflected in the tables above reveals certain trends 
in environmental litigation which are discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Proposed developments 
The commencement of the 1997 EIA Regulations provided the first opportunity 
for the public to participate in environmental decision-making on proposed 
developments. The Regulations accordingly stimulated a new type of 
environmental litigation. The results of the analysis showed that 58 per cent of the 
judgments dealt with proposed developments. When compared against the second 
table, it is noted that references to the EIA Regulations were made 50 times. There 
are three reasons for the discrepancy. In some instances both the NEMA and ECA 
EIA provisions were referenced in a judgment. In others no reference was made 
because litigation took place prior to the commencement of the Regulations.
210
 In 
yet other instances, applicants argued that the requirements of section 24 of 
NEMA (as it was then) required other government departments to take 
environmental impacts into account in their decision-making processes, even 
where the proposed development was not a listed activity in terms of the EIA 
Regulations.
211
  
As the EIA Regulations afforded both proponents of development and the 
public increased access to the courts to challenge government decisions on 
developments, an assessment was also undertaken to determine the extent to 
                                                 
210
 See, for example, Van Huyssteen and Others NO v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism 1996 (1) SA 283 (C). 
211
 See, for example, Evans & Others v Llandudno/ Hout Bay Transitional Metropolitan 
Substructure & Another 2001 (2) SA 342 (C). 
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which different groups approached the courts and whether the basis of litigation 
was support or objection to the development. Approximately five per cent of the 
judgments could not be described as being for or against proposed developments 
for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the relief sought was a request that 
an EIA be undertaken. Private parties opposing proposed developments utilised 
the increased access to the courts the most, accounting for 48.9 per cent of the 
cases. When the applications brought by private parties were scrutinised further, it 
was observed that the private parties were not homogenous in their motivation for 
objecting to the proposed development. Many of these applications were brought 
by people who had a commercial, rather than environmental, interest in preventing 
the development from taking place.
212
  
The remaining litigation was equally split between proponents of a 
development and government. With regard to the types of development decisions 
that were opposed, very few related to activities with a potentially high 
environmental impact such as the undertaking of a major industrial process.
213
 
Furthermore, it was observed that nearly a quarter of the cases related to a single 
issue, namely the construction of filling stations.  
 
4.3.2 Litigation in respect of existing pollution issues 
At the beginning of the study period air pollution and pollution from poor waste 
management practic s presented a serious problem. For example, the President’s 
Council report noted that unacceptable practices occurred at the majority of 
landfill sites with almost two thirds of them causing water pollution, air pollution 
and nuisance to neighbouring communities.
214
 These problems persisted during 
the study period and were acknowledged in a number of official government 
documents. For example the environmental policy Green Paper stated that 
‘[w]aste disposal practices are unacceptable ….  The handling and disposal of 
                                                 
212
 Discussed further in section 4.9 below. 
213
 An exception is Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism & Another 2005 (3) SA 156 (C) which related to nuclear 
energy. 
214
 Op cit at 95. 
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toxic and hazardous waste is in crisis.’215 The IP&WM Discussion Document on 
the other hand highlighted the social inequalities that had eventuated from waste 
management practices and stated that –  
Poorer communities are, however, more affected because of the apartheid 
legacy, particularly because of the abuse of municipal landfills by industry 
and the collapse of services during unrest.
216
  
The poor state of air quality in certain areas was also noted in official 
government documents. The IP&WM Discussion Document was less explicit on 
air quality than on waste management, but identified air pollution as an issue that 
required attention.
217
 The continued impacts of air pollution in hotspot areas are 
evidenced by the fact that the Minister has recently declared certain areas to be 
priority areas in terms of AQA.
218
  
It was accordingly anticipated that the increased scope for environmental 
litigation discussed in Chapter 3 would result in a high proportion of the cases 
being requests for the redress of existing environmental pollution problems. In 
fact, the analysis revealed that only 18.5 per cent (15) of the judgments dealt with 
existing pollution problems. Of these, a third related to pollution emanating from 
informal settlements or insurance liability for transportation spillages. Pollution 
from major industries and the operation of waste disposal facilities was not highly 
targeted in the litigation. Section 20 of ECA which regulates waste management 
was not relied on at all. APPA was relied on five times.
219
 In three of these 
instances, APPA was relied on by private parties seeking to secure compliance 
with the Act. None of the cases sought to attack government decisions to permit 
activities in terms of ECA or APPA. The courts have accordingly had limited 
opportunity to intervene in existing environmental injustices.  
 
                                                 
215
 Green Paper for Discussion – An Environmental Policy for South Africa op cit at 18. 
216
 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Discussion document towards a white 
paper on integrated pollution and waste management (1997) section 2.1.4.3. 
217
 Ibid at s 1.5.2. 
218
 The Vaal Triangle was declared as a priority area in terms of AQA in 2006 (GN 365 GG 28732 
21 April 2006) and the Highveld was declared a priority area in terms of AQA in 2007 (GN 1123 
GG 30518, 23 November 2007).  
219
 Act 45 of 1965. 
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4.3.3 Biodiversity and the natural environment 
The protection of the natural environment was also not prominent in the litigation. 
Although 12 judgments – approximately 15 per cent - were identified as falling 
within the biodiversity category, only four of these (4.9 per cent of all the 
judgments) were regarded as being brought primarily in the interest of protecting 
biodiversity or the natural environment. Whilst the number of cases was low, the 
success rate was high - all cases that were initiated in the interests of the natural 
environment were successful. 
Of the remaining cases, five sought approval to impact negatively on 
biodiversity or the natural environment, with three of these being requests to 
review government decisions regarding the keeping or hunting of animals. The 
success rate of these applications was low as only two were successful. Another 
case involved a review of biodiversity related legislation and the final two 
judgments related to the powers of government to enter into contractual 
arrangements for the management of nature reserves. 
The litigation primarily relied on the old provincial conservation 
Ordinances. Since the Protected Areas Act and Biodiversity Act commenced on 1 
November 2003 and 1 September 2004 respectively, the lack of litigation based on 
these Acts is probably a reflection of the lead time that occurs before decisions are 
made in terms of the Act which affect the public.   
 
4.4 Relief sought in environmental litigation 
The types and extent of relief that were sought in environmental litigation were 
considered to assess whether there were any trends regarding reliance on the 
different types of relief and the success of applicants seeking different types of 
relief. Table 4-4 sets out the number of times that different types of relief were 
sought. The numbers reflected in the table are higher than the number of 
judgments considered because in some cases more than one type of relief was 
sought. For example, review proceedings were sometimes combined with a 
request for an interdict. 
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Table 4-4 Types of Relief sought in Environmental Litigation 
 
RELIEF SOUGHT  NUMBER 
 
Review 
  
37 
Interdict  18 
Mandatory order  16 
Declaratory order  16 
Permission to approach Constitutional 
Court directly 
 2 
Other (including eviction orders, 
interlocutory disputes, cost orders and 
claims for delictual damages) 
 11 
Total  100 
 
4.4.1 Review 
Requests for a review of government decisions potentially have the most 
significant implications for the public administration of the environment.
220
 The 
table above illustrates that review was the preferred mechanism of people 
approaching the courts in respect of environmental matters. Applications for a 
review of government decisions bears some relationship with the high percentage 
of cases that were brought in respect of decisions made in terms of the EIA 
Regulations. Of these cases 26, including seven appeal judgments, involved 
environmental departments. The applicants were effectively successful 50 per cent 
of the time. Seven of the review applications pertained to filling stations. Only one 
of these cases was effectively successful. If those cases are discounted, the success 
rate is even higher.  
 
4.4.2 Interdicts 
After review applications, interdicts were the next most common relief sought. Of 
the 18 interdicts that were applied for, five were sought by environmental 
departments. Two of these pertained to addressing non-compliances with APPA 
and were brought prior to the administrative function being transferred to DEAT. 
The other three were interdicts brought on the basis of non-compliance with 
section 31A of the ECA. Government obtained interdicts in four out of five of the 
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cases. Three interdicts were sought directly against environmental departments, 
two of which were successful.  
 
4.4.3 Mandatory orders 
Mandatory orders sought against environmental departments have implications for 
the way in which the departments decide to implement legislation. This is 
particularly so where the departments have opted for a co-operative approach to 
securing compliance as opposed to utilising the enforcement powers that are 
provided for in legislation. Of the 16 requests for mandatory orders, seven were 
sought against environmental departments. The success rate of applicants in these 
instances was 50 per cent. Government only sought a mandatory order in one 
matter and was successful.
221
 
 
4.4.4 Declaratory orders 
Declaratory orders may be used to obtain cl rity on the legality of administrative 
actions. Such orders have the potential to impact on public administration either 
because the courts confirm that a practice is acceptable or declare it to be 
unacceptable. Sixteen judgments included an application for a declaratory order, 
of which ten were sought against environmental departments. Applications for 
declaratory orders against environmental departments reflected the lowest success 
rate of all relief types as applicants were only successful in 2.5 of the cases, giving 
a success rate of 25 per cent. The low success rate may be attributable to the 
courts displaying a reluctance to consider such matters and discouraging such 
litigation.  
 
4.4.5 Direct access 
Two litigants approached the Constitutional Court seeking direct access to the 
court.
222
 Neither party was successful. Although the court has indicated that direct 
access should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, it demonstrated some 
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 The remainder of the judgments involved private parties. 
222
 De Kock op cit and Hekpoort Environmental Preservation Society op cit. 
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sympathy in one of the cases where the applicant was unrepresented. In that 
instance it directed the Registrar of the court to bring the matter to the attention of 
the Law Society with a request that the matter be taken up on a pro bono basis.
223
 
 
4.5 Departmental involvement in environmental litigation 
Exposure to litigation can result in behavioural responses which have several 
consequences for impact.
224
 The number of judgments in which the environmental 
departments had been cited as a party was accordingly analysed to establish the 
extent to which the different departments have had direct exposure to judicial 
control.  
In compiling the data, planning decisions in which the Western Cape had 
been involved were included as the Land Use Planning Ordinance, 1985 falls 
within the administrative responsibility of the environmental department.
225
 Two 
actions which were initiated by the Department of Health in respect of APPA were 
attributed to DEAT because this function was subsequently transferred to the 
department along with the officials who had been responsible for administering 
the Act.  
Collation of the data was complicated in some instances where it was not 
possible to identify all the parties involved in a case from the judgment. The 
figures in the graph below are accordingly conservative and may in fact be 
marginally higher.  
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 De Kock op cit. 
224
 Halliday at 23; Spriggs op cit at 1129 and Platt et al op cit at 1. 
225
 Ordinance 15 of 1985. 
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Figure 4-3 Number of Judgments per Department 
 
The environment departments were cited as parties 57 times in 49 
judgments.  The number of citations is higher than the number of judgments 
because DEAT was cited as a party together with a provincial department on eight 
occasions. The departments were therefore involved in 60 per cent of the 
judgments.  
The exposure level was concentrated in four departments, namely DEAT 
and the Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Eastern Cape provincial departments. The 
remainder of the environmental departments were exposed to less than five, or no, 
cases.  
Of the 49 cases, most of the litigation was initiated against the 
environmental departments. The environmental departments only initiated six 
preliminary actions and three appeals. Of the six preliminary applications that 
were brought by the environmental departments, the Department of Health 
brought two of the applications to secure compliance with APPA and the Eastern 
Cape environmental department brought two applications - one in an attempt to 
have a contract in respect of the management of a nature reserve declared null and 
void and the other to secure compliance with a section 31A directive. The 
remaining two applications were brought by the Gauteng environmental 
department to secure compliance with a section 31A directive and the Western 
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Cape environmental department seeking a declaratory order overturning its own 
decision.  
These statistics indicate that the majority of environmental departments 
have not used civil litigation processes extensively to secure compliance with 
legislation. This finding is supported by the fact that six of the ten environmental 
departments have not approached the courts on a civil basis at all. 
The data was also analysed in terms of the types of environmental issues 
that were litigated on to consider whether it was of a homogenous nature or 
whether particular types of litigation attracted to particular departments. No 
pattern emerged from that analysis. 
The success rate of the government departments was high. Overall, they 
were successful 66 per cent of the time.
226
 The success rate of government in 
applications initiated by it was even higher. It had an overall success rate of 89 per 
cent, with almost a 100 per cent success rate on appeal. Based on the findings in 
other studies,
 227
 the high success rate of government together with the limited 
amount of litigation that it has been involved in ought to have contributed 
positively to legal conscientiousness. 
 
4.6  The role of public interest groups and the public in 
environmental litigation 
As noted in Chapter 3, recourse to the courts as a strategy by public interest 
groups to secure environmental protection prior to 1994 was limited by an array of 
obstacles that were encountered by litigants. The Constitution and subsequently 
promulgated legislation such as the NEMA has had the effect of removing, or at 
least diminishing, these obstacles. Post-1994 legislation has resulted in there being 
a broader basis on which public interest litigators can develop a cause of action, 
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 Two cases were not included in the calculation because no order was sought against the 
departments. 
227
 See Obadina op cit. 
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increased access to the courts, the establishment of procedural rights
228
 and 
possible relief from cost consequences if the plaintiff is not successful.
229
 
An analysis of the public’s involvement in litigation was accordingly 
undertaken with a view to understanding the extent to which the public took up the 
opportunity provided by these legislative interventions  as well as when these 
groups resort to litigation, against whom they litigate and how successful they are. 
From the outset, it was noted that this sector could not be considered as a 
homogenous group. The lack of homogeneity stems from the motivation for 
litigation. In this regard, two types of litigants were identified. The first group of 
litigants was public interest organisations whose primary goals include securing 
environmental protection in the public interest. The motivation of this sector in 
initiating litigation is usually based around securing an impact on environmental 
governance or the redress of significant environmental disputes that impact on the 
community.   
The second group comprises of individuals and organisations that have 
been formed solely for the purposes of organising collectively around a particular 
issue. These issues tend to affect the group directly and the motivation for 
litigation is mostly self-interest. In some circumstances that self-interest can be 
regarded as being anti-environment.
230
 These groups were considered separately 
and are referred to as Group 1 and Group 2 respectively.  
Business was excluded from this category because, although the outcome 
of some cases involving business litigants may have implications for the public 
interest, these are secondary consequences from the perspective of the business 
litigant. 
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 Sections 32, 33 and 34 of the Constitution.  
229
 See s 32 of NEMA. 
230
 For example Deana and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Others (Tk) Case No 913/00 26 February 2002, unreported and Barnett and Others v Minister 
of Land Affairs and Others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) involved disputes regarding the right to 
occupy illegally built cottages in a protected environmental area. 
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4.6.1 Litigation initiated by public interest groups and the public 
The analysis revealed that the public were the least active litigants during the 
study period. In combination the two groups were involved in 40 of the 81 cases. 
However, the two groups were the second most active sector in initiating 
litigation. Of the cases in which the sector was cited as a party, it initiated 73.5 per 
cent. The number of matters that were initiated by Group 1 and 2 against 
government, business and the public are described in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5 Number and Types of Actions Initiated by Public Interest Groups 
and the Public 
 
PARTIES AGAINST 
WHOM LITIGATION 
WAS INITIATED 
NUMBER OF GROUP 
1 ACTIONS 
NUMBER OF GROUP 
2 ACTIONS 
Government  7 17 
Business or industry 5 12 
NGOs and the public  0 2 
Total 12 31 
 
The total number of cases which Group 1 and 2 initiated was 27. (The 
figures in the table above give a total of 43 because in some instances government 
and business were cited jointly or because litigation was initiated jointly by people 
falling in Group 1 and 2). Litigation in the public interest that was initiated by 
Group 1 (7) accounted for eight per cent of the total number of cases considered in 
the study. As a percentage of all the judgments, the figure is low compared to, for 
example, the United States where public interest groups account for approximately 
56 per cent of environmental litigation.
231
 The figure suggests that South Africa 
has a less resourced public interest lobby and also possibly that it is not litigious 
by nature. 
The majority of the cases initiated by Group 1 were brought against 
government, of which five were in respect of proposed developments and one in 
respect of recently passed regulations. Public interest groups falling in Group 1 
accordingly focused the majority of their efforts on opposing proposed 
developments and expended none of its efforts seeking the redress of existing 
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pollution or environmental degradation. This group enjoyed a degree of success in 
cases that it initiated, winning 57 per cent of the time. 
Group 2 also focused much of its litigation efforts on government. 
However the underlying motivation differed from Group 1 as more than half of 
the 20 cases brought against government could be classified as being NIMBY 
based
232
 and several others were aimed at securing property rights. The success 
rate of Group 2 was lower than Group 1. It was successful in 50 per cent of cases 
initiated by it. The reduced success rate may suggest that the courts are less likely 
to endorse NIMBY litigation than litigation which is brought purely in the public 
interest. 
 
4.6.2 Litigation initiated against public interest groups and the public 
The judgments in response to litigation initiated against Group 1 and 2 were 
recorded in terms of three categories of plaintiffs or applicants viz business, 
government and the public. The results of this exercise are reflected in Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-6 Number of Cases Initiated Against Public Interest Groups and the 
Public 
 
PARTIES BY WHOM 
LITIGATION WAS 
INITIATED 
NUMBER OF 
ACTIONS AGAINST 
GROUP 1 
NUMBER OF 
ACTIONS AGAINST 
GROUP 2 
Business   0 7 
Government 0 5 
NGOs and the public  0 3 
Total 0 15 
 
Group 1 and 2 are litigated against far less frequently than government or 
business, having been cited as a respondent in only 13 cases. (The total in the table 
is higher because in some instances government and business were joint 
applicants). From the table it can be seen that Group 1 was not cited as a 
respondent or defendant at all during the period. The absence of litigation against 
Group 1 is significant because it shows that, unlike other jurisdictions such as the 
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 NIMBY is an acronym for ‘not in my backyard’ and indicates opposition to a development in a 
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Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
86 
 
United States of America, litigation is not generally used strategically to silence 
opposition by NGOs. (One so-called SLAPP suit -strategic lawsuits against public 
participation - occurred during the study period in Group 2).
 233
 
Furthermore it was noted that all five of the government initiated actions 
and just more than half of the business initiated actions were appeals. (Four of 
these were decided against the public). Government and business therefore rarely 
initiates the primary litigation against Group 2. Of the four cases that were not 
appeals, two were brought against squatters or occupiers of illegal developments 
on the basis that court intervention was required to enable the applicant to comply 
with statutory obligations; one defamation order was sought against a person 
opposing the development of a filling station and one action was brought in 
respect of a costs dispute.
234
 The three cases not related to appeals were heard 
during 2005 to 2006. This may be indicative of an emerging trend that government 
and business is increasingly willing to approach the courts to redress actions of the 
public and to challenge rights to administrative justice.  
 
4.7 The role of business in environmental litigation 
Litigants were categorised as falling within the business category where the 
organisation’s primary objective is making profit and the litigation would impact 
on the business operations of the applicant. The analysis of the group was 
undertaken with a view to understanding how often and when the sector resorts to 
litigation as well as who they litigate against and how successful they are.  
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 For a discussion on SLAPP suits see Penelope Canan and George W Pring ‘Studying 
strategic lawsuits against public participation: mixing quantitative and qualitative approaches’ 
(1988) 22 2 Law and Society Review 387; Robert Abrams ‘Strategic lawsuits against public 
participation (SLAPP)’ (1989) 7 1 Pace Environment Law Review 33 and Frederick M Rowe 
and Leo M Romero ‘Resolving land-use disputes by intimidation: SLAPP suits in New 
Mexico’ 2002 32 New Mexico Law Review 217. 
234
 Minister of Land Affairs and Others v Barnett and Others 2006 JDR 0106 (Tk); Transnet 
Ltd v Nyawuza & Others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D) and Petro Props (Pty) Ltd v Barlow & Another 
2006 (5) SA 160 (W) and Han Retail (Pty) Ltd v Conradie NO and Others (NC) Case No 
118/02 29 August 2003, unreported.  
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4.7.1 Litigation initiated by business 
The analysis revealed that business was involved in 65 of the 81 cases, making it 
the most active litigant during the study period. The majority of the litigation (62 
per cent) was initiated by business. The types and number of matters that business 
was  responsible for initiating are described in Table 4-7. 
 
Table 4-7 Number and Types of Actions Initiated by Business 
 
PARTIES AGAINST WHOM LITIGATION 
WAS INITIATED 
NUMBER OF ACTIONS 
Government only 18 
Government in respect of decisions in favour of 
another business 
11 
Government to compel enforcement for 
environmental transgressions against another 
business 
2 
Another business other than in respect of a 
government decision 
3 
NGOs and the public  6 
Total  40 
 
Table 4-7 shows that business most frequently initiates litigation against 
government. Litigation against government can be divided into three categories, 
namely actions affecting the business’ operation directly, actions constituting a 
form of anti-competitive behaviour and actions compelling government to enforce 
environmental legislation. In the first category, the 18 actions that were brought 
against government included decisions of environmental departments to refuse 
authorisation in terms of the EIA Regulations; decisions of government 
departments in respect of hunting; objections to enforcement measures and 
requests that government undertake an EIA before finalising a decision. Industry 
was successful in 66 per cent of these cases. This rate decreases to 50 per cent, 
however, when the appeal judgments are taken into consideration. 
In the second category the statistics reveal that business expended 27 per 
cent of its efforts attempting to stop other from businesses obtaining regulatory 
approvals where it would result in a negative competitive effect. This category of 
litigation was dominated by attempts to have departmental decisions to authorise 
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the construction of filling stations in terms of the EIA Regulations reviewed and 
set aside.  
When these cases are considered with some of the cases in the first 
category in which it was argued that government was required to undertake an 
EIA, or ensure that an EIA was undertaken, it suggests that business has taken 
advantage of the expanded public participation processes in environmental 
decision-making as a means of managing the competitiveness of its business. This 
suggestion may be supported by the fact that the table indicates that business 
seldom litigates against government to compel enforcement or against another 
industry on the basis of environmental pollution or degradation.  
Notwithstanding the willingness to approach the courts on these matters, it 
was noted that business had a lower rate of success in the second category than the 
first category. In these instances, the effective success rate – taking appeals into 
consideration – was 44 per cent. 
As noted previously, business seldom litigates against the public. In two 
instances business attempted to curtail the constitutional rights of the respondent.  
The first involved an appeal against a court order to provide information and the 
second was brought with the aim of mitigating the impacts of environmental 
activism.
235
 Business was not successful in either of these matters. The lack of 
success in matters that affect individual constitutional rights provides a 
preliminary indication that the courts are reluctant to favour the interests of 
business over the rights of individuals.  
 
4.7.2 Litigation initiated against business 
The judgments in which litigation was initiated against business were recorded in 
terms of three categories of plaintiffs or applicants, namely, business, government 
and the public. The results of this exercise are reflected in Table 4-8. 
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 Mittalsteel SA Ltd (previously known as Iscor Ltd) v Hlatshwayo 2007 (1) SA 66 (SCA) and 
Petro Props op cit respectively. 
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Table 4-8 Number of Cases Initiated Against Business  
 
PARTIES BY WHOM 
LITIGATION WAS INITIATED 
NUMBER OF ACTIONS 
Business  16 
Government 10 
The public  16 
Total citations 42 
 
It is clear from the table that business is as most likely to initiate litigation 
against business as the public. As has been noted above, this threat is likely to 
eventuate far more often in respect of competitive issues than actual 
environmental impacts. 
The public’s reasons for litigating have been discussed in section 4.6.1 
above. The reasons why government litigates against industry are varied. Of the 
10 cases which government initiated, the majority – six – were in respect of 
compliance and enforcement disputes. Of the remaining disputes three were 
appeals. When the time dimension was considered, it was noted that half of the 
government initiated litigation in respect of compliance matters were brought 
between 2004 and 2007 ie after the commencement of the EIA Regulations. 
Government itself therefore contributed to the trend of increased litigation in 
response to the promulgation of legislation. 
 
4.8 Findings 
The statistical analysis shows that the number of judgments handed down during 
the period is relatively small, geographically spread across the courts, and diverse 
in nature. Three potential implications were identified from these trends. Firstly, 
the quality of judgments on complex matters could be negatively affected by the 
courts’ limited individual exposure to environmental litigation. Secondly, the 
departments themselves are not exposed to a great deal of litigation. Thirdly, the 
low number of judgments could have positive consequences for officials’ overall 
awareness of the judgments. These issues are taken up further in Chapters 5, 7 and 
8.  
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With regard to the frequency of litigation, the increased number of 
judgments from 2001 onwards suggests that litigation does escalate in response to 
the implementation of new legislation. This is supported by the fact that legislative 
provisions relating to EIAs were raised in 50 of the 81 cases. Notwithstanding 
this, South Africa can hardly be classified as a litigious society. Although business 
was the most active sector in taking advantage of the opportunities presented by 
rights-based legislation, the public has been slower to do so. For example, the 
expanded access to the courts did not result in a substantial number of cases being 
brought to court to redress the environmental impacts of existing business 
activities. Furthermore, government is seldom a proactive litigant as it only 
initiated 11 per cent of the cases. 
The profile of the sector initiating litigation appears to be relevant in some 
instances. The success rate of government, particularly in respect of matters 
initiated by it, appears to suggest that the courts will generally adopt an approach 
of judicial deference. The relatively low success rate of NIMBY litigation and of 
business challenges against government decisions favouring another business 
appears to suggest that the courts are reluctant to endorse the furthering of 
unintended advantages under the guise of environmental protection. In practice 
this means that government departments need not be unduly wary of the courts, 
particular given their high success rates when initiating legislation. 
The findings that emerged from the statistical analysis provided input to the 
development of the semi-structured questionnaires that were used as the basis of 
interviews with officials in the environmental departments. Some of the trends 
were used to test officials’ knowledge of judicial responses to environmental 
litigation and others were used to test the accuracy of officials’ perceptions of 
judicial decisions. The statistical analysis, however, only provided a basis for part 
of the insights that were sought in the study. A more penetrating understanding of 
responses by officials required a substantive analysis of the judgments. That 
analysis is the subject of the next chapter. 
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5. Environmental case law – the courts’ 
contribution to environmental 
jurisprudence 
 
As noted previously, the Constitution laid the basis for a more democratic and 
equal society. However, the environmental right and right to administrative justice 
do not transform people’s lives unless they are given content. For example, 
environmental justice is given life through everyday administrative practices 
which prevent or manage environmental impacts to acceptable levels. The 
realisation of the rights is therefore largely dependent on the way in which 
individuals in government respond to the requirements of the rights-based 
approach in exercising their administrative discretion. 
Prior to 1994 officials could exercise their powers of discretion with 
limited prospects of successful legal challenge. That was because the substantive 
parameters in which decisions were made were narrow and did not incorporate 
broad concepts such as sustainable development. The requirements of 
administrative process were also limited and it was permissible in many instances 
to make decisions without any public participation or furnishing reasons for a 
decision.
236
  
The responses of government to the required changes of the rights-based 
approach have taken place within the context of broad and often aspirational 
legislative wording. This wording has created interpretative spaces and, at the 
same time, officials have been required to transform their behaviour in parallel 
with an evolving environmental jurisprudence. Since 1994 the public 
administration of the environment has accordingly been characterised by an 
uncertain time in which officials have an imperative to change past practices 
without detailed guidance on how to implement new practices. 
The second part of the case analysis accordingly involved a review of 
judicial responses to a range of issues where tension surrounding government’s 
implementation of the rights-based approach and exercise of discretion had 
become visible.  
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5.1 The nature of environmental decision-making 
 
5.1.1 The influence of the Constitution on decision-making 
The environmental right gave environmental issues a prominence which they did 
not have before. As expressed by the courts in Petro Props (Pty) Ltd v Barlow and 
Another (Petro Props), the right provides both a shield and a sword. 
237
 Apart from 
affording a direct right to people, the right sets out an imperative which requires 
government to adopt a proactive approach to environmental security. The 
inclusion of the right also means that the interpretation of environmental 
legislation has become a constitutional matter.
238
  
The right does however contain terms which are not defined and which 
would benefit from judicial guidance. In the first part of the right, ‘environment’ 
and ‘well-being’ are not defined.239 In the second part of the right the duty of 
government to protect the environment is linked to the needs of future 
generations
240
 and the need for sustainable development
241
 - neither of which is 
defined. Although these are complex terms to define, guidance provided by the 
courts on their meaning contribute to the development of an environmental 
jurisprudence which must be applied by officials.  
 
5.1.2 The meaning of environment 
The meaning of what constitutes ‘environment’ and accordingly the factors that 
should be taken into account in environmental decisions has been widely debated 
both internationally and in South Africa. Some people argue that environment 
should be construed narrowly and limited to biophysical issues on the basis that an 
expansive approach is impractical for determining the scope and content of 
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 At 184B. 
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 Fuel Retailers Association of SA (Pty) Ltd v Director-General Environmental Management, 
Mpumalanga and 11 Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at para 40. 
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 Section 24(a). 
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 Section 24(b). 
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environmental law.
242
 Conversely, others have argued that an expansive approach 
should be adopted which includes factors such as human conditions and culture.
243
 
In view of these debates there has been a degree of uncertainty regarding whether 
certain issues fall within the scope of environment. 
One of these issues related to socio-economic considerations. Disputes 
regarding whether such considerations fall within the scope of environmental 
decision-making came to a head when the Gauteng Province adopted the EIA 
Administrative Guideline: Guideline for the Construction and Upgrade of Filling 
Stations and Associated Tank Installations (filling station guideline).
244
 The 
purpose of the guideline was to facilitate departmental decisions on applications 
for authorisation to construct filling stations in terms of the EIA Regulations. In it 
there was clear evidence that the Gauteng Province considered socio-economic 
impacts as falling within the scope of its environmental decision-making powers.  
Gauteng’s interpretive stance had potentially far-reaching consequences for 
the ability of oil companies to expand operations in certain areas. Existing 
competitors such as the Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa (FRA) - an 
industry organisation which aims to protect the interests of existing filling station 
owners - also saw an opportunity to prevent new entrants to the market. The 
application of the guideline accordingly triggered litigation regarding the right of 
environmental departments to take socio-economic considerations into account.  
The first judgment was handed down in March 2004 in the matter of Sasol 
Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another v Metcalfe N.O. (Sasol).
245
 Sasol asked the court to 
declare the guideline ultra vires
246
 partly because it took socio-economic 
considerations into account. The judge held that in terms of the 1997 EIA 
Regulations, the MEC only had the power to regulate the storage and handling of 
petroleum products and not filling stations in their entirety.
247
 Because of this 
finding, he concluded that the MEC did not have the authority to regulate the 
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commercial aspects of filling stations. The portions of the guidelines which dealt 
with the socio-economic aspects of filling stations were, in the judge’s opinion, 
irrelevant.
248
  
The same court handed down another judgment, based on substantially 
similar facts, two months later in BP SA (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment and Land Affairs, Gauteng (BP).
249
 This time the 
court reached a different conclusion. In a detailed judgment the court held, not 
only that the MEC’s powers related to filling stations as a whole, but also that the 
Department was obliged to take socio-economic considerations into account.
250
 
The basis for the court’s finding was that the environmental right articulates the 
linkage between environmental and socio-economic considerations and lays the 
foundation for a consideration of socio-economic factors. This foundation is 
supplemented by NEMA through both the principles which require authorities to 
evaluate the ‘social, economic and environmental impacts of activities’251 as well 
as the sections dealing with EIAs. In addition the court noted that the powers 
contained in section 26 of ECA specifically provide that regulations may be made 
in respect of social and economic impacts.
252
 
The conflicting judgments stimulated further litigation, particularly by 
existing filling station owners who saw an opportunity in the BP judgment to 
protect their own commercial interests. Several cases followed in which filling 
station owners challenged decisions to authorise new filling stations on the basis 
that the economic impacts of the proposed filling station on existing filling 
stations had not been taken into account adequately, or at all. The focus of this 
litigation accordingly shifted from a general enquiry as to whether socio-economic 
impacts could be taken into account to a specific enquiry as to whether that 
consideration must include the potential commercial impacts of proposed filling 
stations on existing filling stations.  
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The TPD handed down four judgments which considered this issue 
between February and July 2005. One of the judgments related to a filling station 
in Gauteng and three to filling stations in Mpumalanga. (Unlike the Gauteng 
environmental department, the Mpumalanga environmental department initially 
adopted the stance that it was not required to take socio-economic considerations 
into account).  
These judgments continued the contradictory approaches Sasol and BP. In 
All the Best Trading CC t/a Parkville Motors and Others v S N Nyagar Property 
Development And Construction CC & Others (All the Best) the judge decided that 
BP was not relevant to the case and chose to cite Sasol as authority for the view 
that the power vested in competent authorities in relation to EIAs is ‘intrinsically 
related to the environment as opposed to any consideration of trade’.253 The 
judgment reflects a narrow interpretation of the meaning of environment. The 
basis for this is not completely clear and the judgment does not explain why the 
judge did not take the legislative provisions that were mentioned in the BP 
judgment into account. It may be that the judge was influenced by a strong feeling 
that competitors should not be able to use environmental legislation to protect 
purely competitive interests. 
Contrary to the findings in All the Best, the court followed the BP line of 
reasoning in the other three cases, namely,  Capital Park Motors CC & Another v 
Shell South Africa Marketing (Pty) Ltd & Others (Capital Park),
254
 Turnstone 
Trading CC v Director-General Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Development and Others (Turnstone Trading)
255
 
and Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v The Director-
General Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
and Environment for Mpumalanga Province and Others (FRA).
256
 In these 
judgments, the court upheld the approach that socio-economic factors must be 
taken into account. In addition, these judgments developed the findings of the BP 
                                                 
253
 2005 (3) SA 396 (T) at 300I-J and 400A. 
254
 (T) Case No 3016/05 18 March 2007, unreported. 
255
 (T) Case No 3104/04 11 March 2005, unreported. 
256
 (T) Case No 35064/2002 28 July 2005, unreported. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
96 
 
judgment by requiring that economic impacts of proposed filling stations on 
competitors must be considered by environmental departments.  
The debate was partly resolved by the SCA in September 2005 when it 
handed down judgment in respect of the MEC’s appeal against the Sasol judgment 
(Sasol appeal).
257
 The SCA remarked that attempts to separate out the storage and 
handling of petroleum products from the commercial aspects of a filling station 
would be contrary to the principle of sustainable development.
258
 It accordingly 
held that the guideline was not ultra vires in respect of the inclusion of socio-
economic considerations. The judgment did not, however, specifically address 
whether economic impacts on existing filling stations must be considered.  
The SCA reiterated its approach in its judgment on the FRA’s appeal (FRA 
appeal)
259
 in August 2006. In that judgment the court referred to many of the 
judgments discussed above and stated that ‘… it is clear from a number of 
decisions that socio-economic considerations must be taken into account in 
making decisions’.260 Because of the facts of the matter, the court again did not 
express a direct opinion as to whether the economic impacts on existing filling 
station owners had to be considered.  
Two further judgments handed down after the Sasol and FRA appeal 
judgments - Micro Math Trading 14 CC t/a Parkville Motors & Others v Oelofse 
N.O. and Another in their Capacity as Joint Liquidators in the Insolvent Estate of 
S N Nyagar Property Development and Construction CC & Others and Senekal v 
The Director General, Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment for Mpumalanga Province (Senekal) - did not take 
the debate further.
261
 Furthermore, despite the direction which had been laid down 
by the SCA, the court in Senekal was clearly reluctant to find that economic 
impacts on a competitor had to be taken into account by a competent authority. 
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This is evident from the court’s reasons for awarding costs against the applicant 
where it cited the finding in All the Best Trading that a commercial entity should 
not be entitled to approach the court on an environmental issue which is actually 
an attempt to protect commercial interests, particularly where it fails to establish 
an environmental basis.
262
  
The debate was settled by the Constitutional Court in the appeal by the 
FRA from the SCA.
263
 In its judgment (FRA CC judgment), the Constitutional 
Court held that NEMA makes it clear that environmental authorities must consider 
socio-economic factors.
264
 It also went further to specifically address whether that 
consideration includes the potential impact on existing filling stations and stated 
that - 
The cumulative effect of the proposed development must naturally be 
assessed in the light of existing developments. A consideration of socio-
economic conditions therefore includes the consideration of the impact of 
the proposed development not only in combination with existing 
developments, but also its impact on existing ones.
265
 
The judgment has been the subject of some criticism on the basis that the 
court blurred the distinction between the environmental, social and economic 
aspects of sustainable development.
266
 Nevertheless, as the judgment stands it is 
now clear that the environmental departments must take socio-economic factors 
into consideration when making decisions and that the enquiry includes looking at 
the impact on existing activities. The FRA CC judgment also provides support for 
the opinion that a broad definition of environment is required to give effect to the 
environmental right. 
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5.1.3 Scope of the environmental right 
Apart from the meaning of environment, three terms are introduced in the 
environmental right that have implications for the scope of the right, namely, 
‘well-being’, ‘future generations’ and ‘sustainable development’. The first part of 
the environmental right entitles people to an environment that is not harmful to 
their health or well-being. In HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (HTF) the court indicated that the 
term ‘well-being’ is probably incapable of definition.267 Notwithstanding this, the 
court provided some guidance on the meaning of the term.
268
 It indicated that 
well-being included a moral or ethical component and held that the term was of 
crucial significance as it ‘defines for environmental authorities the objectives of 
their task.’269 
The court’s opinion regarding the subjective component of the term had 
previously been stated in Hi-change Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products and Others (Hi-change) in which the judge indicated 
that there is a large subjective component in establishing what violates a person’s 
well-being. 
270
 In that case, odour was sufficient to constitute a violation as the 
judge held that ‘[o]ne should not be obliged to work in an environment of stench 
and, in my view, to be in an environment contaminated by H2S is adverse to one’s 
“well-being”’.271 
Judicial guidance on the meaning of well-being requires that an expansive 
approach be adopted to environmental decision-making. In particular, it requires 
that subjective impacts on people be taken into consideration. These views are 
significant as impacts on well-being are often incapable of scientific proof and 
may otherwise be at risk of not being considered in decisions. 
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The concept of legally linking environmental protection to the needs of 
future generations (or intergenerational equity) is also a departure from past 
approaches. Intergenerational equity is a critical component of sustainable 
development. The failure of policy and decision-makers both locally and 
internationally to take the long term impacts of human activities into account has 
contributed to many current environmental problems; including climate change, 
and the depletion and extinction of biological resources. The implications of this 
failure in the South African context has been expressed by Whyte as follows - 
The environmental toll of apartheid has created a huge environmental 
deficit. ...[which] will cost South Africans dearly over the next decades in 
terms of health effects, lost productivity, and clean-up costs. It is vital that 
additional environmental costs not be added to the national environmental 
debt ... . Environmental costs can be deferred for a while, but they 
ultimately have to be paid, usually in economic losses and human 
suffering.
272
 
Notwithstanding its importance the courts have not always been mindful of 
the requirement. In Hentru Developers and Contractors CC v Hanekom N.O. and 
Another (Hentru), for example, the applicant requested the court to review and set 
aside the decision by the Gauteng environmental department to refuse an 
application in terms of the 1997 EIA Regulations for a housing development.
273
 
One of the reasons which the Head of Department (HOD) gave for refusing the 
application was that the area was predominantly rural in character and that 
approval of the application would have resulted in a loss of sense of place. The 
judge rejected this as he took note of the applicant’s submissions regarding the 
number of businesses and community activities already present in the area.
274
 The 
court accordingly considered the existing factual situation without considering the 
cumulative implications of allowing further development for future generations.  
In practice there may be situations where land has been transformed but 
there is a need to draw a line to prevent further incremental environmental 
destruction and loss of natural areas or open spaces. If the intergenerational equity 
requirement is not considered in these situations, and an approach of considering 
existing factors only is followed, it is difficult to prevent cumulative 
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environmental degradation where specific developments, considered in isolation 
of future needs, do not present an undue environmental risk.  
Where the courts have considered intergenerational equity, the risk created 
by the Hentru approach has been avoided. In HTF the court accepted the 
viewpoint that intergenerational equity means that the needs of future generations 
should not be comprised by current needs. It noted that this requires that the 
limitations of existing technology and social structures are considered and that 
environmental considerations are incorporated into economic decisions.
275
 The 
court also stated that the nature of the intergenerational equity requirement was 
one of stewardship in terms of which authorities are the custodian of the 
environment for future generations. The implication of this is that – 
…owners of land no longer enjoy the absolute real rights known to earlier 
generations. An owner may not use his or her land in a way which may 
prejudice the community in which he or she lives, because to a degree he 
or she holds the land in trust for future generations.
276
 
The court’s judgment makes it clear that the environmental right has 
changed the common law approach to property rights and that the implementation 
of the intergenerational requirement can constitute a justifiable limitation on 
property rights.
277
 This approach was again emphasised in the judgment in 
Khabiso NO and Another v Aquarella Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(Aquarella).
278
 In that judgment, the Gauteng environmental department sought an 
interdict to stop the construction of a housing development on a ridge. In 
considering the nature of the department’s function, the court stated that – 
…officials responsible for a healthy environment have a duty to ... ensure 
that all developments serve present and future generations and not only 
the economic and commercial needs of property owners or developers. A 
failure to adhere to this vision would regrettably result in serious 
environmental disaster.
279
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The judgments that consider intergenerational equity have at least two 
implications for officials. On the one hand, they expand the power of 
environmental departments to protect the environment beyond immediate 
concerns. On the other, they expand the historical range of factors that must be 
considered by requiring the time dimension of a decision to be taken into account. 
This time dimension must include a consideration of the need for 
environmental protection, social development and economic development viz the 
three elements of sustainable development. The relationship between 
environmental protection and development was described by the Constitutional 
Court in its FRA judgment as follows – 
Economic and social development is essential to the well-being of human 
beings. … But development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating 
environmental base. Unlimited development is detrimental to the 
environment and the destruction of the environment is detrimental to 
development. Promotion of development requires the protection of the 
environment.
280
 
The inclusion of sustainable development in the environmental right 
accordingly means that decision-makers must be cognisant of the need for 
development. They must however, regulate development where necessary to 
protect the environment. The actual factors that must be considered in giving 
effect to sustainable development will depend on the facts of a particular matter. 
The Constitutional Court has pointed out that some guidance is provided by the 
NEMA principles.
281
 It has also provided some specific guidance. In this regard, 
the court noted that the idea of sustainability implies continuity. This implication 
requires decision-makers at least to consider the effects of a proliferation of 
similar activities – as Gauteng did in the filling station guideline – as well as the 
end-use of land on which developments take place.
282
 
 
5.1.4 Relationship between the environmental right and other rights 
The relationship between the environmental right and other substantive rights is 
relevant to decision-making when more than one right has a bearing on the 
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decision. In these instances a tension can arise between the rights where they 
appear to compete with each other. The socio-economic inequalities that exist in 
South Africa mean that such tensions are not uncommon. For example, it is often 
argued in applications for authorisation of social infrastructure that the imperative 
to meet basic needs such as housing, access to potable water and electricity are 
immediate priorities which should trump the environmental right.
283
 The tension 
between rights is not limited to such situations and also occurs in respect of 
people’s interests in developing property.  
After the adoption of the Constitution commentators raised concerns that 
the environmental right would yield where it was in apparent conflict with another 
right.
284
 In practice this concern has not materialised and the courts have 
frequently emphasised that that there is no hierarchy amongst the various rights. 
For example, in BP, the court stated that - 
…the constitutional right to environment is on a par with the rights to 
freedom of trade, occupation, profession and property ... . In any dealings 
with the physical expressions property, land and freedom to trade, the 
environmental right requirements should be part and parcel of the factors 
to be considered without any a priori grading of the rights.
285
 
Again, when considering the relationship between the rights to property, 
housing and the environment the court in Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others 
remarked that ‘[t]he right to property is no stronger or weaker than any other 
right’ (Transnet).286 The court’s approach that all rights have the same status 
means that other rights will not automatically trump the environmental right. 
Tensions between different substantive rights must therefore be resolved by 
balancing the rights in the context of the facts of a given situation. A mechanism 
for conducting such balancing exercises is found in the sustainable development 
component of the environmental right. The significance of the concept of 
sustainable development to the resolution of seemingly competing rights was 
expressed by the Constitutional Court in its FRA judgment as follows – 
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…the concept of sustainable development ... offers an important principle 
for the resolution of tensions between the need to protect the environment 
on the one hand, and the need for socio-economic development on the 
other hand. ... [T]he concept of sustainable development provides a 
framework for reconciling socio-economic development and 
environmental protection.
287
 
 When using sustainable development as a balancing mechanism, the courts 
have balanced the extent of the impact and longevity of the impact on the 
environment against the advantage to be gained by limiting the environmental 
right.  
From the Aquarella judgment it appears that where environmental damage 
will be permanent and the impact felt by the broader public, the courts will 
support the limitation of the property right, rather than the environmental right. So 
too, in Transnet, the court indicated that the hardship that the informal settlers 
would experience from being evicted had to be considered in the light of the 
public’s right to an unpolluted environment and the protection of ecologically 
sensitive areas as well as the property owner’s rights.288 Taking these factors into 
consideration, the court decided against the informal settlers, partly because the 
hardship that they would experience on eviction could be addressed in other ways. 
The application of sustainable development as a balancing mechanism in 
these cases implies that the economic hardship that an individual may suffer as a 
consequence of the application of the environmental right is not a factor that will 
automatically persuade a court to balance rights in favour of that individual. In 
certain situations this may seem unfair – especially where an individual has 
already obtained a property right and others have been permitted to exercise 
similar rights in the same area. The court acknowledged this in Self and Others v 
Munisipaliteit van Mosselbaai and Another (Self).
289
  Although not expressly 
considering the environmental right, it held that the hardship could not override 
critical impacts on an ecosystem.
290
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However, where the courts have not been mindful of the requirements of 
sustainable development, different conclusions have been reached. For example, 
in Endangered Wildlife Trust v Gate Development (Pty) Ltd and Others (EWT 
judgment) the court was asked to review the decision of the Mpumalanga 
environmental department to authorise the construction of a golf and trout estate in 
terms of the 1997 EIA Regulations. 
291
 Even though the court was prepared to 
accept that one or more of the grounds of review had merit, it refused to set the 
decision aside. Underlying the court’s decision was the fact that the developer 
would suffer substantial financial losses - even though much of the expenditure 
had occurred after the commencement of the litigation.  
The judgments discussed above have focused on a tension between a 
substantive right and the environmental right. In Petro Props the relationship 
between the right to freedom of expression and the environmental right ought to 
have been central to the dispute. In that case, a public interest group had mounted 
a campaign against a decision of the Gauteng environmental department to 
authorise the construction of a filling station. Petro Props sought an interdict to 
stop the campaign on the basis that the right to freedom of expression undermined 
its property rights. It argued that freedom of expression cannot be exercised in 
such a way that a landowner is negatively affected. It also argued that the public 
participation process provided for in ECA and the EIA Regulations constituted a 
limitation on freedom of expression and the public interest group was therefore 
not entitled to conduct a campaign outside of the process provided for in 
legislation. By way of defence the respondent relied on the environmental right; to 
which Petro Props responded that only government is obliged to give effect to the 
right. 
Petro Props’ arguments were rejected by the court. In respect of Petro 
Props’ first argument, the court noted the chilling effect that a limitation of the 
right to freedom of expression could have on a public interest group’s willingness 
to seek redress of environmental issues. It responded to Petro Props’ reliance on a 
Constitutional Court judgment
292
 by stating that - 
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‘I do not interpret these passages to mean that the demonstration of 
significant prospective economic harm by an applicant will inevitably 
justify the abridgment of the rights of expression of another.’293 
The court also found that Petro Props’ second argument would result in 
absurd consequences as it would result in a general limitation not being applicable 
for the initial period during the application process and then being applicable from 
the date on which the period of appeal expired.
294
 
Whilst the judgment has been criticised for not dealing with the 
relationship between the property, freedom of expression and environmental rights 
explicitly,
295
 it provides a further indication that the courts will not automatically 
allow property rights to triumph over the freedom of expression or environmental 
right. This interpretation means that officials should not necessarily defer 
environmental considerations to other political priorities. In practice this is 
significant as officials can be placed under pressure to approve applications 
related to social infrastructure. The confirmation of the environmental right’s 
status as being on par with other rights gives officials a clear authority not to yield 
to such pressure. Where they have been doing so, their approach must change.  
 
5.2 Administrative justice in environmental decision-making 
 
5.2.1 Public participation in environmental decision-making 
Since 1994 public participation in environmental decisions has increasingly been 
reflected as part of government policy.
296
 These policy positions have 
subsequently been reflected in legislation. The constitutional right to just 
administrative action, which has been amplified by PAJA, establishes a general 
                                                 
293
 Op cit at 187A. 
294
 Op cit at189D – F. 
295
 Loretta Feris ‘Constitutional environmental rights: An under-utilised resource’ (2008) 24 
SAJHR 29. 
296
 This is illustrated by CONNEP where the drafting team of the Green Paper proposed two 
principles relevant to public participation viz the principle of inclusivity which required that the 
interests, needs and values of stakeholders be taken into account in environmental management 
processes and the principle of public participation itself. Green Paper op cit at 28-29 respectively. 
These principles were included – in a slightly modified form – in the White Paper. (See 20–23). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
106 
 
imperative for public participation in all government decision-making. In addition 
to this, the NEMA principles include requirements that – 
The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental 
governance must be promoted, and all people must have the opportunity to 
develop the understanding, skills and capacity for achieving equitable and 
effective participation, and participation by vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups must be ensured. 
… 
Decisions must take into account the interests, needs and values of all 
interested and affected parties, and this includes recognizing all forms of 
knowledge....
297
 
This shift in approach to public participation changed the context and 
manner within which administrative decisions affecting the environment must take 
place. However, whilst legislation and policy clearly require public participation, 
they generally provide limited guidance regarding the implementation of the 
requirement. This has resulted in different interpretations as to what the right to 
public participation means in environmental decision-making processes. 
Government’s interpretation of the requirement of public participation has 
accordingly been challenged in the courts.  
An early divergence of opinion that arose regarding the public 
participation requirement was the extent to which participation opportunities had 
to be afforded during the different stages of a decision-making process. In 1998, 
the court was first asked to consider this matter in Save the Vaal Environment and 
Others v Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another.
298
 The 
case concerned a dispute regarding whether Save the Vaal Environment and the 
other applicants (SAVE) were entitled to make representations on an application 
for a mining licence in terms of section 9 of the Minerals Act, 1991.
299
  
The authorisation procedure for mining activities under the Act involved an 
incremental decision-making process.  Firstly, a decision was made on an 
application for a mining licence in terms of section 9. If a mining licence was 
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granted, the licensee then had to submit an environmental management 
programme to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) for approval in 
terms of section 39 before mining could commence.  
The issue before the courts was whether SAVE was entitled to participate 
all the way through the process ie at both the section 9 and 39 decision-making 
stages. SAVE had requested and been refused an opportunity to make comments 
on the application in terms of section 9. It argued that it was entitled to make 
representations as the audi alteram partem rule applied. (The argument was based 
on the common law rule regarding the right to be heard because the dispute arose 
before the promulgation of PAJA). The court decided the matter in SAVE’s 
favour and the respondents took the decision on appeal (SAVE appeal).
300
  
In arguments before the SCA, counsel for DME conceded that the audi 
alteram partem rule applied to decisions made in terms of section 9.
301
 However 
counsel for the second appellant - the mining company that had applied for the 
mining licence - made three arguments as to why DME was correct in believing 
that SAVE was not entitled to a hearing on section 9 applications.  
The first argument was that section 9 sets out the facts that must be taken 
into account when making a decision on an application for a mining licence. 
Because participation was not included as a requirement the audi alteram partem 
rule was excluded by implication and the DME was not obliged to give SAVE a 
hearing.
302
 The SCA dismissed this argument on the basis that listing the facts that 
must be taken into account when making a decision does not exclude the 
application of the audi alteram partem rule. The court pointed out that if the audi 
rule was excluded whenever legislation indicated certain factors that decision-
makers should be guided by, the principles of natural justice would be 
undermined.
303
  
The second argument raised by counsel for the mining company was that 
the granting of a mining licence in terms of section 9 did not have an 
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environmental impact because mining could only start when the licensee’s 
environmental management programme had been approved in terms of section 39. 
According to this argument, the environmental impact could only eventuate and 
environmental rights could only be infringed at the section 39 decision-making 
stage.
304
  
In response, the SCA held that ‘it is settled law that a mere preliminary 
decision can have serious consequences in particular cases, inter alia, where it 
“…lays the necessary foundation for a possible decision…”’305 In such instances 
the court indicated that the audi alteram partem rule applies to the preliminary 
decision. In the court’s opinion the granting of a mining licence in terms of section 
9 was such an instance.
306
  
The third argument put forward on behalf of the mining company was that 
since the audi alteram partem rule had to be applied to the decision at the section 
39 stage, it would be an ‘unnecessary and costly duplication’ to apply the rule at 
the section 9 stage of the process.
307
 The court found that this argument did not 
take into consideration the different objectives of the two sections. The different 
objectives of the two sections meant that the application of the audi alteram 
partem rule at the section 39 stage would not necessarily meet the objectives of 
section 9. The court’s view on the different objectives was emphasised by the fact 
that the Act entitled DME to grant a temporary authorisation to mine pending a 
section 39 decision. The third argument was accordingly also dismissed by the 
court. 
308
 
The SCA’s unqualified dismissal of the appellant’s attempts to justify 
exclusionary decision-making by officials provides a clear signal that the courts 
will reinforce the obligation of officials to change the approach which had been 
adopted to making decisions prior to 1994, even where legislation does not 
expressly provide for public participation. The SCA expressed this clearly in its 
concluding remarks where it stated that –  
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[o]ur Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental 
justiciable human rights, by necessary implication requires that 
environmental considerations be accorded appropriate recognition and 
respect in the administrative processes in our country. Together with the 
change in the ideological climate must also come a change in our legal 
and administrative approach to environmental concerns.
309
 
The judgment also has implications for the extent of participation that is 
required. In this regard, the SCA stated that participation must be expansive 
enough to ensure that the opportunity afforded to the public provides a meaningful 
opportunity to influence the decision-maker on all issues that interested and 
affected parties (I&APs) may have. A single opportunity to participate at the end 
of an incremental decision-making process will not suffice if there is no real 
prospect of being able to influence the outcome. 
The courts have subsequently considered this issue on two further 
occasions. On these occasions participation was considered in the context of the 
EIA Regulations and PAJA. In both cases the exercise of official discretion in 
respect of the implementation of the public participation requirement to different 
stages of the application process was challenged. 
In the first case, Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Another (Earthlife 
judgment),
310
 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) (Earthlife) requested the court to 
review DEAT’s decision to grant authorisation to Eskom Holdings Limited 
(Eskom) to construct a pebble bed modular reactor as part of its nuclear 
programme. Much of Earthlife’s case related to the way in which its right to 
public participation had been interpreted by DEAT. Earthlife claimed that the 
public participation process was flawed because it did not have access to crucial 
information and documents to which it was entitled and that it needed to make a 
full submission on the application. Earthlife also argued that it was incorrectly 
refused an opportunity to make comments on the final environmental impact 
report (EIR) submitted by Eskom’s consultant as well as an opportunity to make 
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representations directly to the Director-General (DG) of DEAT who was the 
decision-maker on the application.
311
 
Before addressing these arguments, the court disposed of a preliminary 
point raised by the DG and Eskom. The point was that, based on the provisions of 
PAJA, a court may not review an administrative action unless any internal remedy 
provided for in the legislation had been exhausted.
312
 They argued that the appeal 
which Earthlife had made to the Minister against the DG’s decision in terms of the 
ECA had to be disposed of before the court could review the decision. The court 
exercised its powers in terms of PAJA
313
 to exempt Earthlife from exhausting the 
internal remedies. In reaching its decision, the court cited the SAVE appeal 
judgment with approval and reiterated the fact that the audi alteram partem rule is 
not excluded merely because the DG’s decision may result in subsequent 
decisions being taken on that matter.  
The court then considered the issues raised by Earthlife. It did not find it 
necessary to make any decision regarding Earthlife’s complaint that it did not have 
access to all relevant information because of its findings on the other points. The 
court did, however, give detailed attention to the second issue raised by Earthlife 
regarding whether it was entitled t  comment on the final EIR. 
From the judgment it is clear that the DG did not dispute that Earthlife had 
been denied an opportunity to comment on the final EIR.
314
 He also acknowledged 
that a substantial number of additional documents and new information was 
attached to the final EIR.
315
 The DG’s opinion, however, was that Earthlife had no 
right to comment on the final EIR. Several reasons for the DG’s opinion are 
reflected in the judgment. He believed that allowing comments on the final EIR 
would result in the process being long, expensive and ‘never-ending’.316 By 
implication he felt that this was unnecessary since the review panel that had been 
appointed to advise the Department on the application found that the majority of 
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issues raised by I&APs had been adequately addressed.
317
 The DG also justified 
his belief on the basis that Earthlife would be entitled to appeal to the Minister if 
they disagreed with his decision.
318
 Finally, the DG pointed out that the EIA 
Regulations did not provide for public comment after the finalisation of the EIR 
and the process prescribed by the Regulations was therefore fair but different from 
that prescribed by PAJA.
319
 
The court described the DG’s approach as being ‘fundamentally 
unsound’.320 It pointed out that there are two phases to the EIA process, namely, 
the investigation phase and the adjudication phase. The investigation phase entails 
the preparation of documents to support the application by a consultant. The 
adjudicative phase relates to the decision-making process of government. The 
court indicated that the DG’s approach resulted in public participation being 
limited to the investigation phase. It held that the limitation of public participation 
to the investigation stage resulted in procedural unfairness as the final EIR was 
substantially different from the draft EIR. This in turn resulted in the DG’s 
decision being based on substantially different and new information that Earthlife 
had not had an opportunity to comment on. The court accordingly found that the 
EIA Regulations provided for full public participation at both stages and in all 
relevant procedures. The DG’s attempt to limit the participation was accordingly 
held to be incorrect.
321
 
The court also dismissed the argument that Earthlife had access to the final 
EIR and that it was in a position to make comments if it had wished to. In this 
regard, the court stated that because the DG had clearly adopted an attitude that 
Earthlife was not entitled to comment on the final EIR, the purported opportunity 
to make comments on the document would have been ‘meaningless’.322 
The opinion of the DG was motivated in part by the implications that a 
lengthy public participation process can have for adding to administrative burden 
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and the consequent delays in processing applications. In reaching its decision, the 
court took notice of this and also of the Constitutional Court’s view that in the 
context of South Africa being a young democracy which faces challenges in 
respect of transformation, courts should hesitate before imposing onerous 
procedural obligations on Government which will impede its ability to conduct its 
administration efficiently.
323
  
The implications of an extended participation process for the administrative 
burden of DEAT were raised expressly by the DG in response to Earthlife’s claim 
that it was entitled to an opportunity to present its views directly to him. In 
response, the DG stated that ‘it would not only be physically impossible for (him) 
to read each and every page submitted, but it would also be senseless’.324 He 
argued that because of this, he was entitled to rely on summaries and expert advice 
when making his decision. The court was sensitive to the point and indicated that 
in certain circumstances the public would not be entitled to a direct hearing with 
the decision-maker. It found that the application by Eskom was one in which the 
DG would be entitled to rely on summaries and expert advice.
325
 However, it did 
not find in favour of the DG because he had not considered Earthlife’s 
submissions and the court was of the opinion that in this instance the consideration 
of further submissions would not place an undue onus on the Department.
326
  
The judgment reinforces the approach adopted in the SAVE appeal 
judgment that incremental decision-making processes do not mean that public 
participation is excluded from preliminary decisions. However, whereas the 
SAVE appeal judgment was limited to indicating that public participation is 
required at the decision-making phase, the Earthlife judgment expanded this 
approach in two ways. Firstly, it provides clarity regarding the stages when 
participation is required leading up to a decision by introducing a distinction 
between the investigative and adjudicative phases. Secondly, it requires that 
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opportunities for public input must be afforded iteratively if the information which 
is presented to the decision-maker differs from that which the public has already 
commented on. In practice, the public will only know if the information is 
different if they have sight of the final documentation which is submitted to the 
decision-maker. A cautious approach to securing compliance with the 
requirements of the judgment would therefore dictate that an opportunity be 
afforded for the public to comment on all final documentation. 
The TPD considered substantially the same issues a year later in 
Muckleneuk/ Lukasrand Property Owners and Residents Association v The MEC: 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Gauteng Province 
and Others (Muckleneuk).
327
 In that case, the Muckleneuk/ Lukasrand Property 
Owners and Residents Association (residents’ association) requested the court to 
review a decision taken by the Gauteng HOD and confirmed on appeal by the 
MEC to grant authorisation in terms of the EIA Regulations for the development 
of the Gauteng Rapid Rail Link.  
As part of the grounds of review, the resident’s association claimed that the 
HOD and MEC had not met the PAJA requirement of applying their minds. In 
support of this argument, counsel referred to the Earthlife judgment and indicated 
that the participation process must be applied to the investigation and adjudication 
phases. The court rejected the approach adopted in Earthlife.
328
 In departing from 
the judgment, it focused on the facts of the case rather than the principles of 
participation. For example, it indicated that the case was a clear example of why 
there has to be a ‘cut-off period’ to the participatory process. The applicants had 
already made six submissions on the application and the court did not believe a 
further opportunity to make a submission would result in any important additional 
information. A further iteration of the process in the court’s view ‘would just have 
delayed matters.’329 
The reason for the court’s departure from Earthlife centred on its approach 
to the adjudication phase. It compared the EIA application process to the 
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adversarial approach of court proceedings and stated that the submission of the 
final EIR, as the point at which the application is to be decided on by the 
Department, is analogous to a court reserving judgment. The consequence of this 
is that ‘[a]t that stage no one of the parties, in law or in logic, has any further 
right to influence the outcome of the decision.’330  
The analogy overlooks the fact that, unlike EIA applications, in court 
proceedings all parties have the opportunity to present their case directly to the 
judge. Court processes also ensure that all parties know what information is being 
placed before the judge. In the EIA situation, the views of the public are filtered 
through the interpretation of the consultant. The consultant is paid by the applicant 
and the high degree of independence that is required by the EIA Regulations may 
be compromised by the financial relationship between the applicant, as the holder 
of the proverbial purse-strings, and the consultant.
331
  
The jurisprudential approach of the court in Earthlife was not commented 
on by the court. In Earthlife the court’s approach is explained by the following – 
The ordinary principles of fair dealing require that a farmer should be 
able to put his case in his own words before the very man who is to take 
action against him, rather than that he should have to put it before an 
intermediary, who in passing it on may miss out something in his favour or 
give undue emphasis to things that are against him. This is so manifestly 
just and reasonable that the Minister would, I think, in all cases have been 
bound to hear the representations himself, unless the Act authorised him to 
appoint someone else.
332
 
The certainty of the line of reasoning that emerged regarding the 
implementation requirements of public participation has been cast in some doubt 
by the Muckleneuk judgment. All three judgments indicate that Government has 
attempted to limit public participation and to confine it to certain stages or aspects 
of a decision-making process. The reason for adopting this stance in the SAVE 
case was related to the decision-maker’s historical approach that it simply did not 
believe that the views of the public needed to be considered. In Earthlife and 
Muckleneuk, the attempt to limit public participation was motivated, at least in 
part, by concerns that the additional steps in the process would result in 
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administrative burden and delays in processing applications.
333
 The cases therefore 
reveal the tension that can exist between officials’ concerns regarding 
administrative efficacy and the legislative imperative to give effect to democratic 
decision-making.  
The judgments also reveal that in some instances, the courts are willing to 
intervene in this tension and to play a watchdog role in ensuring that the 
transformation of administrative processes takes place in accordance with the 
spirit and intent of the Constitution. However, understanding when the courts will 
be willing to intervene is not predictable. 
The trend of the judgments, with exception of Muckleneuk, is to give an 
expansive approach to public participation. In adopting an expansive approach, the 
courts have given guidance to officials regarding the necessary administrative 
actions and responses that are required to give effect to the new approach to 
procedural rights. Muckleneuk is out of line with the emerging thinking of the 
other two judgments. However, both the Earthlife and Muckleneuk judgments 
were handed down by a full bench of judges and are binding on the courts within 
their respective jurisdictions. Unlike the dispute regarding socio-economic 
considerations where the Constitutional Court ultimately provided a basis for 
consistent approaches across the country, the judgments enable different 
approaches to be adopted to the adjudication phase of public participation until the 
matter is settled by the SCA or Constitutional Court. 
 
5.2.2 Abdication of decision-making 
As sustainable development comprises of social, economic and environmental 
elements, many activities which require authorisation from environmental 
departments often involve a consideration of issues that also fall within the 
legislative competence of other departments. For example, until 2010, water 
legislation was administered by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) as opposed to the environmental departments. In these instances, a 
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person who must obtain an environmental permission may also require 
authorisation from other departments.  
In practice environmental departments have sometimes relied on the 
expertise of other departments to provide input into their decisions. This is not 
objectionable in itself as, apart from constitutional requirements in respect of co-
operative governance, certain legislation such as the EIA Regulations require 
environmental departments to co-ordinate with other departments. However, case 
law reveals that the extent to which an environmental department may draw on the 
expertise of other departments and whether an environmental department is 
entitled to defer aspects of an application for consideration by another department 
has been disputed.  
The issue was first raised, but not decided on, in Earthlife. Six months later 
the issue was raised in the FRA judgment in relation to the way in which the 
Mpumalanga environmental department and MEC, on appeal, had considered 
water and socio-economic impacts.
334
 With regard to the MEC’s consideration of 
the filling station’s potential impact on water resources, the FRA claimed that the 
approach adopted by the MEC amounted to an unauthorised delegation of 
decision-making powers to DWAF.  
The High Court judgment does not clearly set out the FRA’s arguments. 
However, it appears that the Department had referred the application to DWAF. 
As a result of DWAF’s input, the Department had included a condition in the 
authorisation requiring the applicant to obtain the relevant licence from DWAF. 
The court dismissed the FRA’s point on the basis that the Department had made a 
decision and then requested DWAF to formulate conditions to mitigate the impact 
of the development on water.
335
 Although the issue was raised directly, the manner 
in which the point was argued by the FRA did not require the court to grapple with 
the extent to which the Department was entitled to rely on the expertise of DWAF 
or whether the Department itself had to be satisfied that there was no impact on 
the water. 
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In the appeal to the SCA, the court considered the FRA’s argument that the 
inclusion of the condition which required the applicant to obtain a licence from 
DWAF had the effect of delegating the decision to DWAF. The FRA argued that 
this action was a violation of PAJA. The court found that the provision of PAJA 
that was relied on by the FRA was not applicable. Like the High Court, the SCA 
found that the Department had made a decision and then required the applicant to 
obtain a licence from DWAF.
336
 It also did not provide much clarity on the nature 
of the relationship between different departments in EIA decision-making. 
In the FRA CC judgment, the way in which the Department had considered 
the potential impact of the proposed filling station on water was not raised. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court commented with concern on the approach 
which the Department and DWAF had adopted as follows - 
 … one would have expected that the environmental authorities and Water 
Affairs and Forestry would conduct a thorough investigation into the 
possible impact of the installation of petrol tanks in the vicinity of the 
borehole, in particular, in light of the existence of other filling stations in 
the vicinity. The environmental authorities did not consider the cumulative 
effect of the proliferation of filling stations on the aquifer.
337
  
These remarks show that the Constitutional Court did not object to DWAF 
providing input to environmental decisions or to the departments adopting a 
collaborative approach. However, the remarks also suggest that whilst the 
protection of water resources may lie with both authorities, the court requires that 
an environmental department must to be satisfied itself that the potential impacts 
of a proposed development may or may not eventuate. An environmental 
department is accordingly directly responsible for discharging its environmental 
mandate and is not entitled to abdicate its decision-making responsibilities to 
another department. 
Ironically, although the MEC had successfully countered the FRA’s direct 
arguments that they had delegated their responsibility in respect of water impacts 
in the High Court and SCA, the Constitutional Court was required to consider the 
matter further as a result of the defence put forward by the MEC to the FRA’s 
allegation that they had not considered the socio-economic impacts of the 
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application. The MEC’s defence was that the local authority is responsible for 
considering rezoning applications and is obliged to consider the need and 
desirability of an application. The Department’s practice was therefore to accept 
that socio-economic factors had been considered by the local authority where 
rezoning rights have been granted. In other words, the MEC’s opinion was that 
where there is an overlap of departmental functions, the environmental department 
does not need to reconsider any aspect of an application which another department 
has already decided on.  
The High Court had supported the MEC’s views and indicated that the 
Department’s approach supported intergovernmental co-ordination and 
consistency. In justifying its finding, the High Court pointed out that in terms of 
the Constitution, departments may not usurp the functions of another department 
and noted that it could not have been the intention of the legislation to provide for 
potentially conflicting views to be reached by different authorities.
338
  
The High Court does not appear to have considered the fact that the 
rezoning decision had been taken eight years before the EIA decision nor that the 
decision had been taken before NEMA was promulgated. Furthermore, by 
referring to ‘the need and sustainability test’ which the local authority had applied 
to the application, as opposed to the need and desirability enquiry which is 
required by the rezoning legislation, the court appears to have accepted that the 
enquiry encompassed all the relevant factors contemplated by the environmental 
legislation. This is despite the fact that environmental legislation introduced new 
decision-making requirements for environmental matters. The implication of the 
High Court judgment is that an environmental department’s power to consider a 
specific issue is negated where another government department has taken that 
issue into consideration in a prior, albeit different, decision-making process.  
The SCA upheld the judgment of the High Court. It found that the MEC 
had applied her mind to socio-economic impacts by having regard to the fact that 
the local authority had considered those issues. The SCA’s finding was influenced 
by the fact that there was no additional or new information which suggested that 
the decision of the local authority was flawed. Like the High Court, the SCA did 
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not compare the objectives of the rezoning legislation and the environmental 
legislation. This omission resulted in it equating the need and desirability enquiry 
with the consideration of socio-economic impacts that was required by the EIA 
Regulations. The SCA also did not consider the fact that the approach which it 
adopted could limit the rights of public participation provided for in the EIA 
Regulations as the public would effectively be denied the opportunity of being 
heard by the decision-maker in the environmental application. 
The Constitutional Court, however, did consider many of these points and 
consequently reached a different conclusion. It considered both the FRA’s 
arguments and the MEC’s responses. In the Constitutional Court case the FRA 
argued that the Department was obliged to conduct an enquiry on the socio-
economic impacts of the proposed filling station itself. This enquiry was broader 
than the need and desirability enquiry which is conducted by local authorities in 
respect of rezoning applications as it included, for example, cumulative 
impacts.
339
 The MEC did not dispute that they had not taken socio-economic 
impacts into account. However, the MEC attempted to counteract the FRA’s 
arguments by reasoning that she was entitled to rely on the local authority process 
as that process could be considered to be part of the environmental application 
process. To do otherwise could result in different departments considering the 
same issue and reaching conflicting decisions. 
The MEC’s reasoning was rejected on several accounts. The court started 
its judgment by addressing the relationship between the socio-economic enquiry 
required in terms of the EIA Regulations and the need and desirability enquiry that 
a local authority is required to conduct in respect of rezoning applications. It found 
that the MEC was incorrect in assuming that it was the same enquiry as the 
different perspectives which townplanning and environmental departments must 
take into account could result in an application meeting the requirements of need 
and desirability for townplanning purposes but not from an environmental 
perspective.  
Apart from the differences between the two enquiries, the court noted that 
the MEC accepted the decision of the local authority without having sight of any 
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documentation which justified the need and desirability of the rezoning 
application. The court held that the consequence of this was that – 
[t]hey left the consideration of this vital aspect of their environmental 
obligation entirely to the local authority. This in my view is manifestly not 
a proper discharge of their statutory duty. This approach to their 
obligations, in effect, amounts to unlawful delegation of their duties to the 
local authority.
340
 
The court stressed further that the requirement to consider socio-economic 
impacts is a mandatory and material requirement which the Department itself was 
obliged to consider. The failure of the Department to consider socio-economic 
impacts meant that ‘the environmental authorities failed to perform the very 
function which they were required by law to perform.’341 The fact that this would 
result in two departments considering the same issue with the potential for 
conflicting decisions was, in the court’s opinion, a consequence authorised by 
law.
342
  
Finally, the court pointed out that the cont xt within which the local 
authority had made its decision had changed. A long period of time had elapsed 
between the rezoning decision and the EIA decision and the environmental 
legislation had changed. These two factors alone would have required a 
reassessment of the socio-economic impacts.
343
 
The implication of the Constitutional Court judgment is that although an 
environmental department is entitled to draw on the views of other departments, it 
must be mindful that the mandates and objectives of the departments may differ. It 
must therefore conduct its own enquiry on the factors that it is obliged to take into 
account by legislation. A second consequence of the judgment is that it provides 
clarity on the scope of an environmental department’s mandate. Where more 
powerful departments attempt to limit the impact of environmental departments’ 
influence on matters falling within their mandate, the judgment provides clear 
authority for refuting such territorial or undermining behaviour.  
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5.2.3 Giving reasons for decisions 
Furnishing adequate reasons for an administrative decision is an important 
mechanism for increasing the accountability of departments to the public. It both 
enables the public to understand why a decision has been taken and increases the 
ability to challenge decisions where the reasons provided are flawed. Although 
furnishing reasons is now a requirement of legislation such as PAJA and the EIA 
Regulations, the legislation does not provide detailed guidance on how to 
discharge this obligation.
344
 Officials accordingly have some discretion regarding 
how they interpret the legislation. Challenges to the exercise of this discretion 
have resulted in the courts considering the interpretation of the legislative 
provisions and providing some guidance as to what will, or will not, constitute 
adequate reasons.  
In Turnstone Trading the issue of vague reasons was considered. In that 
case the MEC provided her reasons for dismissing an appeal in a two page 
document, much of which pertained to the details of the appeal. The court held 
that the reasons were very general and did not constitute adequate reasons as 
contemplated in PAJA. It accordingly found that the applicant was entitled to 
request further reasons. The court obviously required a greater degree of 
specificity than what the MEC provided, but did not explain what criteria it had 
used for assessing the adequacy of the reasons. It therefore left the question of the 
extent of the specificity that is required open.  
The danger of using generic or existing reasons was made apparent in 
Hentru.
345
 In that case, the reasons that the MEC gave for dismissing an appeal 
were identical to those that were given by the HOD in making the initial decision. 
The court indicated that this gave rise to the impression that the MEC had not 
reconsidered the matter independently.
346
 The use by the MEC of the HOD’s 
reasons, together with the fact that the MEC did not mention the additional expert 
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reports which had been filed on appeal, resulted in the court holding that the MEC 
had not applied her mind properly to the appeal.  
The court also commented on the HOD’s reasons for refusing the 
application. The Department had indicated early on in the application process that 
it did not support the application for certain reasons. The applicant gave responses 
as to why those reasons should not be applied to the application in question. The 
court noted that the HOD did not address the applicant’s responses in her 
reasons.
347
 This factor contributed to the court’s ruling to set the decision aside. 
The implication of the judgment is that when furnishing reasons, a decision-maker 
should indicate the relevant information which has been placed before them and 
provide a response as to why they were not persuaded by submissions that have 
been made. 
Whilst these two cases provide an indication of when reasons will not be 
adequate, they do not provide a clear test or set of criteria against which the 
adequacy of reasons can be measured. The judgments accordingly do not provide 
comprehensive guidance to officials on what is required to discharge the 
legislative obligation to furnish reasons. 
A clear test was, however, applied in Self.  In that case, Self applied for a 
municipality’s decision to approve the building plans of a house on his 
neighbouring property to be set aside. One of his grounds of review was that the 
building would have an unacceptable environmental impact. The court scrutinised 
the reasons given by the municipality for deciding to approve the building plans 
and applied the test set out in Ansett Transport Industries (operations) Pty Ltd and 
Another v Wraith and Others
348
 as cited in Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others v Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd as well as the comments made 
by the court in the Bato Star Fishing matter on the test.
349
 
The test in Ansett was formulated as follows – 
Even though I may not agree with it, I now understand why the decision 
went against me. I am now in a position to decide whether that decision 
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has involved an unwarranted finding of fact, or an error of law, which is 
worth challenging.
350
 
The court in Self also cited extracts of the Bato Star judgment which 
expanded the Ansett test. These extracts included the fact that the adequacy of 
reasons will depend on the facts of each case. However, to meet the requirements 
of the Ansett test a decision-maker must set out the legislative basis for the 
decision, the factual considerations and the reasoning that resulted in the decision-
maker’s conclusion.  
The municipality’s reasons merely stated that it had taken the relevant 
provisions of NEMA into account. The court found that by placing the minimum 
amount of information before the court and only a statement that NEMA had been 
taken into account, it was not clear how environmental impacts had actually been 
considered by the municipality. It accordingly held that the reasons furnished by 
the municipality did not meet the criteria set out in Bato Star Fishing.
351
 Reliance 
on a bald reference to legislation or the wording of legislation alone will therefore 
not constitute compliance with the requirement of furnishing adequate reasons. 
The Ansett test was used again in the Muckleneuk judgment.
352
 In that 
instance the MEC had provided reasons for dismissing an appeal by the residents 
association. The residents association subsequently submitted a request for more 
detailed reasons in a 24 page document, which the court described as a 
questionnaire,
353
 and a equest for information in terms of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act.
354
 In deciding whether the reasons given by the MEC 
were adequate, the court also applied the Ansett test as cited in Bato Star Fishing.  
It relied only on the Ansett test, however, and did not refer to the additional clarity 
provided by the court in the Bato Star Fishing judgment. 
355
 
In the court’s opinion, the request for further reasons was ‘a myriad of 
argumentative questions, mainly enquiring why the proposals of the applicants 
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have not been accepted.’ It also remarked that the request was in fact seeking to 
obtain information for the purposes of reviewing the decision.
356
 The reasons 
given by the MEC were held to be adequate because she had indicated that she 
was satisfied that all economic, social and environmental factors had been taken 
into account. The judgment indicates that there are limitations that may be 
imposed on an affected party’s request for reasons. This view is pragmatic, but in 
the absence of guidance regarding when limitations may be imposed, it provides 
limited direction to environmental departments. It also casts some doubt regarding 
the extent to which a party is entitled to know why their submission has not been 
accepted. Extracts of the reasons that were given by the MEC were not quoted in 
the judgment. However, if the reasons were as general as indicated in the 
judgment, the court adopted a less stringent approach than it had in the Hentru 
matter.  
 
5.3 The use of administrative guidelines as tools for decision-
making 
Administrative guidelines can be useful tools for supporting consistent and 
efficient decision-making. For the three environmental departments in this study 
they offer an additional benefit of ensuring that the cumulative environmental 
impacts that arise from a series of individual authorisation decisions are addressed 
at a strategic level. In view of these advantages it is not surprising that the courts 
have generally indicated support for the use of administrative guidelines 
developed by environmental departments. For example, in BP
357
 the court 
remarked that –  
There are clearly circumstances in which a state organ such as the 
Department ..., would wish to formulate a particular policy to guide the 
exercise of its discretionary powers …. The adoption of a guiding policy is 
not only legally permissible but in certain circumstances may be both 
practical and desirable.
358
 
Notwithstanding the potential utility of guidelines, their adoption overtly 
signals an intention by departments to exercise their discretion in decision-making 
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in a certain way. Where a guideline effectively provides an early warning that 
discretion will be exercised in a manner which impedes people’s ability to develop 
or undertake certain activities, they are particularly vulnerable to challenge. In the 
case of the filling station guideline discussed in section 5.2.2, for example, there 
was a clear reluctance by some affected parties to accept the guideline.  
Apart from the inclusion of socio-economic factors, the draft filling station 
guideline proposed a so-called distance rule of 5 kilometres. The effect of the rule 
was that departmental approval would generally not be given for a new filling 
station where it would be located within a 5 kilometre driving distance of an 
existing filling station. As noted previously, the FRA had a direct interest in 
preventing the proliferation of new filling stations. In support of its position that 
the final guideline should retain the distance rule, the FRA furnished the 
department with documentation to show that existing filling stations were 
operating at marginal levels.
359
 By contrast, most oil companies objected to the 
distance rule on the basis that it would have a significant negative impact on their 
ability to expand operations.
360
 They accordingly lobbied officials and politicians 
to remove or relax the distance rule.
361
 When the final filling station guideline was 
issued the distance rule was retained, but relaxed from five kilometres to three 
kilometres.
362
  
The litigation which followed the application of the filling station guideline 
focused as much on the distance rule as it did on the consideration of socio-
economic factors. During the period when the filling station judgments were 
handed down, the courts also had cause to consider challenges to the use of the 
environmental administrative guidelines in several other cases. In consequence 
there is now a substantial body of case law which provides guidance on the court’s 
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powers to review guidelines as well as the requirements for developing and 
implementing guidelines. These aspects are discussed in more detail below.  
 
5.3.1 The power of the courts to review guidelines  
In terms of PAJA the powers given to the courts to provide relief in respect of 
government actions arises only if the action is an administrative action as defined 
in section 1 of the Act. The application of PAJA to administrative guidelines was 
considered by the court in Sasol. The court’s assessment focused on whether the 
filling station guideline fell within the ambit of the definition of administrative 
action.  
A requirement of the definition is that the action has ‘direct external legal 
effect’.363 The court held that direct legal effect means that the act of an official 
affects a person’s rights and that that effect has an element of finality. The finality 
criterion means that the court can only review the final decision that impacts on a 
person’s rights. If the finality criterion is not established the decision is not ‘ripe’ 
for review.
364
 The court found that the filling station guideline did not meet the 
requirement of finality as the direct impact of the guideline only manifests when a 
decision is made based on the guideline. The court accordingly held that the filling 
station guideline did not constitute an administrative action as contemplated by 
PAJA and that the court did not have the power to grant an order declaring the 
guideline to be ultra vires.
365
  
In reaching its decision, the court did not consider the guidance on  
incremental decision-making which was provided in the SAVE appeal judgment. 
It also did not discuss the court’s powers in terms of the common law. According 
to the court’s reasoning, guidelines can only be challenged when they are applied 
to a decision. They cannot be challenged per se unless the guideline is 
unconstitutional.. This approach curtails the ambit of the courts to control the 
abuse of government power in the development of guidelines.  
                                                 
363
 Sasol judgment op cit at 170E. 
364
 Ibid at 170G. 
365
 The court at 171C remarked that if it had the power, it would have issued a declarator that the 
guidelines were largely irrelevant because the MEC had misconstrued her powers. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
127 
 
In BP the court did not consider the application of PAJA expressly. 
However, it is clear from the judgment that the court held a different opinion 
regarding its powers to review guidelines. In the BP judgment the court found that 
the guideline was compatible with the Department’s legislative mandate.366 This 
assessment indicates that the court was of the opinion that it had at least the power 
to make a finding as to whether the guidelines were legally permissible.  
Once the court reached the conclusion that it was entitled to review the 
guideline, it followed that it was also prepared to consider the procedural aspects 
of the development and application of guidelines. In this regard, the court accepted 
that it is a requirement that a guideline must be communicated to a person who 
will be affected by it and that it must not be applied rigidly.
367
 The court was also 
willing to accept a lesser form of communication than publication in a government 
gazette, which is the usual practice for the communication of official regulatory 
documents. (The requirement against rigidity is discussed in section 5.3.2 below). 
The court in BP construed its powers to be wider than it had done in Sasol 
with the result that conflicting views were expressed by the same court on its 
powers to review guidelines. The MEC appealed the court’s decision in Sasol after 
the BP judgment had been handed down.
368
 During the Sasol appeal proceedings, 
Sasol counter appealed the court a quo’s refusal to grant a declaratory order 
holding the filling station guidelines to be ultra vires. The SCA followed the 
reasoning of the BP judgment. Citing the Constitutional Court judgment of Bato 
Star Fishing
369
 with approval, it confirmed that courts should defer to the policy 
decisions of decision-makers, but also that a court has the power to establish 
whether a guideline is aligned with the legislative mandate. It also confirmed that 
the court has the power to test whether the requirements of communication to 
affected parties and flexibility in the application of a guideline have been adhered 
to.
370
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The judgment in the Sasol appeal retains the power of the courts to review 
administrative guidelines. However, it means that the courts will generally limit 
their enquiries to the legality of a guideline; whether the guideline has been 
communicated to a person who will be affected by it and whether the guideline 
has been applied rigidly. The courts will therefore generally defer to government 
on matters of policy. 
 
5.3.2 Implementation of guidelines 
The filling station guideline judgments reiterate the common law position that 
guidelines may not be implemented in a rigid and inflexible manner. This 
requirement means that a decision-maker need not justify the rationale and 
requirements of the guideline in each application. However, the decision-maker 
must be open to submissions that the guideline should not apply to a particular 
case.
371
 The effect of this is that the onus is on an applicant seeking a departure 
from a guideline ‘to demonstrate that there is something exceptional in his or her 
case that warrants a departure from the policy.’372  
The rule that a guideline must not be applied rigidly raises questions 
regarding how a decision-maker must deal with an objection that is made to the 
application of a guideline. Broad guidance was provided by the court in Vorster & 
Another v The Department Economical Development, Environment and Tourism: 
Limpopo Provincial Government  (Vorster)
373
 where the court stated that – 
[a]s far as the application of a policy is concerned, such would not 
preclude the proper exercise of a discretion as long as the relevant 
functionary is independently satisfied that the particular policy is 
appropriate to a particular case, and thus not consider it to be a binding 
rule irrespective of factual circumstances.
374
   
In terms of the guidance provided in the Vorster judgment a decision-
maker must apply their mind to objections to the application of a guideline. There 
are two criteria that must be met to discharge this obligation. Firstly, it must be 
demonstrated that the decision-maker was not prevented from considering an 
                                                 
371
 See BP op cit at 154B. 
372
 Sasol appeal judgment op cit at 491B – D. 
373
 2006 (5) SA 291 (T). 
374
 Ibid at 298H. 
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objection favourably. Sometimes the wording of the guideline will assist in 
rebutting allegations that a guideline had to be applied rigidly. For example, in BP 
the court noted that the guideline contains ‘an introductory sentence that filling 
stations will “generally” not be approved for the reasons stated thereafter.’375 It 
found that this sentence indicated that the guideline was not considered to be a 
rigid rule.
376
  
The second criterion is triggered where there is no evidence that a decision-
maker is prevented from exercising flexibility. This criterion involves a factual 
enquiry of whether the decision-maker actually applied their mind as to whether 
the objections justify a deviation from the guideline. Case law provides some 
guidance regarding the conduct that is expected to discharge this criterion. In 
Mitchell and Another NO v Mpumalanga Parks Board and Another,
377
 the court 
indicated that a decision-maker will not be expected to depart from the approach 
set out in the guideline where the person seeking the departure has not made a 
clear case and justification for the deviation. In that case the applicant applied for 
permits to keep lion cubs on its farm. The Mpumalanga Parks Board declined the 
application on the basis that it had a policy that no captive big cats could be 
imported into the province and additionally that it supported the national 
moratorium on the establishment of new lion holding and breeding facilities.
378
 
The applicant reapplied for permission and the Parks Board requested additional 
information on the basis of discussions with several relevant experts. Further 
communication was exchanged, the result of which was that the Parks Board was 
not satisfied that the information requested had been adequately provided.
379
  
Mitchell approached the court for a review of the first refusal to grant 
permission and a review of what it believed was a constructive refusal on the 
second application. The court found that the Parks Board’s request for further 
information was to enable it to assess whether it should deviate from its policy. On 
                                                 
375
 Ibid at 137B–C. 
376
 At 137C. 
377
 (T) Case No 14549/02 9 July 2004, unreported. 
378
 At 4. 
379
 At 6.  
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appeal, the court upheld the court a quo’s decision to dismiss the application.380 In 
the appeal decision, the court held that the application was so lacking in substance 
that it would have been irresponsible for the Parks Board to grant it.
381
 In this case 
the Parks Board met the test of showing that it was willing to consider a deviation 
by requesting information from Mitchell on which it could base its decision. These 
judgments show that decision-makers are not expected to give undue attention to a 
request for deviation from a guidance which is not properly substantiated. 
Other guidance was given in the Hentru judgment. It will be recalled that 
Hentru requested the court to review and set aside the decision of the HOD to 
refuse an application in terms of the EIA Regulations for a housing development. 
One of the arguments that Hentru put forward to the court related to the HOD’s 
reliance on the Gauteng Agricultural Potential Atlas as a determinant of the soil 
value.
382
 The Atlas describes the land in question as being of moderate to high 
agricultural value. Specialists for the applicant disagreed with the value ascribed 
to the soil in the Atlas and described the soil potential as being low to moderate.
383
 
As a legislative objective, the Department was opposed to allowing the loss of 
agricultural land. The court found that the HOD’s adherence to the policy was not 
justified as the land units were too small to provide for sustainable agriculture.
384
 
The implication of the judgment is that where an objection is substantiated, the 
actual facts surrounding an application must be considered. In view of the 
reasoning of the judgment, it is likely that a decision-maker may be expected to 
deviate from a guideline where adherence to the strict requirements of the 
guideline will not result in the objectives of the guideline being achieved.  
 
                                                 
380
 Mitchell and Another NO v Mpumalanga Parks Board and Another (T) Case No 
A1888/2004 5 June 2006, unreported. 
381
 At 3.  
382
 Gauteng Provincial Government (2002). 
383
 Op cit at para 90. 
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 At para 91. 
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5.3.3 The scope and extent of application of guidelines 
The final issue that emerges from the judgments is whether guidelines can be 
developed in respect of specific legislative provisions and whether only the 
authority that has adopted the guideline may use it. 
The question regarding the scope of the legislative mandate to pass 
guidelines was considered in HTF.
385
 The dispute in HTF arose because the 
Gauteng environmental department served an enforcement notice in terms of 
section 31A on HTF. The enforcement notice required HTF to cease its 
development activities, inter alia, because it conflicted with the department’s 
ridges policy.
386
 The ridges policy is a general policy which sets out the 
department’s approach to the management and protection of ridges. The policy 
can be given effect to in part through decisions made in terms of the EIA 
Regulations. However, not all activities that impact on ridges fall within the ambit 
of the regulations or any other specific legislative provisions. In order for the 
objectives of the policy to be achieved, it therefore requires a broad application 
which cannot always be linked to a specific legislative prohibition or 
obligation..
387
 
In support of its review application HTF argued that the department had 
incorrectly relied on its ridges policy in the enforcement notice as the policy had 
no statutory force. The court found that the ridges policy was compatible with the 
objectives of the environmental right and the principles of sustainable 
development set out in NEMA. It accordingly held that the department was 
entitled to enforce the ridges policy through the general enforcement mechanism 
provided for in section 31A.
388
  
This judgment means that the environmental right and the principles set out 
in NEMA may now be viewed as providing a broad mandate for the development 
of general guidelines on environmental protection. The effect of this is that 
guidelines need not necessarily be linked to decisions that are made on 
                                                 
385
 Op cit.  
386
 Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs Development 
Guidelines forRridges 19 April 2001. 
387
 Op cit at 523, paras 32–33. 
388
 The decision was overturned on appeal by the SCA and upheld by the Constitutional Court. 
The guideline was not considered on appeal. 
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applications. The judgment has accordingly expanded the use of guidelines to 
include serving as a tool for general environmental enforcement. This approach 
elevates the status of guidelines to quasi-legislation as a flexible rule can be 
created without a specific legislative provision being in place. It has far-reaching 
implications as, for example, a developer who does not require authorisation in 
terms of legislation or who is not expressly prohibited from undertaking an 
activity must still assess whether the proposed activity will conflict with 
departmental guidelines or risk exposure to enforcement actions.  
The jurisdictional application of a guideline was considered by the court in 
Turnstone Trading.
389
 In that case Turnstone Trading argued that the 
environmental department in Mpumalanga should have taken the Gauteng filling 
station guideline into account in reaching its decision to authorise the construction 
of a filling station in terms of the EIA Regulations. The court remarked that any 
relevant document that is submitted as part of the application process should be 
considered.
390
 It specifically noted that, because decision-making in terms of the 
EIA Regulations is so complex, the Mpumalanga department was entitled to take 
the Gauteng guidelines into consideration, but that it was not obliged to do so.
391
 
The court did not express an opinion on the weight that should be given to 
guidelines that do not emanate from the authority in question. The ability of 
departments to take guidelines passed by other departments into consideration 
provides a platform for streamlining decisions nationally and for avoiding a 
duplication of effort in the development of guidelines. Conversely, it requires 
environmental departments to take guidelines into consideration which are not of 
their making and in which they may have had no input.  
 
                                                 
389
 Op cit. 
390
 At para 19. 
391
 Ibid.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
133 
 
5.4 The courts and environmental jurisprudence –  missed 
opportunities and mistakes 
The extent of the changes that are required in environmental decision-making and 
the difficulties that officials have faced emerge from the discussion above. For 
example, it is clear that the existence of interpretative spaces has resulted in 
different approaches and practices being adopted by environmental departments. 
This is most evident in the diametrically opposing approaches which the 
Mpumalanga and Gauteng environmental departments adopted to the role of 
socio-economic factors in environmental decision-making. 
Differences such as these have real consequences for the public. It is 
clearly unacceptable that a person in one geographical area has, by accident of 
political boundaries, more or less rights than a person in another area. The courts 
therefore have a significant role to play in reconciling different interpretations, 
facilitating consistent public administration and providing clarity that can guide 
the public administration’s transition to democratic and accountable governance. 
In some instances they have done this successfully, in others not. 
Environmental decisions are complex ones, even for officials who have the 
requisite training and experience to make them. They are arguably more so for 
judges, most of whom have only sporadic exposure to environmental disputes and 
no technical background in environmental management. These constraints have 
resulted in several researchers questioning the extent to which the courts have the 
ability to make a substantive impact on environmental decisions. Tarlock, for 
example, believes that since the 1970’s the court in America has been ineffective 
in protecting the environment because it engages in ‘hyperactive passivity’ to 
minimise its influence on environmental disputes.
 392
 If that view is indicative of a 
particular judicial culture, Tarlock makes other points which have more 
generalised application. He argues, for instance, that the risks, uncertainties and 
scientific complexity associated with environmental decisions mean that courts are 
ill-equipped to review government decisions.
 
In consequence the case specific 
                                                 
392A Dan Tarlock ‘The future of environmental “rule of law” litigation’ (2000) 17 2 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 237. See also Craig Anthony Arnold and Leigh A Jewell 
‘Litigation’s bounded effectiveness and the real public trust doctrine: The aftermath of the 
Mono Lake Case’ (2001-2002) 8 1 Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law 
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nature of each decision involving both technical and value-based intricacies leads 
judges to focus on procedural matters rather than the merits – an approach which 
Bazelon, judge of the US Court of Appeal, concedes. 
393
  
Even where judgments are made on the merits, the individual 
characteristics of each decision have obvious implications for the ability to 
extrapolate general principles which can be applied to other decisions. This is 
illustrated by Farber’s findings that, where the US Supreme Court has decided 
disputes on narrow technical grounds, the judgments have had limited impact on 
the development of environmental law.
394
  
It is therefore likely that judgments on environmental matters may by their 
nature suffer from more disadvantages than other judgments which deal with 
routine decision-making. The conflicting judgments identified in the analysis, 
such as those relating to the consideration of socio-economic factors and the 
requirements of public participation, certainly show that judges in South Africa 
have experienced challenges in developing a new cohesive environmental 
jurisprudence. The judgments reveal that the courts are also adapting to the 
implications of the rights-based approach in judicial decision-making. In particular 
some judgments reveal that the resolution of the dispute was based on traditional 
administrative law approaches rather than locating the dispute within the context 
of the environmental right.  
This is clearly illustrated in All the Best, Senekal, FRA and EWT. In these 
instances circumstantial considerations weighed more heavily than the 
requirements of the environmental right. For example, in All the Best and Senekal 
the court’s seeming scepticism regarding the competitive advantage that was to be 
gained from environmental litigation overshadowed the dispute whereas in the 
FRA High Court judgment the court’s desire to avoiding requiring a duplicate 
administrative process led it to overlook the specific requirements of the 
environmental right. In EWT, the court acknowledged that at least some of the 
grounds of review merited the decision being set aside. However, the judge’s 
consideration of the financial expenditure which had taken place largely after 
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 Judge David L Bazelon ‘The impact of the courts on public administration’ (1976 – 1977) 
52 Indiana Law Journal 101 at 107. 
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 Daniel A Farber ‘Is the Supreme Court irrelevant? Reflections of the judicial role in 
environmental law’ (1996 – 1997) 81 Minnesota Law Review 547. 
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litigation was initiated, held more sway than the accepted environmental impacts 
that would eventuate.  
In these judgments the courts failed to interpret the dispute through the 
prism of the constitutional rights as is required. Doing so ought to have lead to a 
different conclusion. For instance when the Constitutional Court reconsidered the 
FRA judgments and embedded the dispute in the context of the environmental 
right, its findings were markedly different and the emphasis of the judgment 
shifted from procedural defensibility to the environmental consequences of the 
dispute.  
In other instances, a lack of purposive interpretation has arguably resulted 
in simply incorrect or impractical interpretations of the law. Two such examples in 
which the environmental consequences of the court’s decision were overlooked 
are explored in greater depth in Chapter 8. In the first, Bareki NO and Another v 
Gencor Ltd and Others
395
 (Bareki), the court declined to apply an enforcement 
provision of NEMA retrospectively, despite clear wording to that effect in the Act. 
In consequence, officials were prevented from using a key legislative mechanism 
for addressing historical pollution problems. In the second, HTF Developers (Pty) 
Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (HTF 
SCA),
396
 the SCA’s requirement that draft compliance notices issued in terms of 
section 31A of ECA be published for comment prevented any reliance on section 
31A for addressing urgent environmental incidents. 
Judgments such as these have several implications for the extent to which 
the judiciary has an impact on decision-making. On the one hand, it is speculated 
that these judgments slowed the emergence of a comprehensive environmental 
jurisprudence and reduces the courts’ potential contribution to the realisation of 
environmental justice. On the other, they have direct implications for the courts’ 
impact on decision-making. For both Wasby and Halliday an inability to extract 
principles of general application is a significant barrier to impact.
397
 Furthermore, 
such judgments require extra effort to be expended by departments in responding 
to the judgments. 
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5.5 Potential impacts on the public administration of the 
environment 
Notwithstanding the negative impacts that may flow from the judgments discussed 
in the previous section, the analysis also reveals certain norms or trends that ought 
to have positive consequences for the quality of environmental decisions. The 
consideration by the courts of the substantive nature of environmental decision-
making confirms that environment has a broad meaning. The inclusion of socio-
economic considerations and the linkage of the right to well-being, 
intergenerational equity and sustainable development requires a broader range of, 
sometimes ‘soft’, factors to be taken into consideration when discharging the 
environmental function than in the past. In some instances this may confirm 
existing departmental approaches. In others it requires departments to expand 
practices to include additional factors their decision-making.  
With regard to the process of decision-making, the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling on abdication of decision-making now requires environmental departments 
to deal with the full spectrum of environmental factors. This ruling may have 
implications for the existing capacity and expertise of environmental departments. 
However, it also has another less apparent consequence. It asserts that the 
environmental departments’ mandate involves an overarching function and that 
environmental departments are not excluded from exercising that function where 
there is an overlap of functions with another department. This ruling strengthens 
the reach of environmental department’s control. Since environmental 
departments have historically been weak, 
398
 this may be an important affirmation. 
The judgments also show that the courts are relatively consistent in 
requiring that there is no abdication of decision-making within a department. In 
other words, decision-making responsibilities cannot ordinarily be discharged on a 
piecemeal basis by different individuals in the department. The extent of the 
consideration required by a decision-maker is, however, less certain. For example, 
in Hentru and Self there is a departure from the common law requirement that 
gross unreasonableness be demonstrated before the merits of a decision are 
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reviewed. However, other judgments such as Senekal appear to accept the 
decision-maker’s statement that they have considered an issue with limited 
scrutiny.  
Rational application of mind by a decision-maker is primarily 
demonstrated by the reasons that are given for a decision. Judgments such as 
Turnstone Trading and Hentru emphasise that reasons are an important part of 
environmental justice and that any reasons that are given must be clear and those 
of the decision-maker themselves. Compliance with these requirements also 
reflects the willingness of a decision-maker to accept transparent government. If 
the courts continue to follow this approach, it will most likely require a change in 
some environmental departments regarding the rigour and transparency with 
which decisions are made. Such changes have consequences for the administrative 
time that is spent processing a decision.  
In addition, the judgments reinforce the approach that not only must 
environmental departments consider a broad range of issues but, in most instances, 
they must ensure that they solicit comments on those issues. The majority of 
judgments on the requirements of public participation show that the courts will 
resist attempts by environmental departments to constrict the procedural rights of 
the public. Departments who have not followed the approach of the courts to date 
will be required to provide opportunities for more expansive and iterative 
participation.  
These norms suggest that changes in administrative practices are required, 
many of which may have consequences for the speed at which decisions are made. 
Other findings which confirm existing practices, such as those on the use of 
guidelines, may contribute to enhanced administrative efficiency through 
increased confidence and more frequent use of those practices by departments. 
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6. The influence of political and institutional 
factors on impact  
 
Discretion has become an increasing feature of public administration 
because elected bodies cannot practically undertake all administrative tasks 
themselves. Discretion also provides for flexibility in the implementation of 
legislation, which is presumed to facilitate results that are more equitable and 
appropriately tailored to the circumstances. However, as soon as discretion is 
included in the normative framework, a lack of certainty is introduced. Decisions 
are no longer entirely predictable because it is not known which considerations 
will weigh more heavily with the decision-maker, unless their relative importance 
has been specified in the empowering legislation.  
Amongst legal practitioners the uncertainty associated with discretion is 
generally accepted as long as a decision conforms to the rules of administrative  
justice. This legalistic approach has given rise to mechanisms for managing the 
abuse of power, but provides little understanding of how or why people make 
decisions. In practice decisions are influenced by many direct and indirect 
pressures or circumstances.
399
 According to Sparrow, the consequence of these 
pressures is that decision-makers ‘inhabit, and are obliged to navigate, a 
landscape of conflicting and shifting interests.’400 As a result the effects of values, 
pressures and contextual settings on discretion have been the subject of academic 
scrutiny.
401
 Lo et al, for example, found that financial and human resource 
limitations have caused environmental enforcement officials in China ‘to focus on 
the most salient responsibilities … thereby overlooking others.’ 402 Baron on the 
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 D J Galligan Discretionary powers: a legal study of official discretion (1986) Chapter 3. 
400
 Malcolm K. Sparrow The regulatory craft: controlling risks, solving problems, and 
managing compliance (2000) 17. 
401
  See Nicola Lacey ‘The jurisprudence of discretion: escaping the legal paradigm’ in 
Hawkins K (ed) The uses of discretion (1992) at 361; Richard Lempert ‘Discretion in a 
behavioral perspective: the case of a public housing eviction board’ in Hawkins K (ed)  op cit 
at 185; Herbert A Simon Administrative behavior (4
th
 ed) 2000; Sparrow, op cit and Spriggs 
op cit. 
402
 Lo et al 1 op cit at 390. Kerman Calvo, Lucinda Platt and Maurice Sunkin ‘Does judicial 
review influence the quality of local authority services?’ 2007 ISER working paper 2007-34 at 
7. Available at www.iser.essex.ac.uk/pubs/workpaps/ [accessed on 12 May 2010]. 
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other hand documents how intuition has led to poor decisions on environmental 
policy.
403
  
Whilst it is clear from these studies that various factors have a bearing on 
decision-making,
404
 the relevance of any particular factor  is dependant on the 
specific context. Similarly the extent to which these factors compete with the 
weight that is attached to judgments in the decision-making process also depends 
on the degree of pressure – perceived or actual – that each factor exerts. In this 
regard, Halliday points out that the importance of legal conscientiousness amongst 
officials in facilitating the reception of judgments may be more or less important 
in different contexts.
405
   
In this Chapter, five factors arising out of the political and institutional 
context are discussed. In the next part of the chapter two external factors are 
considered, namely accountability and the political status of the departments. 
Accountability includes formal mechanisms that are designed to ensure sound 
administrative practices. They are potentially significant as they provide an 
opportunity to supplement the courts’ limited resources to secure impact by 
reinforcing judicial requirements. The extent to which different accountability 
mechanisms actually exert pressure on environmental departments to be receptive 
to judgments is assessed. The status of environmental departments in relation to 
other departments on the other hand is an informal factor. The discussion on that 
factor explores the possible effects on decision-making of the environmental 
departments’ ‘Cinderella’ status. 
The consideration of external factors is followed by a discussion of three 
internal factors, namely the nature of environmental decisions, time pressures and 
capacity. These three factors were selected because they provided the potential to 
offer new insights for understanding judicial impact. As noted previously, judicial 
impact studies conducted to date are largely based on routine decision-making in 
developed countries. The three factors accordingly relate to non-routine decision-
                                                 
403
 Jonathon Baron Judgment misguided: intuition and error in public decision making (1998). 
404
 Lone Kørnøv and Wil A H Thissen ‘Rationality in decision- and policy-making: 
implications for strategic environmental assessment’ (2000) 18 3 Impact Assessment and 
Project Appraisal 191 and W Kip Viscusi and James T Hamilton ‘Are risk regulators rational? 
Evidence from hazardous waste clean up decisions’ (1999) 89 4 The American Economic 
Review 1010. 
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making in a developing country context in order to assess whether any significant 
points arise out of these differences. 
Environmental decision-making has been described as non-routine in 
previous chapters. In this chapter the comment is elaborated on by providing an 
overview of the nature of environmental decisions and how this differs from 
routine decision-making. Some tentative suggestions regarding the implications of 
non-routine decisions for the courts’ potential to influence decision-making are 
made.  
Time pressures and institutional capacity are internal organisational 
pressures which were frequently raised during the interviews. These factors are 
closely related to the fact that the form and functions of the public sector in South 
Africa have changed radically in the last 15 years and are still relatively immature. 
The influence of these pressures on the reception of judicial guidance is 
accordingly also explored.  
 
6.1 Accountability 
Democracy requires that where officials are granted discretionary powers, the 
exercise of that discretion must be accompanied by accountability mechanisms 
which require officials to disclose what actions they have taken and why. Bovens 
et al define accountability as ‘the relationship between an actor and a forum, in 
which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face 
consequences.’406  
Bovens’ definition suffices to impart a broad understanding of the term, but 
a cursory literature review reveals that the concept of ‘accountability’ has different 
meanings depending on the underlying rationale for introducing accountability 
mechanisms.
407
 Democratic approaches, which stem from the writings of 
Rousseau and Weber, for example, hold that accountability is important for 
providing the public and their elected representatives with information that can be 
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used to assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of government conduct. The 
information which is disclosed theoretically places the public in a position to make 
informed choices at election time. Constitutional perspectives advocated by Locke 
and Montesquieu on the other hand, place more emphasis on institutionalising 
checks and balances to control and redress abuses of power. More recently a trend 
to regard accountability from a learning perspective has emerged. In terms of this 
perspective, the purpose of accountability is to make government more effective 
by creating a context within which bureaucratic approaches are debated and 
adapted to reflect the input of external stakeholders.
408
  
These different approaches result in at least four different types of 
accountability mechanisms, all of which are aimed at forcing some type of 
responsiveness by officials viz – 
1. bureaucratic accountability - in which internal supervisory control is 
applied to ensure that the priorities of management are given effect to; 
2. legal accountability - where a body outside the bureaucracy has the 
power to exercise control over bureaucratic actions and to impose legal 
sanctions; 
3. professional accountability - where control is given to an expert in the 
bureaucracy; and 
4. political accountability - in which officials must be responsive to 
political and public priorities and needs.
409
 
Viewed from this perspective, the court’s powers of judicial oversight are 
one type of legal accountability and judgments may be viewed as the outputs of 
that accountability process. As an accountability mechanism, the role of the courts 
may be supported by both constitutional and learning perspectives. Judicial review 
is most closely aligned with the constitutional perspective as it is concerned with 
individual allegations of the abuse or inappropriate exercise of power by officials. 
However, particularly in a young democracy, the courts’ role is not only to 
                                                 
408
Ibid at 230 - 232. Mureinik (‘Reconsidering review: participation and accountability’ op cit) 
describes this approach as being one of responsive democracy in terms of which government 
ought to justify its decisions. He also argues that ‘rationality review’ by the courts should be 
in place as an accountability enforcement tool. 
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provide a check on the abuse of power, but also to provide an opportunity for 
learning by officials and improvement of government practices.
410
  
Notwithstanding this, judicial proceedings are an inconsistent form of 
accountability because the functioning of the mechanism relies on an external, and 
often sporadic, trigger rather than routine reporting. In addition, the courts’ ability 
to enforce sanctions and to monitor general responsiveness to judgments is 
limited.
411
 The efficacy of the courts as an accountability mechanism which results 
in widespread impact on administrative practices is accordingly dependent either 
on self-regulation (voluntary responsiveness) by officials or on the pressure which 
is exerted by other factors.
412
 In view of this, the integration of judicial directions 
and guidance into other accountability processes and outputs ought to enhance the 
responsiveness of officials to judgments. The study accordingly considers the 
extent to which certain accountability mechanisms facilitate the reception of 
judgments into administrative practices.  
In South Africa the basis for holding officials accountable is vested in 
several sections of the Constitution. The rights to administrative justice and access 
to information, which form part of the accountability framework, are discussed in 
previous chapters. Apart from these rights, section 195(1) of the Constitution sets 
out the basic values and principles governing public administration. Three of these 
values are relevant to accountability, namely – 
(e) People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making. 
(f) Public administration must be accountable. 
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information. 
These basic values resonate with all three of the accountability perspectives 
discussed above and suggest that accountability mechanisms should be extensive 
in their focus ie they should provide information to the public on government 
                                                 
410
 Heinz Klug ‘Introducing the devil: an institutional analysis of the power of constitutional 
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411
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performance, uncover and redress abuses of power and stimulate learning by 
officials.   
In addition to the basic values contained in section 195(1), the Constitution 
also obliges Parliament and the provincial legislatures to provide mechanisms to 
ensure that the executive and organs of state are accountable to them and to 
maintain oversight of executive and departmental functions.
413
 
The constitutional approach means that, in the first instance, an obligation 
to demonstrate accountability vests with the departments. They do so in a variety 
of ways including providing information about their policies and activities, 
responding to questions from Parliament or the legislature and briefing portfolio 
committees. Because there are obvious caveats about relying on self-disclosure by 
departments, a number of state institutions supporting constitutional democracy 
are also established by the Constitution to monitor accountability. These include 
the Public Service Commission (PSC) and the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC). Reports by these institutions are intended to provide 
assistance to Parliament in giving effect to its obligation to scrutinise and oversee 
administrative action.
414
  
The PSC is responsible for assessing and monitoring implementation of, 
and compliance with, the constitutional values and principles of public 
administration.
415
 The Constitution requires the PSC to discharge this function 
independently and ‘without fear, favour or prejudice in the interest of the 
maintenance of effective and efficient public administration and a high standard 
of professional ethics in the public service.’416  
In practice, the PSC considers annual reports prepared by government 
departments to be an important accountability mechanism. It believes that the 
utility of such reports lies in the fact that they place citizens in a position where 
they can understand the impact that government has had on their lives; the 
legislature can assess the performance of departments against articulated goals and 
                                                 
413
 Sections 55(2) and 114(2) respectively. 
414
 Hugh Corder et al Report on parliamentary oversight and accountability July 1999 at 7. 
Available at www.pmg.org.za/bills/oversight&account.htm [accessed on 26 March 2010]. 
415
 Section 196(4). 
416
 Section 196(2). 
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that managers in the department are made aware of successes and weaknesses.
417
 
Annual Reports should therefore be drafted expansively to address the 
requirements of the different accountability perspectives discussed above. 
Given the importance that the PSC attaches to annual reports, it has 
conducted a number of evaluation exercises. In 1999 it published a report titled 
‘An evaluation of departments’ annual reports as an accountability 
mechanism’.418 The report includes an analysis of annual reports produced by 
several national departments including DEAT. The conclusion of the study was 
that – 
The content of departmental annual reports falls far short of 
international best practice .... Annual reports tend to reflect 
departments’ activities rather than their performance during the year.  
These deficiencies were attributed to the absence of a monitoring and 
evaluation culture in terms of output and outcome indicators; an absence of 
information management systems which could provide useful performance data 
and a gap in agreed performance criteria.  
Three years later the PSC undertook a follow up review. The purpose of the 
second review was to assess the degree to which annual reports facilitated 
accountability and the extent to which departments were meeting new reporting 
requirements.
419
 DEAT was not included in the sample of the second study. The 
report notes that although there was a slight improvement in reporting, the 
language used was often inaccessible and that - despite the increase in reporting 
on programme areas - the previously identified flaw in relation to reporting on 
activities rather than achievement of desired results was still evident.
420
 In 
particular, the PSC noted that there was an ‘inadequate consideration of the 
strategic environment and changes within which departments operate.’421 The 
absence of relevant information has also been noted by politicians.
422
 (Ironically, 
                                                 
417
 Public Service Commission, A review of departments’ annual reports as an accountability 
mechanism October 1999. Available at www.psc.gov.za [accessed 26 November 2009]. 
418
 Ibid.  
419
 Ibid.  
420
 Ibid at 3.  
421
 Ibid at 5. 
422
 See, for example, Corder et al op cit at 13. 
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the PSC’s own approach to reporting has been criticised for omitting relevant 
information).
423
 
A review of several annual reports produced by the environmental 
departments confirmed many of the PSC’s concerns. Although there has been a 
shift to reporting on programme areas, the annual reports contain little information 
about legal proceedings regarding the inappropriate use of power which would 
cast light on administrative performance. Reporting in respect of compliance and 
enforcement programmes in more recent annual reports does mention enforcement 
proceedings that have been initiated by the departments. However, with the 
exception of the Gauteng 2007/2008 Annual Report which mentions that one of 
the functions of the regulatory services branch is to manage litigation initiated by 
and against the Department, none of the reports reviewed provide information 
about litigation initiated against the department or judgments.
424
  
Although the absence of such information may not be totally unexpected in 
the departmental report, the absence of any information on judgments in the 
2005/6 Annual Report of the National Environmental Advisory Forum (NEAF), a 
stakeholder advisory body established in terms of NEMA is interesting.
425
 This is 
particularly so because litigation resulted in some victories for civil society during 
the reporting period of the NEAF report.  
The outcome of judicial proceedings which have a bearing on the 
assessment of departmental performance are therefore not brought to the attention 
of the public or politicians in annual reports. No overt link is made between the 
accountability function exercised by the courts and the oversight function of 
Parliament and the legislatures. The omission of such information - in a 
mechanism which is considered to be a key method for holding departments 
accountable - means that annual reports do not facilitate the exertion of pressure 
by politicians to require responsiveness to judgments. It may be partly because of 
this that no parliamentary questions relating to judgments were found during the 
research for this study. 
                                                 
423
 Assessment of the impact of the work of the PSC on public policy and practice in South 
Africa Report No. 108/2009 at xvi. Available at www.psc.org.za [accessed on 28 March 
2010]. 
424
 Available at www.gautengonline.gov.za [accessed 19 November 2009].  
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 Available at www.environment.gov.za [accessed 11 March 2010]. 
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Apart from annual reports, accountability also arises from the monitoring 
of socio-economic rights by the SAHRC. Like the PSC, the SAHRC is an 
independent body which is required to be impartial and to exercise its powers and 
perform its functions ‘without fear, favour or prejudice.’426 It has a broad mandate 
to promote, monitor and assess the realisation of all the rights contained in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution
427
 as well as a specific mandate to monitor and 
assess the implementation of socio-economic rights by government departments.  
The latter is achieved by requiring the departments to submit information to the 
SAHRC every year on the steps that have been taken to realise the socio-economic 
rights.
428
 The SAHRC must report its findings to Parliament at least once a 
year.
429
 
As part of its monitoring process, the SAHRC compiled six economic and 
social rights reports between 1997 and 2006. In order to compile the reports, the 
SAHRC developed protocol questionnaires that were sent to government 
departments and which aimed to elicit information on policy, legislative, 
budgetary and other measures that have met constitutional obligations
430
 as well as 
the steps that are taken to address identified problems.
431
 Because the format of 
these questionnaires was strongly influenced by landmark Constitutional Court 
judgments and international treaties on socio-economic rights, the focus of the 
questionnaires was mainly on identifying violations of socio-economic rights. 
Many analysts recognise the enormity of the task that faced the SAHRC in 
compiling the reports. (Frequent references in the reports to difficulties in getting 
departments to respond or submit information of adequate quality appear to have 
made the task particularly challenging). However, these analysts also raise several 
criticisms. Horsten, for example, points out that the first two reports are criticised 
for reflecting a collation of information without any meaningful assessment. 
                                                 
426
 Section 181(2). 
427
 Section 184(1)(c). 
428
 Section 184(3). 
429
 Section 181(5). 
430
 Cameron Lee Jacobs ‘Demystifying the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa’ (2009). Available at 
http://acthra.anu.edu.au/PESCR/Publications/Cameron%20Jacobs_ESR%20presentation.doc 
[accessed 25 March 2010]. 
431
 D Horsten ‘The role played by the South African Human Rights Commission’s Economic 
and Social Rights Reports in good governance in South Africa’ (2006) 2 PER 4. 
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(Subsequent reports attempted to remedy this deficiency).
432
 Klaaren, on the other 
hand, argues that the methodology inappropriately focuses on the justiciability of 
the rights which has already been achieved through Constitutional Court 
rulings.
433
 In Jacobs’ opinion the limitation of this violation-focused approach is 
that the threshold for assessing compliance is set very low because it only looks at 
legislation, policies and programs and not at the full range of matters that are 
necessary to monitor the progressive realisation and enforcement of the rights.
434
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms – which are accepted – the SAHRC has 
made some attempts to incorporate judicial matters in its reports. In the 
environmental section of the second report, for example, the Commission 
commented on DWAF’s approach to litigation as follows – 
The assertion that legal action is not a preferred measure is flawed. 
Section 24(a) [of the Constitution] contains an individual’s justiciable 
right to a healthy environment. Any conduct, by the State or private 
individuals, that infringes upon the right can be challenged. This 
challenge can only be effected by way of a legal action.
435
 
The environmental section of the fifth report makes several references to 
judgments.
436
 Legal proceedings on procedural matters such as access to 
information are noted, although there is no attempt to analyse the implications of 
such proceedings for the departments or to monitor responses to the judgments.
437
 
Observations, with reference to judgments, are also made regarding the tension 
that can exist between the environmental function and the needs of other 
departments.
438
 More importantly, the report demonstrates the willingness of the 
SAHRC to reprimand departments where they have performed less well. For 
example, commenting on the enforcement of legislation, the report states that – 
In the case of the Pelt Products semi-processing tannery which 
produced gaseous emissions including ammonia and hydrogen sulphide 
                                                 
432
 Horsten ibid at 10. 
433
 J Klaaren ‘A second look at the South African Human Rights Commission, access to 
information, and the promotion of socio-economic rights (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 
539. 
434
 Jacobs op cit. 
435
 South African Human Rights Commission 2
nd
 Economic and Social Rights Report: 1998 – 
1999 (2000) 57. 
436
 South African Human Rights Commission  The Right to a Healthy Environment: 5
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Economic and Social Rights Report Series 2002/2003 Financial Year (2004). Available at 
www.info.gov.za [accessed 25 March 2010]. 
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gives credence to the existence of a lax regulatory system. Pelt Products 
started business without a permit … . On intervention by a lobby group 
the chief officer in terms of APPA took up the issue and required Pelt 
Products to apply for a permit … At the end of 3 months the conditions 
of the provisional certificate had not been met and the certificate 
continued to be extended several times until a case was filed by 
Hichange Investments in 2001. It took the intervention of the court to 
order DEAT to force Pelt Investments to undertake an EIA and to take 
steps to prevent further pollution. [sic, footnotes omitted].
439
 
An attempt is also made in the fifth report to measure the performance of 
departments against judicial requirements.  
The incorporation of judgments in the SAHRC’s economic and social 
rights reports is noteworthy because there were only a limited number of 
judgments handed down during the reporting periods in question. The reports are 
therefore potentially important for the receptivity of judgments because they begin 
to raise the visibility of the accountability function played by the courts in relation 
to the performance of the departments. In doing so, they facilitate the scrutiny by 
politicians of departmental responsiveness to judgments. This view may be given 
weight by the fact that when asked to express their confidence in different 
institutions during the interviews, officials’ indicated a 57 per cent approval rating 
for the SAHRC. If these levels of confidence are widely held, politicians will 
afford considerable status to the reports.  
However, the potential displayed by these SAHRC reports may not be 
realised. This is because the sixth report, which covers an expanded reporting 
period from April 2003 to June 2006, is far more superficial than the fifth 
report.
440
 It omits any references to judgments, despite an increase in judgments 
being handed down in that reporting period. Furthermore, no reports have been 
produced since then.  
The discussion shows that judicial outputs are integrated into political 
accountability mechanisms only to a limited extent. Political accountability 
mechanisms therefore currently do not constitute a significant source of pressure 
for the reinforcement of judicial control. In the South African context, the high 
levels of legitimacy attributed to the courts by officials and the fear of litigation 
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(discussed in Chapter 8) is likely to be a weightier factor in the reception of 
judgments than political accountability mechanisms. 
 
6.2 Competing political priorities 
Many developing countries prioritise development and perceive protection of the 
environment to be in conflict with developmental needs.
441
 Where this is the case 
departments of finance, trade and economic development are often substantially 
more powerful than environmental departments.
442
 Such imbalances in power 
result in environmental departments effectively being ‘Cinderella departments’ 
because the implementation of environmental policies may be subjected to adverse 
pressure where they are viewed as undermining development and they are often 
allocated less financial and other resources. The reception of judgments may be 
more limited where there is extensive competition between developmental 
priorities and the implementation of environmental legislation.
443
 
 In South Africa, this ought not to be the case because protection of the 
environment has been elevated to the status of a right in the Constitution and, by 
implication, is a national priority.
444
 Furthermore the inclusion of sustainable 
development in the environmental right makes it clear that the need for 
development must be balanced against the need for environmental protection and 
that an either-or policy approach is impermissible.  
In practice, however, tensions do arise between the two
445
 and there are 
unmistakable suggestions that environmental departments have been regarded as 
Cinderella departments. One example of this is the allocation of ministerial 
                                                 
441
 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo et al ‘Changes in enforcement styles amongst environmental 
enforcement officials in China’ (2009) 41 Environment and Planning 2706; Gideon E D 
Omuta ‘Environmental planning, administration and management in Nigerian cities: the 
example of Benin City, Bendel State’ (1988) 8 1 Public Administration and Development 1 
and Ching-Ping Tang and Shui-Yan Tang ‘Democratizing bureaucracy: the political economy 
of environmental impact assessment and air pollution prevention fees in Taiwan’ (2000) 33 1 
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example, Kellow and Niemeyer op cit for a discussion on the weak political status of the 
environment function in Queensland, Australia. 
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444
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positions which took place after the 1994 elections. At that stage a government of 
national unity was formed in terms of which the winning party was obliged to 
appoint politicians from other parties to cabinet positions. For obvious reasons, the 
ruling party could be expected to retain those portfolios which were of strategic 
importance and to allocate those which it viewed as being of lesser importance to 
opposition parties. The fact that Ministers from opposition parties were appointed 
to the environmental portfolio in both national government and the Eastern Cape 
implies that two out of the three environmental departments falling within the 
scope of the study, at least initially, were considered to be less important than 
other portfolios.  
Since then there have been other signs that politicians from more powerful 
portfolios experience frustration with the implementation of environmental 
policies. In some instances they have attempted to reduce the effects of such 
policies on the execution of their own portfolio requirements. This was 
particularly evident in 2006 when the Minister of Housing is reported to have 
given an undertaking in Parliament that EIAs would no longer delay housing 
delivery and stated that - 
We cannot forever be held hostage by butterfly eggs that have been 
laid, because environmentalists would care about those things that are 
important for the preservation of the environment, while we sit around 
and wait for them to conclude the environmental studies.
446
 
Other Ministers are also reported to be concerned about the impact of the 
EIA Regulations on delivery, including the Ministers of Public Enterprises, Trade 
and Industry and Water Affairs and Forestry.
447
 The Minister of Minerals and 
Energy fiercely, and successfully, resisted proposals in the draft 2006 EIA 
Regulations to bring mining environmental impacts under the control of DEAT.
448
 
Ministers have, on occasion, also made public announcements that projects will 
                                                 
446 Fiona Macleod ‘Ministries aim to trash green laws’ Mail and Guardian 20 March 2006. 
447
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448
 Personal knowledge, drafter of the 2006 EIA Regulations. The relationship between the 
two departments has been described in a parliamentary portfolio committee meeting  as being 
‘complicated’ partly owing to the fact that DME maintained that it had environmental 
provisions in its own legislation and a duplication under NEMA needed to be avoided. 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Environmental Impact Assessments: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Briefing’ (2008). Available at www.pmg.org.za [accessed 
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proceed prior to the relevant environmental department making a decision whether 
to approve an EIA or not.
449
 The latter suggests that certain politicians with greater 
power view environmental approvals as being a fait accompli once a project is 
identified as being a political priority. 
This raises the question whether officials are affected by such influences.
450
 
The interviews revealed that junior officials often appear to be institutionally 
isolated from their Minister or MEC in operational matters. For example, many 
indicated that they had no knowledge as to whether the Minister or MEC 
considers judgments in the appeal process or how seriously judgments are taken. 
However, messages regarding political and developmental priorities do filter down 
through all levels. In this regard, the interviews confirmed that many officials have 
felt under pressure at some stage to approve delivery orientated applications, 
especially those relating to infrastructure.  
During the interviews, the extent to which political pressure influences 
decisions was also considered by reference to a hypothetical example viz – 
If Cabinet approves the construction of a building for an international 
event and the court makes a decision that certain parts of the application 
process have to be redone which would result in the building not being 
completed in time for the event, how do you think your department 
would respond? 
Most officials appeared to be familiar with such situations. However 
responses varied significantly. Some officials candidly indicated that they believed 
political priorities would prevail and made statements such as ‘they would bow 
down to political pressure – I am very sure of that’ or ‘if Parliament approves [a 
project] people must read that with glasses on.’  
By contrast, other officials demonstrated complete confidence in their 
MEC to withstand such pressures. For example, one official who has been 
involved in a number of controversial applications which have been drawn to the 
President’s attention, commented that – 
 Unless something changes, our MECs have always had extreme 
respect of law so I’ve not experienced a case where something is legally 
required and they’ve decided not to respect that or to adhere to that. … 
The MECs are generally not impressed with national pressure.  
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These two views were extremes. The majority of officials indicated that 
ways would be found to comply with both the court’s order and political needs by, 
for example, allocating additional resources to the application or fast-tracking 
aspects of the process.  
Further attempts to obtain insight on the influence of political pressure 
yielded similarly varying responses. Several officials indicated that they had 
experienced, or knew of, situations in which officials had been instructed to 
change their recommendations on an application. Whilst some of these 
experiences suggested blatant interference,
451
 it is likely that others may have been 
attributable to senior management having a different opinion.
452
 (The latter is of 
course not objectionable if the senior manager found fault with the reasoning of 
the junior official or weighed various factors differently). Notwithstanding these 
reports, no official could identify a situation in which a Minister or MEC had 
attempted to circumvent the application of a judgment. In fact, when asked 
directly, the majority of officials indicated that they believed that their political 
head would not expressly or knowingly issue an instruction that was contrary to a 
judgment. 
The discussion above suggests that competing political priorities do 
influence decision-making, although possibly to a lesser extent than witnessed by 
Halliday.
453
 Whilst such pressures may have negative implications for the 
reception of judgments in decision-making, the data was insufficient to 
conclusively demonstrate that competing political priorities limits the 
consideration of judgments in decision-making. 
 
                                                 
451
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environmental department. See ‘Barking up the wrong tree’ Issue 7 September 2008 
Noseweek; ‘Political influence yields fat profits’ Issue 100 February 2008 Noseweek and 
Wiseman Khuzwayo‘DA blames staff attrition on Mosunkutu’s overruling of EIA’s’ 30 April 
2008 Business Report online. Available at www.busrep.co.za [accessed on 30 April 2009]. 
452
 See discussion on competence amongst junior officials below. 
453
 Halliday op cit at 99. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
154 
 
6.3 The nature of environmental decisions 
Environmental decisions are demanding ones that are characterised by uncertainty, 
change and conflict management.
454
 The failure internationally by politicians and 
officials in the past to understand fully the nature and importance of 
environmental decision-making  has resulted in increasingly visible and negative 
impacts on the environment. Over time many of these impacts have manifested as 
global problems such as climate change and the depletion and extinction of 
biological resources. Addressing current environmental problems and preventing 
new ones from arising requires large scale changes in behavioural patterns, most 
of which are driven by bureaucratic decisions.  
As noted in Chapter 3, the inclusion of the environmental right in the 
Constitution and the promulgation of new environmental Acts have increased 
both the scope and complexity of bureaucratic decision-making. A common 
requirement of all environmental decision-making imposed by the environmental 
right is that the goal of environmental decisions must be to give effect to 
sustainable development.
455
 In essence, that goal requires decision-makers to 
ensure that the effects of a decision do not result in environmental impacts that 
will compromise the ability of present or future generations to meet their 
developmental needs.
456
 
Basing decisions on sustainable development means that the scope of what 
falls within the ambit of an environmental decision is extremely broad because it 
involves the integration of socio-economic concerns with biophysical ones and 
then with a long-term perspective. The breadth of these decision-making 
parameters is indicated by the definition of ‘environment’ contained in NEMA 
which states that ‘environment’ means the –  
surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of- 
i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; 
ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the 
interrelationships among and between them; and 
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iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and 
conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and 
well-being.
457
 
As can be expected, the definition includes biophysical elements such as 
plants, animals, water and air quality. However, it also includes the relationships 
between biophysical elements, such as ecosystems, as well as physical, chemical, 
aesthetic, cultural and economic properties that impact on health and well-being. 
The incorporation of ‘well-being’ within the scope of the definition extends the 
meaning of environment further as it introduces a value-based or subjective 
component.
458
 
At the outset of the decision-making process, the decision-maker must 
therefore identify all biophysical and socio-economic issues and impacts that may 
have a bearing on the decision. This is not a simple task because it involves 
numerous factors and variables which are different in each decision. (For example, 
factors such as geographical location and environmental attributes may affect the 
relative importance of an issue in a particular decision). 
All identified issues must then be contextually located within the 
biophysical and socio-economic environment, both of which are dynamic and 
subject to change.
459
 Issues relating to water quality, air quality, waste disposal 
and biodiversity, for example, need to be considered in the context of affected 
biophysical systems. Socio-economic issues, on the other hand, require an 
understanding of prevailing cultural, heritage and economic conditions. The 
implications of biophysical issues for the socio-economic context and visa versa 
must then also be considered and understood. In many instances the 
interrelationship between the issue and the context is not readily apparent. 
(Biophysical systems, for instance, are extremely intricate and the effect of 
changes on those systems is often not known).
460
  
The complex interdependencies that occur in environmental matters mean 
that decisions are not isolated in their effect. Environmental problems seldom arise 
                                                 
457
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458
 See discussion in Chapter 5 on the implications of ‘well-being’. 
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from one activity alone, but are more often caused by the impact of a number of 
activities that cumulatively exceed the carrying capacity of the environment. 
Sustainable development therefore also requires that the cumulative impacts of 
issues identified in the decision-making process be understood – both at the time 
when the decision is taken and in the future. 
In addition, different decision options and alternatives, including the issues 
and impacts associated with those options or alternatives, must be identified 
during the initial stages of the process.
461
 In some instances, the process for 
identifying such alternatives is prescribed in legislation. For example, the EIA 
Regulations set out procedures for identifying and assessing alternatives. Because 
of the potential number of variables that may be applicable, the range of 
alternatives that occur in environmental decisions is usually greater than in many 
other types of decisions. 
462
 
The technical complexity of decision-making is compounded by the fact 
that nearly all environmental decisions entail some involvement by external 
stakeholders because both PAJA and NEMA recognise rights of public 
participation.
463
 In some instances participation is relatively narrow. Before 
issuing a compliance directive, for example, officials must afford the affected 
person (and in certain circumstances other government departments) an 
opportunity to comment on the proposed content of the directive. In others, public 
participation is extensive as is the position in the EIA Regulations where the 
public must be involved at all stages of the application process.
464
  
External stakeholders who participate in environmental decision-making 
processes frequently display different or competing values which result in 
conflicts regarding both process and desired outcomes. In EIA applications, for 
example, applicants may emphasise economic issues, whereas the public are more 
likely to emphasise social or biophysical ones. The decision-maker is required to 
manage the conflict between these values without the benefit of fixed rules for 
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reconciling different social objectives or determining the value that should be 
attached to them.
465
 
A consequence of the dynamics involved in environmental decision-
making is that the process is seldom a linear one and is frequently marked by 
iterative steps. Environmental decisions therefore differ from routine decisions 
which are well specified, relatively standard and usually do not require particular 
expertise or training in complex policy, social or technical analysis.
466
  
The non-routine nature of environmental decisions intuitively suggests that 
there may be implications for the court’s potential to influence administrative 
practices that differ routine decision-making.
467
 The fieldwork in this study 
suggests at least three possibilities. Firstly, a tendency was noted - particularly 
amongst more inexperienced officials – to focus on the facts of a judgment rather 
than the principles involved.
468
 Because the activities and substantive issues in 
different decisions vary significantly, some officials do not apply the principles of 
a judgment, which are based on a different set of facts, to a decision at hand in the 
belief that the judgment has no bearing on the decision.  
The omission of judicial requirements in these circumstances is not 
indicative of defiant behaviour, but rather a failure to grasp the underlying legal 
principles in a judgment and an inability to apply those principles to a different set 
of facts. However, it is possible that such factual differences may also enable more 
experienced officials to evade compliance by arguing that the facts in a decision 
are so markedly different from those in respect of which a judgment was made, 
that the principles of the judgment are not applicable.
469
  
A second possible consequence is that the already extensive amount of 
information that must be considered in a decision may result in information on 
judgments being regarded as ‘information overload’ and a greater potential for 
                                                 
465
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that information to be overlooked or omitted from consideration. This aspect is 
discussed further below.  
Whilst the two points above suggest that non-routine decision-making 
presents obstacles to the acceptance of judicial guidance, the non-routine nature of 
decisions also presents opportunities for the reception of case law. In this regard, 
many officials experience discomfort in operating in an environment of 
uncertainty.
470
 In addition to the inevitable variables that are involved in 
environmental decision-making, this discomfort is exacerbated in South Africa 
because the regulatory context is relatively new, has not yet stabilised and is 
constantly evolving. There is accordingly an additional degree of uncertainty 
regarding the interpretation of some aspects of the law, which are frequently 
challenged by the regulated sector.  
Since certainty reduces the discomfort or stress that is experienced in 
decision-making, officials with a non-defensive attitude may welcome the clarity 
which the courts can provide; particularly if there is a culture of adaptive 
management and learning within the department.
471
 This was found to be the case 
in several interviews when officials were asked if they thought judgments were 
relevant to their work, and if so, why. One junior official commented as follows - 
Environmental legislation is new and everyday precedents are being set 
and there is new research. If ever you want to get the best out of a 
system, you need to change and grow. You can’t change if you’re not 
willing to list n to others’ opinions, including judgments as one aspect. 
 
… If a decision is good, it reduces the chances of an appeal and the 
environment will be the receiver of great things. 
An open approach was not limited to junior officials. Others, at more senior 
levels, also viewed judgments as being a valuable source of clarity as is illustrated 
by the following comment – 
The environmental field is fairly young and we’re learning what works 
and what doesn’t and what is allowed and what isn’t. We’ve used 
judgments as a learning process. There have been a few important 
cases which taught us how to approach decision-making in some cases 
and what are the critical flaws. The filling station case in Mpumalanga, 
... sounded like it was out of the mandate of environmental departments, 
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but if you think about it makes sense as downstream impacts are 
environmental impacts. So it opened the door to think about it further 
and that that view would then be supported legally. … It’s a useful way 
of addressing the fuzzy concept of cumulative impacts. 
The exploration of environmental decisions shows that some factors can be 
both enhancers and barriers to impact at the same time. The extent to which the 
nature of the decision emerges as either depends on other circumstantial factors 
which emphasises the need to consider, not only the factors which may affect 
impact, but also the interrelationships between different factors.  
 
6.4 Time pressure 
The time within which officials have to make decisions may also affect the quality 
of their decisions and the extent to which case law is considered in decision-
making. For example, Halliday notes that performance targets resulted in some 
officials cutting corners to make sure that they processed a sufficient number of 
applications.
472
  
The actual time required to make a carefully considered decision cannot be 
emphatically determined because it varies according to officials’ different 
decision-making styles. The individual nature of the time taken to make decisions 
was alluded to by a senior manager who commented that – 
My own approach is a very time consuming one but I find that I cannot 
do it otherwise. [My approach] is to actually analyse the whole 
situation against all known polices, legislation and guidelines. I can’t 
myself take a decision without that context. … People think it takes too 
much time. But if one doesn’t do that then precisely your own values 
[influence the decision] – you start taking subjective decisions.  
Notwithstanding variations in personal style, in practice officials often do 
not have the luxury of processing each decision within a timeframe that suits their 
individual needs. Whilst research shows that some time pressure in the decision-
making environment can have positive benefits for productivity, too much time 
pressure affects decision-making negatively.
473
 Negative consequences occur 
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because one or more effects associated with time pressure manifest during the 
decision-making process, including limiting or omitting information searches and 
processing; denying important information; bolstering selected alternatives; 
impaired judgment and reaching incorrect conclusions.
474
 Even prior training and 
development of strategies for improved decision-making have limited efficacy 
when decisions are made under pressure.
475
  
The threshold beyond which time pressure compromises decision-making 
need not be assessed by the presence of actual time constraints because the 
perception that there is insufficient time to make a decision can have as much 
influence. This is illustrated in a study conduct by Mann and Tan in which people 
were tested under identical deadlines, but with one group being advised that they 
had limited time to make the decision and the other that they had plenty of time.
476
 
Mann and Tan found that this information resulted in people performing 
differently in their decision-making processes. Those who perceived themselves to 
be pressurised paid less attention to the initial stages of the decision-making 
process which involves the clarification of the objectives of the decision, 
alternatives and costs and benefits of each alternative.
477
  
The research in this study revealed that time pressure features prominently 
in decision-making, particularly in the processing of applications in terms of the 
EIA Regulations. Under the 1997 EIA Regulations, no time periods for decision-
making were stipulated and decisions were therefore only required to be taken 
within a reasonable time. (The failure to make a decision within a reasonable time 
could be taken on review in terms of PAJA). By at least 2004 there were 
departmental concerns that the time taken to process many applications was 
unreasonably long. One response of the national department was to initiate a 
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process to revise the Regulations to alleviate administrative burden and streamline 
the application process.
478
  
However, concerns regarding the delays in processing EIA applications 
escalated to the highest political levels and in 2006 President Thabo Mbeki was 
reported in the media as saying that EIAs had resulted in ‘a quite considerable 
slowing down of economic activity’ and that whilst they were necessary, they had 
resulted in delays and a ‘frightening backlog’ at provincial levels.479 Following 
this, the national department made funds available to appoint consultants to assist 
in processing delayed applications in all the environmental departments and 
initiated studies to investigate possible causes of the problem. By 2008 the Chief 
Director stated that the number of pending applications in terms of the 1997 EIA 
Regulations had been reduced from 6 000 in June 2006 to 570 by March 2008 and 
that ‘[a]bout 300 of these are still within reasonable timeframes, and the true 
backlog, accordingly, is in the order of 270 applications.’480 
The departments’ progress continued to be monitored by both the media 
and Parliament. In the President’s 2008 State of the Nation Speech he noted that 
‘the tardiness with which government processes applications for investment in 
relation to issues such as ... environmental impact assessments can at times make 
or break investor decisions’.481 In response to an internal question paper from a 
Member of Parliament in June 2008, the national department reported that 70 per 
cent of applications in terms of the 2006 EIA Regulations were being processed 
within stipulated timeframes although there were concerns that new backlogs were 
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developing in the provinces.
482
 By June 2009 that percentage had dropped to 65 
per cent.
483
  
The political and internal departmental focus on processing applications 
within stipulated time periods is clearly a source of pressure for officials. During 
the interviews many officials cited time as a constraint in their work or a reason 
for not undertaking an activity. This pressure is often exacerbated by external 
parties regularly following up on applications; applications for authorisation or 
enforcement responses being identified as urgent political priorities and lack of 
experience on the part of officials. In some instances officials are also required to 
spend time on non-core functions. For example, a study on air quality indicated 
that resources (time) are unnecessarily expended on supporting the development 
of by-laws or managing projects that are unrelated to air quality management.
484
 
During the interviews one middle manager described their perception of 
being pressured to fulfil too many responsibilities within the time constraints as 
follows – 
DD’s [deputy directors] are always in the firing line. ... [You’re] appointed 
to a level to do everything and drive everything. Don’t come with 
complaints to the director – they’re not there to make life easier or to 
support you. You’re always in trouble for not doing everything. 
Some officials openly admitted that the result of this pressure had 
negatively affected the quality of their decisions in the past owing to the limitation 
of information that was considered. For example, one senior manager referred to 
officials ‘falling in the trap’ of deferring to another authority’s views without 
considering an issue themselves ‘when we got under time pressure’ – an approach 
which is in conflict with the requirements in the FRA CC judgment. Such 
shortcuts resulted in the department’s decisions being overturned on 
administrative appeal in several instances.
485
  
                                                 
482
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Another noted that the EIA Regulations and challenges to decisions made 
in terms of the Regulations place a substantial emphasis on procedural aspects. 
Because of this they indicated that ‘if I’m under pressure I would focus on 
procedural aspects more than on the importance or significance of 
[environmental] impacts.’  
Time constraints were also raised in respect of compliance and 
enforcement decisions. In certain situations time considerations influence the 
official’s choice regarding which alternative to pursue. For example, one official 
indicated that they preferred civil enforcement mechanisms ‘more than criminal 
because criminal enforcement takes rather a lot of time and resources and with 
administrative enforcement we take less time and get quick responses.’  
Notwithstanding a preference for civil enforcement mechanisms, the 
internal chain of decision-making can make it difficult to meet the requirements of 
judicial processes. This was raised by an official who remarked that -  
It’s very hard to move quickly in government structures. … How can 
you then go to court for an urgent interdict? I see the court as an ally 
[in compliance and enforcement], but if you haven’t followed the 
correct procedures, they are not going to hear the case urgently. 
The official also referred to one instance where the time required to obtain 
all internal management approvals resulted in an application for an urgent interdict 
being unsuccessful because the department had not established urgency. The 
reality of the constraints presented by the complex decision-making chain has now 
caused officials to consider changing their approach to pursuing interdicts and to 
explore whether, in similar circumstances, it is ‘better to arrest as a way to stop’ 
illegal developers.  
The fieldwork suggests that the presence of time pressure has several 
implications for the way in which judgments and potential legal challenges are 
managed in the departments. On the one hand the comments by the compliance 
official show that it influences which legislative options are pursued. On the other 
it affects the dissemination of knowledge.
486
 In this regard, a senior manager 
pointed out that they had disseminated an important judgment to their officials, 
but took no other action because of insufficient time. Their manager in turn 
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commented that even if judgments are distributed, officials may not read them 
because they do not have time. (They also indicated that this resulted in low 
confidence levels regarding the interpretation and application of case law). The 
same situation was found in another department where the person responsible for 
collecting and summarising judgments in a particular unit had not done so for a 
number of years because of the demands of other tasks. 
In addition it is likely that, where officials perceive time pressure to be 
such that they need to filter or limit the information which is considered in a 
decision, they may prioritise other information over judgments.
487
 Unless 
information on judgments is already embedded in procedures or is common 
knowledge, little attention may be paid to researching the implications of 
judgments for a decision and such information may well be omitted from decision-
making considerations. 
 
6.5 Capacity, competence and degree of comfort with job 
Capacity constraints in public sector environmental management are a problem 
experienced in many developing countries.
488
 In South Africa the capacity of 
environmental departments to effectively discharge their mandate has been 
profoundly influenced by the general context of transformation that has occurred 
in the public sector in the last 15 years. The profile of officials employed in the 
public sector had to change substantially after 1994 to accommodate the transition 
to a democratic developmental state. This involved making the bureaucracy more 
representative of society in accordance with the dictates of section 195(1) of the 
Constitution and ensuring that additional skills were acquired to give effect to new 
service delivery orientated policy objectives.  
The mammoth task of transformation was guided by several national 
government initiatives including the Public Service Act, 1994
489
 and the White 
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Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service.
490
 The White Paper outlined 
eight priority areas for transformation including (i) rationalisation and 
restructuring of departments; (ii) institution building and management to promote 
greater accountability and organisational and managerial effectiveness; (iii) 
representivity and affirmative action; and (iv) human resource development and 
capacity building. 
Several impediments had to be overcome to realise the goals of the White 
Paper. Ncholo, for example, notes that South Africa’s previous homelands policy 
resulted in 11 public administrations which had developed separately with 
consequent differences in the organisation of functions, post structures and 
conditions of service.
491
 Mokgoro points out that past approaches to the public 
sector resulted in several factors which constrained transformation at the 
provincial sphere of government including bloated bureaucracies; inappropriate 
departmental structures; serious capacity problems; low levels of productivity and 
a culture of corruption.
492
  
Transformation was (and still is) also exacerbated by skills shortages in the 
country.
493
 Apart from the reasons which cause skills shortages in other countries, 
certain causes are specific to South Africa.
494
 In particular, the system of bantu 
education implemented during apartheid is considered to be a major reason for 
skills shortages. Under bantu education black children were given inferior 
education. The effects of the system have not yet been eradicated and learners 
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from schools in historically disadvantaged areas still under perform relative to 
learners in higher socio-economic areas.
495
  
Government’s efforts to overcome these obstacles have been criticised 
extensively. The Presidential Review Commission (PRC), which was set up to 
review and evaluate the functioning of the public service, presented its findings in 
1998. It found that national and provincial governments had been strong on policy 
and commitment but weak on implementation. The PRC also noted that 
transformation was generally disappointing. Overall, the PRC concluded that 
‘[t]oo little progress has been made in remedying the inequalities and 
inefficiencies of the past.’496 In some instances the poor performance of 
government was extreme. For example the PRC stated that effective government 
in some provinces, including the Eastern Cape, was virtually paralysed.  
The PRC identified many reasons for the public sector’s underperformance, 
including a lack of strategic direction and leadership; ineffective planning and 
prioritisation (with too much focus being placed on reactive fire-fighting 
activities); inadequate research; lack of effective systems for monitoring 
performance; continuation of a rule-bound culture; procedural bottlenecks; lack of 
skills and capacity; and low morale.
497
 
Other writers have amplified the reasons for the poor progress. Ncholo 
points out that in the early stages of the transformation process, the challenge of 
overcoming existing obstacles was hindered by a lack of co-ordination in the 
different transformation initiatives.
498
 Mokgoro notes that the number of initiatives 
and the extent of capacity problems resulted in the provinces feeling 
overwhelmed. In addition, effective change has been undermined by frequent 
restructuring of departments and the devolution of powers to provinces without 
enough consideration of the provinces’ capacity to absorb the function.499  
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Transformation measures per se have also attracted criticism. Breier cites 
affirmative action as being a key reason for the loss of capacity at senior levels. In 
this regard, the White Paper proposed that, by 1999, 50 per cent of managerial 
posts should be filled by blacks and that 30 per cent of new recruits at middle and 
senior levels be women. In the drive to balance racial profiles of the public sector, 
many experienced white employees were encouraged to leave their employment. 
This resulted in a depletion of both experience and resources for training new 
junior officials.
500
  
Wenzel also notes that most new officials lack experience and adds that the 
practice of using private contractors to undertake substantive work does little to 
transfer skill to those officials. In addition, he argues that transformation practices 
have prioritised law reform and racial balance without focusing on efficacy and 
service delivery. As a result Wenzel believes that much time is expended on 
‘internal affairs, transformation committee meetings and interdepartmental 
coordination efforts’ rather than the substantive aspects of departmental 
mandates.
501
 Notwithstanding this, he observes that interviews conducted between 
1994 and 2003 suggested that ‘public managers in fact often neither knew what 
was expected of them by the new government ... nor how they were supposed to 
achieve it’.502 In consequence Wenzel describes the mode of public administration 
as being autocratic and characterised by ineffectual management.  
Within the context of transformation, government encountered an 
additional challenge in securing sufficient capacity to discharge the environmental 
function. Historically national government was primarily responsible for 
environmental matters, and then to a limited extent. The main regulatory 
responsibility of the national department was air pollution control. Because the 
waste permitting function was managed by DWAF, the environmental officials 
involved in waste management focused on policy formulation and participation in 
meetings on international conventions. A few officials acquired some experience 
in evaluating EIAs which were submitted to the department on an unregulated 
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basis and the department had no dedicated enforcement officials. The department 
was accordingly a weak and relatively toothless authority. 
The environmental function at provincial level consisted only of 
conservation matters. They had no experience in implementing other aspects of 
the environmental function such as pollution management or environmental 
impact assessments. The constitutional allocation of the environmental function to 
both the national and provincial spheres of government meant that the provinces 
had to create new environmental departments to discharge the increased 
responsibility. 
The creation of these departments was initially hampered by limited budget 
allocations as well as uncertainty regarding the precise content of the portfolio. By 
early 1996, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng provincial departments had each 
appointed a senior manager.
503
 However, the national policy processes which were 
initiated to define approaches to environmental management for the country meant 
that the provinces had no clarity regarding how implementation responsibilities 
would be divided between national and provincial government. The departments 
were therefore not in a position to develop structures which were appropriately 
aligned with functions. In consequence, the finalisation of departmental structures 
was slow because, as indicated by the then director of the Gauteng department, the 
provinces did ‘not want to develop capacity for functions which may not be 
assigned to the provinces.’ 504 
Towards the end of 1996 it became clear that the provincial departments 
would play a significant role in the administration of the proposed EIA 
Regulations. The departments accordingly began employing officials to take on 
the function. Populating the departments with appropriately qualified people was 
not easily achieved because of the scarcity of environmental skills in the country 
at the time. (In 1995 it was estimated that only 200 people in the country had 
higher degrees relevant to environmental management and less than 500 who had 
attended intensive short course training on environmental assessments).
505
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An assessment of provincial capacity to implement the 1997 EIA 
Regulations conducted in 2001 revealed that the Gauteng and Eastern Cape 
departments employed 25 and 12 officials respectively to process EIAs. Of these, 
60 per cent of officials in the Gauteng department and 30 per cent in the Eastern 
Cape department had less than five years working experience. The ratio of staff to 
number of applications was 1:38 and 1:27, which rendered the two departments 
the most resourced of all provincial environmental departments.
506
  
Whilst the provincial departments had made progress in employing 
officials to undertake the EIA function, they clearly experienced some difficulties 
in implementing it. The limited experience of officials was a major constraint to 
effective and efficient administration.
507
 Presumably because of limited in-house 
skills, the 2001 assessment notes that the provinces often sourced specialist 
reviewers for complex EIAs.  
Some impacts on effective delivery were not directly related to skill and 
experience. The Eastern Cape department’s ability to be effective was also 
affected by infrastructural constraints such as a lack of database software and 
access to pool vehicles.
508
 In other instances external constraints were reported 
such as the poor quality of reports received from many practitioners which placed 
an unnecessary burden on officials.
509
  
Apart from conservation management and processing EIA applications, the 
provincial departments implemented few other environmental functions to any 
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significant extent - mainly because the national law reform process, which set out 
the functions of the provinces, had not been completed. Some powers which the 
provinces did have were also not implemented. For instance, apart from Gauteng, 
the provinces did not monitor or enforce conditions of authorisations or instances 
of general environmental degradation.
510
 This factor itself retarded capacity 
development because, without feedback on monitoring and enforcement activities, 
an opportunity to advise officials about the strength and weaknesses of 
authorisation conditions was missed. 
Since 2001, the departments have increased their staff complement to 
manage EIA applications dramatically. By 2009 DEAT employed 21 officials; 
Gauteng 133 officials (an increase of more than 400 per cent) and the Eastern 
Cape 44 officials (an increase of almost 300 per cent). The increased number of 
officials, together with the 2006 EIA Regulations, has resulted in greater viability 
regarding the number of applications which officials must manage. (The ratio of 
applications received in terms of the 2006 EIA Regulations to officials is currently 
1:29 for DEAT; 1:11 for the Gauteng department and 1:16 for the Eastern Cape 
department).
511
 
The departments have also increased their staff complement in other areas. 
This occurred most notably as a result of the establishment of dedicated 
compliance and enforcement units from 2003 onwards. (Figures are not available 
for the number of environmental management inspectors (EMIs) employed by 
each department. However, DEAT reports that, by March 2008, 866 officials from 
DEAT and the provinces had been trained and designated as EMIs).
512
 
Although the departments now have reasonable numbers of officials to 
undertake departmental regulatory functions, the experience and skills of the staff 
affect the ability of the departments to do so competently.
513
 There are a number 
of factors that impede the development of capacity, some of which are openly 
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acknowledged by the national department in reports to Parliament and public 
briefings.
514
 Almost all such information relates to the EIA function and there is 
very little available information on other functions. 
One of the constraints on the development of capacity identified by the 
national department relates to unfilled posts. In 2009 the national department 
estimated that on average 44 per cent of EIA posts were vacant across the 
country.
515
 Although reasons for the high vacancy rate are not explained, one 
factor may be the time consuming procurement procedures in government
516
 
coupled with frequent resignations of officials.
517
  
During the interviews several officials raised the fact that, even when 
interviews are held, the pool of candidates was poor. A middle manager explained 
that they struggled to complete all the tasks allocated to their unit as they were 
unable to delegate work to their junior officials because - 
Generally I get legal and environmental people with zilch knowledge of 
environmental law and technical [aspects]. You don’t find [qualified 
candidates] on the salary scale offered, so their worth to you is very 
little. 
High vacancy rates place additional pressure on incumbent officials and 
limit the time available for mentorship and learning. Related to the problem of 
high vacancy rates is the departments’ experience in retaining staff. In 2009 the 
national department indicated that 50 per cent of EIA officials had been in their 
current position for less than two years.
518
 The extent and causes of the high 
turnover of officials was illustrated by a senior manager who commented that - 
I have 6 officials plus [X] ... . X is the only one with more than two 
years experience. We are losing them to the private sector, promotions 
to other departments, and within the department. … But it’s part of 
                                                 
514
 Ngcaba op cit; Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Review and revision of 
the environmental impact assessment system of South Africa – a report to the select committee 
tasked with environmental management op cit and National Council of the Provinces Land 
and Environmental Affairs Committee ‘Minutes of meeting held on 12 February 2008’. 
Available at www.pmg.org.za [accessed on 20 April 2010]. 
515
 Ngcaba ibid. 
516GA Lawerence ‘Challenges in recruiting professionals for provincial service delivery’. 
Paper presented to the International Human Resource Management Conference co-hosted by 
IPMA-HR and the Public Service Commission of South Africa on 19 April 2007, Cape Town. 
517
 Laurence J O’Toole Jr and Kenneth J Meier ‘Plus ca change: public management, 
personnel stability, and organizational performance’ (2003) 13 1 Journal of Administration 
Research and Theory 43. 
518
 Ngcaba op cit. 
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what we’re here for – we mentor them, empower them and then they 
leave the nest. 
The complex nature of environmental decisions means that new appointees 
require a period of time to develop an understanding of legislation and 
administrative requirements.
519
 The widespread limited experience in the 
departments means that officials who are responsible for the primary processing of 
decisions generally lack the competence to evaluate the information which is 
provided to inform the decision. Many of the managers interviewed during the 
study candidly referred to a general lack of competence. For example, a middle 
manager said that - 
They don’t have a critical mind – I try to get them to think critically. 
For example I say that they must do more than just accept EAP 
[consultant] documents. When I ask why they haven’t asked or raised 
‘x’ they will say it’s not in the document or not raised by the consultant. 
Their views are borne out in other studies which highlight concerns 
regarding competence. For example, a survey conducted in the Western Cape 
found that only 50 per cent of respondents thought the national department was 
competent. Respondents from the national department also clearly indicated that 
they believed the department lacked the capacity to implement the desired 
decision-making framework. 
520
 
Kotzé notes that the lack of confidence which arises from this capacity gap, 
coupled with the increased legislative mechanisms aimed at transparency and 
accountability, results in officials engaging in avoidance behaviour.
521
 Such 
behaviour often manifests in the form of requests for additional and unnecessary 
information.
522
 The interviews confirmed that managers are aware of this 
behaviour. One senior manager expressed particular frustration about the effects 
of such behaviour as follows - 
                                                 
519
 Pat Jennings ‘Reflections from both sides of the desk’ (20009). Paper delivered at the 
IAIAsa 2009 National Conference held at the Wilderniss 23 – 26 August 2009. Available at 
http://www.iaia.co.za/Conference_2009/pages/Papers.asp [accessed 15 April 2010]. 
520
 Leanne Seeliger and Johan Hattingh An opinion survey of ethical concerns in 
environmental decision-making in Cape Town and surrounds: the baseline of 2002 (October 
2004). Available at 
http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/Departments/philosophy/documents/ENVIRO
%20ETHICS%20OPINION%20SURVEY.pdf [accessed 19 November 2009]. 
521
 According to Loveland op cit at 72, it may also result in discretionary powers being 
hardened into ‘increasingly rigid rules’.  
522
 L Kotze ‘Environmental governance’ in Alexander Paterson and Louis J Kotzé 
Environmental compliance and enforcement in South Africa: legal perspectives (2009) 117. 
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An EO [environmental officer] who knows nothing about geohydraulics  
would ask for a groundwater study for filling stations and the guys in 
DWAF will fold their arms and say it’s not necessary. The developers 
must then spend thousands of rand to tick off [a requirement] for an 
official who doesn’t understand a word of it. 
The consequences of limited competence at junior levels also have more 
subtle consequences. Officials have to deal with external stakeholders who have 
been described by Jennings as being ‘less than frank, often arrogant or 
overbearing.’523 Officials may feel intimidated by external stakeholders who argue 
with authority and may give in to suggestions made by those stakeholders because 
they do not have the confidence to stand their ground or fear reprisals if they make 
a wrong decision. At least one official discussed the difference in attitude that 
occurs from when an official is unconfident to when they acquire more confidence 
by sharing their own experience as follows – 
[The attorneys] bargain on inexperience. Like [x law firm], – if they 
wrote a letter, I couldn’t sleep for a week. Later on I looked for flaws.  
... In general environmental lawyers delay their client’s projects 
unnecessarily and the advice is of very poor quality. In last 3 years 
have I felt uncomfortable with lawyers maybe once. 
High turnover rates are not limited to junior levels. Jennings, a previous 
employee of both the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal environmental 
departments, argues that turnover at more senior levels results in rapid promotions 
of under-experienced officials.
524
 The same point was made by an official who 
commented that -  
The quality of staff in the last 3 years is shocking. We’re now 
appointing people up to AD [assistant director] level without the 
necessary qualifications or experience. We had a pool of choice to 
choose from for [internal] promotions until 2006.  
High turnover at managerial level and appointments of new managers who 
lack sufficient experience results in a steady erosion of the quality of mentorship 
and guiding role that managers ought to play. Jennings also points out that there is 
a high turnover of staff in non-line function posts. In her view this has resulted in 
a decay of support systems which places greater pressure on technical officials to 
absorb support functions in their daily tasks.  
                                                 
523
 Jennings op cit at 3. 
524
 At 4. 
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The transience of officials’ impact on institutional memory means that the 
departments have been unable to achieve what Sandham and Pretorius refer to as 
‘a stable core of skilled officials’ who can make decisions in a consistent and well 
considered manner.
525
 It is a significant factor which militates against the 
development of competence. The departments have, however, initiated many 
capacity building projects. For example, the Danish government donated R6 
million to the Gauteng province in the mid-90’s for capacity building. DEAT and 
the Gauteng department also developed templates and conduct training to support 
the implementation of the EIA Regulations. EMIs, prior to designation, attend 
extensive courses developed jointly by the national department and selected 
universities.
526
 These initiatives are unlikely to have a sustained impact unless 
there is institutional memory to pass on the knowledge or the courses are repeated 
for all new employees.  
Impacts on the quality of decision-making also arise from other reasons 
which are not often widely discussed. In this regard, the departments have striven 
to adhere to national policy requirements in respect of the transformation of staff 
demographic profiles.  This is illustrated by the national department’s 2007/08 
Annual Review which states that the number of black employees is currently 77 
per cent.
527
 For almost all black officials, English – the language of government 
business - will be a second or third language. (English is also a second language 
for many white officials). Drafting defensible and enforceable decisions which 
often include directives or conditions is a challenge for most officials who have 
technical rather than legal academic backgrounds. A lack of proficiency in English 
exacerbates this challenge.  
During the interviews it was noted that some junior officials experienced 
difficulties in understanding certain of the questions which were posed in English. 
In addition, the content of certain correspondence received from the departments 
clearly indicated that the writer was not comfortable writing in English. Within the 
                                                 
525
 Luke A Sandham and Hester M. Pretorius ‘A review of EIA report quality in the North 
West Province of South Africa’ (2008) 28 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 229 at 
238. 
526
 Anecdotal experience also indicates that departments have funded many officials’ 
attendance at university courses on environmental law. 
527
 These figures include statistics for the whole department and not just the environmental 
component. Gender transformation has also occurred as 48% of senior management positions 
were filled by women by 2008. 
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departments, proficiency in English appears to be a concern as is frankly indicated 
by one manager who commented that ‘[m]y Engels is moer goed [my English is 
damn good] compared to others - the quality of writing is pathetic.’ In addition, at 
least one of the departments budgeted for ‘business English’ training courses.528 
The discussion indicates that many of the officials in the departments have 
significant capacity constraints regarding the technical aspects of their tasks. This 
has resulted in ‘questionable decisions and vulnerability to legal challenges’.529 In 
these circumstances it is assumed that obtaining knowledge about the basic 
requirements of the tasks will assume highest priority and that officials may feel 
overwhelmed by an additional requirement to consider judgments. Furthermore, 
even if officials are receptive to judgments in principle, one senior manager 
pointed out that –  
People don’t see the relevance in judgments. They don’t understand 
legal issues … and the implications of judgments are not a priority 
because they don’t know the job. … [Implementing] judgments will 
suffer as a result. 
This may well be a legitimate concern as discomfort with the substantive 
aspects of a task may result in officials failing to understand the implications of a 
judgment. It may be for this reason that some officials tend to focus on the facts of 
a judgment rather than the legal principles.
530
  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter the point was made that officials do not carry out 
their tasks in isolation of their political and institutional environment. Factors 
arising out of the political and institutional environment have a bearing on the way 
in which officials exercise their discretion, including the extent to which and 
manner in which judgments are considered.  
                                                 
528
 Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment Annual report 
2007/2008. Available at http://www.gdard.gpg.gov.za/AnnualReports.htm [accessed 19 
November 2009]. 
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 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism Review and revision of the 
environmental impact assessment system of South Africa – a report to the select committee 
tasked with environmental management op cit. 
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The five factors considered in this study are by no means the only ones 
which are potentially relevant. (Others might, for example, include financial 
resources, culture and corruption). No attempt is made to make absolute findings 
because the five factors also do not operate in a vacuum and the influence of 
additional factors cannot be discounted. 
With this caveat in mind, the preceding sections make some tentative 
comments regarding the extent to which the five factors contribute to, or detract 
from, the potential for judicial impact. The analysis of the external factors 
suggests that there is a neutral to negative effect. In this regard, the expansive 
parameters of accountability envisaged in the Constitution mean that 
accountability mechanisms have the potential to support the role of the courts. 
Currently, however, accountability mechanisms have a largely neutral effect on 
the reception of judgments because limited attention is paid to judicial 
proceedings in the outputs of accountability processes. Nevertheless, there is a 
possibility that such mechanisms could exert positive pressure should the 
approach to accountability reporting change in the future. 
The implications of the environmental departments’ Cinderella status is 
less clear. As is discussed in Chapter 8, politicians in environmental portfolios are 
generally publicly supportive of the rule of law. Such support enhances the 
potential for judicial impact. Nevertheless, the reality of competition between 
different authorities and attempts to railroad environmental objectives may result 
in pressure which subtlety, and perhaps unintentionally, undermines the influence 
of the courts.  
The results of the assessment of internal factors emphasise the importance 
of considering the interrelationships between different factors. In this regard, the 
fact that environmental decision-making based on sustainable development is 
complex and relatively new in South Africa, together with the fact that officials 
may welcome clarification on areas of uncertainty, may enhance receptivity to 
guidance from the courts. (This lends support for the first hypothesis). At the same 
time, paradoxically, time pressure and low levels of competence in the context of 
complex non-routine decision-making present barriers which inhibit the reception 
of judgments. In the current circumstances, the extent to which the courts can 
influence administrative processes is unpredictable and will vary according to the 
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nature of the officials that are employed at any given time. In view of this, internal 
factors seem to have a more pronounced effect on judicial impact than the external 
factors.  
The assessment of internal factors also suggests that complex non-routine 
decision-making in the context of an immature public sector system yields a 
particular set of positive and negative dynamics. Challenges of stabilising 
consistency and quality of decision-making and developing capacity appear to 
have a significant competitive effect with the reception of judgments. In addition, 
continued high turnover of officials makes it increasingly difficult for new 
officials to keep pace with the growing body of case law.
531
 These dynamics, 
which may be of lesser importance for judicial impact studies conducted in 
developed counties, merit further consideration in similar studies conducted in 
respect of developing countries.  
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7. Knowledge 
 
Two of the five hypotheses underpinning this thesis relate to knowledge. The 
second hypothesis postulates that knowledge of judgments is required for impact 
to eventuate. The fourth suggests that the potential for impact is greater where 
there are formal mechanisms for analysing, determining responses and 
disseminating information on judgments. In South Africa, the importance of 
knowledge in the public sector is underpinned by the dictates of legislation. Both 
the Constitution
532
 and PAJA require decisions to be taken in a rational and 
accountable manner. Explicit in this obligation is a requirement that, as part of 
good governance, officials must have knowledge of relevant factors which are 
used to inform their decisions. PAJA, for example, provides that administrative 
decisions may be reviewed on a number of grounds which involve the application 
of knowledge, including the failure to take relevant factors into account and 
basing decisions on errors of law.
533
  
The courts are responsible for both interpreting legislation and articulating 
the requirements of sound administrative conduct. When they exercise these 
powers the ensuing judgments result in case law which supplements legislation. 
Case law accordingly forms part of the legal mandate which circumscribes the 
exercise of discretion in environmental decision-making. This means that, as part 
of the knowledge requirement set out in legislation, officials must obtain 
knowledge about case law and apply that knowledge to decision-making 
processes. Moreover, this knowledge requirement provides a basis for judicial 
impact.
534
 Although officials’ knowledge of judgments does not necessarily lead 
to greater compliance, without some knowledge, the courts cannot have an impact 
on the public administration’s responses to the environment. 
Whilst the need to acquire knowledge is clear, identifying what the nature 
of that knowledge is, and the extent to which it is required, are more fluid 
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 See s 195(1). 
533
 See Chapter 3 for the range of grounds on which a review action can be based. Certain 
environmental legislation also contains provisions aimed at securing administrative justice. For 
example, the 2006 EIA Regulations specify that reasons must be given for a decision. 
534
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propositions – particularly given the unresolved philosophical debates about 
knowledge reflected in epistemology literature. It may be that these issues are 
dependent on so many circumstantial factors, that precise clarification is 
impossible. However, for the purposes of considering what knowledge is required 
in this study, the enquiry may be confined to three interrelated criteria –  
1. In order to be able to contextualise the information contained in 
judgments, officials require background knowledge of legal processes 
and concepts. For example, an official must have a basic understanding 
of judicial review in order to understand which outcomes and responses 
are possible.
535
  
2. Officials must be aware of the existence of relevant judgments.  
3. In order to translate these forms of knowledge into impact, a third 
criterion is necessary, namely an interpretive phase in which officials 
gain an understanding of  the court’s findings in respect of the legal 
principles involved in the judgment, and the implications of those 
findings for future decisions.
536
 
An exploration of officials’ knowledge based on these three criteria 
provided a necessary entry point f r considering the second hypothesis as they 
offer insights as to whether there is sufficient knowledge to provide a basis for 
impact. Officials were accordingly asked questions which tested their knowledge 
of legal proceedings, awareness of relevant judgments and understanding of case 
law. This type of enquiry is, however, limited as several important questions are 
not answered. For example, it cannot provide reasons why knowledge does, or 
does not, exist. It also cannot provide any understanding of how information is 
received and whether there are factors, in respect of the circumstantial exposure to 
information, which have implications for understanding impact. The enquiry 
therefore reveals little about the relationship between knowledge and the context 
within which information and knowledge are generated. These are important 
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 Simon op cit at 208.  
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 These criteria do not expressly address government’s role in managing knowledge for the 
benefit of the public. See in that regard Karl M Wiig ‘Application of knowledge management 
in public administration’ (2000) Proceedings of the international symposium building policy 
coherence, Taipei, Taiwan:  City of Taipei and Alexander, P M and Phahlamohlaka, LJ 
‘Information flows for meaningful implementation of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act in South Africa’ (2005) 150 SAICSIT 29. 
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considerations for assessing impact because some literature shows that a lack of 
communication is a key reason why new approaches do not penetrate decision-
making behaviour.
537
 
To address these issues, a second more penetrating enquiry is required - 
one which explores how officials receive information on judgments and which 
identifies barriers to receiving knowledge. Johnson and Canon propose one 
approach to such enquiries.
538
 They suggest that the reception of information on 
judgments be viewed in the context of communication theory.
539
 Whilst 
communication studies lack an overarching theory, conceptualising the reception 
of information on judgments as a process of transmission from message sender to 
message receiver provides a useful framework for the second enquiry (and testing 
of the fourth hypothesis). 
 In this study a basic communication model was adapted as a framework 
for considering the contextual factors which influence the extent of officials’ 
knowledge on judgments. The model, depicted in Figure 7-1 below, views the 
courts as message senders or generators. Their messages reach officials (message 
receivers) via different sources (channels of communication). In some instances 
the message is transformed by these sources. For example, media reports truncate 
the message whereas legal opinions provide an interpretation of the message. In 
other instances, where the information is received directly from a written 
judgment, the message is transmitted largely intact. At each stage of the process 
barriers or enhancers may occur which either detract from the message being 
understood by the receiver in its intended form or which facilitate the clear 
transmission of the message. Ideally for maximum communication efficacy, the 
model should include a feedback loop between the message sender and receiver.
540
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 John P Kotter Leading change (1996) 9 and 85 – 100. 
538
 Johnson and Canon op cit at 204.  
539
 The idea is not unique to Johnson and Canon. See also Martin Shapiro ‘Towards a theory of 
stare decisis’ in Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet On law, politics and judicialization (2002) 
and Wasby op cit at 83 – 98 and 251 - 252. 
540
 A full discussion on feedback loops, which form part of systems thinking, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It is nevertheless an important consideration in impact studies because the 
limited communication from departments to the courts may in itself undermine the courts’ 
impact. In this regard, Meadows states that‘[m]issing information flows is one of the most 
common causes of system malfunction’. See Donella H Meadows Thinking in systems (2009) 
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However, it is omitted because the institutional relationship between courts and 
officials provides very few opportunities for feedback. 
 
Figure 7-1 Communication Flow of Knowledge on Judgments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 The courts as messenger  
The conduct of the courts as message-sender requires consideration because, as 
Schutte and Snyman point out, the message sender can either ‘enhance or impede’ 
knowledge flow.
541
 Some barriers to knowledge flow created by the messenger 
sender’s conduct which they identify will seldom occur in the context of the 
courts.
542
 For example, reluctance to share knowledge owing to fear of losing 
power, pressure from superiors or lack of reward, are unlikely to emerge as 
barriers because judges are isolated from departmental dynamics.  
                                                                                                                                            
and T van der Heijden and M Mlandi ‘Organisational performance, success and failure in the 
public sector’ (2005) Journal of Public Administration 234. 
541
 M Schutte and MMM Snyman ‘Knowledge flow elements within a context – a model’ (2006) 8 
2 South African Journal of Information Management  at para 4.2. 
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 Ibid. 
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However, there are factors which may hinder the reception of judicial 
messages in their intended form. These are most likely to manifest in relation to 
the requirement identified by Graber that message senders must ‘know the culture 
and comprehension levels of receivers.’543 Three aspects of this requirement are 
discussed below.  
 
7.1.1 Judgments and language 
Eagleson aptly expresses the importance of language in the communication of 
legal rules in his discussion on the drafting of legislation. He states that -  
Language – and therefore all legal drafting as a manifestation of it – is 
a social as well as a purposeful activity. It exists not just to express a 
message but also to communicate it successfully to others. It cannot be 
said that an act of language has really occurred unless the message is 
comprehended; and no law can accomplish its task of regulating 
behaviour unless it can be understood.
544
 
Eagleson’s comment equally applies to case law. An inability on the part of 
an official to assimilate the language in a judgment will have consequences for 
that official’s ability to interpret the requirements of the judgment. If attention is 
not paid to the use of language in judgments, it may therefore result in confusion, 
greater scope for misinterpretation and potential reduction of the intended impact. 
Although it is generally accepted that judgments should be written in a way 
which can be understood by affected parties,
545
 expressing the complexities of a 
case and applicable legislation in simple language that is readily understandable, 
requires a substantial degree of skill on the part of judges. The timing of the 
judgment is one factor which places pressure on the exercise of this skill.
546
 Judge 
Corbett points out that whilst it may be preferable to hand down judgments at the 
                                                 
543
 Doris A Graber Public sector communication: how organizations manage information 
(1992) 5. 
544
 RE Eagleson ‘Efficiency in legal drafting’ in D Kelly (ed) Essays on legislative drafting (1998) 
13 as quoted in Bernard Bekink and Christo Botha ‘Aspects of legislative drafting: some South 
African realities (or plain language is not always plain sailing)’ (2007) 28 1 Statute Law Review 34 
at 65. 
545
 See MM Corbett ‘Writing a judgment – address at the first orientation course for new judges’ 
(1998) 115  SALJ  116 at 119 where Judge Corbett explained this as follows: ‘... a judgment 
should be intelligible to any ordinary layman of reasonable education and intelligence.’  
546
 Another challenge arises where the language used in legislation is poor. See Eduard Fagan 
‘The longest erratum note in history: S v Mhlungu and Others’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 79. 
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end of hearings, most judges are ill-equipped to deliver a judgment in those 
circumstances which is of the same quality as a reserved judgment.
547
  
Even where a judgment is reserved, accessibility is complicated by the fact 
that language usage is embedded in social, cultural and ideological values
548
 and 
that legal terminology is unfamiliar to most people. These terminological 
differences may be more pronounced in judgments involving complicated legal 
arguments. In these situations Corbett points out that –  
…every now and again it is necessary to strike out in a new direction or 
take a new line. And then you have to leave the layman behind and 
direct your writing more to the lawyer, particularly the academics.
549
 
The implication of the disjuncture between terminology and vocabulary 
which is used by the legal profession and others has been explored in several 
studies. Wildeboer et al found that three types of vocabulary had to be 
accommodated in designing a case retrieval system for laypersons, namely, 
language used by laypersons to describe their situation, language used in 
legislation and language used in judgments.
550
 During a user study to assess how 
helpful laypersons found the system to be, participants were divided into three 
groups. The group that was given the most information was found to have more 
understanding than the other groups and could respond most accurately. 
Notwithstanding this the group still made comments such as ‘this is way too 
difficult for a layman like me.’551 Such responses suggest that language usage in 
judgments creates an intimidatory effect.  
The fact that many laypersons struggle to understand legal language is also 
illustrated by Reifman et al’s study on jurors’ understanding of instructions by 
                                                 
547
 Ibid at 119. 
548
 Shadrack B O Gutto ‘Plain language and the law in the context of cultural and legal pluralism’ 
(1995) 11 SAJHR at 311. For a further discussion on the theories and impact of language on 
knowledge formation see Steven Pinker The stuff of thought (2007). 
549
 Corbett op cit at 122. 
550
Gwen R Wildeboer et al ‘Explaining the relevance of court decisions to laymen’ in Arno R 
Lodder and Laurens Mommers (eds) Legal knowledge and information systems: Jurix  2007: The 
Twentieth Annual Conference (2007) 165 at 129. Available at http://pubs.cli.vu/en/pub346.php 
[accessed on 19 January 2009].  
551
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judges.
552
 Their findings confirm the results of previous studies that less than half 
of jurors understand the instructions given to them by judges. The study also 
demonstrates the link between low levels of comprehension and the use of legal 
language. Factors such as education levels had no effect on jurors’ understanding. 
However, when jurors requested clarity from the judge and received ‘plain 
English’ responses, as opposed to a restatement of previous instructions, 
comprehension levels improved.  
 The alienating effect of legal language in judgments potentially acquires 
more significance in South Africa than in predominantly monolingual countries, 
as there are 25 spoken languages in the country.
553
 Since 1994, there has been 
political sensitivity regarding the need to redress language practices to enhance 
accessibility. For example, the African National Congress’ (ANC) Reconstruction 
and Development Programme states that ‘[t]he legal processes and institutions 
should be reformed by simplifying the language and procedures used in court.’554 
The Constitution also reflects this need.  Section 6 changes the historical 
dominance of English and Afrikaans by declaring eleven of the languages to be 
official languages. In addition to elevating the status of different languages, the 
bill of rights provides, indirectly, for the right to accessible language. In terms of 
the right of access to information, people are entitled to information necessary for 
the exercise or protection of one of the constitutional rights.
555
 Bekink and Botha 
argue that the access to information right includes the right to be able to 
understand and interpret the law (or case law) because the objectives of the right 
cannot be realised without this element.
556
  
Notwithstanding the political and legislative sensitivity to language, the 
superior courts hand down an overwhelming majority of their judgments in 
English. (This may change if the draft South African Languages Bill is 
promulgated with the proposed provision that the use of English by the courts be 
                                                 
552
 Alan Reifman et al ‘Real jurors’ understanding of the law in real cases’ (1992) 16 5 Law and 
Human Behavior 539. 
553
 National Language Policy Framework (2003) at 5. Available at http://www.info.gov.za 
[accessed on 29 April 2009]. 
554
 ANC Reconstruction and development programme (1994) 124.  
555
 Section 32. 
556
 Bekink and Botha op cit at 58. 
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expanded to include other languages).
557
 Although the range of languages used by 
judges is limited, it is clear that some judges have made efforts to address the 
accessibility of their judgments. The style of judgments handed down by the 
Constitutional Court, for example, is a marked departure from the language 
traditionally used in judgments.  
Controversies regarding the identification of appropriate English norms in 
linguistic circles, however, must affect the success of these efforts. Hibbert and 
Makoni indicate the complexity of selecting appropriate English norms to enhance 
accessibility. 
558
 In their analysis of the plain English movement in South Africa, 
they discuss the different types of English norms used in South Africa and point 
out that ‘African English norms’ are in a state of flux whereas ‘educated South 
African English’ is subject to the criticism that it is biased to socially advantaged 
users.  
The interviews revealed that concerns about language may be impacting 
negatively on officials’ knowledge of judgments. Of the officials interviewed, 
only 30 per cent were mother-tongue English speakers or bilingual with one 
language being English. The alienating effect of legal terminology is likely to be 
exacerbated where the official reads the judgment in a language which is their 
second or third language, particularly given the low levels of functional literacy in 
the country.
559
 
It is also likely that an intimidatory effect surrounds judgments and this is 
exacerbated by the use of legal terminology in situations where officials do not 
have regular exposure to judgments or legal proceedings. The following 
comments by officials support this view – 
‘It’s difficult to read the language - the lawyer’s language.’ 
 
‘Sometimes judgments are difficult to understand as we don’t have the 
background .... Also, to understand the words used there [in judgments] 
- understand they use words that we don’t know.’   
                                                 
557
 South African Languages Bill GG 24893 GNR 1514 30 May 2003. 
558
 Liesel Hibbert and Sinfree Makoni ‘The plain English campaign in South Africa’ (1997) 13 2 
English Today 50 3 at 5. 
559
 Victor N Webb Language in South Africa: the role of language in national transformation, 
reconstruction and development (2002). Webb describes the extent of the problem by noting a 
1996 survey amongst trainee teachers which found that only 5% were functionally literate in 
English and could use it as a medium for teaching. 
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‘People already have the perception that they won’t understand it 
therefore put it in plain language.’ 
 
These comments echo the results of Wildeboer et al  and Reifman et al.  
 
7.1.2 Clarity of requirements 
Apart from the actual language used by judges, the lucidity of a judgment may 
also affect the translation of the courts’ message into knowledge. A clear message 
ought to leave an official in no doubt as to the conduct required in public 
administration activities. An unclear message on the other hand creates 
opportunity for disparate interpretations and responses.
560
 
The case analysis revealed that the courts often take great care to ensure the 
message is clear. For example, in the FRA CC judgment the court explained what 
administrative practice ought to be when considering socio-economic factors and 
cumulative impacts in environmental decision-making as follows -
561
 
... NEMA makes it abundantly clear that the obligation of the 
environmental authorities includes the consideration of socio-economic 
factors as an integral part of its environmental responsibility. 
 
… 
 
 A consideration of socio-economic developments therefore includes the 
consideration of the impact of the proposed development not only in 
combination with existing developments, but also its impact on existing 
ones.  
 
… 
 
…the Constitution, ECA and NEMA do not protect the existing 
developments at the expense of future developments. What section 24 
requires, and what NEMA gives effect to, is that socio-economic 
development must be justifiable in the light of the need to protect the 
environment.
562
 
                                                 
560
 Johnson and Canon op cit at 206 and Spriggs op cit at 207. See P A Brynard ‘Policy 
implementation and cognitive skills: the difficulty of understanding implementation’ (2010) 
45 1.1 Journal of Public Administration 190 regarding the consequences of misunderstandings 
of the message sender’s intention for policy implementation. 
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 Op cit. 
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An official reading this extract ought to understand that socio-economic 
factors must be taken into account in all subsequent decisions.  
 There are however instances when the way in which judicial findings are 
expressed can result in unintended consequences. In Senekal, for instance, the 
court was required to make a finding on the extent to which crime should be 
considered in EIA applications.
563
 The court’s view was potentially significant 
because crime is a major concern in South Africa and is often raised in comments 
on EIA applications. It falls, arguably, within the scope of environmental decision-
making because an increase in crime following approval of a development, would 
impact negatively on peoples’ right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
well-being. In response to the applicant’s complaint that the department did not 
take crime into account, the court stated that - 
Crime and prevalence of AIDS should be considered but their existence 
should not be given too much weight because they are issues which 
should be dealt with mainly by some various government development. 
[sic] 
Instead of clarifying the approach th t officials should adopt, the statement 
creates ambiguity because officials may receive disparate messages. Some 
officials might interpret the message to mean that crime is an important factor but 
that they may not refuse an application on that basis alone. Others may interpret 
the message to mean that they should take note that comments on crime have been 
raised, but that it is the responsibility of other government departments to manage 
crime and they should accordingly not take the comments too seriously. In 
consequence officials may adopt one of three responses, namely increase the 
consideration that is given to crime in a decision; reduce the attention which is 
paid to comments on crime or respond to issues on crime inconsistently and on a 
case-by-case basis. Instead of generating consistency in officials’ responses to 
crime, the finding of the court may exacerbate a lack of uniformity in decision-
making.  
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7.1.3 Consistency in approach 
Section 7.1.2 considers the effects of clarity of individual judgments. A closely 
related aspect is the clarity of collected or grouped messages sent by the courts. 
Clearly individual judgments do not exist in isolation. They form part of a body of 
case law which develops over time, often in a piecemeal manner. Individual 
judgments are therefore seldom the absolute authority on a particular issue and can 
be amplified, departed from and even overturned by subsequent judgments. In 
order to properly understand what the courts require of them, officials need to 
have knowledge of the entire related body of case law on any issue. The process of 
acquiring such knowledge must involve continual interpretation of a collection of 
messages, or judgments, and modification of existing interpretations where 
necessary. 
The level of consistency shown by courts when sending a collection of 
messages can either facilitate or impede this process. Consistently attaining 
absolute clarity where a collection of messages is concerned is undoubtedly an 
impractical goal. This is particularly true for environmental law where there is 
limited precedent, and therefore considerable opportunity for judges to reach 
different conclusions. Furthermore, the facts in dispute and the arguments made 
by counsel differ between cases. Consistency in collective judicial messages is 
generally only achieved when a definitive decision is made by the SCA or the 
Constitutional Court. 
However, where a line of judgments dealing with an issue lacks 
consistency, conflicting interpretations and responses may follow. In these 
instances, the courts exacerbate uncertainty and their ability to realise widespread 
acceptance of its authority to regulate conduct or, in other words, to have an 
impact on officials’ behaviour, is reduced. 564 Legitimately divergent 
interpretations as a result of the different messages increase the defensibility of a 
business-as-usual response, and reduce the measurability of impact because key 
indicators, such as compliance, become difficult to define. 
Chapter 5 highlights instances of inconsistent approaches by the courts in 
terms of public participation requirements and the consideration of socio-
economic factors. In the public participation judgments both Earthlife and 
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Muckleneuk were handed down by a full bench of judges and are therefore binding 
in their respective jurisdictions. In consequence, at that time  different approaches 
to public participation in respect of the adjudication phase could be legitimately 
adopted by the provinces.
565
 
Judicial inconsistency was more pronounced in respect of the consideration 
of socio-economic factors where the same court handed down diametrically 
opposing judgments. For a period of time the court’s inconsistency made it 
possible for officials to follow the line of reasoning which best fitted their own 
views.
566
 It was only as certainty incrementally emerged from the SCA and 
Constitutional Court that officials were in a position to definitively understand 
which opinion they ought to respond to. 
These examples of conflicting decisions illustrate the dangers of 
disregarding judgments as a collection of messages. If, for example, officials were 
aware of only one of the High Court judgments on socio-economic issues which 
was subsequently overturned, their responses may inadvertently have been in 
conflict with the final guidance provided by the SCA and Constitutional Court. 
The examples also provide a tangible insight to the interpretation process that is 
required in the formulation of knowledge. To initiate this process, officials must 
be aware both of the conflict and the mechanisms that can be used to reach a 
defensible interpretation. In particular, conflicting judgments emphasise the need 
for background knowledge. A formal mechanism for managing interpretation of 
conflicting judgments is by reference to the rules of precedent. The extent to 
which officials have this background knowledge is explored further in section 7.3.  
 
7.2 The channel of communication 
Officials receive court messages from a number of sources. These sources, known 
as channels of communication, take different forms, from the judgments 
themselves, to formal opinions, media articles, oral messages and many more. 
Apart from judgments, these mechanisms provide translations of the courts’ 
original message. Functional, structural and psychological barriers may all have an 
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Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
190 
 
effect on the accuracy and scope of information received by officials through these 
channels.  
Functional factors affect the quality of information supplied to message 
recipients, particularly when that information is diluted or distorted. Information is 
diluted when a need to summarise the message constrains the translation thereof, 
or when the message is translated for a specific audience. For example, media 
articles are generally brief and journalists must decide which part of the original 
message to convey and which to omit. Further incremental dilution may occur 
when an already translated message is altered and passed from one person to the 
next.  
Garber points out that the extent of dilution in such instances can be 
significant, because approximately half of the information passed up a hierarchy, 
is lost at each level.
567
 In other words, the amount of information passed through 
six levels of a hierarchy will have been reduced by 98 per cent when it reaches the 
highest level. Similarly, information passed down the hierarchy can get filtered 
and reduced as managers extract and transmit only that which they deem relevant. 
Where information is diluted, an altered and incomplete version of the original 
message reaches the message recipient. This affects the extent of knowledge 
gained from the information. In some instances, the consequences of dilution can 
be significant, particularly where it results in distortion of the original message.  
Both Wasby,
568
 and Johnson and Canon,
569
 highlight the importance of 
message distortion in the communication of judgments. They point out that 
distortion may be intentional or unintentional. Dilution is also not the only cause 
of message distortion. Johnson and Canon indicate that oral transmission of 
messages is vulnerable to distortion, particularly when time pressures or ‘need-to-
know’ considerations cause the transmitter to focus on aspects of a judgment 
which they deem important. The transmitter may also exaggerate the outcomes 
and consequences of a judgment, thereby distorting the message.
570
 In other 
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570
 Johnson and Canon op cit at 209. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
191 
 
instances the translator of a message causes distortion by focusing on aspects of a 
judgment which suit a particular situation. For example, a lawyer preparing an 
appeal against an official’s decision is likely to focus on extracts of judgments 
which support their client’s case. Similarly, a lawyer defending a decision of a 
department will also tend to rely on judgments which bolster their defence. 
Distortions in these instances are particularly influential because the lawyer is 
often perceived to be more knowledgeable than the receiver of the distorted 
message.  
Whatever the cause, distortion reduces the effectiveness of the channel of 
communication as a mechanism for accurate transmission of a message to a 
message recipient. The effect of distortion can be reduced if the message recipient 
receives additional information on the same judgment through other channels. 
However, where the distorted message is the only source of information, the 
knowledge derived from the information by the recipient, will be tainted by that 
distortion.  
Structural factors, on the other hand, impact on the extent to which 
information is received. If information flow from message sender to recipient is 
erratic or in any way impeded, it cannot be optimally utilised in decision-making. 
A clear system for managing information on judgments, and ensuring that 
information is delivered to the correct recipients, therefore increases the potential 
for considered and consistent responses. 
The discussion below explores the extent to which certain functional and 
structural barriers arise when the courts’ messages are transformed by these 
channels of communication.
571
 During the interviews, both external and internal 
channels of communication were explored. 
 
7.2.1 External channels of information 
Interviewees were asked to identify external channels of communication 
which they use to receive information on court messages. The results set out in  
Table 7.1, show that newspapers, followed by television programmes, training and 
judgments, are the most frequently cited as sources of information. In the study, 
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three of these were considered in more depth, namely, judgments, newspaper 
articles and articles in professional newsletters or magazines.  
 
 Table 7-1 Sources of Information 
 
 Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never 
Training sessions 18.8 34.4 25.0 21.9 
Consultants working for 
the department on 
departmental projects 
0.0 18.8 28.1 53.1 
Judgments 15.2 36.4 18.2 30.3 
Summaries in 
professional newsletters 
6.3 28.1 18.8 46.9 
Television 6.1 51.5 21.2 21.2 
Radio 6.3 34.4 15.6 43.8 
Newspapers 17.6 52.9 17.6 11.8 
Stakeholder submissions 
on applications 
6.1 39.4 21.2 33.3 
 
 
 
Judgments 
Officials can access judgments with relative ease. Two of the departments 
subscribe to electronic law reports, although access is generally confined to 
lawyers in those departments. Apart from formal subscription services, access to 
the judgments of many courts is also available on the internet free of charge. The 
research results, however, indicate that these sources are almost never accessed 
with one notable exception where an interviewee indicated that a previous 
manager had encouraged officials to ‘google’ relevant judgments when 
developing a response to appeals. Furthermore, it appears that most officials’ 
access to judgments is reactive, and occurs when a judgment is distributed directly 
to them. In consequence, judgments are read on an ad hoc, rather than a 
systematic basis. The finding that officials in general do not routinely read 
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judgments is borne out by responses to a subsequent question. Officials were 
shown a list of judgments which were likely to be more well known. The 
responses set out in Table 7.2 show that the majority of the judgments are read by 
a quarter or less of the interviewees.  
 
Table 7-2 Percentage of Officials who have read Judgments 
 
Case name Percentage 
Bareki NO and Another v Rencor Ltd and Others 11.1% 
Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another v Save the 
Vaal Environment and Others 
27.8% 
Eagles Landing Body Corporate v Molewa NO and Others 0.0% 
Fuel Retailers Association of SA (Pty) Ltd v Director-General: Environmental 
Management, Mpumalanga and Others 
54.1% 
Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
Products and Others 
19.4% 
HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others 
25.0% 
SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd and Another v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Economic Development (Western Cape) and Another 
5.6% 
 
 
Notwithstanding the potential barriers of communication that may arise 
from judgments discussed in 7.2 above, judgments are the most accurate of all the 
external channels of communication because they are generated by the message 
sender. Nevertheless, the table above shows that the availability of judgments does 
not mean that officials will access them.  
 
Newspapers 
All of the departments have a system of identifying relevant newspaper 
articles and then disseminating them to officials. Given the significance of 
newspapers as a cited source of information on judgments, a search was conducted 
in major newspapers for articles on judgments which fell within the scope of the 
study. The purpose of this search was to establish the comprehensiveness of 
coverage and the extent of accuracy - or distortion - that is present. The search was 
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not exhaustive as it focused on newspapers with a provincial or national 
distribution (including on-line versions).  
The search revealed that reporting on environmental litigation is scarce, 
and when reported, more emphasis is placed on prospective litigation than on the 
outcome of the dispute. Printed newspapers give very limited space to reporting 
on judgments on environmental matters. (Online versions of the newspapers 
provide slightly more coverage). This finding is consistent with other research 
which shows that media coverage on environmental issues as a whole comprises 
approximately one per cent of all reported issues.
572
  
There are several reasons for the limited attention which newspapers pay to 
environmental judgments. Berger points out that, in an effort to reach a greater 
audience, journalism in South Africa has moved to coverage of people-centred 
stories.
573
 Environmental stories therefore become of interest to journalists when 
they can be written to focus on the impact on people’s daily lives. This shift in 
approach limits the media appeal of many environmental judgments and is 
exacerbated by the time required to understand environmental issues, which Tyrell 
argues is prohibitive for most journalists.
574
 In addition few journalists have the 
requisite legal skill to facilitate their understanding of judgments.
575
  
A further reason for the limited coverage is suggested by Jooste, Findlay 
and Harber who, commenting on the reporting of AIDs, note that media interest is 
stimulated where there is political conflict or well known personalities are 
involved.
576
 The presence of political conflict may explain why the Earthlife 
judgment received more coverage than all the other judgments considered as 
DEAT’s decision to approve the construction of a pebble bed modular reactor 
(PMBR) nuclear facility was controversial in many sectors.  
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It is also possible, however, that judgments are more likely to receive 
attention when they are handed down by the Constitutional Court. Articles were 
found in respect of most of the Constitutional Court judgments covered in the 
study, whereas stories on the judgments handed down by the courts a quo were 
not.  In one of the Constitutional Court judgments, namely, MEC: Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment and Another v HTF Developers (Pty) 
Ltd (HTF CC judgment), the judgment dealt with the technical requirements for 
issuing an enforcement notice in terms of section 31A of ECA.
577
 The technical 
nature of the judgment seemingly contradicts the identified circumstances in 
which environmental judgments will capture media attention unless it is related to 
the status of the court. 
The infrequent reporting of environmental judgments suggests that officials 
can only receive a limited awareness of the range of environmental judgments 
which are handed down. Notwithstanding this, it is important to consider the 
quality of information contained in newspaper reports, as it will affect the message 
received by an official. Several writers have commented on the potential 
constraints of newspaper reports as a source of information. Newspaper space 
constraints usually allow for only the key legal points of a judgment to be 
accommodated in an article. Wasby notes that this truncation of a judgment may 
result in distortion, and that stories tend to focus on the parties and background 
facts of the dispute rather than the legal issues.
578
 Johnson and Canon’s research 
supports Wasby’s views. They found that legal principles are downplayed in 
reports and that newspapers often exaggerate the implications of a judgment.
579
  
These researchers’ findings in respect of the lack of explanation of legal 
principles are applicable to most of the articles reviewed in this study. Information 
on legal principles involved in the case was seldom discussed in the stories. This 
is illustrated by an article on the Muckleneuk judgment titled Court Gives 
Gautrain Project the Green Flag in which there is no discussion on the court’s 
findings on the public participation process which is a significant legal finding of 
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the judgment.
580
 Similarly, an article titled Wild Coast Cottages Have to Go – 
Court in respect of Minister of Land Affairs and Others v Barnett and Others
581
 
provides no information on the legal arguments or findings  of the court. 
582
 
However, contrary to Johnson and Canon’s findings that the implications of a 
judgment are often exaggerated, the articles tend to be factual and those which 
provide an interpretation or a discussion of the implications of a judgment are the 
exception.
583
  
In addition almost none of the articles provide a citation of the judgment. 
Whilst the story may accordingly raise awareness of a judgment’s existence, the 
absence of a citation inhibits efforts to locate the judgment.  
The reporting was found to be generally accurate. However, the potential 
for space constraints and eye-catching headlines or introductory sentences to 
distort the message contained in judgments was noted in some instances. For 
example, the Mail and Guardian ran an article on South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance v Head of Department: Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Affairs. KwaZulu-Natal and Others
584
 titled Plans for Durban 
incinerator goes up in smoke.
585
 The first sentence of the article states that ‘[i]t’s 
back to the drawing board for paper giant Mondi after a Durban judge ruled on 
Wednesday it could not build an incinerator to burn waste and generate steam at 
its south Durban plant.’ Although this statement is subsequently qualified to 
indicate that the court stayed construction until the department’s decision to 
exempt the activity from requiring authorisation was done in writing, the first 
sentence could leave a lasting impression that construction of the incinerator had 
been permanently halted by the courts. 
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Distortion as a result of attempts to influence the direction of stories 
through press releases and media statements was also limited. For example, the  
national department’s media statement on Earthlife provided a summary of nearly 
all the legal findings in the judgment and stated that - 
 
The essence of the court’s judgment regarding the EIA process on the 
PBMR is to further lengthen what already is a highly inclusive and 
participatory process, the result of which is that the country’s 
development program will be hamstrung, in a manner that could 
undermine good intentions of ensuring that environmental concerns are 
taken into account in the country’s reconstruction and development 
programme… .586 
 
Except for the Cape Times which quoted the DG as sayi g that the 
judgment ‘effectively renders the environmental impact assessment process 
unworkable,’587 no other newspaper article explored the potential implications of 
the judgment on the EIA application process which are suggested by the 
Department’s statement.  
The discussion above shows that, as a channel of communication, 
newspapers may contribute to awareness of a judgment’s existence. However, the 
scarcity of reporting on environmental judgments limits the value of the source 
and the emphasis on factual rather than legal aspects of judgments dilutes the 
court’s message considerably. Officials are accordingly unlikely to receive 
sufficient information to transform the information into knowledge regarding the 
implications of the judgment. The depth of knowledge required to establish a basis 
for impact will therefore be absent.  
 
Professional media 
Several professional magazines and newsletters, including those generated 
by technical environmental professionals as well as lawyers, contain articles on 
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recent environmental judgments.
588
 One third of officials indicated that they 
receive information on judgments from these sources. Like newspapers, the 
review found very limited analysis of the implications of judgments in these 
articles. However, unlike newspaper articles, those in the professional media do 
not usually include contextual discussion or views of the parties.
589
 In general, 
articles are drafted in a factual style and range in length from a few lines to a full 
page. These articles are also characterised by a relatively high degree of accuracy, 
although a degree of distortion occurs because the limited length of the articles 
result in some of the issues in the judgment being omitted. The articles are 
therefore seemingly more useful sources of information than newspapers for 
officials since officials fall within the target audience of the publication. Distortion 
is therefore more likely to arise from simplification and conciseness than from 
inaccurate reporting. 
 
7.2.2 Institutional arrangements and communication 
Clear systems for receiving and disseminating information on judgments can 
facilitate the reception of information by officials. An effective system is 
predicated on an understanding of who needs to know about judgments. Halliday 
suggests that ‘the conditions which are conducive to compliance with 
administrative law are where all those who exercise discretion in the run up to the 
final decision outcome receive the requisite legal knowledge.’590  
Decision-making in each of the three departments differs mainly in respect 
of the rank that has authority to make a final decision. Some authorise only the 
most senior manager to make the final decision, whereas others allow certain 
decisions to be made at lower levels. Notwithstanding this, in all three 
departments, there are several people who are involved in making any decision. 
This is particularly evident in the case of EIA application processes. Most 
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applications are initially evaluated by an EO and/ or principle environmental 
officer (PEO), the most junior level. (Occasionally, more complex cases are first 
evaluated by ADs). The EO and PEO route an evaluation and recommendation to 
an AD who, in turn, considers the application and forwards it to a DD. (In only 
one of the departments may a DD make a final decision and this is limited to 
certain types of applications). The evaluation and recommendation, together with 
any comments that have been added up the line, are then considered by a Director 
and, in most instances, a Chief Director. In some instances, the recommended 
decision is also considered by a Deputy Director-General (DDG) and HOD or DG. 
In a complex application, as many as seven officials may be involved in the 
decision-making chain. It follows that officials at all levels need information on 
judgments to some extent.
 591
  
None of the departments has a formalised internal system for routinely 
disseminating information on judgments to all officials involved in decision-
making. In the absence of a formal system, there are several ways in which 
information can flow in an organisation, including through the dissemination of 
information by departmental lawyers and managers.  
Departmental lawyers play a potentially significant role in conveying 
information on judgments.
592
 Their training and experience theoretically places 
them in an ideal position to interpret or translate judgments, and to break down 
any barriers such as the inaccessibility of judgments. It is probably for this reason 
that Halliday states, ‘the stronger the relationship between bureaucrats and their 
legal advisors, the greater ... will be the level of legal knowledge within the 
agency.’593 In order for this proposition to be realised, lawyers need to have 
sufficient knowledge of judgments and must transmit that knowledge to the 
officials.
594
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All the departments have some access to legal advice. One of the 
departments is dependent on legal services that are shared between several 
government departments. The other two departments have dedicated legal advisors 
in both legal services and compliance and enforcement components. The legal 
services components provide a general legal support function and are located 
outside the line-function or decision-making components of those departments. 
The compliance and enforcement components on the other hand have lawyers 
embedded in the component who provide direct support to, or are part of, 
compliance and enforcement decision-making processes. With the exception of 
compliance and enforcement, legal advice therefore comes from officials who are 
somewhat removed from the daily decision-making activities of the line-
function.
595
 
Electronic access to judgments and e-mail provide lawyers, both in legal 
services and in compliance and enforcement, with good infrastructure which can 
support their ability to obtain and disseminate information on judgments. Some 
lawyers also have personal collections of judgments on environmental matters. 
Legal services, however, do not routinely manage information on 
judgments through the systematic identification, interpretation or dissemination of 
new judgments. This is partially understandable in the case of the department 
which relies on shared legal services where the pressures involved in servicing a 
range of departments with different focus areas limits the scope for proactive 
support to individual departments. In addition, their location outside the 
department, probably impedes an in-depth understanding of the department’s 
needs because interactions are limited to formal but ad hoc requests for specific 
assistance.  
For the other two departments, where the increased number of in-house 
lawyers is a relatively new situation, efforts to address the priority needs of the 
departments, namely managing litigation and law reform, have dominated their 
activities.
596
  In one of the departments some attempt was made previously to 
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introduce a more formal approach in the form of briefing notes on judgments.
597
 
The briefing notes comprised of a summary of the judgment as well as an 
explanation of the key implications for the line function. The practice stopped 
several years ago and, accordingly, few officials knew of their existence. One 
official who did, indicated that the briefing notes were helpful because ‘you knew 
that a court decision had been taken and [had] an outline of how they affected 
new decisions. The interpretation was interesting.’ 
At present, the transmission of information on judgments is therefore ad 
hoc and largely confined to e-mailing a copy of a judgment to other senior 
managers or responding to specific requests from the line-function. The 
consequences of the inconsistent flow of information between legal services and 
the line-function was illustrated during the interviews by one official who 
expressed surprise upon learning that a judgment had been passed on a decision 
that they had worked on extensively. 
The position in the compliance and enforcement components is slightly 
different and a focus on judgments is visible in many areas of work. Information 
on judgments has been included in some induction training and the EMI training 
provided by external service providers.
598
 In DEAT an official has also been 
designated  responsibility for collating judgments relevant to compliance and 
enforcement,  compiling summaries and distributing these to EMIs, both within 
the department, and in other departments. During 2009 that official started 
compiling and distributing the summaries.
599
 Judgments will also be placed on the 
website which has been established to support EMIs.
600
 Furthermore, locating 
lawyers within the line-function allows them to have a hands-on understanding of 
the requirements of the component and provides an increased opportunity for oral 
                                                                                                                                            
...Legal Officers were essentially reactive: there was no evidence that they had, as a 
matter of course, either sought to keep HPU officers abreast of judicial norms or 
brought such norms to bear in formal policy-making processes, Rather they tended to 
become involved ... only where contact had been initiated by HPU officers or where 
legal challenges had been threatened. 
597
 Personal knowledge, drafter of the original briefing notes.  
598
 Discussed in Chapter 6. 
599
 The summaries that were reviewed do not provide an exhaustive analysis of the implications of 
the judgments.  
600
 The website was not operational for a period of time due to a contractual dispute. 
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transmission of information during component meetings, supervision meetings 
and on a case-by-case basis.  
Most of the interviewees believed that in-house lawyers should play a 
central and expanded role in managing information on judgments. This view is 
held even by those sceptical of the calibre of legal advice. With regard to the 
latter, one manager commented that many environmental departments do not 
employ in-house lawyers and that where they do, the ‘lawyers are appalling’. This 
was echoed by another senior manager, referring to a particular lawyer’s 
experience, who said that ‘I wouldn’t trust [them] - I’m extremely uncomfortable 
[about relying on their advice].’ Another’s concerns stemmed less from his 
opinion of the lawyers’ competence, but more from the consequences of the 
operational distance between legal services and the line-function. In that instance, 
the manager felt that the need to consider judgments was part of the line function’s 
responsibility and a legal services department located outside of the line-function 
is unable to render the type of interpretation which reflected officials’ needs.  
Apart from lawyers, managers also have a potentially important role to play 
in disseminating information on judgments. Although few have a formal legal 
background, they do have an understanding of the strategic context within which a 
judgment is received. They are accordingly in a good position to provide an 
interpretation which can guide junior officials.  
Several managers indicated that when they receive a judgment, they 
distribute it to their superiors, in some instances, and to their immediate 
subordinates – primarily via e-mail and without providing an interpretation. Their 
subordinates have a discretion regarding whether to distribute the information 
further. The limited efficacy of this form of communication is illustrated by the 
fact that most subordinates could not recall more than one, if any, instances of 
receiving such e-mails. This suggests that the method of communication lacks, 
what Eppler refers to as, internal knowledge stickiness.
601
  
                                                 
601
 Martin J Eppler ‘The concept of knowledge communication and it’s relevance to management’ 
(2005). Available at http://www.knowledge-communication.org [accessed 25 July 2009]. 
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Many subordinates did, however, note that their manager would alert them 
to new judgments during supervisory meetings or component meetings. In this 
regard, a junior official explained her understanding of the process as follows – 
It’s [generally] passage talk and if there is a big issue the chief director 
will inform us. For example, if there is lots of media attention or 
responses required to ministerial enquiries [we will be told] ‘be 
informed and remember in the next document.’ 
The ad hoc approach to the dissemination of judgments has resulted in the 
compartmentalisation of information in the departments. The effect of this is 
described by one interviewee as follows - 
Lots of judgments don’t filter down and I’m sure we don’t see 90 per 
cent of them. The lower down the rank you are, the less you know. If 
someone picks up a big thing then those would possibly reach us.  
Apart from barriers to information flow, the ad hoc approach creates the 
potential for inconsistent interpretations of judgments. This is because the 
officials’ reception of information is generally not guided by an organisational 
interpretation and response either on individual judgments or lines of judgments. 
In consequence, almost all the officials indicated that they would prefer a 
formalised system to be implemented. There were two exceptions – one by an 
official who did not believe that judgments had any relevance to their work and 
the other by an official who stated that – 
… one sometimes feels that putting a system like this in place would 
compete too directly with political decisions. Sometimes it’s better if 
something remains a little bit more vague – and [there is] more room 
for discretion and excuses. 
Irrespective of whether the dissemination of information is formalised or 
not, some methods of communication appear to be preferred by subordinates more 
than others. 
602
 In this regard, the electronic transmission of judgments by senior 
management appears to be less effective than oral communication.
603
 This is 
supported by the fact that some officials expressly indicated that pressures of 
                                                 
602
 See T du Plessis and M Boshoff ‘Preferred methods of communication for organisational 
knowledge sharing and decision making’ (2008) 10 2 South African Journal of Information 
Management for a discussion on the relevance of identifying preferred methods of 
communication. 
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workload have prevented them from reading judgments and that if summaries 
were sent which they ‘can read in two minutes, we will do it.’  
Many of the junior officials accordingly expressed a desire to be given 
information through formal training and focused memoranda (despite indications 
that oral messages were better retained). Several managers on the other hand 
pointed to the general lack of competence of junior officials, much of which was 
attributed to length of tenure and high staff turnover. Because of this, senior 
managers were more likely to emphasise the need for the interpretation phase to 
be systematised at a higher level and the results thereof to be given to juniors. This 
was expressed by one senior manager who said that ‘[i]t’s about systems, not 
individuals. If there are good systems individuals don’t have to be so competent. 
We’re often lacking the elementary systems and there is a lack of guidelines.’ In 
fact other studies show that a combination of methods of communication is most 
likely to increase awareness.
604
  
 
7.2.3 Intergovernmental communication of judgments 
Many of the middle and senior managers indicated that much of their information 
on judgments occurs through the MinMEC intergovernmental structures.
605
 
MinMEC is a non-statutory structure where the Minister and MECs meet. It was 
established shortly after the adoption of the Constitution to manage and coordinate 
the concurrent environmental competence between the national and provincial 
departments. A number of substructures feed into MinMEC, as depicted in Figure 
7.4, all of which meet quarterly.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
603
 Findings in other studies also show that people remember what they hear more than what 
they read. See G Michael Campbell Communication skills for project managers (2009) at 71. 
604
 A study conducted in the 3M Corporation shows that people remember 10 per cent of what 
they read; 20 per cent of oral communication; 30 per cent of what they see and 60 per cent of 
information when they see, hear and read the information. See Campbell op cit at 71. This is 
reinforced by Kotter op cit at 85 – 100. 
605
 In one department reference was also made to meetings of an Environmental Crimes Task 
Forum which included discussions on judgments. The Forum comprises of environmental 
officials, prosecutors and officials from the South African Police Services. 
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Figure 7-2 MinMEC Structure 
 
 
 
Discussion on judgments takes place in both Working Group II and 
Working Group IV meetings. Working Group II meetings are divided into three 
parts - EIAs, air quality and waste management. Each of these issues is dealt with 
sequentially, which means that the same officials do not necessarily attend an 
entire meeting. Judgments are a specific agenda item for the session dealing with 
air quality. Previously, judgments were also included as a standing agenda item in 
the session dealing with EIAs. However, since the establishment of the EIA 
Implementation Workshops in 2006, judgments are discussed at the workshops 
and are only tabled at the Working Group II meetings if the implications of the 
judgment are considered to be particularly significant. Judgments are also a 
standing agenda item in Working Group IV meetings. Some effort is made to 
ensure that there is cross-pollination between the two groups by inviting a 
compliance and enforcement official to attend Working Group II meetings.  
The form of discussion at the EIA Implementation Workshops is relatively 
casual as no one official assumes responsibility for identifying judgments and 
discussions are based on the discretionary tabling of judgments by members. 
Proceedings at Working Group IV meetings are more structured. From 2009 
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DEAT began identifying judgments to be tabled at the meetings and preparing the 
summaries referred to in section 7.2.2 to guide the discussions. 
Many of the interviewees viewed the interactions at the Working Groups 
and EIA Implementation Workshops positively. They feel it is a way for them to 
find out about judgments which would be unlikely to occur otherwise. Some 
pointed out that the meetings provide an opportunity to discuss interpretations and 
to share experiences and responses to the judgments. The benefit of this was 
illustrated in respect of the FRA CC judgment. A lawyer had threatened to take all 
previous decisions to approve EIA applications of one province on review, on the 
basis that it had not taken socio-economic factors into account as required by the 
judgment. The issue and response was tabled at an EIA Implementation Workshop 
as information which the other provinces could use if they encountered a similar 
challenge.
606
  
As a channel of communication, the Working Groups have limitations 
regarding the quality of the information and the dissemination of that information. 
With regard to the quality of information, interviewees acknowledged that owing 
to lengthy agendas, discussions are generally limited and exclude an analysis of a 
judgment’s relationship with other case law. The brevity of discussions, and the 
reliance on the views of the official sharing the information, creates considerable 
scope for dilution and distortion, particularly as the official raising the judgment 
has often been involved in the litigation. Discussions are also sometimes affected 
by attempts to avoid offending people who may have been involved in the 
litigation. The latter is illustrated by a middle manager who stated that -  
In the beginning [people made] a big “hoo-haa”. If people are realistic 
and were in the judge’s shoes they would have made the same decision. 
[The officials] messed up, but you need to be tactful when conveying that. 
The information which is shared during the meetings appears to be 
confined to a limited group of people. As one official remarked, ‘what happens is 
that the person sitting in the Working Group gets the benefit, but I’m not sure that 
it flows down.’ A review of past minutes of the meetings revealed that the minutes 
are extremely brief and provide little or no analysis. The main benefit of the 
                                                 
606
 When the working groups function as what Bukowitz and Williams refer to as 
‘communities of practice’ they also facilitate knowledge management.  See Wendi R 
Bukowitz and Ruth L Williams The knowledge management fieldbook (1999). 
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minutes for officials who do not attend the meetings is that they will be made 
aware of a judgment. A few officials indicated that when they attend working 
group meetings, they prepare back-to-office reports which are distributed within 
their respective departments. By and large however, reservations regarding the 
reach of information presented at the meetings appear justified as several other 
officials noted that, in their experience, feedback was erratic. In this regard, one 
stated that ‘the Working Group distribution of information was so slack I only got 
information if I went.’ Furthermore, many junior officials who do not attend these 
meetings indicated that they were not aware that such discussions took place at 
all.
607
 Inconsistent feedback may be exacerbated by the fact that there is a 
substantial inconsistency of officials who attend the meetings.  
 
7.3 The recipient 
So far this chapter has considered the forms and sources of information that are 
received by officials. Exposure to this information does not constitute 
knowledge.
608
 Although there is no consensus regarding a precise definition of 
knowledge, it is generally accepted that knowledge involves a process of 
comprehension and learning which takes place when information is combined 
with experience, understanding of facts and context.
609
 Information contained in 
the messages discussed in earlier sections is therefore not knowledge to the 
message recipient, but rather information which can be assimilated and interpreted 
by officials. The information only becomes knowledge when the information is 
absorbed, understood and interpreted in combination with the context and 
experience of the message recipient.
610
 In this section background knowledge and 
the extent to which information on judgments is translated into knowledge are 
considered.  
                                                 
607
 The meetings are attended by the rank of AD or above. 
608
 The distinction between information and knowledge is explained by Wilson in TD Wilson ‘The 
nonsense of “knowledge management”’ (2002) 8 1 Information Research.  
609
 XH Chen, MMM Snymann and N Sewdass ‘Interrelationship between document management, 
information management and knowledge management’ (2003) 7 3 South African Journal of 
Information Management 5 at 5. 
610
 Petter Gottshchalk ‘A stages of growth model for knowledge management in law firms’ (2002) 
2 JILT 3 at 3. 
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7.3.1 Background knowledge 
The recipient’s perspective influences the extent to which information can be 
turned into knowledge as well as the kind of knowledge gained.
611
 One contextual 
factor which influences the development of knowledge on judgments, is degree of 
pre-existing knowledge of legal processes. The more officials have an 
understanding of these legal processes, the better their ability to comprehend 
judgments will be because pre-existing knowledge forms a framework within 
which the meaning and implications of judgments can be understood.
612
 
In the fieldwork, officials’ background knowledge was assessed in two 
ways. In the first part of the assessment, officials were asked three questions  
related to the role and authority of the courts. One question was whether officials 
thought that judgments were relevant to their work. Ninety-five per cent of the 
interviewees answered affirmatively. When asked to explain their answer, most 
alluded to the authority of the courts to make binding decisions and to set 
precedent. (The binding effect was interpreted differently by some officials who 
understood it to mean that a judgment is only binding in respect of decisions 
which involved the same facts). Some amplified their answers by explaining that 
the courts contribute to good administrative practices as follows -  
‘… they tell you what is a legally acceptable interpretation and direct 
you how to administer law.’ 
 
‘… they provide clarity and a precedent to reference against. … clarity 
is a positive – even if you don’t agree with it. Then you can take steps to 
change it. Rather a decision than a grey area.’ 
 
‘Because the environmental field is fairly young and we’re learning 
what works and what doesn’t and what is allowed and what isn’t, we’ve 
used judgments as a learning process.’  
These responses indicate that officials value the learning role that courts 
can play in developing sound administrative practices. The responses correlate 
with two other questions asked earlier in the interview regarding officials’ 
perceptions of the powers of the courts. The results reflected in the table below 
show that 95 per cent of interviewees believe that the courts have the authority to 
                                                 
611
 Wilson op cit.  
612
 P A Brynard op cit.  
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make decisions which bind government officials and 92 per cent agree that the 
courts have an oversight authority regarding the public abuse of power.  
 
Table 7-3 Perceptions of Judicial Powers 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
The courts have the 
right to make 
decisions that 
government officials 
have to abide by. 
32.4% 62.2% 2.7% .0% .0% 2.7% 
Courts have the right 
to manage the abuse 
of power by officials 
36.8% 55.3% 2.6% .0% .0% 5.3% 
 
 
These results indicate that the officials’ awareness of the role of the courts 
within a separation of powers structure is very high. It suggests that this 
knowledge is an enhancing factor for the reception of information on judgments 
because officials believe that they are obliged to consider judgments in their 
activities. Nevretheless, the high level of awareness of the courts’ general powers 
does not always extend to a more nuanced understanding of what the court is, or is 
not, authorised to do. For example, the results in Table 7.4 below show that more 
than a third of officials either did not know, or did not believe that the courts are 
entitled to issue specific instructions in their court orders.
613
 
 
Table 7-4 Knowledge of Judicial Powers 
 
 True False 
Don’t 
know 
Courts have the right to give specific 
instructions to an environmental department on 
how to administer an issue. 
64.9% 21.6% 13.5% 
 
 
                                                 
613
 The court has recently been more willing to issue structural interdicts. See, for example, 
Kiliko and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2006(4) SA 114 (C); Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another v Ngxusa and Others, 2001(4) SA 1184 
(SCA) and MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate, 2006(4) SA 478 (SCA). 
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Limitations in depth of background knowledge were also visible in other 
areas where a more penetrating level of knowledge could contribute to the 
interpretation of judgments. For example, the rules of precedent can provide a 
useful mechanism for resolving information on conflicting judgments. The results 
of questions regarding precedent are set out in Table 7.5.  
 
Table 7-5 Knowledge of the Rules of Precedent 
 
 True False 
Don’t 
know 
Government officials must implement the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court and 
Supreme Court of Appeal, even if the judgment 
relates to another environmental department. 
89.2% 2.7% 8.1% 
Government officials do not have to follow a 
judgment which was made by a High Court in a 
different province. 
24.3% 62.2% 13.5% 
 
 
Nearly 90 per cent of officials answered the first question correctly. This 
was not surprising in view of the responses which the officials gave to the 
questions regarding the courts’ general powers. However, only 24 per cent of 
officials understood that the binding nature of a judgment is influenced by which 
court hands down the judgment. When responses from lawyers were omitted the 
number decreased to 15 per cent. The responses are explained by one middle 
manager as follows –  
When I look at judgments I don’t look at the court, I just look at the 
judgment and take it as a decision and will use it as a precedent. … I’ve 
never heard of distinguishing [between courts]. 
The majority of officials therefore do not know that a distinction is made 
between different courts when assessing the extent to which a judgment is 
binding.  Without this knowledge, officials require the assistance of external 
interpretation to resolve conflicting judgments in a legally defensible way. These 
findings also indicate that officials who are not lawyers tend to attribute an 
unqualified power to the courts. It suggests that these officials’ background 
knowledge will contribute to a deferential approach when receiving messages on 
judgments because there is limited insight to the parametres of the court’s powers. 
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In addition to background knowledge on legal process, a limited attempt 
was made to ascertain officials’ perceptions on litigation trends because such 
perceptions may positively or negatively influence the attitude with which 
information on judgments is received.
614
 In the first two questions, officials were 
asked to express an opinion on government’s success rates. The results are set out 
in Tables 7.6 and 7.7.  
 
Table 7-6 Perceptions of Trends of Government as an Initiator of Litigation 
 
How often do you think government wins environmental court cases that it takes  to 
court – all of the time, most of the time, half of the time, less than half of the time, 
almost never, or don’t you know? 
All of the 
time 
Most of the 
time 
Half of the 
time 
Less than 
half of the 
time 
Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
5.3% 44.7% 21.1% 5.3% 2.6% 21.1% 
 
 
Table 7-7 Perceptions of Trends when Government is Litigated Against 
 
How often do you think government wins environmental court cases where someone 
else takes government to court – all of the time, most of the time, half of the time, less 
than half of the time, almost never, or don’t you know? 
All of the 
time 
Most of the 
time 
Half of the 
time 
Less than 
half of the 
time 
Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
0% 23.7% 36.8% 7.9% 2.6% 28.9% 
 
 
The responses show that more than 50 per cent of officials believe that 
environmental departments enjoy high success rates when they initiate litigation. 
They are less optimistic about government’s prospects of success when litigated 
against as only 24 per cent think that government succeeds more than half the time 
in these instances. Chapter 4 shows that in both instances government is in fact 
successful most of the time. The majority of officials accordingly have a more 
negative perception of government’s success than is actually the case.  
 
                                                 
614
 Calvo et al op cit at 18 -19. 
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7.3.2 Awareness of judgments 
The second knowledge requirement is that officials must be aware that judgments 
exist. Since awareness may be articulated in different ways, the interview process 
used both name and issue recognition in the assessment.  
For name recognition, interviewees were shown a list of nine judgments, 
referenced by their formal citation and more colloquial name. Interviewees were 
asked to indicate whether they had heard of the judgments. (No information was 
given regarding the content of the judgments). To verify responses, where officials 
indicated that they had heard of a judgment, they were asked to briefly state what 
they thought the key legal issue in the judgment was. In addition, a fictitious 
judgment was included as an indicator of reliability.
615
 The list was comprised of 
judgments which were anticipated to be well known as well as judgments 
pertaining to a range of environmental different issues that were handed down by 
different courts over a period of time. One non-environmental judgment was also 
included to explore whether officials have knowl dge of non-environmental 
judgments. The percentage of officials who had heard of the judgments is 
reflected in Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7-8 Knowledge of Selected Judgments 
 
Case name Court 
Year of 
judgment 
Percentage 
read 
Bareki NO and Another v Rencor 
Ltd and Others (Bareki) 
TPD 2005 17.1% 
Director: Mi eral Development, 
Gauteng Region and Another v 
Save the Vaal Environment and 
Others (SAVE the Vaal) 
SCA 1999 37.1% 
Eagles Landing Body Corporate v 
Molewa NO and Others 
TPD 2002 8.6% 
Fuel Retailers Association of SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Director-General: 
Environmental Management, 
Mpumalanga and Others (Fuel 
Retailers) 
CC 2007 71.4% 
Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others 
CC 2000 17.1% 
                                                 
615
 The responses are considered to be an accurate representation because only two per cent of 
officials indicated that they knew about the fictitious judgment. 
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(Grootboom) 
Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd 
t/a Pelts Products and Others  
(Hi-change) 
ECD 2001 22.9% 
HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and Others (HTF) 
SCA 2007 28.6% 
SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd 
and Another v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and 
Economic Development (Western 
Cape) and Another (Longlands) 
CPD 2008 8.6% 
 
With the exception of two, judgment names were recognised by less than a 
third of interviewees. Only one was recognised by the majority of interviewees. 
Arguably, these figures are generous because they include vague responses such 
as ‘it rings a bell’. In addition, many interviewees could recall the factual aspects 
of the case, but not the legal principles involved. For example, several respondents 
remembered that SAVE involved mining on the Vaal River but could not recall the 
legal arguments or findings. These responses indicate that officials are more likely 
to retain information from a judgment which is readily comprehendible to them, 
such as the facts of the case. The responses also lend credence to the argument in 
section 7.1.1 that the complexities of judgment language provide a barrier to the 
reception of knowledge. 
The three judgments which enjoyed the highest recognition amongst 
officials were appeals handed down by the SCA and Constitutional Court. 
Intuitively, this suggests that the departments and officials either place more 
emphasis on judgments from these courts (discussed further below), or that 
officials are more likely to be exposed to information on these judgments because 
prominence is given to them by the different channels of communication. When 
the latter was explored, it emerged that the reasons for increased awareness 
differed. In the case of SAVE, many of the interviewees indicated that they had 
heard of the judgment during their tertiary education. When the judgment was 
handed down, there were only a limited number of judgments to which academics 
could refer to illustrate arguments. It may be that the limited quantity of 
information received on judgments as part of the curricula facilitated a 
comparatively high retention of information.  
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With regard to the FRA CC judgment, awareness appears initially to be 
attributable to the government department which was involved in the matter 
drawing it to the attention of other departments in the MinMEC working groups, 
and subsequently to the internal dissemination of information amongst officials. 
(There was very limited media exposure on the judgment). Whilst the high 
recognition of the SAVE judgment appears to be attributable to external sources, 
the recognition of the FRA CC judgment appears to be attributable to internal 
sources. 
Table 7.8 indicates the extent to which there is conscious awareness of the 
judgments without distinguishing whether there are different levels of awareness 
amongst different types of officials. Table 7.9 below shows the results of 
awareness interrogated on that basis. 
 
Table 7-9 Knowledge of Selected Judgments by Rank 
 
 
 
E
O
 
P
E
O
 
A
D
 
D
D
 
D
ir
ec
to
r 
C
h
ie
f 
D
ir
ec
to
r/
 
D
D
G
 
Bareki .0% .0% .0% .0% 100.0% .0% 
SAVE 10.0% .0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 10.0% 
Eagles 
Landing 
.0% .0% .0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
Fuel Retailers 
CC 
5.0% 5.0% 15.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 
Grootboom .0% .0% .0% .0% 20.0% 80.0% 
Hi-change .0% .0% 14.3% 14.3% 57.1% 14.3% 
HTF .0% .0% .0% 22.2% 33.3% 44.5% 
Longlands .0% .0% 50.0% .0% .0% 50.0% 
 
These results show that DDs and senior managers (including directors, 
chief directors and DDGs) are far more likely to know about judgments than other 
ranks of officials. Junior officials, including EOs and PEOs, are the least likely to 
know about judgments. They had no awareness of six of the eight judgments. Of 
all ranks, directors are the most likely to know about a judgment. This suggests 
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that awareness of judgments enters the departments primarily at the rank of 
director and may flow horizontally or up to other senior managers and down to 
middle managers. It does not generally flow to junior officials.  
The flow of information reflects the containment effect identified by 
Halliday in which legal knowledge enters an organisation, but is confined to a 
select group of actors and in this way constitutes a barrier to the reception of 
knowledge by those officials falling outside the containment.
616
 This containment 
effect is also evident in other research. In a study concerning the impact of a high 
profile judgment on the fire services, Hartsthorne et al found that, whilst just over 
half of operational personnel had been made aware of the judgment, the 
dissemination of information was largely limited to senior levels. Junior fire 
fighters had not been routinely advised of the implications of the judgment.
617
  
 In case name recognition was an unreliable indicator of awareness, 
officials were also asked questions which offered them the opportunity to discuss 
judgments on specific issues. The purpose of these questions was to consider 
whether recognition of judgments increased when judgments were discussed by 
issue rather than by name, and whether officials knew about lines of judgments. In 
the first of these questions, officials were asked if they were aware of any 
judgments which considered socio-economic factors and environmental decision-
making. Nearly 64 per cent responded positively. This high level of awareness is 
mainly related to the FRA CC judgment. Few officials had knowledge of the line 
of judgments that preceded the FRA CC judgment.  
No clear trend could be extracted which explains why the judgment enjoys 
wide recognition compared to the other judgments on socio-economic issues. It is 
speculated, however, that the discussion of the judgment at the EIA 
Implementation Workshop, combined with an apparent increased receptiveness to 
the significance of judgments in the last few years, may be a substantial part of the 
reason.  
In the second set of questions, officials were asked whether they knew 
about any judgments dealing with the powers of environmental departments to 
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develop and apply guidelines. It was anticipated that responses to these questions 
could be used as indicators of awareness of multiple judicial pronouncements on 
an issue, as well as indicators regarding awareness of conflicting judgments. Fifty-
one per cent of respondents indicated that they knew about these judgments. 
Although few could name judgments, most could justify their answers by 
describing the legal principles which emerged from the decisions.  
In the last set of questions, awareness was considered by reference to 
judgments on public participation. Interviewees were provided with more 
information than in the previous two sets of questions ie they were given both the 
judgment name and an explanation of the courts’ findings. Sixty-four per cent of 
officials indicated that they knew about the Earthlife judgment – the second most 
recognised judgment of any mentioned throughout the interviews. This high 
recognition may be attributable to the profiled nature of the case, both in terms of 
the nature of the application and the media attention which followed the judgment. 
By contrast, only five per cent of interviewees had heard of the Muckleneuk 
judgment.  
The discrepancy of awareness levels is interesting because many of the 
officials, and indeed the Minister at that time, disagreed with Earthlife and it may 
have been expected that information of a contrary judgment would have been 
extensively disseminated. However, the results suggest that there is a degree to 
which awareness levels cannot be predicted and that awareness is not directly 
attributable to whether officials consider the judgment to be important.  
The findings show that there is limited knowledge about issues relating to 
lines of judgments or conflicting judgments. It is difficult to isolate clear trends as 
to when higher levels of awareness are likely to occur. The recognition of 
Earthlife and FRA CC by approximately two thirds of officials, which is 
significantly higher than other judgments, shows that awareness is not necessarily 
linked to the profile of the court. Furthermore, awareness levels are not necessarily 
linked to the implications of a judgment because, although the FRA CC judgment 
impacted on the existing practices of two of the departments, the judgments on 
guidelines in some instances reinforced existing practices. Furthermore, amongst 
those cases with lower recognition were; Bareki – which effectively stopped a 
range of enforcement actions in respect of environmental transgressions which 
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occurred prior to 1998, and Hi-change – which substantially increased 
departments’ scope of responsibility.  
There is also no clear correlation between when a judgment is handed 
down and awareness as recent judgments do not necessarily enjoy higher 
recognition. Since the FRA CC judgment and the judgments on guidelines were 
related to activities with a relatively minor environmental impact, no clear link to 
the significance of the factual background of a judgment has been established 
either. Furthermore, as recognition of SAVE is linked to external sources and 
recognition of the FRA CC judgment to internal sources, there are also no 
discernible trends regarding the impact of different channels of communication on 
awareness. In consequence, awareness of a judgment may be more closely related 
to a combination of circumstantial factors that are specific to the judgment, than to 
the presence of objective factors.  
The findings also indicate that awareness in all of the departments tends to 
be restricted. The reasons for this vary, but include priority of duties and the 
absence of formalised systems for disseminating information. In some instances, 
officials believe that it is preferable to restrict detailed information because of a 
potential to overload junior officials with additional information. In this regard, 
one senior manager commented, ‘I don’t think juniors should be worrying about it 
- just give them the correct procedure.’ In that manager’s view, it was the 
responsibility of middle and senior managers to be aware of judgments and to 
provide an interpretation which should be disseminated to junior officials. (This 
opinion overlooks the fact that as junior officials are promoted, they will not have 
the requisite knowledge of judgments that is expected of middle management). 
The statistical information provides an indication of awareness trends 
without purporting to be a definitive pronouncement on the actual levels of 
awareness. This is because certain factors may result in the degree of awareness 
being adjusted upwards or downwards. For example, the lack of awareness of 
more obscure judgments implies that the level should be adjusted downwards. By 
contrast, a distinction can be made between direct, or conscious knowledge, and 
indirect knowledge. It is extremely difficult to determine how much indirect 
awareness officials have of judgments, precisely because it is not conscious.  
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The effect of indirect knowledge may require that the level of awareness be 
adjusted upwards because an official may be aware of the requirements of a 
judgment without being able to link that knowledge to the judgment. For example, 
although the results show a moderate conscious awareness of judicial guidance on 
the development of guidelines, that guidance has been considered and reflected in 
the 2006 EIA Regulations of which officials do have knowledge.
618
 In such 
instances, knowledge of the judgments has permeated into the department, but 
officials not involved in the legislative process may not attribute their knowledge 
of those requirements to the courts.  Similarly, the oral transmission of a message 
may result in omission of the source. A manager commenting on a junior official’s 
approach may explain that a particular approach is required without identifying 
the source of the requirement as being a specific judgment.  
The difficulty in tracing knowledge to a judgment where there are pre-
existing practices is related to this. When asked how they approached tensions 
between the environmental right and other constitutional rights in decision-
making, most interviewees referred to the balancing mechanism provided by the 
principle of sustainable development.
619
 Whilst this approach is in line with 
judicial requirements, none of the interviewees mentioned judicial decisions to 
support their approach. It is accordingly unclear whether awareness of judicial 
guidance has contributed to shaping this practice or not.  
 
7.3.3 Depth of knowledge 
Background knowledge and awareness of judgments are pre-requisite building 
blocks for the interpretative phase of knowledge acquisition, but do not in 
themselves lead to an understanding of a judgment nor what the implications of a 
judgment are for the subsequent conduct of an official. It is only after the 
interpretation of information contained in the judgment that a sound basis for 
impact is generated.  
During the fieldwork officials’ depth of knowledge was assessed by reference to 
the principles flowing from individual judgments as well as the implications of 
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 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
219 
 
groups of judgments. In most instances where officials were aware of a judgment 
they also had, at least, a simple understanding of the main message of the 
judgment. For example, most officials who knew about the FRA CC judgment 
also knew that, as a result of the judgment, socio-economic factors must be 
considered in decision-making. Amongst many of the middle and senior managers 
there was also a clear ability to deduce the implications of a judgment and to 
measure existing practices against the requirements of judgments. For example, 
commenting on the court’s requirement in the FRA CC judgment that socio-
economic factors be considered in decision-making processes, a middle manager 
observed that – 
 We were looking at it before, but not in much detail. For example, we 
were looking at the proximity of other filling stations but weren’t asking 
for detailed reports. … In hindsight it’s not enough. The judgment 
indicated to us that we need to consider [socio-economic factors] in 
more depth than what we previously did – not just as an add-on to an 
assessment but as an important part of the application..  
Such insights are also illustrated by a senior manager’s comments on the 
Hi-change judgment in which the court made strong remarks about the province’s 
failure to directly enforce compliance with legislative provisions that the 
department assumed fell within the national department’s responsibility. They 
remarked that – 
The Hi-change ca e is bizarre to me. The CAPCO [chief air pollution 
control officer] got off and the province got lashes. It’s really important 
because it brought home the role of provinces and that capacity 
constraints are not an excuse.  
In some instances the translation of the message into personal knowledge is 
affected by a lack of, or inaccurate, background knowledge. This situation was 
detected amongst officials who believed that the factual circumstances of a 
judgment dictated its scope of application and that the judgment need not be 
applied to decision-making processes involving different facts. For example, some 
indicated that if a judgment centred on a decision regarding the construction of a 
filling station, they did not need to apply the reasoning of the judgment to 
applications not involving filling stations.
620
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 This situation is distinct from that discussed in Chapter 8 where certain officials choose to 
apply judgments only to applications with similar facts, with the knowledge that that approach 
is not correct. 
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Furthermore, since few officials read judgments, they usually rely on an 
interpretation received via a channel of communication. In most instances, the 
channel of communication is oral or electronic (mostly in the form of e-mail). 
Whilst accurate messages do get received, the effect of dilution and distortion 
ensuing from these channels was also visible. For example, more than one 
official’s understanding of the Earthlife judgment was that it created a cycle of 
public participation that could not be finalised without being in violation of the 
judgment –  
‘The judgment was poor. The implications are that there is a never 
ending process. No matter what you do it will be wrong.’  
 
‘What does concern us is the Dennis Davis decision – the PMBR 
[judgment] - because it’s an ongoing loop [of public participation]. At 
a certain point you have to make a decision. If there are very 
substantive changes then he was right and [we should] give an 
opportunity to comment. But at what point do you exercise the right to 
make a decision? That’s an unknown question. … The way the judgment 
is being read is that you can never stop [public participation]. ... 
Beyond a point it is wrong to leave people in limbo.’  
These interpretations are a misunderstanding of the judgment which 
required that I&APs be given an opportunity to comment on documents which had 
substantially changed, and on final documents. It was also interesting that none of 
these officials raised the fact that the 2006 EIA Regulations amplified approaches 
to public participation to give effect to the judgment. 
Although the interview questions were not sufficiently representative to 
make a clear finding, the responses suggest that officials are more likely to 
consider the implications of a judgment and to reach a uniform understanding of 
the judgment where a government department has lost a case. Unlike the clear and 
succinct responses that were given in respect of FRA CC, responses in respect of 
the judgments dealing with administrative guidelines in which government was 
successful were varied and less consistent. As is indicated by the following 
observations, officials’ understanding of the key message in the judgments ranged 
from the requirements for developing guidelines to their implementation -  
 ‘I don’t know the detail. I know that guidelines aren’t binding.’ 
 
‘They helped to the extent that there was a bit of uncertainty as to the 
importance that a guideline can play and it gave some certainty as to 
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the role of a guideline and gave officials more confidence to use 
guidelines.’ 
 
‘I agree that the guidelines should be gazetted and known to the public 
and stakeholders and should guide the decision-making process.’ 
As noted previously, impact ought to flow not only from individual 
judgments, but also from judicial findings that emerge from a range of judgments. 
This is particularly true where there are conflicting judgments, or where the 
required conduct of officials is provided incrementally by the courts. Given the 
profiled nature of most of the conflicting judgments discussed in section 7.1.3, it 
was anticipated that officials’ awareness of the judgments would be high. 
However, this was not the case. When officials were asked if they knew of any 
conflicting judgments, less than a third indicated that they did, and many of those 
could not provide any detailed information on the judgments. This figure broadly 
correlates with the number of officials who indicated in a previous question that 
they did not believe the courts were consistent in their treatment of similar 
cases.
621
   
Of the officials who could elaborate on their knowledge of conflicting 
judgments, there appeared to be a high degree of uncertainty as to how to respond 
in practice. This was candidly expressed by a senior manager who said, ‘[w]e 
have never known what to do with it – [we] still don’t.’ Another senior manager 
stated that – 
[i]t’s difficult. With the petrol station judgments the one judgment [Sasol] 
felt as if it was insane. The second one [BP] was a well reasoned 
judgment. The one was gob smackingly bad and the other was gob 
smackingly good. 
That manager, like several others, believed that the conflicting judgments 
did not have any application to their work and that they could therefore avoid 
wrestling with the conflict. As could be expected, lawyers had more insight into 
the need to resolve conflicting judgments. However, their responses focused less 
on applying the rules of precedent, and more on appealing judgments to ensure a 
greater level of certainty. 
                                                 
621
 Of the interviewees who believed the judgments from the superior courts are consistent, 
several indicated that they held this view because judges must follow precedent. 
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Judicial guidance on the requirement to give reasons for a decision is even 
less readily apparent than guidance provided in the conflicting judgments and 
requires a higher degree of insight into judicial reasoning across a range of 
judgments.
622
 By the very nature of the fact that reasons must be specific to a 
decision, extracting principles from the judgments requires a certain level of skill. 
Nevertheless as the adequacy of reasons lies at the core of many of the challenges 
to environmental decisions, it might be anticipated that officials would expend 
some effort obtaining interpretations of the courts’ approaches. However, only 5.4 
per cent of officials indicated that they had found guidance from the courts 
regarding the furnishing of reasons for a decision.  
The discussion above reveals that officials are more likely to understand 
the requirements and implications of single judgments than guidance provided in a 
range of judgments. Whilst some officials have a strong ability to understand and 
interpret judgments, the findings also reveal the presence of certain barriers. In 
particular, gaps in background knowledge of the consequences of judgments are 
illustrated by misunderstandings that judgments should only be applied to 
decisions based on substantially similar facts. Furthermore, the dilution and 
distortion of information as a result of oral transmission of the original message 
are observed. 
It was also found that, in general, the lower the rank of an official, the 
lower the depth of awareness. This is significant as junior officials play a 
significant role in decision-making, particularly in respect of EIA applications 
where they undertake the primary assessment. If junior officials do not incorporate 
judicial requirements into the primary recommendation; time constraints and 
summarised findings may result in middle and senior managers not detecting the 
omissions in the application of judicial requirements. In view of this, a lack of 
knowledge by junior officials may have negative implications for impact.  
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7.4 Findings 
At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that knowledge is a prerequisite for 
incorporating judicial requirements into decision-making. In order to acquire this 
knowledge, officials must receive and internalise information on judgments. The 
receipt of this information is contingent on an effective communication process in 
which information or messages are transferred from the courts to officials.
 623
 The 
application of a communications model provides insights regarding both the 
degree to which information on judicial messages is transferred, and the adequacy 
of communication behaviour. Where there is a high level of knowledge, it 
indicates a significant presence of factors which enable the free flow of 
information. Conversely, where knowledge levels are low, it signals the presence 
of barriers. These barriers can be identified by tracing the flow of information 
through the communication process. In this way, the communication model 
facilitates an understanding, not only of how much officials know about 
judgments, but also how they know. 
The communication model has certain limitations including the fact that it 
is usually impractical to assess the full range of variables involved in 
communication processes. Nevertheless, the application of the model yielded 
important findings regarding the different types of knowledge and their role in 
realising impact. With regard to background knowledge, the results show that 
officials have a high level of awareness regarding the courts’ role in a system 
which is based on the separation of powers. There is, however, a lower level of 
awareness across all ranks of officials about more complex aspects of legal 
processes such as the rules of precedent. Whilst the high level of awareness of the 
courts’ role constitutes an enabling factor for the reception of knowledge, the 
limited in-depth understanding of legal processes is an inhibitor. 
The findings on the second knowledge requirement - awareness of 
judgments - show that whilst two judgments were known by the majority of 
officials, the remainder were known by less than a third. There is even less 
knowledge of lines of judgments. Further interrogation of these general findings 
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 The importance of communication is stressed by Simon op cit at 116 who states the 
following – ‘The question to be asked of any administrative process is: How does it influence 
the decisions of these individuals? Without communication, the answer must always be: It 
does not influence them at all.’ 
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revealed that general findings can disguise important factors in the communication 
process which have a bearing on the reception of knowledge. For example, the 
assessment of where knowledge is located revealed that there are marked 
differences across different ranks. Senior officials have the most information and 
are consequently far more aware than junior officials. This finding points to clear 
trends regarding the flow of information – in particular that information does not 
always flow to all officials who require the information. The relatively low levels 
of awareness also show that the physical availability of judgments alone does not 
automatically result in awareness. This suggests that awareness and hence the 
potential for impact will be enhanced where additional stimuli are present.  
The lack of consistency in the levels of awareness of individual judgments 
means that it is not possible to predict when a judgment will result in higher levels 
of awareness. Consequently no link could be made between the court handing 
down the judgment; the implications of the judgment; the channel of 
communication and officials’ awareness of a judgment. The enquiry on the second 
knowledge requirement also indicated the importance of selecting a range of 
indicators which explore knowledge levels from different perspectives. For 
example, in the case of the three environmental departments it is clear that name 
recognition is a less reliable indicator than issue-based enquires.  
The consequences of strengths and weaknesses revealed in the first two 
knowledge enquiries become evident in the findings on depth of knowledge. In 
this regard, minimal understanding of rules of precedent and poor awareness of 
lines of judgments resulted in relatively low depths of knowledge. 
Notwithstanding this, the third enquiry showed that where middle and senior 
managers are aware of judgments, they have a reasonable ability to understand the 
implications of those judgments for administrative practices.  
Assigning a value to these levels of knowledge is difficult because it 
implies that there are predetermined assessment criteria. No such criteria have 
been proposed in other literature, and there are clear challenges in doing so. 
Clearly 100 per cent knowledge is not a realistic benchmark. A simplified 
approach of comparing actual knowledge to the percentage of existing cases is 
therefore not useful. Such an approach would overlook the fact that some 
judgments are more significant than others and that indirect knowledge may not be 
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captured. By contrast adopting other approaches which reflect factors, such as the 
significance of a judgment, introduces a subjective element in which acceptability 
is framed by the writer.  
These challenges may assume more significance where attempts are made 
to link casual relationships to precise statistics. However, because this thesis is 
concerned with understanding the relationship between contextual factors, 
knowledge, conscientiousness and impact only a general qualitative understanding 
is required. Therefore, whilst acknowledging the challenges of assessment, the 
basis for assessment in this study is a combination of factors which take into 
account the favourable comparison with knowledge levels in other studies; the 
statistical findings of the study and the qualitative responses received from 
officials.
624
 On this basis, knowledge levels are considered to be moderate to low. 
These findings are static and applicable to the study period only since a range of 
factors, including the effects of increased legal capacity and introduction of new 
systems for disseminating information, may have an influence on levels in the 
future. 
Since the level of knowledge is moderate to low, barriers must exist which 
impede the flow of information on judgments. Although the literature abounds 
with descriptions of barriers to communication processes, for convenience, the 
titles assigned by Eppler are used.
625
 An underlying and permanent barrier is 
created by the institutional separation of the courts and the environmental 
departments. Once the courts have formulated a message (judgment), they take no 
further part in the communication process and they have limited control over the 
dissemination of the message.
626
 The court’s isolation from the communication 
process carries a double disadvantage. On the one hand, officials have no 
opportunity to clarify or interrogate the message with the courts. On the other, the 
absence of a feedback loop leaves the courts with little information about the 
needs and circumstances of the officials which they could use to inform the 
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 The Constitutional Court issues media summaries to guide reading of its judgments. Some 
power to limit the dissemination of judgments exists through judges’ identification of a judgment 
as being reportable or not. 
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formulation of future messages. In the context of judgments, many suggested tools 
which improve communication flow involving interactive and reinforcing 
behaviour, therefore cannot be applied at a primary level. (There is scope to apply 
these tools to internal communication processes).  
A consequence of the dislocation between the courts and the departments is 
that barriers identified in respect of the initial message regarding language, clarity 
and consistency (terminology illusion, paradox of expertise and projectionism 
barriers), assume greater relevance than in other contexts. This is because, unlike 
intra-organisational transmission of messages where such barriers can be 
overcome in a variety of ways (such as simply asking for clarity), a judgment is a 
static message and its efficacy is determined solely on the basis of one iteration. 
Apart from barriers which arise in respect of the court as message sender, 
section 7.2 explored barriers which arise in channels of communication. Contrary 
to findings reported by Wasby and Johnson and Canon, the effect of the dilution 
and distortion of information by external sources is considered to be less 
significant in this study because of their limited penetration into the departments. 
More significant, are the barriers related to internal communication.  
The absence of a formal institutional mechanism to identify and 
disseminate information results in an ad hoc and inconsistent approach by the 
departments. Judicial requirements and the need to track implementation of those 
requirements are therefore not ‘rooted’ in the organisational culture of decision-
making. It consequently acts as a barrier to the reception of knowledge of the full 
range of judgments. The ensuing compartmentalisation of information means that 
the information does not flow to all officials who need it. Where information does 
flow to junior officials, the limited amount of interpretation accompanying 
information can impede a full understanding of that information (inert knowledge 
barrier). In some instances, the informal nature of the communication process may 
also create a barrier because the information does not have the same status as other 
instructions (Cassandra syndrome barrier).
627
  
Furthermore the lack of a formal approach to the absorption of judgments 
is relevant to the consideration of the competing internal factors discussed in 
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Chapter 6. In the absence of a system which promotes consistency, whether the 
positive or negative effects associated with the different factors will triumph is 
largely dependent on the nature of the individual official. Those officials who are 
unconfident and overwhelmed by the requirements of decision-making are most 
likely to overlook the implications of judgments; whereas officials, who are 
inexperienced, but open to learning, may err towards being receptive. 
Many barriers identified in respect of the message recipient flow logically 
from those which arise earlier in the communication process. This is particularly 
true when they intersect with barriers associated with the individual characteristics 
of the message recipient. Given the individual nature of the latter, the presence of 
such barriers is not uniform and applies more in the case of some officials than of 
others. For example, absorptive capacity is a barrier where there is a lack of 
background legal knowledge. Eppler identifies a range of other barriers which 
were evident in the study including internal knowledge stickiness (where 
knowledge cannot be transferred because of uncertainty regarding the meaning of 
the knowledge or absorptive capacity), inert knowledge (where the knowledge 
does not come to mind in a situation that merits its application) and information 
overload.
628
 These barriers are most prevalent amongst junior officials. In other 
instances, the official’s background knowledge creates a barrier. This was 
illustrated by those officials who believe that judgments only apply to decisions 
involving the same facts, as opposed to decisions falling within the same legal 
framework.  
Notwithstanding the range of barriers which have been identified, the 
levels of knowledge indicate that there are factors that enable communication 
(‘enablers’). A significant enabler is considered to be the officials’ receptiveness 
to information which arises from their views on the role of the courts. The finding 
that the vast majority of officials believe that judgments are relevant to their work, 
means that these officials are, in principle, receptive to information from the 
courts. Apart from contextual receptivity, the different forums in which the oral 
transmission of information occurs, such as the working groups, appear to be the 
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most effective form of communication. These forums also indicate a willingness 
to create a knowledge-sharing environment.  
A further enabler is the availability of judgments (although not often used 
and with somewhat compartmentalised access). It is possible that if the current 
trend toward formalising aspects of the dissemination process continues through, 
for example, the development of memoranda on new judgments, that these 
enablers may be more prominent in the future. Finally, as officials increasingly 
become comfortable with the requirements of the new environmental function and 
rights-based approaches to the administration, opportunities for increased focus on 
judgments may arise. 
In view of the findings above, the basic communication model which was 
presented at the beginning of the chapter can be amplified to reflect the barriers 
and enablers which are relevant to knowledge of judgments. See Figure 7-4 below. 
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Figure 7-3 Amplified Communication Flow of Knowledge on Judgments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effects of the levels of knowledge and the presence of identified 
barriers and enhancers on legal conscientiousness are explored further in the next 
chapter. 
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8. Legal conscientiousness 
 
Section 165(2) of the Constitution, which states that ‘an order or decision issued 
by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies,’ 
provides the basis for the courts’ influence on administrative decision-making. 
Notwithstanding this, in Chapter 1 it is noted that the judiciary’s influence on 
public administration is affected by the context within which judgments are 
received. The myriad of dynamic processes that surround decision-making in the 
public sector may all affect the way in which officials respond to judgments. Apart 
from external factors (discussed in Chapter 6) the personal values and behavioural 
approaches of officials also enhance or impede acceptance of judicial direction.  
Understanding the normative framework within which judgments are 
received is therefore important because, as Elster points out, norms ‘provide an 
important kind of motivation for action that is irreducible to rationality’.629 One 
such motivation is the level of legitimacy that is attached to the courts and 
legislation. Many researchers consider the presence of legitimacy to be an 
important condition for ensuring acceptance of judgments and legitimacy theory 
has accordingly been used as a basis for analysing obedience and behaviour in 
several studies.  
In a study on the reasons why the public obeys the law Tyler concludes that 
people obey law if they believe it is legitimate.
630
 Gibson, who has also written 
prolifically on legitimacy, believes that ‘more legitimate institutions are more 
effective at bringing about compliance than are less legitimate institutions’.631 
Friedrichs argues that the justice system is most effective when there is 
widespread acceptance of its legitimacy and authority and that legitimacy serves 
as a ‘bridge or connecting point in the consideration of normative and empirical 
dimensions of legal order and law-related behaviour’.632 Legitimacy has also been 
                                                 
629
  Jon Elster The cement society (1989) 15 as quoted in Benedict Kingsbury ‘The concept of 
compliance’ (1997-1998)  19 Michigan Journal of International Law  355. 
630
 TR Tyler Why people obey the law (1990). 
631
 James L Gibson ‘Understandings of justice: institutional legitimacy, procedural justice and 
political tolerance’ (1989) 23 3 Law and Society Review 469 at 472. See also James L Gibson 
‘Institutional legitimacy, procedural justice, and compliance with Supreme Court decisions: a 
question of causality’ (1991) 25 3 Law and Society Review 631 – 636.  
632
 David O Friedrichs ‘The concept of legitimation and the legal order: A response to Hyde’s 
critique’ (1986) 3 1 Justice Quarterly 33 at 34. 
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raised in judicial impact studies. Wasby proposes at least two hypotheses on 
legitimacy viz ‘[t]hose who consider the Court’s authority legitimate will be more 
likely to comply with its rulings than those who do not’ and ‘[t]he higher the 
regard in which the Court is held, the less negative the reaction to its 
decisions’.633 
Notwithstanding the frequent use of legitimacy theory for analysing 
behaviour, there are criticisms about its effectiveness. Gibson and Caldiera’s 
findings on the ability of the South African Constitutional Court to secure 
acceptance with unpopular decisions lead them to conclude that legitimacy theory 
does not work well for countries in transition.
634
 Their analysis however, does not 
address two issues which may have had a bearing on their conclusion. Firstly, it is 
based on responses by interviewees indicating how they believe they will react to 
a hypothetical judgment on an issue that was extremely controversial at the time. 
There is a vast difference between what people think they will do and what they 
actually do. Kollmuss and Agyeman’s work on pro-environmental behaviour, for 
example, refers to qualitative research that finds differences between attitude and 
behaviour.
635
 Certainly, experience in this study shows that initial emotional 
reactions of outrage to judgments often change to acceptance with time. Secondly, 
Gibson and Calderia’s fieldwork was conducted between 1996 and 1997. At that 
time the courts had only been functioning within a constitutional democracy for a 
few years. Bumin’s study on the effect of post-communist constitutional courts 
shows that judicial institutionalisation is a developmental process and that as new 
courts consolidate institutionally they have a greater impact.
636
 Legitimacy 
accordingly has a temporal component and should not be prematurely discarded.  
Hyde presents a broad critique on the constraints of legitimacy theory. As a 
point of departure, he notes that a popular meaning ascribed to legitimacy is the 
Weberian interpretation in which legitimacy of a social order is considered to be 
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the ‘effective belief in its binding or obligatory quality.’637 On this basis, Hyde 
raises several objections to the use of legitimacy as a tool for analysing responses. 
He argues that other factors, such as the fear of consequences for non-compliance, 
can also motivate compliance and that legitimacy can be explained by rationality 
or habit and cognitive dissonance.
638
 
Hyde’s critique raises important concerns regarding reliance on legitimacy 
as the sole determinant of, or explanation for, behavioural responses. However, his 
concerns relate to the fact that responses to judgments are multidimensional in 
nature. Reliance on any single indicator as a means of determining cause and 
effect of impact will have shortcomings because the analysis is conducted in 
artificial isolation of the contributory effects of other factors. Hyde’s critique is 
accordingly not a justification for discarding legitimacy theory. Rather it points to 
the fact that analysis of behavioural responses must acknowledge that there are a 
range of competing influences which have a bearing on the final outcome.  
Furthermore, if legitimacy is excluded from consideration an opportunity to 
understand its relative weight in forming responses to judgments is overlooked. It 
is more likely that Johnson and Canon’s suggestion that legitimacy is a 
background factor influencing judicial impact is correct.
639
 In this thesis it is 
accordingly not suggested that legitimacy is the sole factor determining responses. 
It rather seeks to establish whether legitimacy is an important factor.   
Most literature considers the extent to which legitimacy can be used to 
measure motivations for compliance or non-compliance. In this thesis, the enquiry 
is broader because it seeks to understand the influence that the courts have on 
government practices generally. Legitimacy (in the narrow sense) is therefore 
combined with the consideration of an additional nuance that is required to 
facilitate judicial impact namely what Hart refers to as ‘an internal aspect’ where 
legal rules are ‘combined with an appropriate internal attitude among relevant 
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actors involving criticism of oneself and of others for certain violations on the 
ground that a rule has been violated.’640  
In this thesis Hart’s comments are not construed narrowly to imply that the 
internal aspect is applicable only to securing compliance with law. There are 
numerous reasons why complete compliance may not occur that are not indicative 
of a resistance to the court’s influence.641 (The concept of compliance itself is 
subject to criticism on the basis that there may be different interpretations of what 
is meant.).
642
 Rather, the requirement is approached from the perspective that the 
internal aspect should relate to a value system in which the official has no 
underlying resistance to the court’s authority and accepts the need to respond to 
judgments. Halliday describes this as a requirement of legal conscientiousness in 
which – 
Decision-makers must also care about acting lawfully. A commitment to 
legality must be part of the decision-maker’s professional orientation 
and value system. They must be conscientious about applying their 
legal knowledge to the full range of their decision-making tasks.
643
  
Examining the extent of legal conscientiousness amongst officials provides 
potentially important insights as to why the courts do, or do not, have an impact 
on decision-making. In this chapter legal conscientiousness is explored from two 
angles viz the officials’ perceptions of the courts and law and their responses to 
judgments in practice. The first part of the chapter examines the extent to which 
officials believe that the courts have the authority to make decisions that must be 
reacted to in a lawful manner. The second part examines reactions to hypothetical 
scenarios as well as three types of judgments namely reinforcing, adverse and 
questionable judgments. The chapter concludes with findings regarding the 
relationship between legitimacy, conscientiousness and responses. 
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8.1 Perceptions of the courts 
Prior to 1994 the legitimacy of the courts was questionable because of their role in 
implementing apartheid legislation. Many people had no or only limited 
confidence in the courts. A study conducted by Wilkins in 1988 found that nearly 
all black lawyers interviewed believed that it was impossible to have a fair trial.
644
 
However, research also shows that negative perceptions of the courts were not 
held uniformly by black South Africans. In a poll conducted by Markinor in 1981, 
half of the black respondents expressed a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence 
in the courts. In 1990 confidence levels increased, with 60 per cent of urban blacks 
and over 75 per cent of rural blacks indicating a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of 
confidence in the country’s legal institutions. These ratings were comparable to 
levels of confidence expressed by whites.
645
 
The results of the Markinor research show that peoples’ distaste for 
apartheid did not mean that the courts’ legitimacy was entirely compromised. 
There are a number of reasons why people may have attributed a measure of 
legitimacy to the courts.
 646
 These include the fact that the Freedom Charter, 
adopted by the ANC in 1955, recognised the rule of law
647
 and that anti-apartheid 
lawyers often resorted to the courts. Albie Sachs, anti-apartheid lawyer and former 
judge of the Constitutional Court, describes the dichotomous view which people 
had of the courts as follows - 
... for much of my life I lived simultaneously as a lawyer and outlaw. 
Anyone who has been in clandestinity will know how split the psyche 
becomes when you work through the law in the public sphere, and 
against the law in the underground.
648
 
Ironically, in 1993 when the new constitutional dispensation had been 
adopted with an emphasis on the rule of law, Markinor polls show that confidence 
in the courts had dropped significantly across all racial groups. (Of the urban 
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blacks that were interviewed, only 6 per cent indicated ‘a great deal of confidence’ 
and 19 per cent ‘quite a lot of confidence’). 649 
The new government’s responses to the courts had the potential to 
influence the legitimacy of the reformed court structure either positively or 
negatively. In 1999 political support for the rule of law and the role of the courts 
was tested when President Mandela was ordered to appear in court regarding his 
decision to appoint a commission of inquiry into certain rugby matters. It was the 
first time a South African president had been subjected to such an order and many 
people reacted with indignation. The President, however, elected to abide by the 
court’s order and indicated that his appearance was out of respect for the rule of 
law. 
650
 The approach adopted by President Mandela made headlines in both the 
national and international press.
651
  
Since then there have been other occasions when political commitment to 
the rule of law has been tested. In 2002 the Minister of Health indicated during a 
media interview that she would not abide by the Constitutional Court’s decision 
regarding an NGO’s successful challenge to the government’s policy of limiting 
the medication to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Shortly thereafter, 
however, the Minister of Justice gave assurances that government would respect 
the Constitution and the Minister of Health subsequently issued a statement that 
she would not circumvent the courts and would abide by the court’s ruling.652 
More recently President Zuma, prior to his election, was involved in litigation in 
                                                 
649
 Ellmann op cit at 427. 
650
 Hassen Ebrahim ‘The South African constitution: birth certificate of a nation’ in Turning 
points in history book 6: Negotiation, transition and freedom’. Available at 
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his personal capacity, including being accused of rape and corruption. He too has 
deferred to judicial process.
653
  
Generally politicians have reinforced the role of the courts and established 
a context for legitimacy by officials.
654
 The extent to which they have been 
successful was explored in the study by eliciting officials’ responses to three types 
of questions. The first set of questions examines officials’ acceptance of the rule 
of law. The second aims to understand confidence levels in the courts relative to 
other institutions and the third investigates perceptions regarding the courts’ 
ability to discharge their role effectively.  
 
8.1.1 Acceptance of the rule of law 
In the first set of questions (also discussed briefly in Chapter 7) officials were 
presented with three statements regarding the role of the courts and asked how 
strongly they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The statements and results 
are set out in Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1 Perceptions on the Role of the Courts 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
The courts have the right 
to make decisions that 
government officials have 
to abide by. 
32.4 62.2 2.7 - - 2.7 
Government officials 
should respect court 
decisions, regardless of 
whether they agree with 
them or not. 
42.1 57.9 - - - - 
Courts have the right to 
manage the abuse of 
power by officials. 
36.8 55.3 - 2.6 - 5.3 
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The results show that the overwhelming majority of officials (94.6 per 
cent) agree or strongly agree with the statement ‘the courts have the right to make 
decisions that government officials have to abide by’. All officials supported the 
second statement ie ‘government officials should respect court decisions, 
regardless of whether they agree with them or not’. The third statement ie ‘courts 
have the right to manage the abuse of power by officials’ also received very high 
support (92.1 per cent). The last statement was the only one in which any 
disagreement was indicated. In that instance, the officials concerned believed that 
public service complaint mechanisms should be relied on in preference to the 
courts.  
The responses to the three statements show that nearly all officials have a 
high acceptance of the court’s authority – a key requirement of legitimacy. The 
responses also indicate that this legitimacy is accompanied by the ‘internal aspect’ 
referred to by Hart as the officials believe that they ought to comply with 
judgments. The officials’ levels of acceptance of the courts’ authority are 
significantly higher (25 per cent) than that of the general public.
655
  
 
8.1.2 Confidence levels relative to other institutions 
In the second category of questions officials were asked to rate their confidence in 
the courts and other institutions. The consolidated responses are set out in the table 
below. 
                                                 
655
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Table 8-2 Levels of Confidence in Institutions 
 
Institution A great 
deal 
Somewhat Only a 
little 
Hardly 
any 
Don’t 
know 
enough 
Parliament 15.8 42.1 31.6 7.9 2.6 
South African Police 
Services 
10.5 42.1 31.6 15.8 0.0 
Supreme Court of 
Appeal 
52.6 21.1 5.3 2.6 18.4 
SAHRC 40.5 16.2 21.6 10.8 10.8 
Constitutional Court 68.4 18.4 5.3 2.6 5.3 
 National department 
(DEAT) 
55.3 34.2 10.5 0.0 0.0 
Provincial 
environmental 
departments (as a 
whole) 
21.1 36.8 28.9 10.5 2.6 
Local government 2.6 42.1 26.3 28.9 0.0 
High Courts 44.7 36.8 5.3 2.6 10.5 
 
When approval responses are ranked, as reflected in Table 8-3, the results 
show that the courts enjoy high levels of confidence amongst officials, with 
approval ratings ranging between 73.7 and 86.8 per cent for the different types of 
courts. The variance in approval ratings between the courts relates to the 
knowledge which officials have about each courts - whilst 5.3 per cent of officials 
indicated that they did not know enough about the Constitutional Court to give a 
rating, the ‘don’t know enough’ responses for the High Courts and SCA were 
much higher ie 10.5 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively. The variance in 
approval ratings is therefore probably indicative of different levels of knowledge 
rather than different levels of trust between the three court structures. 
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Table 8-3 Approval Ratings per Institution 
 
Institution A great deal Somewhat Total 
 DEAT  55.3 34.2 89.5 
Constitutional Court 68.4 18.4 86.8 
High Courts 44.7 36.8 81.5 
Supreme Court of Appeal 52.6 21.1 73.7 
Parliament 15.8 42.1 57.9 
Provincial environmental 
departments  
21.1 36.8 57.9 
SAHRC 40.5 16.2 56.7 
South African Police Services 10.5 42.1 52.6 
Local government 2.6 42.1 44.7 
 
Officials’ confidence levels in the courts compare favorably to other 
institutions. With one exception, confidence levels in other institutions ranged 
between 44.7 and 57.9 per cent and were significantly lower than the courts. Only 
DEAT received a higher overall approval rating than the courts. However, if the 
ratings for only the highest level of approval (‘a great deal’) are considered, 
officials have 13 per cent more confidence in the Constitutional Court than DEAT 
and almost the same levels of confidence in the SCA. 
In addition, when responses indicating a lack of confidence (‘only a little’ 
or ‘hardly any’) are considered, there is less dissatisfaction with the courts than 
other institutions, including DEAT. The table below shows that for all three types 
of courts ratings reflecting a lack of confidence are 7.9 per cent. Apart from 
DEAT dissatisfaction with the other institutions is far higher and ranges between 
32.4 and 55.2 per cent.  
 
Table 8-4 Disapproval Ratings per Institution 
 
Institution Only a little/ hardly any 
Constitutional Court 7.9 
High Courts 7.9 
Supreme Court of Appeal 7.9 
DEAT 10.5 
SAHRC 32.4 
Provincial environmental departments  39.4 
Parliament 39.5 
South African Police Services 47.4 
Local government 55.2 
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The results for the second category of questions on legitimacy support a 
finding that officials have confidence in the courts as an institution and view them 
as being highly legitimate. A caveat to such a finding is that legitimacy levels may 
fluctuate over time and the finding is accordingly only applicable at the time when 
the interviews were conducted. In this regard, Afrobarometer periodically collects 
statistics on the public’s views of the courts. The table below summarises the 
results of Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2000 and 2008 and shows 
how perceptions of legitimacy vary at different points in time. 
 
Table 8-5 Public Approval Ratings of the Courts 
 
 2000
656
 2002
657
 2005
658
 2008
659
 
Trust somewhat/ a 
lot 
43 39 68 60 
Distrusts somewhat/ 
a lot 
52 55 Not 
provided 
34 
 
8.1.3 Opinions on the performance of the courts 
The first two categories elicited responses regarding high level perceptions of the 
rule of law and the courts as an institution. Perceptions regarding how the courts 
exercise their role also influence levels of conscientiousness and merit attention. 
In the third step of the analysis officials’ perceptions of the performance of the 
courts is considered from two perspectives. Firstly, officials were asked to express 
agreement or disagreement with 13 more detailed statements regarding the courts’ 
performance and operational activities. Secondly, officials were asked about their 
experiences with litigation.  
 
Statements on the approach of the courts 
The 13 statements that were presented to the officials and the consolidated 
results are set out in Table 8-6. 
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Table 8-6 Perceptions about the Courts 
 
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
1. Judges do not know 
enough about environmental 
policy and issues to make 
good judgments. 
13.2 44.7 26.3 13.2 - 2.6 
2. Because judges are highly 
independent they make fair 
decisions. 
2.6 48.7 20.5 15.4 2.6 10.3 
3. Judges make findings on 
procedural issues and avoid 
making findings on 
substantive environmental 
issues. 
12.8 56.4 10.3 15.4 - 5.1 
4. Judges’ decisions are 
consistent in environmental 
cases that are similar. 
- 39.5 7.9 26.3 2.6 23.7 
5. Judges do not consider the 
implications of their 
decisions on government’s 
administrative load. 
7.9 55.3 10.5 15.4 - 10.5 
6. Government experts 
should be allowed to get on 
with their work without 
being micro managed by the 
courts. 
5.4 40.5 8.1 40.5 2.7 2.7 
7. We need judges to help us 
clarify the meaning and 
requirements of legislation.  
21.1 57.9 5.3 13.2 - 2.6 
8. Judges play a useful role 
in explaining the conduct 
that is required of 
government officials. 
5.3 63.2 5.3 15.8 - 10.5 
9. We need the courts to 
make sure that government 
does not abuse its powers. 
47.4 50.0 - - - 2.6 
10. The outcome of a court 
case  depends a lot on which 
judge is making the 
decision. 
2.6 55.3 10.5 23.7 - 7.9 
11. Because NGOs have 
procedural rights and do not 
always have to pay costs if 
they lose a case, it is too 
easy for them to bring a case 
to court.  
13.2 15.8 7.9 50.0 5.3 7.9 
12. Courts allow business to 
abuse environmental 
legislation to fight 
commercial battles. 
2.6 23.7 18.4 39.5 2.6 13.2 
13. Courts are generally 
sympathetic to cases which 
government brings to 
enforce compliance. 
5.3 21.1 26.3 31.6 2.6 13.2 
 
The results are characterised by a higher degree of uncertainty (‘neither 
agree nor disagree’ and ‘don’t know’) than responses to the previous two 
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categories of questions. This shows that views on legitimacy are partially based on 
general perceptions rather than specific knowledge about the performance of the 
courts.  
A preliminary analysis of the results also suggests that those officials who 
do have opinions about the judicial process often hold negative views. For 
example, responses to statement 1 indicate that most officials (57.9 per cent) 
believe that judges do not have enough knowledge on environmental issues to 
make good decisions. For some officials this perception clearly has implications 
for the courts’ ability to be effective in environmental disputes as they referred to 
judges’ lack of knowledge in responses to subsequent statements. For example, in 
response to statement 4 regarding the consistency of judgments, one official 
remarked that ‘you can’t judge them – how can you judge them if they don’t know 
anything about the function?’ In response to statement 7 on the need for judges to 
interpret legislation another disagreed with the statement because judges ‘don’t 
have knowledge on the subject matter and make findings that are off the subject 
matter and illogical’.  
However, a conclusion that officials often view the courts’ performance in 
a negative light would be misleading as further analysis of the responses indicates 
that ‘negative’ scores are sometimes qualified by other factors. For example, 
approximately 40 per cent of officials believe that the court’s decisions are 
consistent in similar cases (statement 4). This figure is low but does not mean that 
the majority of officials think the courts are inconsistent because 31.6 per cent of 
officials were undecided or did not know enough to respond. If responses by 
officials who were uncertain are discounted then the majority of officials (57.7 per 
cent) believe that the courts are consistent.  
Interestingly, many of those who believed that the courts are consistent 
hold that belief, not because of their knowledge of judgments, but because of their 
belief that judges follow precedent. They made comments such as ‘they look at 
precedent, so they should be [consistent]’.  
In addition some responses reflect what officials perceive the role of the 
courts to be. For example, statement 5 aimed to assess whether officials believe 
that the courts are insensitive to the administrative implications of their judgments. 
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Sixty three per cent of officials believe that judges do not consider the 
implications of their decisions on government’s administrative load. However, 
almost none of these officials felt any resentment about this and, to the contrary, 
made comments such as ‘it’s not their job to do that’ or ‘judges are ruled by a 
particular law and must make judgments [based on those rules] – how it affects us 
is a very different story.’ In these instances there is an acceptance, and often 
sympathy, for the perceived constraints of the judicial role. 
Five of the statements solicited views on whether officials consider judges 
to be impartial umpires in environmental disputes. Just over half of the officials 
believe that judges make fair decisions because they are highly independent 
(statement 2). (Eighteen per cent hold a contrary view and 30.8 per cent did not 
have an opinion). This response appears to be in contradiction with the 57.9 per 
cent of officials who agreed with statement 10 (the outcome of a court case is 
depends a lot on which judge is making the decision). Some officials who agreed 
with statement 10 and who had also agreed with statement 2 indicated that the 
individual nature of litigation outcomes is attributable to ‘how much experience 
[judges] have on the environment’.  
However, comments by other officials explain the reasons for the apparent 
discrepancy. These officials noted that a judge’s decision must be based on the 
information which is placed before them. They indicated agreement with 
statement 10, not because of the different personalities or preferences of individual 
judges, but because they believe that the outcome of a court case – 
… depends very much on the preparation that is given by the officials, 
defence and applicant. Judges make their decision solely and 
objectively on what is before them.  
The variability that is suggested by the results therefore largely relates to 
the quality of legal argument and not the individual nature of judges.  
Following on from these two statements, statements 11, 12 and 13 question 
whether officials believe that certain litigants receive particular preference by the 
courts. Most officials do not believe that NGOs’ access to the courts is overly 
facilitated (55.3 per cent) or that the courts allow business to abuse environmental 
legislation to fight commercial battles (62.1 per cent). Although some officials 
believe that business is abusing environmental legislation, they did not blame the 
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courts and made comments such as ‘you can’t blame them [the courts] because 
the legislation allows it’.  
Responses to the courts’ sympathy towards government initiated litigation 
to secure compliance and enforcement were more evenly spread with 26.4 per cent 
believing that the court was sympathetic to government, 34.2 per cent holding a 
contrary view and 39.5 per cent not expressing an opinion. 
Three of the 13 statements elicited clearly positive responses from officials. 
Compared to the statement in the second category of questions regarding whether 
officials believe that courts have the right to manage abuse of power, statement 9 
questioned whether the courts are needed to make sure that government does not 
abuse its powers ie whether the courts ought to play an oversight role. Nearly all 
officials (97.4 per cent) indicated that the courts should play such a role.  
In addition, responses to statements 7 and 8 indicate that the majority of 
officials believe that judgments add value to the public administration. In response 
to statement 7, 79 per cent of officials indicated that they believe judges are 
needed to clarify the meaning and requirements of legislation. Although some 
officials believed that the legislation should be drafted clearly enough so that it is 
unnecessary for the courts to interpret it, they nevertheless indicated that the 
courts could make a valuable contribution either because ‘once we go to court we 
see if our intention in drafting was correct’ or because –  
If you have a badly written law the only place that you can take it to is 
the courts. We know what it’s supposed to mean so the idea that a judge 
has to interpret it is awful. But it’s a good test. ... For example, the 
arguments around pre-directives.
660
 I don’t think the intention of the 
lawmakers was to write pre-directives – it could be a phone call - but it 
was unclear so to have a judgment did give certainty for 
implementation. 
One official’s response was particularly interesting because it highlighted 
the tension which arises between the court’s power to interpret legislation and the 
transformation process in which government is developing and settling new 
legislative approaches. The official stated that – 
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On the whole we have drafters in the system that know what we mean. 
But it changes. As more decisions are made we are better able to have 
people up front deciding what it means than the courts. 
The majority of officials (68.5 per cent) also believe that judges play a 
useful role in explaining the conduct that is required of officials. Again, many of 
the positive responses were based on a desire for certainty. For example, one 
official agreed with the statement because ‘every time you ask for a legal opinion, 
they [lawyers] say that it’s only an opinion because it’s not tested in court’ and 
another agreed because officials can ‘take judgments as precedent and consider 
them when reviewing applications’.  
A final area where officials displayed high levels of agreement was the 
focus of judgments. The majority (69.2 per cent) agreed with statement 3 that the 
courts focus on procedural issues rather than substantive issues. Many officials 
attributed this to the fact that procedural issues are raised more frequently than 
substantive issues in legal argument or that procedural issues, as opposed to 
substantive issues, fall within a judges areas of expertise. Some indirectly referred 
to the policy of judicial deference and indicated that judges are supposed to check 
procedural fairness rather than substantive outcomes. However, a minority of 
officials found the emphasis on pr cedure frustrating. One official felt that judicial 
deference resulted in an avoidance of much needed interpretative clarity – 
Judges will sit for three days and wait for one sentence on a technical 
flaw and make their judgment on that and end his judgment off with 
“the department is the competent authority with reason” and he’s not 
going to question that. ... It was a very nice judgment, but we didn’t get 
what we wanted.  
Another felt that procedural emphasis obscured substantive justice -  
In the legal field it’s not about being right or wrong, it’s about being 
legally right or wrong. The courts are somewhere I don’t want to be. 
It’s better to settle because it’s all about technicalities. … One day I 
was ready to testify. The state prosecutor said you’re not going to win 
and it’s better to settle out of court. The guy was caught red-handed 
with alien fish (pirannah) and didn’t have a permit and it’s not the first 
time that he was caught. ... [There were] some wrong procedural things 
regarding gathering evidence. [So then] it’s no longer about him being 
guilty, it’s about technicalities. That’s why I hate the courts. You can’t 
blame the judges – the guy has rights.  
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Whilst the responses to these statements are less unanimous than the first 
two categories, they nevertheless indicate that the majority of officials have a 
strong respect for the courts.  
 
Exposure to litigation 
Several studies show that experiences affect views on legitimacy. Tyler, for 
example, found that procedural fairness, rather than the outcome of a decision, 
impacted on the degree of legitimacy which the public afforded legal 
authorities.
661
 As part of this study the extent to which direct involvement 
enhanced or undermined conscientiousness was considered in a limited manner.  
Of the officials interviewed, 63 per cent indicated that they had been 
involved in litigation. For the majority their involvement related to trial 
preparation activities such as reviewing affidavits and consulting with counsel in 
one or a limited number of cases. Few had attended court. Of those who had, the 
experience varied. Part of the reason for this may be that the exposure of officials 
to litigation processes was explored from a broader perspective than other impact 
studies. As pointed out previously there is a duality in the way that officials 
experience the role of the court. On the one hand the courts act as ‘big brother’ in 
their accountability role of ensuring that administrative power has not been 
abused. On the other, the courts are part of an expanded compliance and 
enforcement team, albeit as an arms-length role-player. 
Two officials, whose experience resulted from the same case involving 
judicial review which the department lost, found the experience to be distinctly 
uncomfortable as is illustrated by the following - 
‘Now I try and stay away from courts. It’s not a nice experience to sit 
there. A small decision [that you made] gets dragged out for days when 
you only had 5 to 10 minutes to decide. It feels like you’ve made a hell 
of a mistake and are incompetent and no one talks about [all the] cases 
that didn’t go to court.’662 
 
‘Court benches are hard. It’s a terrible place, and cold. The guys talk in 
front. You feel stupid. The proceedings are not clear to us non-legal 
people. When our advocate was talking I wanted to pull his robe and 
tell him not to forget things, but I felt would be disturbing the court.’ 
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 Such sentiments were also observed by Calvo et al op cit at 23. 
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Notwithstanding the first official’s personal discomfort with their 
experience, it did not appear to impact negatively on their legal conscientiousness 
because they displayed a high degree of sensitivity or deference to the courts in 
other responses. For example, they agreed that the courts do not consider the 
implications of their decisions on government’s administrative burden but 
qualified their answer by indicating that ‘it’s not their job to do that.’ They also 
understood that their department did not have to follow a judgment made by a 
High Court in a different province but again qualified their response by adding 
that it was ‘unwise’ not do so and that ‘you should take serious cogniscance’ of 
such judgments. The second official was less enthusiastic about the courts but 
nevertheless commented that ‘as a public servant I must recognise and respect the 
courts’. 
The intimidatory effect of judicial review suggested by these officials was 
also evident amongst certain managers who had not yet been involved in 
litigation. One official, when asked if they had been involved in litigation, 
responded as follows - 
Thanks God no, but [a case is] going to the High Court now. … I hope I 
don’t have to go to court. Some us are not made to stand there and 
argue things out – it’s just intimidating.  
This anxiety is similar to the findings of Pick and Sunkin who considered 
the impact of judicial review on the independent review service of the Social Fund 
in the United Kingdom.
663
 By contrast however, other officials, also with very 
limited experience in attending court, but who had been involved in cases with a 
positive outcome reported a different experience. One indicated that the 
experience had provided a learning opportunity and said that ‘it was a great 
experience which taught me the tactics of litigation in environmental law’. 
Another referred to the benefits of being involved in litigation and said that 
‘[when] sitting with counsel who is trying to pick holes in your story you learn 
quite quickly what mistakes you’ve made and what to avoid and what to bring to 
court cases’. For a third official the experience demystified the legal process – 
I really enjoyed going to court. I was surprised with the amount of 
nonsense included in such a case – they argued for two days and 
nobody has said nothing and you’ve actually paid for it! The clerk of 
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the court, for the entire day, slept with his head on his arms. It made a 
mockery of South Africa and the court – I couldn’t believe it.  
Similarly officials with more experience in litigation were mostly not 
intimidated by litigation. Two senior managers highlighted the fact that when 
viewed in perspective, legal challenges were largely unsuccessful and relatively 
few. (One commented that ‘this department has a strong record of winning court 
cases across the board’ and the other noted that the approximately 60 000 EIA 
applications which had been processed across the country had only resulted in 100 
judgments). 
Enforcement officials were more likely to view litigation experiences 
positively than those involved in judicial review matters. For example a senior 
manager, whose experience had been in a criminal matter, described the process as 
– 
… an amazing experience. What was important was the expertise and 
experience of the judge … . Getting a search warrant was a piece of 
cake and [the judge] offered more than we asked for – he interrogated 
the warrant and empowered us. 
Some of these officials also saw positive opportunities in litigation for 
obtaining certainty on legislative interpretation and administrative practices. For 
instance a manager working in enforcement referred to a difficulty that they were 
experiencing with a particular legislative provision and said – 
I think we should take it through the court process and test it. ... We 
need to test the law. The only time we’ll find out if it’s effective is if we 
run it through the courts.  
The responses described above indicate that officials’ experiences of the 
litigation are influenced by the amount of exposure that they have as well as the 
nature of the litigation. This means that officials’ perceptions may change and 
become less reactive if they are involved more frequently in litigation. In addition 
the interviews revealed that experiences have also differed over time as a result of 
changes in judicial culture. Two officials who have substantial experience in 
litigation (albeit mostly criminal) shared their views on how their experiences 
have changed since 1994. Both officials perceive the courts to be more accessible 
and receptive to environmental matters. The first referred to changes in both the 
quality of adjudication and the culture of the courts as follows –  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
249 
 
I think the courts have improved over the last decade - as long as 
you’re prepared. It’s not so much of a lotto. In the past we weren’t so 
prepared – we weren’t trained enough – we’re still not. They [used to 
be] up there with Moses and the disciples. Now things are more 
relaxed.  
The second official indicated that the attitude of the courts to 
environmental matters has changed as follows -  
Prior to our democracy our courts were not pro- conservation or 
environmental management. They did not know much. So much so that 
in most of our cases … [the court was] biased in terms of defending the 
suspect more than dealing on the official’s side. We would have a 
prosecutor or magistrate saying “oh but you caught this man hunting 
or with this carcass, but isn’t hunting a traditional way of making a 
living? Do you think this man could destroy all the animals that you 
have in this world? If this man has killed this animal for subsistence 
then what is the impact? Sorry, he can’t kill all the animals in this 
country” ... . For me I think the current situation is okay. 
Officials’ experiences in litigation have resulted in a range of feelings from 
vulnerability to confidence. Notwithstanding this no comments were made during 
the interviews which suggest that these experiences have reduced officials’ 
perceptions of legitimacy. Even where the departments had lost a case officials 
were more likely to attribute the unsatisfactory outcome to counsel rather than the 
judge. For example, officials made comments such as ‘the attorney and counsel 
were completely useless - senior counsel was arrogant and incompetent’ or ‘the 
legal team let us down’. 
Responses to all three categories of questions therefore indicate that 
officials attach high levels of legitimacy to the courts.  
 
8.2 Legitimacy of the law 
Chapter 3 provided a brief overview of changes in environmental and 
administrative law since 1994. The re-orientation of the legislation to a 
democratic, rights-based approach substantially expanded the scope of 
environmental decision-making by requiring the consideration of additional 
substantive factors as well as adherence to new administrative justice processes.  
The alignment of officials’ values and perceptions with the rights-based 
approach were explored during the interviews by means of both structured and 
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semi-structured questions. In the structured part of the interview, officials were 
provided with a list of statements relating to legal requirements and asked how 
strongly they agreed, or disagreed, with each statement. The statements were 
framed both positively and negatively and all reflected a legally correct or 
incorrect position. Officials were requested to provide a response which reflected 
their personal opinions rather than what they understood the correct legislative 
position to be. Officials were also advised that they could explain their responses. 
(Many took advantage of the latter).  
For the purpose of analysis, the statements are divided into four 
thematically grouped categories. The first category relates to the content of the 
environmental right. The second pertains to the nature and scope of environmental 
decisions. The third category deals with perceptions of administrative justice and 
the fourth, a subcomponent thereof, with public participation. The statements and 
consolidated responses are set out in the table below.
664
  
 
Table 8-7 Statements on Environmental and Administrative Approaches 
 
 
Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
CONTENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT 
1. The impact of a new development 
on existing competitors is not an 
environmental issue. 
17.9 35.9 5.1 38.5 2.6 
2. Landowner’s rights to develop a 
property should be limited f it is 
necessary to protect the environment.  
33.3 66.7 - - - 
3. Protection of the environment is 
not so important as giving people 
housing. 
- 7.7 15.4 64.1 12.8 
4. Environmental decisions must 
consider the implications of that 
decision for future generations.  
59 41 - - - 
NATURE AND SCOPE OF DECISIONS 
5. We should rather focus on 
managing environmental impacts than 
saying “no” to an application for 
environmental authorisation. 
17.9 41.0 5.1 20.5 15.4 
6. In EIA applications, officials 
should assess all impacts on the 
environment, such as water, even if 
another department also has control 
over that issue. 
23.1 48.7 5.1 23.1 - 
7. Environmental departments do not 
need to consider an issue that has 
5.1 25.6 2.6 56.4 10.3 
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Statement Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
already been considered by another 
department e.g. desirability of a 
development in terms of 
townplanning legislation. 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
8. Procedural requirements such as 
giving reasons and public 
participation contribute to 
administrative delays without adding 
value. 
- 10.5 5.3 68.4 15.8 
9. Officials are required to spend too 
much time on procedural matters 
which could be better spent protecting 
the environment. 
10.3 33.3 12.8 38.5 5.1 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
10. The public have a right to 
participate in environmental 
applications and this should be 
supported, even if it delays finalising 
an application. 
43.6 53.8 - 2.6 - 
11. All people are entitled to 
participate in environmental 
applications, even if they have vested 
interests. 
7.7 82 - 10.3 - 
 
 
8.2.1 Content of the environmental right 
Statements 1 to 4 relate to value-based issues which often arise in environmental 
decisions. There was a high degree of consistency between responses to 
statements 2, 3 and 4. In this regard, responses to the statements indicate 100 per 
cent support for statement 2 regarding the limitation of landowners’ rights and 
statement 4 regarding the consideration future generations. Statement 3 
(protection of the environment is not so important as giving people housing) 
reflects a legally incorrect position because the Constitution Court has held that all 
rights are on a par.
665
 Responses to this statement reflect a slight drop of actual 
acceptance of the legal approach, with 7.7 per cent of officials supporting the 
(legally incorrect) statement. The officials who support the statement hold views 
on housing and the environment which are not aligned with the constitutional 
approach because they regard one right as being more important than the other. 
None of these officials explained their response. Many of those who disagreed 
with the statement pointed out that both housing and the environment are a 
priority and need to be accommodated when making a decision.  
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Statement 1 draws directly on the FRC CC judgment in which the court 
held that impacts on competitors fall within the scope of environmental decision-
making.
666
 The responses to this statement reveal far less unanimity of opinion 
than the other three statements. In this instance only 41.1 per cent of officials 
believe that competitive issues are relevant to environmental matters, which 
means that the majority of officials (53.8 per cent) disagree with the current legal 
approach. Viewed in the context of the results for statements 2, 3 and 4 this result 
suggests that officials’ values in respect of the environment are strongly aligned 
with approaches reflected in environmental law insofar as they relate to 
biophysical matters but far less so when they relate to socio-economic ones. 
 
8.2.2 Nature and scope of decisions 
Statements 5, 6 and 7 relate to decision-making approaches and requirements. The 
responses to these statements revealed the presence of more varied views than 
those held in respect of the environmental right.  
The purpose of statement 5 is to understand where officials place their 
emphasis in decisions involving applications for authorisaton. The majority of 
officials (58.9 per cent) feel that their consideration of any application for 
environmental authorisation should be focused on the conditions under which the 
application should be approved rather than whether it should be approved. This 
implies that most officials place a self-imposed constraint on the exercise of the 
discretion afforded to them when considering an application. It also suggests that, 
contrary to their personal values which are often pro-conservation, the majority of 
officials may adopt a more pro-development attitude to decisions.  
In this regard officials were asked in a previous question which of the 
following statements most accurately reflected their personal view – 
a. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it 
causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.  
b. Economic growth and creating jobs should be given the top 
priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.  
These statements sought to understand the underlying personal philosophy 
of the officials namely how pro-environment or development they are. Each 
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statement intentionally reflects only part of the principle of sustainable 
development so that it could be ascertained whether officials have a dominant 
preference. Where officials identified the limitations of the statements as being 
problematic, responses was recorded as ‘c’. Responses to this question showed 
that only 12.8 per cent of officials identified with the pro-development statement 
reflected in ‘b’. Of the remainder, 46.2 per cent identified with the pro-
environmental position reflected in statement ‘a’ and 41 per cent identified with 
the principle of sustainable development recorded as ‘c’.  
The discrepancy between the two results is partly explained by the fact that 
many of the officials who agreed with statement 5 indicated that applications for 
projects related to infrastructure such as airports, electricity, roads and housing are 
of such national importance that they cannot be refused in practice. In these 
instances, officials feel compelled to discharge their mandate by managing the 
application process in such a way that environmental impacts are minimised rather 
than prevented. They attempt to achieve this through mitigation measures and, 
where necessary, by requiring a consideration of location alternatives. This 
explanation does not completely account for the discrepancy and it is therefore 
probable that some officials are influenced by perceived political priorities that 
differ from their personal views when making decisions. 
Statement 6 (in EIA applications, officials should assess all impacts on the 
environment, such as water, even if another department also has control over that 
issue) and statement 7 (environmental departments do not need to consider an 
issue that has already been considered by another department) both relate to the 
legislative mandate of the officials and the extent to which environmental 
departments are entitled to rely on, or outsource aspects of decision-making to, 
other departments. The statements are drawn from the FRA CC judgment which 
held that officials are not entitled to abdicate any aspects of a decision to another 
department.
667
 
Statement 6 is phrased positively and statement 7 negatively. To correlate 
the responses, the results must be reversed. When this is done, the results are very 
similar. They indicate that between 23 per cent and 30 per cent of officials 
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consciously hold views on these matters that are at odds with judicial 
interpretation.  
Responses to statements in this category show that for a significant 
minority of officials (30 – 40 per cent) there is less acceptance of legislative 
requirements regarding the implementation of environmental legislation than the 
substantive goals of the legislation.  
 
8.2.3 Administrative justice 
Issues of administrative justice are reflected as statement numbers 8 and 9 in the 
table above. In response to statement 8 that procedural requirements contribute to 
administrative delays without adding value, 84 per cent of officials disagreed with 
the statement. The high percentage of officials who disagreed with the statement 
suggests that most officials value procedural fairness highly, or at least do not find 
it burdensome. This suggestion is supported by the fact that officials often made 
emphatic comments on the importance of administrative justice such as ‘PAJA is 
my bible’, at subsequent points in the interview. 
Explanations given for officials’ support of administrative justice processes 
(ie disagreement with the statement) were twofold. Some highlighted that there are 
value-added outcomes of procedural requirements whereas others focused on the 
reference to delays included in the statement. Officials who focused on the ‘delay’ 
component of the statement indicated that they did not believe that procedural 
requirements per se caused delays. As one official pointed out, ‘there are very few 
applications where people ask for reasons – we’re not flooded’. Where delays 
were encountered as a result of administrative processes, another official 
attributed the delay to applicants and consultants attempting to circumvent the 
requirements, rather than the requirement itself.  
These explanations appeared to be inconsistent with the views that officials 
expressed in response to statement 9 (officials are required to spend too much 
time on procedural matters which could be better spent protecting the 
environment). By contrast to responses given in respect of statement 8, responses 
to statement 9 were evenly spread between those who agreed or disagreed with the 
statement.  
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However, when explanations for the responses are considered, the reasons 
for the inconsistency become clearer. Firstly, some lack of uniformity arose 
because certain officials interpreted statement 9 as meaning that internal 
administrative processes (as opposed to procedural justice requirements) were too 
time-consuming. Other officials interpreted the statement as applying to the 
procedural requirements of administrative justice.  
Several of those who interpreted the statement as applying to internal 
processes believed that those processes were too extensive. As one manager 
explained – 
There are far too many – particularly in EO ranks, the foot soldiers – 
too many red tape and meetings that they’re required to attend rather 
than doing actual conservation work on the ground. … The consultative 
approach that we have with all our officials is a bit over the top. 
By contrast, officials who interpreted the statement as applying to 
administrative justice processes held mixed views. The majority believed that the 
time spent on procedural matters was irrelevant because it was a necessary 
component of democratic environmental m nagement and made comments such 
as ‘[t]hese procedural matters lead to the protection of the environment’ and ‘it’s 
democracy, part of sustainable development’. These views echoed some of those 
made by others in response to statement 8 to the effect that the end justified the 
means ie ‘it puts the burden on us, but [procedural requirements] must be there’ 
and ‘[procedural requirements] do delay, but also add value’. Although the 
responses of those interpreting statement 9 as relating to administrative justice 
requirements are in fact consistent with responses to statement 8, officials selected 
different response options in the interview ie – some expressed their views as 
disagreement with the statement and others as agreement.  
A minority of officials who interpreted statement 9 as applying to the 
procedural requirements of administrative justice had concerns regarding the 
implementation implications rather than the values underpinning the requirements. 
For some falling in this group, the requirements detract from substantive 
considerations in decision-making. This was explained by an official as follows – 
Procedural matters are important but … I get sidetracked by 
procedural requirements. The procedural requirements are a nightmare 
because they aren’t all that clear and there’s too many of them to 
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remember – NEMA, PAJA etc. and officials are not trained lawyers .... 
The requirements should be simple. I would rather spend my time on 
site trying to assess whether the consultant has addressed the impacts 
than whether he’s addressed procedural requirements.  
The competence of officials to implement PAJA was also a concern of one 
official who felt that ‘… PAJA is nonsense – it doesn’t work for the level of 
qualifications that people have’. 
For others the procedural requirements are considered to be inflexible and 
often disproportionate to the need. For example, one official commented that - 
Sometimes the development is so insignificant and the process is too 
much – different scales of development require the same attention to be 
fair, to be consistent and [the requirements] are not influenced because 
it’s small. It can be an administrative burden but legislation sets the 
minimum standard. 
Responses to subsequent questions in the interviews yielded an additional 
insight into how officials’ views on procedural requirements are formed. In this 
regard, most of the officials who expressed strong reservations about the 
requirements of administrative processes had worked together closely for a 
substantial period of time and shared similar reasoning for their reservations. For 
example, both in responses to statement 9 and at other points during the interview, 
they expressed frustration at their perception that only environmental departments 
are required to give effect administrative justice. One of these officials felt that 
‘we’re probably the only department that takes this framework legislation into 
account’ and another stated that - 
In the past government was secretive and didn’t give reasons. People 
were not so aware of their rights, or so militant. We were not 
confronted with it. Now we go overboard with public participation. 
There’s a justification for that .... But look at what we require in terms 
of procedures and what [other departments] require. We have to do 
everything. 
These officials also referred to the changes that administrative justice 
required of their decision-making behaviour. One commented that the discretion 
which he had enjoyed previously had been curtailed as follows - 
Other legislation messes us around. PAJA and PAIA [Promotion of 
Access to Information Act] kraps the fruit salad deurmekaar [messes up 
the fruit salad]. Discretion can [keep] the grey areas out of court. … 
We used to have discretion now we’re in a blik [tin]. We used to have a 
bigger playing field. … Although the environmental impact may be 
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little, it takes hours [to process an application]. … I like to work neat, 
without nonsense. 
Responses to the statements on administrative justice reveal that officials 
mostly have a high regard for the procedural rights.
668
 In addition, the similarity of 
the dissenting views held by the officials who work closely together indicates that 
acceptance, or non-acceptance, of legislation by individual officials is shaped by 
the opinion of the group within which they work. 
 
8.2.4 Public participation 
Statements 10 and 11 focused specifically on public participation. Statement 10 
(the public have a right to participate in environmental applications and this 
should be supported, even if it delays finalising an application) was supported by 
97.4 per cent of officials and implies that officials attach significant value to the 
right of public participation.   
Statement 11 (all people are entitled to participate in environmental 
applications, even if they have vested interests) was included to determine whether 
officials’ values in respect of public participation are conditional. As noted in 
Chapters 4 and 5, businesses have frequently taken advantage of the opportunities 
presented by public participation processes in environmental matters to limit 
competition. The responses suggest that there is only a limited effect of this type 
of behaviour on officials’ opinions as 89.8 per cent of officials supported the 
statement compared to the 97 per cent who supported the first statement.  The 
limited discrepancy between answers to the two statements suggests that the value 
that officials attach to the right of public participation includes an acceptance of 
democratic discourse.  
However, officials may become increasingly less tolerant in practice about 
what they perceive to be abuse of the public participation process. In response to a 
question regarding the acceptance of public participation requirements by officials 
who had been employed before 1994, a senior manager said that - 
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rapid changes which are taking place in South Africa, people tend to assert high values but 
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behaviors under conditions of environmental turbulence: the case of South Africa’ (1996) 15 
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What I’m observing is that people strongly respect that participation 
right, but people who exploit that right for personal ends …  is 
beginning to irritate decision-makers … . There’s quite a lot of abuse. 
The other thing that is beginning to irritate even the MECs is that only 
a miniscule, disproportionate [number] of appeals actually have 
biophysical environmental grounds. It’s almost unknown for people to 
appeal against an authorisation on grounds that, in their view, there 
will be significant biophysical impacts that cannot be mitigated.  
That manager’s opinion in respect of the acceptance of public participation 
by officials with long tenure was reiterated by other officials in the same 
department who also agreed that public participation had been embraced by 
officials employed before 1994. One explained that there was acceptance partly 
because public participation is based on a constitutional approach which is not 
negotiable and partly because officials recognise that they benefit from that 
approach in their capacity as members of the public. Another indicated that the 
change required was not significant because – 
From when I started ... my supervisor was always pro-participation. I 
didn’t have to change my mind when 1994 came along – I already had 
it entrenched.  
Notwithstanding this, the tension between values and implementation 
implications discussed in respect of administrative justice was again visible in 
subsequent discussions on public participation during the interviews. In the course 
of discussion about a judgment which the official believed to be legally correct, 
the official noted that ‘we need to reword PAJA and NEMA because if applied like 
[the court requires] it will take 7 years to build a cellphone mast – [especially] if 
you have a difficult public, for example, neighbours who are doctors and lawyers.’ 
The analysis of the statements on public participation shows that a high 
percentage of officials support the legislative objectives. Like the findings in 
respect of administrative justice, comments regarding the acceptance of public 
participation by officials who were employed before democratic change indicate 
that officials’ values are strongly influenced by the prevailing culture of the 
department or the unit within which they work. 
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8.3 Hypothetical responses 
The high levels of legal conscientiousness described in the previous sections 
suggest that officials will be receptive to court directions. Apart from responses to 
actual judgments, the relationship between perceived conscientiousness and 
practice was explored by reference to how officials believe they will respond. 
During the interviews officials were presented with two hypothetical scenarios and 
asked how they would react. Noting the caveat indicated previously in respect of 
Gibson and Caldiera’s research, the hypothetical nature of the two scenarios 
means that whether officials would in fact respond as indicated cannot be verified. 
However, the responses provide an opportunity to gain some insight regarding 
officials’ attitudes to the potential conflicts that arise between judicial direction 
and other influences in decision-making.  
The first scenario, also discussed briefly in Chapter 6, was phrased as 
follows -  
If Cabinet approves the construction of a building for an international 
event and the court makes a decision that certain parts of the application 
process have to be redone which would result in the building not being 
completed in time for the event, how do you think your department 
would respond? 
The aim of this scenario was to consider whether legal conscientiousness 
prevails, or is sustained, when it competes with prioritised political goals. A small 
number of junior officials believed that politicians would exert sufficient pressure 
to ensure that political priorities triumphed, even if this meant directly violating 
the court order. Responses by the majority of officials, however, revealed a less 
extreme view. Most officials considered the competing interests described in the 
scenario not atypical of their decision-making experiences in which conflicting 
interests are a common dynamic. They indicated that a lawful but pragmatic 
approach would be sought so that both the court’s requirements and political needs 
could be accommodated. Such approaches included diverting resources or fast-
tracking elements of the process. One official’s response drew on practical 
experience with the electricity generation crisis that occurred in the country from 
2006 onwards where decisions involving electricity generation infrastructure are 
taken in a context of severe political pressure to ensure additional generation 
capacity - 
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We would probably try and achieve both things by being very 
accommodating and giving priority treatment to the application. For 
example [electricity] applications at the moment all come to the 
national department and we will give priority attention to [them]. You 
could probably criticise this but it’s wise because we remain a 
government department. If government can’t deliver it’s everyone’s 
problem. 
The official’s comment illustrates clearly how officials are required to take 
different competing interests into account. Notwithstanding the preferred approach 
of balancing different pressures, several officials specifically mentioned that they 
would not defer to political pressure if it meant not complying with the court 
order. Such responses emphasise the presence of legal conscientiousness.  
The second scenario, phrased as follows, focused on possible tensions 
between administrative justice and substantive environmental protection - 
If the courts told you to reconsider a decision to refuse authorisation for 
the construction of a listed activity in a wetland with critically 
endangered species, what would you do? 
In the circumstances described in the scenario the impact of the court on 
behaviour is difficult to assess because the court does not prescribe the final 
outcome. If the official reaches the same decision it will rarely be possible to 
determine whether the official genuinely reconsidered the decision or whether the 
initial decision was merely panel beaten into an acceptable form.
669
  
The officials’ responses reflected a range of underlying attitudes. A limited 
number of officials reacted defensively and made comments such as ‘if the court 
finds reasons to request a reconsideration, I will just have to cancel out those 
reasons and stick to the original reasons’; ‘I will consider and refuse again’ or 
‘you have to do it, but I will try and find a clever way of circumventing the issue’. 
These reactions amount to malicious compliance and indicate a reluctance in 
practice to accept court rulings that are perceived as interfering with the 
departments’ environmental mandate.670 They also indicate that officials’ 
responses are often, in the first instance, emotional ones. 
                                                 
669
 For an example of research which seeks to understand this, see R Creyke and J McMillan 
‘Executive perceptions of administrative law – an empirical study’ (2002) 9 Australian 
Journal of Administrative Law. 
670
 This observation is congruent with Obadina’s (op cit) finding that liberal authorities often 
did not apply case law if it was perceived as penalising housing applicants. 
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These views were exceptional. By far the majority of officials displayed 
attitudes which were more aligned with the requirements of judicial review. They 
made comments such as - 
 ‘I will review all the information provided, do a second review and see 
if I come to the same conclusion. If I do, then I will stick to it. If some 
information was absent or wrong and that is picked up, I will 
reconsider.’ 
 
Apart from a general acceptance of the court’s authority, many officials 
also saw judgments as an opportunity for improving the quality and objectivity of 
decision-making. Some noted that they might request an external review of the 
decision to ensure that the second decision was properly considered. Another 
described their anticipated response as follows - 
If the courts can shed new light and I believe the decision was good, it 
would change things a lot. I would reconsider with the judgment in 
mind. I’m open to it. You can become subjective and judgments can 
make you realise more objectively and it’s something to think about. 
These findings are similar to those of Platt et al who found that judicial 
review had generally more positive effects on quality in local authority service 
delivery than reported by most impact studies.
671
 By contrast, one senior manager 
noted the potentially negative consequences for the quality of decisions that can 
occur when attempts are made to avoid judicial control by what Halliday refers to 
as ‘bullet-proofing’ decisions -672  
Myself and other colleagues and some EAPs tend to take the view that 
the reason for appeals and judicial review is precisely that people can 
challenge the decision that you take. At one time I tried to be political 
in the decisions that I took and anticipate all sorts of ramifications. You 
have to act on the principle of the matter as you see it and the facts. The 
MEC can overturn the decision. If court says I’m wrong, I’m happy to 
accept that. … I started writing authorisations to avoid appeals and 
then you find yourself being trapped into always looking for the best 
possible compromise. In a way the balancing act in NEMA is that, but 
there’s a limit. There have to be cases where you do not do that. 
Like responses to the first scenario, many officials raised their reluctance to 
submit to political pressure. This was particularly evident in one department where 
officials reported that where they have been asked to change their 
                                                 
671
 Platt et al op cit. 
672
 Halliday op cit at 63. 
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recommendations on an application in the past they have requested that the 
instruction be given in writing. It appears that this practice has evolved out of 
concern for being held publicly accountable. As one official said, ‘I’m not going 
to stand in court defending other people’s decision if it’s an important issue.’ 
The responses to the hypothetical scenarios largely support the view that 
legal conscientiousness results in receptivity to judicial direction. However, while 
officials will generally strive to defer to the court’s authority, the nature and 
perceived or actual significance of other influences affect how that receptivity 
manifests. The results accordingly also show that because other considerations and 
influences are present in the decision-making dynamic, conscientiousness cannot 
be used to predict the types of impact that the courts will have.  
 
8.4 Reinforcing judgments 
By their nature, decisions of the courts which reinforce existing administrative 
practices do not require changes to those practices. Nevertheless the courts may 
still have an influence on administration in these instances because the confidence 
which flows from these judgments might stimulate subtle changes which improve 
the quality of decision-making.
673
  
One area where the court almost consistently confirmed the departments’ 
existing approach is the development and use of administrative guidelines.
674
 
Although there are several judgments which discuss guidelines, those dealing with 
the filling station guideline stand out because the guideline itself was central to the 
dispute. These judgments have at least two positive implications for the 
departments. Firstly, the courts confirmed that departments have the right to 
develop administrative guidelines and that in many instances it is desirable to do 
so. This clarification removed any doubts that the departments had. It also opened 
the door to more extensive use of guidelines which could facilitate consistent, 
effective and efficient decision-making in the departments. In the context of the 
limited capacity which the departments are experiencing, the increased use of 
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 Richard A L Gambitta op cit.  
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 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
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guidelines may be viewed as a valuable intervention for addressing the quality of 
decision-making. 
Secondly, the judgments clarified the flexibility criteria for implementing 
guidelines. When the guidelines were developed in Gauteng, officials had little 
experience in using formal guidelines as decision-making tools. For some there 
was uncertainty about the status of the filling station guideline because it did not 
have the same binding effect as legislation.
675
 The department distributed an 
internal briefing note on the application of guidelines in 2001. In that note officials 
were advised that - 
… to avoid successful challenges to the use of administrative 
guidelines, it is important that, inter alia, it can be demonstrated that 
where the administrative guideline was used as an input to decision 
making that it did not exclude the official’s discretion. … an official 
must be able to demonstrate that he or she is open to deviating from the 
guideline where the specific circumstances of the matter indicate that it 
would be appropriate to do so.
676
 
The contentious nature of the guideline, however, resulted in applicants - or 
their consultants – frequently arguing with officials about the validity of the 
guideline and the department’s right to apply it to decisions. (These interactions 
were often accompanied by threats of litigation). In consequence many officials 
felt that they could not merely apply the guideline but had to justify the basis and 
reasoning of it in each decision.
677
  
The flexibility criterion was clarified in BP. The court held that the onus is 
on an applicant seeking a departure from the guideline ‘to demonstrate that there 
is something exceptional in his or her case that warrants a departure from the 
policy.’678 This clear statement by the court ought to have eased and simplified the  
decision-making process because it confirmed that it is unnecessary to justify the 
application of a guideline per se in individual decisions.  
During the interviews those officials who were aware of the judgments (51 
per cent) were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the judgments and 
                                                 
675
 Personal knowledge, consultant acting in the capacity of Legal Director at the time. 
676
 J Hall Legal briefing note No. 4: The use of administrative guidelines in decision-making 
(December 2001). 
677
 Personal knowledge. 
678
 Op cit at para [19]. The courts have reiterated this viewpoint in other judgments – see 
discussion in Chapter 5. 
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whether the judgments had assisted them in any way. Unsurprisingly few 
disagreed with the judgments. Responses to the second question however varied 
between and within departments. Several officials in the Gauteng and national 
departments referred to increased confidence as follows – 
‘They helped to clarify matters and to assist in making decisions which 
might be contentious. It’s a back up. Your always hear them talking 
about it – senior management …. If a petrol company is difficult in an 
application then they [senior management] now say “if they don’t like 
it they can go to court, we won.”’  
 
‘They helped to the extent that there was a bit of uncertainty as to the 
importance that a guideline can play and it gave some certainty as to 
the role of a guideline and gave officials more confidence to use 
guidelines.’ 
These reports of increased confidence levels may be the basis for a number 
of nuanced but beneficial consequences. For example, the success in litigation and 
confirmation of existing approaches may result in officials being more robust in 
their decision-making and less intimidated by antagonistic stakeholders. The 
application of the guideline within a context of certainty should also result in 
consistency in decision-making. 
Notwithstanding this, two managers did not believe that the judgments had 
any meaningful benefits. Their views were largely underpinned by concerns about 
the utility and limitations of guidelines as a decision-making tool rather than the 
findings in the judgments. One of the managers who stated that ‘the judgments 
didn’t help in any way’ explained his answer by referring to an application that he 
had been involved in and said that – 
Once in desperation I asked the developer in a meeting “how do we 
stop guys like you?”  They answered honestly and said “if we think a 
door can be opened, we will open it”. That’s the problem with 
guidelines – they’re too flexible.  
The second manager said that ‘it would be dishonest to say yes [ie that they 
assisted the department] because we made a specific provision in the Act, so we 
still feel vulnerable’. Echoing the views of the first manager, they added that this 
was ‘partially because people want it [guidelines] to be more than it is’.  
The second manager’s reference to legislative changes provides an 
interesting insight. The provisions regarding powers to make guidelines in the 
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2006 EIA Regulations, which were passed after the judgments, were aligned with 
the principles of the judgments. Without the benefit of the manager’s comments, 
many people may conclude that the provisions in the Regulations reflect 
government’s desire to publicly assert its rights which flowed from the judgments 
and to provide legislative certainty regarding how the courts’ directions would be 
implemented. It is far less likely that the aim of the provisions would be 
interpreted as sending a signal of reassurance to officials themselves.  
None of the officials indicated that the judgments resulted in the 
departments making more use of guidelines. There has, however, been a trend 
towards developing more guidelines in recent years. For example, DEAT 
commissioned the development of a series of guidelines to support the 
implementation of the 2006 EIA Regulations and the national compliance and 
enforcement directorate is currently compiling codes of practice for inspectors.
679
  
Although this trend is not attributed to the judgments by the officials, it is 
possible that a causal relationship is not obvious to officials because the outcome 
of the judgments has filtered into the general body of officials’ knowledge and is 
no longer distinguishable from it. This appears to be a plausible explanation 
because the high levels of awareness of the judgments amongst senior officials 
and their indication that they would not act contrary to a judgment suggests that 
there is some relationship between the judgments and the continued development 
of guidelines. It also provides support for the proposition that time is an important 
aspect of determining judicial impact. After a period of time a judgment may not 
be at the forefront of officials’ consciousness. (As one legal manager noted - ‘if I 
haven’t dealt with an issue in 6 months, I forget [the judgment]. I need to keep 
being reminded’). It may nevertheless continue to have rippling effects on 
administrative practices. At this stage it becomes increasingly difficult to isolate 
the effect of the judgment from other influences.  
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 DEAT (2005) Guideline 3: General guide to the Environmental Impact Assessment  
Regulations,  2006, Integrated Environmental Management Guideline Series, Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), compiled by Jenny Hall and Paul Claassen. 
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8.5 Adverse judgments 
Although many judgments have limited implications beyond the specific dispute 
in question, some court decisions which find against government conduct have 
relevance beyond the dispute and require changes to administrative practices. 
Such adverse judgments are the minority but have the most potential to stimulate 
change in bureaucratic behaviour which is why they are the focus of most 
American judicial impact studies.
680
 They may also result in the greatest 
temptation to resist court influence where they are perceived as being in conflict 
with existing policy goals or administrative efficiency or require the deployment 
of additional resources.
681
 Adverse judgments are accordingly most likely to 
produce pronounced and detectable responses. A consideration of responses to 
adverse judgments provides an additional understanding about how robust 
officials’ perceptions of legitimacy are when it is tested in practice. 
Two types of adverse judgments were discussed in Chapter 7, namely those 
relating to the requirements of public participation and those dealing with the role 
of socio-economic issues in decision-making. In this Chapter the departments’ 
responses are explored further.  
 
8.5.1 Earthlife  
It may be recalled that in Earthlife the court rejected the national department’s 
approach to public participation.
682
 Prior to the judgment, the department largely 
relied on consultants to manage comments from the public during the EIA process 
and did not believe that it was obliged to entertain comments which were 
submitted to it after the final EIR had been received. In practice this resulted in the 
public having no opportunity to comment on the final EIR. The court’s finding 
that the public is entitled to comment at both the investigative and adjudicative 
phases of an EIA application process means that the departments are now required 
to consider comments that are submitted to the departments on final reports.  
                                                 
680
 See, for example, Wasby op cit and Johnson and Canon op cit. 
681
 Calvo et al op cit at 8. Conversely Spriggs op cit at 1127 points out that departments have 
an incentive to comply with adverse judgments because they are dependent on the courts to 
implement departmental policies.  
682
 See discussion in Chapter 5. 2. 
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The national department’s unhappiness with the judgment was made clear 
both internally and in media statements.
683
 There was ‘lots of grumbling in the 
hallways and they thought it was taken too far’. Individual’s reactions were 
described as being ‘very emotional … people take things very personally.’ The 
national department’s views were not shared by all provincial departments. 
Several officials in the Eastern Cape noted that they already required participation 
to be conducted in an expansive manner and that the judgment was correct 
because ‘it strengthens the right of communities concerned to be heard, 
considered and responded to’. Nevertheless when the national department elected 
not to lodge an appeal the initial indignation dissipated. As one manager said 
‘everyone just accepted it - said that’s it and got on with it.’ 
These responses are part of what Canon refers to as the ‘acceptance 
decision.’ The term is misleading because it involves a decisional response that 
can be located on a continuum which ranges from rejection to complete 
acceptance. Nevertheless, the acceptance decision has an intensity element which 
is influenced by people’s prior attitudes, including the degree of legitimacy which 
is attached to the courts and the perceived implications of the decision.
684
 The 
department’s response to the Earthlife judgment shows that responses may move 
up and down the spectrum for a period of time before they settle into a final 
acceptance decision. 
Once the final acceptance decision was reached, there is clear evidence to 
show that the departments deferred to the requirements expressed in the judgment. 
When the judgment was handed down, the process of drafting new EIA 
Regulations was at an advanced stage. The draft versions of the Regulations 
produced prior to the judgment already contained more detailed provisions on 
public participation than the existing regulations. However, when the officials 
responsible for overseeing the drafting process received the judgment they 
requested the drafter to review the draft and ensure that it was not in conflict with 
the judgment.
685
 In consequence the final 2006 Regulations contained express 
provisions aimed at giving effect to the judgment. In particular, they provided that 
                                                 
683
 See Chapter 7. 
684
 Bradley C Canon ‘Bureaucratic implementation of judicial policies in the US’ in Hertogh 
and Halliday (eds) op cit at 80.  
685
 Personal knowledge, drafter of the Regulations.  
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registered I&APs may make written comments on all documents submitted to a 
department by the consultant or applicant; consultants are obliged to give 
registered I&APs an opportunity to comment on any document which will be 
submitted to a department - before it is submitted - and include copies of any 
comments that are received; and that registered I&APs may comment on the final 
report submitted by a specialist reviewer if the report contains new substantive 
information.
686
 The legislative response to the judgment indicates an extremely 
high receptivity to judicial guidance. 
Whilst this high degree of conscientiousness is reflected in comments made 
by most officials (‘we follow the Regs and in some cases provinces are by the 
book’ or ‘when there is a decision by the court – if I’m aware of it – I will always 
follow it’), implementation practices in respect of the judgment are sometimes 
uneven. In some instances this is because the views of managers are not absorbed 
by junior officials. For example, in one department a middle manager indicated 
that the HOD at the time ‘made it clear that we need to make sure in our EIA 
reviews that public participation took place’. Their boss indicated that in response 
to the judgment managers ‘emphasise to staff to thoroughly check the 
appropriateness of public participation in EIAs ... before decisions could be 
taken.’ By contrast a junior official in the department indicated that ‘public 
members do need not to participate at the decision-making stage’. 
In other instances there is confusion about the approach that should be 
adopted for applications which are still being processed under the 1997 EIA 
Regulations, even though the judgment related to those regulations. One official 
explained this as follows – 
If additional information is subsequently submitted, there is a difference 
of opinion about if it has to go back [for further consultation]. Now the 
[new] Regulations have clarified it…. But we’re still running lots of 
ECA applications and … you didn’t [send it back] because the old Regs 
didn’t pedantically state how public participation had to be done. 
A further source of unevenness is that the expanded right to participation is 
often applied selectively to controversial applications where the risk of detection 
of not implementing the judgment (or Regulations) is high. This was candidly 
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 Regulation 58. These requirements have been retained in slightly modified form in 
regulation 56 of the 2010 EIA Regulations.  
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admitted by one official who said that ‘we immediately took steps to implement the 
judgment, but to be honest only for major applications because it is a bit onerous’. 
Their views were echoed by an official in another department - 
I apply my mind and use discretion …. If there’s no risk … I issue 
authorisation and don’t let 30 days go by for comment. … In [full] 
EIAs, if you add the Earthlife principles of working on 30 days, you 
extend the process by two months. 
This selectivity also applies to the depth of consideration that officials give 
public comments. Many officials indicated that they check whether the consultant 
has provided proof of compliance with the formal requirements of the Regulations 
such as advertising the application in a newspaper. However, officials higher up 
the decision-making chain usually do not read the public comments themselves 
and comments that are made directly to the department are normally routed to the 
junior case officer. As one middle manager explained - 
We’re way beyond the point where we can check absolute compliance 
with the Regulations. Application forms are designed so that the EAP 
almost signs a declaration that they have complied for reasons of 
administrative expediency. We accept that and look at the 
documentation – did they advise the public, is it technically correct etc. 
In consequence officials screen which applications they will pay more 
attention to. Another middle manager, in a different department, said that ‘in most 
cases that are not high profile, high risk I rely on the conclusion of the consultant. 
But I do [read the comments] for high risk applications because the judges will 
ask.’ This approach is not necessarily in contravention of the judgment because 
the court noted that in certain instances the final decision-maker could rely on 
advice or summaries. However, it does mean that the daily implementation of the 
judgment is largely the responsibility of junior officials. Because many of the 
junior officials lack experience, they rely on the opinion of the consultant and do 
not personally consider public comments in detail. There may accordingly be less 
practical implementation of the judgment than is anticipated by senior managers.  
 
8.5.2 Fuel Retailers Association 
The FRA CC judgment is the first judgment of the Constitutional Court dealing 
with substantive environmental issues. It will be recalled that the FRA challenged 
the Mpumalanga environmental department’s decision to grant authorisation for 
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the construction of a filling station. The Constitutional Court found in favour of 
the FRA and held that socio-economic factors must be taken into account during 
environmental decision-making processes. Importantly, from the perspective of 
current administrative practices at the time, it also stipulated that the consideration 
of socio-economic factors includes potential impacts on existing competitors. 
Although the courts had already considered the relationship between socio-
economic considerations and environmental decision-making in several 
judgments, the FRA CC judgment is significant because, as the ultimate authority 
on constitutional matters, the court settled the dispute and indicated the approach 
that departments must follow.  
In theory the implications of the judgment should have varied between the 
different departments. In Gauteng, for example, the judgment was anticipated to 
have limited implications because the filling station guideline demonstrated that 
the department viewed socio-economic factors, including the impacts on 
competitors, as falling within the scope of its mandate. Ironically however, a 
change in senior management occurred and in practice the application of the 
guideline diminished. In addition it appears that the approach adopted in the 
guideline never permeated completely to the consideration of other applications. 
One reason for this may have been the reluctance of officials to adopt the 
approach in the guidelines as is suggested by the following comment –  
Positive socio-economic factors were taken into account heavily for 
every positive decision, for example, if the [application was] for the 
disadvantaged. In terms of competition, no, we didn’t view it as an 
issue. I thought it was irrelevant. I had good arguments why you could 
apply it to filling station and not [to other applications] – there was a 
guideline where the focus was on applicant being financial viable. 
Other developments had no guideline. 
In consequence socio-economic factors featured in decision-making 
processes to a limited extent and as a secondary consideration. Another official 
described the difference between the court’s approach and existing practices as 
follows –  
We always looked at socio-economic factors. ... The initial review is on 
the ‘green’ environment in a physical form. Then socio-economic 
factors [are considered] as motivation why the green issues should be 
set aside or affected. You need to bring it in because of sustainable 
development. I became more aware of [socio-economic 
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considerations]. I don’t recall denying an application on pure economic 
issues. It wouldn’t be the ultimate issue. 
In reality Gauteng’s approach was similar to the other departments – 
 [The original FRA judgment] used to fit in well with what officials felt. 
Now [the Constitutional Court judgment] has the potential to make 
waves. … [The message is] be careful of how you deal with this in the 
future. It’s not a case as of “I as individual decide and get away with 
it”. Make sure that you think about what you are doing. Be aware that 
NGOs and the public are aware. In the past it wasn’t always like that. It 
may be swaying in the other direction. For example, if you look at FRA 
[it’s] ... broadening it more than is appropriate. ... I understand that 
socio-economic issues must be taken into consideration but the 
competition issue is taking it a bit far.  
All three departments accordingly needed to develop a response to the 
judgment if the misalignment between existing practices and the requirements of 
the court were to be addressed. Unlike any other judgment before, the need to 
make a decision on a way forward became pressing because stakeholders began 
raising the judgment in their interactions with the departments. Some stakeholders 
were alert to the fact that many decisions which had been made prior to the 
judgment were probably flawed. In one instance a stakeholder who wanted to get 
their way on an authorisation threatened to approach the court for an order 
withdrawing all authorisations issued by the department under ECA on the basis 
that socio-economic impacts had not been considered. The department responded 
by drafting a reply which indicated that ‘the judgment was only applicable to that 
specific application and not more generally.’  
The response headed off that particular complaint. However, the judgment 
also influenced administrative appeals on decisions which had been made by the 
departments. In this regard an official commented that the judgment – 
… is wreaking havoc. The main … impact has been on appeals because 
literally all appeals ... now refer to that judgment. Almost always a case 
could be made that the economic assessments that were part of the EIA 
process didn’t provide sufficient information to make a decision and the 
most difficult one is where economic losses to competitors have not 
been considered. 
The judgment has also been used by other sectors as a strategy to manage 
competition. The medical waste sector is well known for its aggressive approach 
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to competition and willingness to challenge the award of government tenders.
687
 
These companies require a range of environmental authorisations before they can 
be awarded tenders. An official described the way in which the medical waste 
sector has seized the opportunities presented by the FRA CC judgment to control 
competition as follows - 
[Company A] got a little bit of a head start on [Company B] and some 
of the other companies. They have more authorisations in place and are 
closer to getting section 20 permits from DEAT. So they are using the 
FRA judgment to put the brakes on everyone else and appeal all 
authorisations …. They pursue the [appeal] until they have entered into 
the contracts that they want … with the Health Department. ... Some of 
these appeals don’t even claim to address biophysical or environmental 
grounds. … . It is simply an effort to prevent competitors from entering 
the [market]. They don’t even make any bones about it. Last week we 
were having a meeting with [Company B] and they were saying they 
would’ve done the same. 
These pressures to give effect to the letter of the judgment created turmoil 
amongst some officials, the general attitude of whom was described as follows – 
People are concerned. People have been slack where issues of socio-
economic issues come up and they don’t believe it has been properly 
considered and they’re concerned about the validity of the judgments 
they have made. … The good thing is that people are aware … and will 
spend more time considering socio-economic issues. … People are 
feeling vulnerable. The  feel they have to base decisions on proper 
information, but give [them] some general guidance or criteria. 
The departments’ concerns about implementation can be broadly described 
as relating to skills and mandate.  A key concern is the additional skills that are 
required to give effect to the judgment. Most officials’ qualifications and 
experience relate to general environmental management and they have limited 
skills to deal with economic matters. The requirement to consider ‘pure economic’ 
matters therefore falls outside the parameters of most officials’ capacity.688 (The 
problem of skills also applies to consultants as ‘they’re not familiar with having to 
deal with that type of issue in their reports and they usually don’t deal with it 
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 See, for example,  Waste Services (Pty) Ltd v The Chairperson of the Bid Award 
Committee of the Department of Health, Eastern Cape Province (Ck) Case No 252/08 27 
November 2008, unreported; Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson Tender 
board: Limpopo Province and Others [2008] 2 All SA 145 (SCA) and Phambili Wasteman 
(Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council: Gauteng Health (WLD) Case No 07/1029 2 
February 2007, unreported. 
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 In view of the discussion on competence in Chapter 6, the requirement to consider 
economic issues is also likely to place an additional strain on most junior officials’ ability to 
perform effectively. 
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adequately’). In addition, some officials believe that assessing economic impacts 
is not their role. For example, one official noted that -  
… these issues were more economic issues and my job is to assess 
environmental issues. They don’t have a role in environmental 
decisions. … Viability should be with those with more expertise, for 
example the banks and in business plans. I don’t have the skills to do 
that – I’m not trained for it and I don’t want to be. 
It is arguable that the departments ought to have some economic capacity. 
This is because the departments’ guiding objective of sustainable development 
comprises of three interrelated elements ie environmental, social and economic, 
and officials at least need the skills to address economic issues that affect the 
physical environment and result in environmental impacts.
689
 
Most officials do not have an objection to incorporating socio-economic 
issues into environmental decisions. Rather, as one official noted, the ‘thing is to 
agree to boundaries’ regarding the scope of socio-economic considerations and 
the responsibility for the primary assessment. In this regard, the Constitution 
stipulates requirements in respect of co-operative governance. These include a 
requirement that departments must exercise their functions in a manner that does 
not encroach on the functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere and that departments co-operate by providing assistance, informing and 
consulting one another on matters of common interest.
690
 Many officials 
accordingly believe that they should not have an obligation to take the primary 
initiative on socio-economic issues in circumstances where other departments are 
the lead agency. As one official stated, ‘you do have to take socio-economic issues 
into account, but you can’t go into other people’s mandates … you get into 
terrible trouble if you try’. This view was echoed by another who said ‘we don’t 
have the mandate or skills to do it.’ Some officials also believe that it is unfair to 
place the onus on the environmental departments because the limited approach to 
public participation adopted by other departments results in the environmental 
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development in South African Law’ op cit at p101. 
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process being overburdened by issues which should be managed by those other 
departments.
691
 
 At the time when the interviews took place, the departments were 
managing this dilemma by concluding memoranda of understanding with other 
departments for complicated applications. More recently an option for dealing 
with such situations has been provided by the insertion of sections 24K and 24L in 
NEMA which provide for the alignment of environmental authorisation processes 
and decisions with other permitting requirements.
692
  
The judgment has nevertheless influenced administrative approaches. The 
mere awareness of the court’s requirements has made officials ‘consciously think 
about it’ and ‘think about answers more carefully’. In addition the departments 
have also responded more directly. A draft guideline on need and desirability, a 
key issue in the judgment, has been produced in consultation with Working Group 
II.
693
 The guideline is reported to ‘work[] except for these cases where the only 
basis is business competition’. There has also been a change in the information 
that is required to support applications for filling stations - 
We were looking at [socio-economic issues] before but not in much 
detail. For example we were looking at proximity of other filling 
stations, … but weren’t asking for detailed reports. … It’s not a 
concern to me if a filling station is making 80 per cent profit and now 
only 50 per cent ... . In hindsight it’s not enough. The judgment 
indicated to us that we need to consider it in more depth than what we 
previously did. It’s not just an add-on to an assessment but an 
important part of the application. ... For filling stations [the 
consultants] have to include a full need and desirability report that 
includes a detailed socio-economic impact study.  
Although this official indicated that they would apply the same approach to 
other types of applications, others intend to adopt a more constrained approach. 
For example, a senior manager in another department indicated that ‘in the short 
term we will literally apply it to filling stations although we need to consider 
changing the law.’ When asked if they believed that they were entitled to apply 
                                                 
691
 Elmene Bray believes that this situation is created by difficulties with the legislation. See 
Elmene Bray ‘Unco-operative governance fuelling unsustainable development’ (2008) 15 (1) 
SAJELP 3. 
692
 Amendments made by Act 62 of 2008. The option is discussed by Kidd in ‘Removing the 
green-tinted spectacles: the three pillars of sustainable development in South African Law’ op 
cit. 
693
 Draft guideline on the information requirements to describe need and desirability in the 
environmental impact assessment process 17 July 2008. 
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the judgment only to filling stations, the official responded that ‘we’re taking a 
chance, but you need to be pragmatic – we can only look at it as far as we’re in 
control of the application, otherwise it’s fundamentally unfair.’694 
The responses also revealed that it takes time for all officials in a 
department to follow the same approach. In this regard, a senior manager noted 
that he was ‘horrified that an authorisation issued by [X] stated that “during the 
EIA the following objections were raised” [on socio-economic issues] and then 
said it was outside of the scope.’ The dissemination of information about the new 
policy approach also needed to extend beyond the line function to officials in 
other areas of work. An official working in enforcement indicated that they had 
first encountered the issue in a compliance matter relating to a filling station in 
which the impact on a competitor argument was raised. Their initial response was 
‘I say stuff it.’ However, after discussions with a colleague in the authorisation 
component and obtaining a legal opinion, they followed an approach which was in 
accordance with the judgment.  
The responses from another official demonstrate the need to be cautious in 
making a causal link between judgments and responses. That official indicated 
that at one stage the departments had a standard clause in authorisations which 
stated that only appeals on environmental grounds would be considered and that 
socio-economic considerations were expressly excluded. That clause has 
subsequently been removed from authorisations. During further questioning it 
became clear that the change had occurred prior to the judgment and was as a 
result of arguments made during administrative appeals on filling stations.   
From the discussion above it appears that the judgment has impacted on 
administrative processes in two important ways. Firstly, it has contributed to 
improved decision-making because officials now consciously take socio-economic 
considerations into account to some extent. This should result in environmental 
decisions being more closely, if not completely, aligned with the principle of 
sustainable development. Secondly, as a result of the judgment government has 
                                                 
694
 The view is support by Francois Retief and Louis J Kotzé ‘The lion, the ape and the 
donkey: Cursory observations on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) in the chronicles of the Fuel Retailers’ (2008) 15 (1) 
SAJELP 127 and L Britz ‘The filling station saga: Environmental or economic concerns’ 
(2007) 2 Journal of South African Law 263 – 275. 
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taken steps to streamline approaches to socio-economic factors between the 
different departments. A consistent approach between the different authorities has 
clear benefits for applicants and stakeholders but also for the quality of decision-
making.  
 
8.6 Impractical and questionable judgments 
In the previous sections responses to hypothetical, positive and unpopular 
judgments are discussed. A fourth category of judgments is discussed in this 
section which is often overlooked in judicial impact studies. Sometimes the courts 
hand down judgments which are grossly impractical or questionable. In these 
instances the limitations of using a compliance approach as an i dicator of impact 
become clear as complete compliance may be unreasonable or result in material 
unintended consequences. Responses to impractical or questionable judgments 
merit consideration because it is in this category that officials experience the 
greatest tension between their legal conscientiousness and operational objectives. 
How officials respond to judicial requirements in these circumstances reveals 
additional insights regarding the tenacity of legal conscientiousness.  
It is accepted that identifying judgments as being incorrect may be 
criticised because it includes a subjective view of the researcher. To manage such 
concerns the judgments were only included in the category where there was 
literature supporting the view or a judgment had been overturned on appeal. Two 
judgments were identified as falling within the category, namely Bareki and the 
HTF SCA judgment.  
 
8.6.1 Bareki 
In Bareki the court considered whether the provisions of section 28 of NEMA 
relating to the duty of care were retrospective. The court held that they were not 
and that the duty of care did not apply to pollution which occurred before 29 
January 1999 (the commencement date of NEMA). Several lawyers and officials 
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believe that the judgment is a clear misinterpretation of the wording
695
 which 
states that – 
…every person who causes, has caused or may cause significant 
pollution or degradation of the environment must take reasonable 
measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from occurring, 
continuing or recurring …696 [emphasis added] 
Nevertheless, the judgment was binding on the national and Gauteng 
departments and had significant implications for their enforcement activities. At 
the time, new pollution legislation had not yet commenced. The enforcement 
provisions in existing legislation had a limited scope and violations attracted 
unrealistically low penalties. The broad nature of the duty in section 28 provided a 
useful mechanism for circumventing the deficiencies of the older legislation. The 
judgment accordingly limited the departments’ ability to effectively address 
pollution which occurred prior to 1999 and which was still impacting on the 
environment.  
DEAT, which was cited as a party in the case, did not make any 
representations to the court. It also appears that by the time lawyers in the line 
function became aware of the judgment, it was too late to appeal the decision. The 
departments therefore had to decide how they would respond to the court’s ruling. 
An initial response by one official whose work was affected by the judgment was 
that the department should have found another case which could be used to test the 
judgment. This approach did not receive sufficient internal support and was not 
pursued. However the judgment continued to be a source of concern to several 
compliance and enforcement officials and they lobbied for the matter to be 
addressed. It was subsequently decided to amend NEMA by making the original 
retrospective intention of section 28 clearer. In 2006 a task team comprising of 
officials from DEAT and the provincial departments was convened to discuss and 
draft the proposed amendment.  
At the same time that these discussions were taking place, DEAT was 
developing the Waste Act. The department wanted to include provisions on soil 
contamination in the Act which applied retrospectively. Mindful of the judgment, 
                                                 
695
 See for example, M Kidd ‘Greening the Judiciary’ (2006) (9) 3 PER/ PELJ 72 at 78 and 
Field ‘Liability to remedy asbestos pollution’ op cit.  
696
 Section 28(1). 
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it was decided to make the retrospective intention abundantly clear.
697
 The final 
Act includes the following wording -  
This part applies to the contamination of land even if the 
contamination – 
(a) occurred before the commencement of this Act; 
(b) …  
(c) arises or is likely to arise at a different time from the actual 
activity that caused the contamination; or 
(d)  arises through an act or activity of a person that results in a 
change to pre-existing contamination.
698
 
This wording was subsequently used to amend section 28 of NEMA.
699
 
 In some circumstances amending legislation is used as a means of 
overcoming judicial control and indicates an overt rejection of the court’s 
authority.
700
 The response to Bareki, however, was not motivated by hostility to, 
or disregard of, the court but by officials’ belief that the judgment misinterpreted 
the intention of the legislation. Underlying the departments’ response was in fact a 
respect for the rule of law. The officials recognis  that their activities must be 
authorised by legislation. (As one official noted, ‘with us, people see law as a tool 
to do their job’). They believed that the situation created by the judgment needed 
to be corrected because it prevented them from being able to discharge their 
constitutional obligation to protect the environment.  
The officials’ respect for the role of the courts is also evident from the 
immediate response which followed the judgment. Despite disagreement with the 
judgment, between the time that the judgment was handed down and the 
amendment to NEMA, the departments did not use section 28 to address pollution 
incidents which occurred before 1999. The decision not to use section 28 was a 
conscious response as all officials who underwent EMI training were advised 
about the court’s decision. This deference to the court appears to be largely 
attributable to the prevailing attitude of management. As one manager explained, 
‘once there is a judgment everyone bows and scrapes and we receive instructions 
to comply with the judgment’. 
                                                 
697
 Personal knowledge - drafter of the Act. 
698
 Act 59 of 2008, s 35. 
699
 Section 12(a) of the National Environmental Laws Amendment Act 14 of 2009 amends 
NEMA by including this wording as section 28(1)A. 
700
 See, for example, Anthony B L Cheung and Max W L Wong ‘Judicial review and policy 
making in Hong Kong: Changing interface between the legal and the political’ (2006) 28 2 
The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 117-141. 
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8.6.2 HTF Developers 
Legal conscientiousness is also evident in reactions to the HTF SCA judgment. In 
that case a compliance directive issued by the Gauteng department in terms of 
section 31A of ECA was contested. On appeal the appellant raised a new point 
and argued that the directive was not valid because the draft directive had not been 
published in the Government Gazette as required by section 32 of the Act. 
(Section 32 of the Act stipulates that regulations, declarations, policies and 
directions must be published in the Gazette for public comment).  
The practical consequences of the appellant’s argument were substantial. A 
requirement to publish pre-directives for public comment, rather than affording 
only the affected party an opportunity to comment, would impede the 
departments’ ability to respond promptly to environmental problems. This would 
be particularly serious where an environmental problem was imminent and could 
be prevented.  
These implications influenced one of the judges. Jafta JA considered both 
the purpose of sections 31A and 32 as well as the context of the wording. He 
found that the purpose of the two sections differed – section 31A was designed to 
give effect to the environmental right whereas section 32 was designed to give 
effect to procedural rights that affect the general public. In view of this, he 
concluded that the objectives of section 31A would be defeated in cases of 
urgency if section 32 were applicable. With regard to the context of the wording, 
Jafta JA found that ‘direction’ is used in a different context in the two sections. In 
section 31A it is used as the noun of the power to ‘direct’ whereas in section 32 it 
means a set of rules. Based on this reasoning, he was of the opinion that section 32 
does not apply to section 31A and that directives in terms of section 31A need not 
be published in the Government Gazette.  
The majority of the court however was not persuaded by the consequences 
of upholding HTF’s argument. They held that the wording of section 31A is 
unambiguous and a directive issued in terms of that section must be published for 
comment in the Government Gazette. 
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The Gauteng department immediately decided to appeal the judgment to 
the Constitutional Court. Approximately six months later, the Constitutional Court 
handed down its judgment, overturning the SCA’s decision. By contrast to the 
majority of the SCA judges, the Constitutional Court was very much focused on 
the practical consequences of finding that section 31A directives must be 
published in the Government Gazette and stated that - 
 [section 31A] cannot be subject to the rigid procedural requirements of 
section 32, as this would hamper the ability of the designated 
functionaries to respond appropriately to harmful situations, in 
particular those that require urgent action.  Section 31A, 
unencumbered by section 32, allows for procedural flexibility to cater 
for urgent circumstances.
701
 
… 
An interpretation of the exercise of power in terms of section 31A as 
constrained by the procedural requirements of section 32 would suggest 
absurdity, and should be resisted.
702
 
The appeal to the Constitutional Court introduced a period of uncertainty. 
However, pending the outcome of the appeal proceedings, the Gauteng department 
elected to implement the findings of the SCA – 
Immediately following [the judgment] we started putting a process in 
place for publishing section 32 notices. We shifted to section 28 [of 
NEMA] for urgent things – with all its problems. We probably 
published three or four [pre-directives] between the SCA and 
Constitutional Court decisions. … We stopped publishing after that.  
Even more so than in the case of adverse judgments, responses to 
impractical and questionable judgments demonstrate an extremely high degree of 
lawful behaviour. Apart from considerations of institutional maturity two factors 
referred to in Chapter 7 were clearly present in this instance. Firstly, the message 
from the courts was unambiguous and the consequent conduct required of the 
officials was clear. In other words the judgments left little room for officials to 
adopt varying interpretations.
703
 Secondly, lawyers were intimately involved in 
formulating the acceptance decision.  
 
                                                 
701
 Para 45. 
702
 Para 51. 
703
 This lends support to predictions that clear judgments result in greater implementation. See 
Spriggs op cit at 1124; Johnson and Canon op cit at 442 – 3 and Wasby op cit at 250.  
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8.7 Summary of findings 
The findings show that at the time that the fieldwork took place officials afforded 
the court a great deal of legitimacy and had high levels of legal 
conscientiousness.
704
 The requirement identified by Halliday that officials must 
care about acting lawfully was identified throughout the interviews. It was also 
supplemented by a significant degree of tolerance of, and understanding for, the 
parameters within which judges discharge their function that has not been noted to 
any significant extent in other studies.  
Numerous responses during the interviews point to a conclusion that the 
presence of legitimacy and legal conscientiousness influences responses to 
judgments. At an anecdotal level these include reports that the Ministers and 
MECs take judgments seriously. It is also supported by actual responses. For 
example, the responses to Earthlife are more positive than findings of many other 
studies and show that the courts have penetrated administrative practices - even 
though many officials dislike the implications of the judgment. The responses to 
questionable judgments are also noted to be lawful rather than defiant.  
In view of these findings, it can be concluded that legitimacy and legal 
conscientiousness results in officials being receptive to the courts and that they 
strive to respond to judgments in a lawful manner. Whilst this supports the third 
hypothesis, it is not meant to suggest that high levels of legitimacy and 
conscientiousness always result in ideal or consistent responses. For example it 
was noted that some officials are engaging in what Halliday refers to as creative 
compliance by attempting to limit the application of the FRA CC judgment to only 
filling station applications. In other instances officials encounter challenges in 
implementing judgments as a result of incomplete knowledge or resource 
constraints. Rather it implies that legitimacy and legal conscientiousness will 
feature as a prominent factor in the acceptance decision. 
The results of the study confirm that alongside legitimacy and 
conscientiousness a number of other factors are accommodated in the acceptance 
                                                 
704
 These findings cannot be applied generally particularly as other writers point to clear 
examples of abuse of power in departments. See Johan Beckmann and Justus Prinsloo 
‘Imagined power and abuse of administrative power in education in South Africa’ (2006) 3 
TSAR 283 and Rolien Roos ‘Executive disregard of court orders: enforcing judgments against 
the State’ (2006) 123 SALJ 744. 
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decision or at least exert an influence on the acceptance decision. Because these 
factors vary, the combination of the range of factors that are present in any 
specific acceptance decision determine the type of impact that will ultimately 
manifest.  
The findings did not yield any indicators which could be used to predict the 
type of impacts that will flow from a judgment. This is because both the types of 
judgments and context within which they are received vary. However, further 
insight was obtained regarding the variables that feature in the acceptance decision 
and which exert pressure on the actualisation of conscientiousness.  
One variable which has not received much empirical attention in impact 
studies is the nature of the judgment. The responses to the different types of 
judgments included in this study indicate that the courts themselves play a role in 
the way in which judgments are received. Whilst this observation is not unique, 
few studies have considered a broad range of judgments and analysed the different 
responses that occur in respect of the different types of judgments within the same 
study. In this study it was noted that responses are influenced by the implications 
of the judgment. Reinforcing judgments by their nature enjoy a high level of 
acceptance and have had some strengthening effect on the quality of officials’ 
decisions by providing more certainty regarding the correctness of existing 
approaches. By contrast, judgments which conflict with existing approaches or 
which are questionable in their correctness require varying intensity of effort in 
order to reach an acceptance decision. For example, in questionable judgments, 
official’s efforts are focused on acquiring certainty and rectification of the 
interpretative approach to legislation by means of appeals or law reform. 
Responses to negative decisions on the other hand are more inwardly focused on 
refining or changing administrative approaches to implementation. 
Notwithstanding this, the implications of a judgment do not have a clear 
cut relationship with the type of acceptance decision that is reached. In this regard, 
whilst some tendency to evade implementation of adverse judgments where they 
were perceived to be impractical was noted, responses to impractical or 
questionable judgments were unambiguously lawful. These findings mean that the 
fifth hypothesis - that judicial control is undermined where decision-makers 
perceive judgments to be impractical – was not proved. 
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An additional factor related to the nature of the judgment is that the 
reception of the different types of judgments is affected by the extent to which 
officials regard the underlying legislation - on which the judgments are based - as 
being legitimate. The relationship between legislative legitimacy and response is 
illustrated by two examples in the study. In the first it was noted that officials who 
considered the legislative administrative justice requirements to be too expansive 
were also those who reported deviating from judicial requirements (and the law) in 
situations where they considered the requirements to be unnecessary or 
disproportionate to the need. In the second example it is noted in section 8.3 that 
officials strongly support the substantive objectives of environmental law. They 
also believe that most judges do not understand the aspirations of environmental 
law. Where officials believe that a judgment will impede their ability to give effect 
to the objectives of environmental law they are less likely to accept the judgment, 
even though legitimacy levels are high. This situation was evident in responses to 
the hypothetical judgments and the questionable judgments. (In the latter active 
steps were taken to eliminate the effect of the judgments). Legitimacy of the law is 
accordingly considered to be a highly significant factor since both high and 
reduced levels of legitimacy may reduce the impact of the courts.  
Another variable that emerges from the study is the effect of institutional 
maturity. It is speculated that differences in institutional maturity may be an 
important reason why responses to negative and questionable judgments differed. 
In this regard, at the time that the questionable judgments were handed down, 
compliance and enforcement units were newly established and most officials in 
the units were yet to become familiar with the function. Enforcement actions were 
accordingly not prolific and the judgments were received into an environment of 
uncertainty. By contrast officials involved in the processing of EIA applications 
had more experience with the function by the time the negative judgments were 
handed down. Two possible implications may result from this situation. Firstly, 
the generally perceived effect of the judgments on compliance and enforcement 
activities may have been less than the perceived effect on the processing of EIA 
applications because the compliance and enforcement function was not fully 
operationalised. Secondly, increased familiarity with a function may result in 
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some officials’ attitudes becoming less flexible where judgments are considered to 
be unduly onerous without merit. 
A fourth variable that is suggested by the study is the implications of 
organisational cohesion and culture. In this regard approaches to environmental 
management have been characterised by constant change and development since 
1994. Many of the senior managers are comfortable with this situation and 
acknowledge that change will continue for the foreseeable future. This view is 
illustrated by the DDG of DEAT in the following comment - 
...life is a work in progress and so is law. We write law. We implement 
the system, we learn from the problems and we look at what we are 
going to do. ... what I am confident about is that there will be further 
amendments to NEMA. 3, 4, 5 years down the line we might say, well, 
we did this and the circumstances have changed or we didn’t 
understand how unworkable this was or something else needs to 
happen. ... this is a commitment to learn from doing, to try and do 
things in the best possible way that we can, but to be able to be flexible 
enough to admit to our mistakes and to actually go forward ...
705
 
Such attitudes do much to instil a culture of learning and openness in the 
departments. It also provides a contextual basis, not only for the acquisition of 
knowledge, but also for responsive attitudes to the courts. This has positive 
implications for the ability of the courts to make an impact on environmental 
administration.  
This situation lends support to the first hypothesis. However, while many 
senior managers actively foster a culture of openness and deference to the courts it 
was noted that juniors sometimes do not follow the official departmental approach 
to judgments in practice. Much of this disjuncture may be attributable to the 
absence of formal mechanisms for disseminating information on judgments as 
well as a lack of knowledge regarding the meaning of judgments and 
understanding of how such requirements should be implemented in practice. It 
was also noted that some groups of officials who work closely together for a 
period of time share similar views. In some instances this enhances the ability of 
the court to have an influence because a group dynamic of respect to the courts 
reinforces individual responses that are aligned with judicial requirements. In 
others it has created a barrier to the court’s influence because a dominant group 
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 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, transcript of the 10 Years of formalised 
EIA conference held on 24 – 25 November 2008 in Somerset West.  
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view that a requirement is unreasonable or should be not be applied 
conscientiously shapes individual attitudes.  
The latter two observations have important consequences for judicial 
impact in the area of judicial review because the final decision on an application is 
largely based on the recommendations of junior officials.
 706
 The extended 
decision-making chain coupled with the number of applications means that senior 
officials usually do not read all the supporting documentation themselves and may 
therefore not detect that a junior official has omitted or manipulated a judicial 
requirement. (The implications in compliance and enforcement activities are not 
likely to be pronounced because managers are usually more actively involved at 
the different decision-making stages and less authority is granted to junior 
officials).  
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 Calvo et al op cit  at 20 noted a similar difficulty and found that ‘Those who are most 
sensitive to the impacts of judicial review judgments, such as those in strategic roles ... may be 
far removed from those whose practice is subject to the challenge.’  
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Part 4: Conclusion 
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9. Conclusion  
  
This thesis began by noting that the courts in South Africa have the potential to 
play an important role in securing the democratic and equal society envisaged by 
the Constitution. In order to make a contribution to the development of an 
understanding about the courts’ effect on government, this thesis set out to explore 
whether the courts have been successful in influencing administrative practices 
during the first 15 years of democracy by reference to their impact on 
environmental decisions. 
A number of substantive and methodological findings that emerged from 
the study are discussed in previous chapters. This chapter draws the findings 
together by providing an overview of the findings in relation to their implications 
for the initial hypotheses and methodological approaches, conclusions about the 
potential contribution of the study to the expansion of the analytical framework 
and possible areas for future research. 
 
9.1 Overarching findings on the state of impact 
As noted previously there are several challenges in assessing judicial impact on 
administrative decisions. Underlying many of these is the difference between the 
functions and priorities of the courts and the bureaucracy. The courts are required 
to interpret the law in accordance with particular rules and in relation to an 
individual dispute. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, must give effect to 
judgments in a very different environment – one which is characterised by the 
need to deliver services in the most efficient and practical manner is possible.  
The courts are rarely in a position to have a deep understanding of the 
practical implications of implementing a judgment. Ideally, to facilitate 
implementation and to maximise the realisation of judicial guidance, the courts 
and the bureaucracy should engage in critical but robust dialogue to address 
obstacles to implementation or any unintended consequences that may arise. In the 
absence of a forum for engaging in such dialogue the relationship between the 
courts and officials is a largely unidirectional one in which officials must wrestle 
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with these issues. There is accordingly a process that unfolds before an acceptance 
decision is reached during which officials manage the range of competing 
influences that affect the implementation of any particular judgment. 
In view of this, assessing impact in terms of compliance usually reveals 
little about prevailing attitudes to the courts. For example, a compliance approach 
may reveal incidents of out right defiance where the courts have failed to make an 
impact, but it does not lend itself to explorations of perfectly permissible efforts 
by officials to test judgments that they disagree with or their attempts to change 
the outcome of a judgment. This is important because a key purpose of judicial 
impact assessments ought to be determining measures to enhance impact and, by 
implication, conduct which increasingly reflects constitutional objectives. 
Achieving that purpose requires an understanding of the factors that facilitate or 
militate against impact. For that reason the approach in this thesis is that impact 
requires an assessment of the range of lawful, unlawful or other types of conduct 
that occur in response to judgments. By framing the enquiry in that way, it was 
possible to make findings, not only about the types of impact that occur, but also 
the reasons why those impacts occurred and the range of factors that contribute to, 
or detract from, the optimal implementation of judicial guidance.  
In Chapter 2 a range of possible impacts and responses was noted. The 
types of responses that were actually identified are indicated in bold in the table 
below.
 707
 
 
                                                 
707
 Certain impacts observed in other studies were not observed in this study. For example, 
Rosemary O’Leary ‘The impact of Federal Court decisions on the policies and administration 
of the US Environmental Protection Agency’ (1989) 41 Administrative Law Review 549 notes 
that the Environmental Protection Agency’s high levels of responsiveness to judgments that 
frequently result in a reallocation of financial resources, sometimes to the detriment of other 
programmes, and that judgments have resulted in increased power of legal staff with a 
corresponding diminution of power of scientific staff. 
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Table 8-8 Observed Responses to Judgments 
 
POSITIVE / LAWFUL 
RESPONSES 
NEGATIVE 
RESPONSES 
OTHER 
   
 Law reform 
 Policy change 
 Decision-making 
changes consistent with 
judicial requirements 
 Administrative 
responses 
 Institutional changes 
 Delayed responses ie a 
‘think twice’ approach 
is applied to subsequent 
decisions 
 Improvement in quality 
of decision-making 
 Appeals 
 Law reform 
 Policy change (or no 
policy change) 
 No change to decision-
making 
 Administrative 
responses 
 Institutional changes 
 Creative compliance 
ie there is formal 
compliance but the 
intent of the judgment 
is not given effect to 
 No change as a result 
of defiance 
 Misdirected 
response through 
misinterpretation 
 No change as a 
result of lack of 
knowledge 
 No change as a 
result of inertia 
 
 
Although no attempt was made to quantify the degree of impact it is 
possible to make general observations about the state of impact. For example, 
impact is currently limited to a minority of judgments and judgments not 
involving the departments have made no impression on officials. In addition, the 
absence of a systemised approach to the management of judgments has resulted in 
responses often being unevenly implemented amongst officials. Nevertheless, 
officials’ high levels of conscientiousness together with their efforts to respond to 
judgments that they know about in a lawful manner create a more positive picture 
and have resulted in several positive impacts. Furthermore, unlike Halliday’s 
observations, there is no significant suggestion that officials abuse their 
knowledge of judgments and the legal process to manipulate decisions. (This 
discrepancy may be attributable to the fact that officials could have less 
knowledge of judgments and less exposure to litigation than those interviewed by 
Halliday). 
It is therefore clear that the courts have had an impact on the public 
administration of the environment. There is also potential for this impact to be 
increased because of the presence of several enhancers. At the same time the 
preceding chapters indicate several barriers which undermine this potential. These 
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findings together with commentary on the methodology used to elicit them are 
discussed further below. 
 
9.1 Case law as an entry point for judicial impact assessment 
As noted in Chapter 2, the foundation for the study was based on a review of a 
broader range of civil judgments than many other studies. Again as noted, the 
departments in this study experience the courts in different ways. Certainly one 
way is through judicial review which, by its nature, is a defensive process for 
officials. A focus only on this type of litigation would have limited the 
consideration of judicial influence to the role of the courts as ‘big brother.’ Other 
types of litigation are often more proactive or neutral experiences. In compliance 
and enforcement matters initiated by government, for instance, the court’s role is 
more closely aligned with departmental functions and objectives.  
The expanded approach to case law had b nefits for the study as it resulted 
in the identification of additional factors that affect receptivity to judicial direction 
which arise out of different types of exposure to the courts. It also provided an 
opportunity to explore the extent to which the courts influence bureaucratic 
decision-making through judgments on disputes not involving environmental 
departments. By expanding the range of judgments it was therefore possible to 
obtain a more complete picture of both the courts’ contribution to the development 
of a new environmental jurisprudence and officials’ responses to judicial 
direction. A direct benefit of adopting this approach was that the examination of 
officials’ responses to judgments could be broadened to include impractical or 
questionable judgments. This provided an ability to examine the tenacity of legal 
conscientiousness in situations where officials experience the greatest tension 
between their legal conscientiousness and operational objectives. 
Perhaps more importantly, the expanded approach also revealed that not 
only constitutional and legislative contexts should be considered in judicial impact 
studies, but also contextual variances that exist within organisations. This need 
became clear as a result of the differences that were found between compliance 
and enforcement units and others. Apart from the nature of litigation which EMIs 
were exposed to, there were also institutional differences. The compliance and 
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enforcement units were more recently established and EMIs had less experience in 
executing their function than officials who processed EIA applications. In 
addition, legal expertise was more focused and accessible because lawyers were 
located in the compliance and enforcement unit in two of the three departments.  
These factors, in combination with the nature of the judgments, have 
contributed to certain disparities in responses to the courts between EMIs and 
officials that process applications. For example, in Chapter 8 it was noted that 
EMIs were more likely to view litigation experiences positively than those 
involved only in judicial review matters. Differences were also detected in 
responses to adverse judgments which focused on decisions on EIA applications 
and questionable judgments which focused on compliance and enforcement issues. 
The latter suggests that the increased familiarity with the EIA function has 
resulted in some officials’ attitudes becoming less flexible to adverse or onerous 
judgments. This, together with the comments by other officials in both the EIA 
and compliance and enforcement components that the courts have a valuable role 
to play in providing clarity on the new requirements of public administration, 
lends support for the first hypothesis that where the underlying legislative 
requirements for public administration change from an undemocratic approach to 
a rights-based approach the potential for the judiciary to have an impact is high 
because approaches to the new requirements of public administration have not yet 
calcified. 
The expanded approach to case law also provided a platform for assessing 
the extent to which the conduct of the courts influences the realisation of impact. 
The findings show that several factors relating to the way in which the courts 
formulate judgments and the content of the judgments act as barriers or enhancers 
to impact. These factors have a direct bearing on both knowledge and legal 
conscientiousness. In Chapter 7, for example, it was noted that clearly and 
accessibly written judgments can be more readily and accurately understood by 
officials. Such judgments have a greater potential to penetrate administrative 
practices, thereby enhancing impact. In practice, however, language usage in the 
majority of judgments presents an obstacle for many officials and is a significant 
barrier to the acquisition of knowledge.  
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By contrast to the form of a judgment, the substance of a judgment can be 
an enhancer where it leads to uniform approaches to decision-making, improved 
quality of decision-making and increased confidence. However in Chapter 8 it was 
noted that different types of judgments also affect the effort which is required to 
reach an acceptance decision. For example, questionable judgments create 
confusion. Apart from retarding the realisation of the Constitution’s ambitions 
regarding the environmental right, where such judgments are appealed, the courts’ 
initial conduct has an unintended consequence of delaying sustained impact 
because a period of uncertainty occurs during which officials’ resources are 
directed at obtaining certainty rather than implementation of the judgment.  
Where the courts’ conduct acts as a barrier to knowledge or legal 
conscientiousness there are inherent difficulties in overcoming such barriers. As 
discussed above, the unidirectional process in which the court articulates a 
decision that must be implemented by officials means that the process lacks a 
feedback mechanism in which the potential for judgments to result in impact is 
continually increased through greater dialogues with and awareness amongst 
judges of the implications of previous judgments.  
 
9.2 Relevance of contextual setting 
Halliday believes that the contextual setting within which a judicial impact study 
takes place may influence the degree to which different factors affect impact.
708
 
By adopting his alternate approach it was possible to respond to Halliday’s 
challenge regarding the need to examine the relevance of context to the 
applicability of his hypotheses. 
Although different contextual issues are noted throughout the study, four 
significant differences were noted at the outset. The first two arise from South 
Africa’s constitutional and economic situation. In Chapter 3 it was explained that 
prior to 1994, the subordination of the common law to parliamentary supremacy 
was a significant obstacle to the courts’ ability to develop a comprehensive 
approach to administrative justice based on democratic principles. The shift in 
authority to constitutional supremacy after 1993 reshaped the scope for judicial 
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intervention and enabled the courts to have a more extensive impact on 
bureaucratic behaviour. In particular the rights-based approach has affected the 
foundation for, and purpose of, judicial adjudication. The inclusion of the right to 
administrative justice, as amplified by PAJA, narrows the previous divide between 
judicial review and merits review.  
The inclusion of other rights, such as those relating to equality, the 
environment, water and housing, require both the courts and government decision-
makers to pay attention to South Africa’s socio-economic realities. The 
inequalities that are present in the country to a much greater extent than in 
developed countries have important implications for environmental decisions. 
This is because, as discussed in Chapter 3, the poor experience disproportionately 
more environmental hardships than others and they are highly dependent on the 
state to alleviate their hardship.  
The ability of the courts to oversee government decisions is one way in 
which the interests of the poor can be safeguarded. In particular the Constitution 
empowers the courts to contribute to the realisation of a more just society by 
authorising them to adjudicate on whether government policies, programmes and 
decisions are adequate to meet the requirements of the constitutional rights. It 
accordingly requires them to consider the redress of social inequities in their 
adjudication of environmental disputes. In this type of constitutional context, the 
function of the judiciary assumes a pronounced public interest dimension and 
supports a more interventionist judiciary.  
Apart from the constitutional and economic setting, the type of decisions 
considered in this study also differs from others. The majority of studies 
conducted in respect of the influence of judicial review have focused on the 
courts’ impact on routine decision-making. These decisions have two important 
characteristics. Firstly, they appear to take place within a clearly defined area of 
law with generally greater certainty of the criteria involved in decision-making. 
Secondly, the effects of routine decisions are usually localised to the individual 
who is the subject of the decision.  
It is noted in Chapter 6 that these two characteristics are not present to the 
same extent in environmental decisions. Environmental decisions are regarded as 
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being non-routine for the purposes of this thesis because they relate to an 
extremely complex area of both law and decision-making. In this regard, 
environmental decisions are concerned with issues that relate to global problems. 
The principle of sustainable development which has been adopted internationally 
to manage environmental concerns presents a challenge to traditional legislative 
approaches. These challenges stem from the fact that new ways have to be found 
to provide a regulatory basis for marrying socio-economic concerns with 
biophysical ones; coping with uncertainty and then within a long-term perspective; 
preventing harm as opposed to merely redressing it; and taking account of the 
transboundary causes and effects of environmental degradation.
709
 In 
consequence, much of the environmental legislation in South Africa has been 
drafted in general terms which places a considerable responsibility on officials to 
give practical effect to legislative objectives in their decisions.  
The effects of these decisions extend far beyond the interests of the 
individuals directly subject to a decision. They have implications for a wide range 
of people and aspects of the environment, sometimes extending across political 
boundaries. If climate change is considered as one example, it is clear that the 
problem has not emerged as a result of one or two major incidents but through an 
accumulation of thousands of activities – many of which have been authorised by 
officials. Unlike housing and mental health decisions, the primary issues to be 
considered in environmental decisions are therefore external ones ie the interests 
of the individual who is subject to the decision should only prevail if they do not 
conflict with the need for sustainable development. In addition, whereas most 
routine decisions have a reasonably limited duration, environmental decisions 
involve extended time horizons because the long term impacts and needs of future 
generations must be considered.  
The fourth contextual difference relates to the transformation of 
environmental governance since 1994. This transformation has resulted in 
functional and institutional changes as well as new and substantially different 
approaches to legislation. In consequence many officials have had to adapt to new 
institutional structures and internal processes. They have also had to implement 
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new functions, or different approaches to existing functions, without the requisite 
experience and without the benefit of decision support tools such as government 
databases of baseline environmental information. The latter is particularly 
significant if one bears in mind that the nature of environmental decisions requires 
officials to take a broad range of environmental impacts and contexts into 
consideration. The enormity of the change has created challenges for officials 
which are unlikely to be experienced to the same extent in developed countries. 
The differences in contextual setting had a significant bearing on the 
findings and yielded some of the most significant barriers to judicial impact that 
were identified in the study. For example, the case analysis revealed that the 
courts’ lack of familiarity with environmental rights and issues has, in some 
instances, contributed negatively to the development of an environmental 
jurisprudence where traditional rather than rights-based approaches have been 
applied. With regard to the nature of the decision, it is suggested in Chapter 6 that 
a number of implications flow from the differences between routine and non-
routine decision-making. Firstly, it may be that the number and diversity of issues 
involved in environmental decisions renders such decisions less susceptible to 
widespread judicial influence than routine decisions. In this regard, the 
requirement that information be interpreted, as discussed in Chapter 7, assumes 
greater relevance in the context of environmental decisions because officials are 
required to extrapolate the legal guidance contained in a judgment and apply it to 
facts that are seldom similar to those in the judgment. In practice a tendency was 
noted – particularly amongst junior officials – to retain information on the facts of 
a judgment but not the principles involved.  
Secondly, the amount of information involved in environmental decisions 
increases the possibility of the requirements of judgments to be overlooked as a 
result of officials experiencing ‘information overload’. Thirdly, in developing 
countries there is sometimes a tension between environmental decisions and other 
political priorities. The data collected in this study was insufficient to demonstrate 
conclusively that competing political priorities limit the consideration of 
judgments in decision-making. However in some contexts this may be a relevant 
consideration which merits further research. Fourthly, and conversely, the nature 
of the decision can also constitute an enhancer to impact. As noted in Chapter 6, 
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many officials experience discomfort in making decisions in an environment of 
uncertainty and the degree of uncertainty is particularly high in the environmental 
departments. These officials therefore welcome the clarity which can be provided 
by the courts.  
The barriers presented by the nature of environmental decisions are also 
affected by other consequences of the transformational process. For instance low 
levels of capacity and high staff turnover exacerbate the officials’ discomfort with 
the uncertainty that surrounds decision-making. Institutional changes too have had 
implications for impact. The enormous task of transforming the public 
administration to accommodate all aspects of the expanded environmental 
function has resulted in a prioritisation of activities. In consequence, the 
departments have not instituted a formalised system for disseminating information 
on judgments, making organisational acceptance decisions or monitoring the 
implementation of judgments. This has had consequences for the extent to which 
officials have knowledge of judgments. It also means that in many instances 
impact is reflected at an individual level rather than at an organisational level or, 
alternatively, that responses to judgments are not consistently applied within or 
across the departments. An example of this situation was pointed out in Chapter 8 
where senior managers had accepted the need to implement a judgment which was 
not reflected in responses by their juniors. The potential of the courts to make a 
widespread contribution to uniformity of decision-making has therefore been 
undermined by the current lack of an appropriate institutional system. 
These findings support the fourth hypothesis ie that there is a greater 
potential for judicial impact on public administration where an organisation has 
formal or coherent mechanisms for analysing judgments, determining responses to 
judgments and disseminating information on judgments than where there is not an 
organisational approach which is consistently applied and the reception of 
judgments is left to the discretion of individual officials. A clear limitation of the 
study, however, is that it was only possible to test the hypothesis from a negative 
perspective. Responses to the value of the briefing notes which were distributed in 
the Gauteng department provide some indication that a positive perspective would 
also confirm the hypothesis. However little is known about the extent to which the 
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introduction of coherent systems has an impact and there may accordingly be 
benefits in exploring this aspect in future research. 
Despite these findings, the context of change has not only resulted in 
negative implications for judicial impact. A positive consequence of the situation 
is that many officials, including senior managers, accept both that there is a lack of 
institutional experience in administering new approaches and that the need for 
rapid change has often placed constraints on the level of attention that has been 
afforded to certain activities. They accordingly view legislation and decision-
making as part of an environmental management process that is still evolving and 
are open to judgments providing an opportunity for reflection and learning. This 
attitude, together with the point made above that officials welcome the 
contribution that the courts can make to reducing the uncertainty involved in 
decision-making, add further support for the first hypothesis that the court has a 
greater impact where there is a change in the legislative regime. At the same time 
it is noted that other factors, such as the non-routine nature of environmental 
decisions and lack of formal mechanisms militate against the opportunities 
presented by transformation.  
 
9.3 Knowledge 
The second hypothesis of the study was that in order for the courts to have an 
impact on environmental decision-making it is necessary for decision-makers to 
have knowledge of the full range of environmental judgments and trends in 
judicial approaches and the implications of judgments for non-routine decision-
making. The relevance of the hypothesis stems from the fact that, unlike many 
professions where knowledge of the law is an ancillary requirement, it is of 
primary importance for government decision-makers because it prescribes both 
the activities that they must perform and the extent of their decision-making 
powers when undertaking such activities. The law, including case law, essentially 
provides both terms of reference and a job description without which officials 
cannot correctly discharge their duties.  
The seemingly self-evident nature of this observation creates a danger of its 
significance being overlooked. Halliday is amongst a minority of researchers who 
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have paid detailed attention to the implications of knowledge. His analysis focuses 
on two enquiries. First he explores two barriers to the reception of knowledge ie 
the ‘containment’ of legal knowledge and relationships with legal advisors. 
Second, he discusses the legal competence of officials to interpret judgments. 
The two elements discussed by Halliday point to the fact that there are 
different dimensions to knowledge enquiries. On the one hand they may relate to 
knowledge content and whether there is sufficient knowledge amongst officials to 
provide a basis for judicial impact. On the other, they may seek to understand the 
process of acquiring knowledge so that barriers to, or enhancers for, the reception 
of information can be identified. In this thesis both were considered to be 
important and the two enquires were combined by linking specific criteria and 
questions to the elements of a basic communication model. It was therefore 
possible to test the extent of knowledge as well as the relationship between 
knowledge and the context within which information and knowledge are 
generated.  
Conceptualising knowledge as a communication process proved to be a 
useful method for analysis. For the purposes of the knowledge enquiry it provided 
a systematic way of looking for barriers and enhancers. In consequence it revealed 
several factors that enhance or impede knowledge formation, some of which may 
have been overlooked by a more ad hoc approach. The most significant barriers 
related to language, the absence of a formal system for receiving and 
disseminating information on judgments (discussed above) and a limited ability to 
interpret the implications of judgments for future decision-making by junior 
officials. Factors that enhance knowledge included officials’ desire to obtain 
information on judgments. 
The use of the communication process as an analytical tool also provided a 
bridge to other aspects of the study. The identification of the barriers and 
enhancers, together with the ability to locate them in the institutional context, 
provided an alert that certain issues had potential relevance beyond the knowledge 
enquiry and could also be applicable to legal conscientiousness and the 
examination of institutional factors. Four of these in fact resurfaced as being 
relevant at subsequent points in the study namely the courts’ own influence on 
impact; the implications of an absence of feedback mechanisms for sustainable 
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and consistent responses; the consequences of time-pressurised environments and 
the limitations of time bound research for judicial impact studies. This finding is 
important because it shows that certain barriers exert a multidirectional pressure 
on other factors. Understanding the significance of a barrier in these instances 
accordingly often requires an iterative approach to the research.  
Returning to the hypothesis, Chapter 7 highlighted areas where there was 
both an absence of knowledge and a presence of knowledge.  The low awareness 
of the Muckleneuk judgment suggests support for the hypothesis because, for 
many officials, the guidance provided in that judgment could have been used to 
support their existing views and to offset their objections to the Earthlife 
judgment. In other words the judgment had a high likelihood of creating an impact 
which, in the absence of knowledge about it, did not materialise. Support for the 
hypothesis is also suggested in Chapter 8 in which it is demonstrated that in 
instances where there is a high awareness of a judgment some form of response 
follows. For example, the FRA CC judgment, which was the most recognised of 
all the judgments, elicited much discussion from officials regarding their views 
and responses to the judgment.  
Whilst there is much to support the hypothesis that knowledge is a 
requirement for judicial impact, the findings also highlight several reasons why 
caution should be exercised in drawing overly simplistic conclusions. For one, 
there are inherent difficulties in determining the presence of indirect knowledge. 
The extent to which indirect knowledge is relevant will vary in different 
circumstances. For example, if the law is changed to reflect the requirements of 
the court, it will probably not be necessary for most officials to have direct 
knowledge about the source which triggered the law reform.  
For another, an example of the absence of knowledge being a possible 
benefit was noted. During the course of the study a third element related to the 
hypothesis was added, namely that in order to be able to contextualise the 
information contained in judgments, officials require specific background 
knowledge of legal processes and concepts. It was observed in Chapter 7 that 
officials’ detailed knowledge of the rules of precedent was low. Ironically, this 
limitation of knowledge may have a positive effect on impact because officials 
attribute more authority to the courts than may be the case in a particular situation 
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and they will consequently feel compelled to give effect to judgments that they are 
strictly not required to.  
The thesis also suggests that there may be justification for modifying 
Halliday’s conclusion that all officials exercising discretion in a decision must 
have a requisite legal knowledge in so far as direct knowledge of judgments is 
concerned. One reason for this is explained in the discussion on indirect 
knowledge above. Another relates to the nature of the discretion that is exercised. 
For example, a junior EMI whose input to a decision-making process is limited to 
initiating an enforcement action and sharing their inspection observations in 
respect of the transgression may not require an expansive knowledge of case law. 
In such instances it may be sufficient that knowledge is located at a senior 
management or institutional level.  
In addition, the contextual setting of this study shows that whilst Halliday’s 
hypothesis may be optimal, it may unfortunately not always be practical for all 
officials to have direct knowledge of judgments. Low levels of capacity and high 
staff turnover, particularly at junior levels, will inevitably have a negative effect 
on the extent to which interventions aimed at providing knowledge on a broad 
range of judgments are successful. In such circumstances alternative mechanisms, 
such as incorporating judicial requirements in decision-making templates and 
guidelines, which embed the requirements of judgments in the law or the decision-
making system may prove to be more effective in securing impact. There are of 
course limitations to adopting alternative mechanisms in the form of soft law. For 
example, Sossin identifies an important difficulty which relates to the fact that 
whereas judgments are binding, guidelines generally are not.
710
 Nevertheless, soft 
law instruments may facilitate enhanced and more consistent impact and merit 
further consideration in combination with other approaches as a means of moving 
towards improved impact.  
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9.4 Legal conscientiousness 
The third hypothesis of the study was that in order for the courts to have an impact 
on environmental decision-making, decision-makers must - in addition to having 
knowledge of judgments - be legally conscientious with regard to their respect for 
the role and status of the courts.  
The limitations of adopting only a positivist or an interpretivist approach 
become particularly apparent when testing a hypothesis of this nature. Unlike 
knowledge, the subjective nature of legal conscientiousness makes it more 
difficult to isolate the relative contribution of conscientiousness to an acceptance 
decision from other factors. In this thesis the use of a court-centred approach was 
a useful entry point for identifying focus areas where impact could be anticipated 
and whether there was a relationship between existing levels of legal 
conscientiousness and receptivity to judicial direction. However a bottom-up 
approach was required to elicit reasons for actual responses to judgments. In this 
regard, the use of open-ended questions me nt that responses were not constrained 
and officials were encouraged to share their views on any issues which they 
believed to be relevant to the enquiry. When the responses were analysed 
collectively this approach contributed substantially to obtaining a broader 
understanding not only of legal conscientiousness but also of the range of factors 
that act in combination to determine responses to judgments. 
The findings set out in Chapter 8 support the third hypothesis as they show 
that high levels of conscientiousness have resulted in officials being receptive to 
the courts’ authority and that they strive to respond to judicial requirements in a 
lawful manner. The effect of the high levels of conscientiousness was in fact such 
that the fifth hypothesis requires rewording. The fifth hypothesis was that judicial 
control is undermined where decision-makers perceive judgments to be 
impractical. The discussion of impractical and questionable judgments reveals that 
officials have given effect to such judgments pending their efforts to clarify the 
courts’ message. The fact that these judgments do not result in sustained changes 
to administrative approaches points more to the inadequacies of the courts’ 
message than to reactionary conduct by officials. The emphasis of the hypothesis 
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should therefore be focused on the courts’ conduct rather than on the perceptions 
of officials. 
Nevertheless whilst legal conscientiousness features strongly in the 
acceptance decision it is also clear that the particular combination of factors that 
are present in a specific acceptance decision, in addition to conscientiousness, 
affect the extent of influence which conscientiouness exerts. In this regard, 
Halliday notes that ‘[t]here is much in the business of routine decision-making 
that prevails against legal conscientiousness’.711 His analysis considers a range of 
competing norms which undermine the affect of legal conscientiousness. The 
findings in this thesis support Halliday.  
They also shed some light on the way that different factors feature in the 
formulation of an acceptance decision. The relevance of some factors is that they 
must be present in order for legal conscientiousness to take root. In other words 
these factors operate as pre-existing conditions. The clearest example of this is the 
interrelationship between knowledge and legal conscientiousness.  The discussion 
on responses to judgments in Chapter 8 focuses on judgments which officials 
knew about. Given the moderate to low levels of knowledge noted in Chapter 7, it 
was not possible to examine responses to several issues that emerged from the 
case analysis. This shows that whilst legal conscientiousness has an important 
bearing on impact, its potential contribution to enhancing judicial impact has been 
diluted by the existing levels of knowledge. 
Other factors that are discussed in Chapters 6 and 8 arise simultaneously 
with legal conscientiousness during the process of arriving at an acceptance 
decision. In these instances the interplay between the different factors and legal 
conscientiousness resembles a pushmi-pullyu dynamic in which the various 
factors exert competing pressures on the acceptance decision process at the same 
time. The extent to which the different factors exert pressure has a significant 
influence on the type of impact that manifests. Attempts to understand this 
dynamic further are complicated by the fact that the combination of factors that 
are present in any particular acceptance decision varies.   
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Furthermore it is also noted that in some circumstances a factor can assume 
the role of both enhancer and barrier. For instance, as indicated earlier, the context 
of change that has characterised environmental decision-making since 1994 has 
resulted in a greater receptivity to judicial guidance by many officials. However it 
also increases defensiveness amongst officials who lack confidence or who 
experience great discomfort with the uncertainty that has followed law reform.  
Where a factor can be an enhancer and barrier, it is likely that the effects of 
leadership are more significant than is suggested by the previous chapters.
712
 
During the interviews officials’ explanations for their responses often included 
references to their manager’s conduct and leadership (or lack thereof). It was not 
possible to explore this issue in the depth required to make meaningful 
comparisons about the influence of leadership without compromising the 
confidentiality of the officials, particularly because many comments were made 
off the record.  
However, the point can be illustrated by reference to one example in which 
a senior manager stood out as being highly respected. That manager’s approach 
appears to be partly responsible for a general culture of respect and ‘easy going’ 
attitude amongst officials who rep rted directly to them, despite substantial 
diversity in the profile of the subordinates. These officials also displayed a notably 
undefensive acceptance of judgments which were adverse to the department.  This 
example together with less complimentary comments about other managers 
intuitively suggests that, when a bureaucracy is relatively immature, leadership 
style plays a significant role in influencing the attitudes of officials and that this 
may be an important factor in assessing impact. 
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9.5 Mapping barriers and enhancers of impact – implications 
for the analytical framework 
So far the discussion in this chapter has highlighted findings regarding whether 
the courts have had an impact on environmental decision-making and why, in 
some situations, they have or have not had an impact. From a substantive 
perspective, these findings contribute to the development of an understanding 
about the courts’ influence on decision-making and the broader relationship 
between the courts and the bureaucracy. In addition, the statistical and qualitative 
analysis of trends and norms that have emerged from environmental judgments 
sheds new light on the judicial development of an environmental jurisprudence. It 
shows both that the courts have had limited opportunity to develop that 
jurisprudence and that they sometimes experience challenges in giving effect to 
the rights-based approach in environmental matters.  
From a methodological perspective, the findings confirm the utility of 
Halliday’s analytical framework in different contexts, particularly insofar as the 
role of knowledge and legal conscientiousness are concerned. They also – 
1.  demonstrate that the inclusion of different types of judgments have clear 
benefits for understanding the full range of responses that occur in varied 
circumstances;  
2.  reveal that non-routine decision-making in a developing country that has 
recently transformed its constitutional approach plays a pivotal role in the 
eventuation of impact; and  
 3. show that evaluating the courts’ transformational potential to bring the 
Constitution to life in a way that has a positive effect on peoples’ lives 
requires scrutiny of the courts’ conduct as well as the employment of a 
methodology which is capable of identifying the barriers and enhancers that 
affect acceptance decisions. 
In combination, these findings were used as a platform for further 
reflection on underlying methodological approaches to judicial impact research. In 
this regard, whilst it is generally accepted that factors which act as barriers or 
enhancers to impact operate in combination and are interrelated, what emerges 
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from this thesis is that there are differences in the way they operate. This insight 
provides a basis for adding a new dimension to the analytical framework. 
If attention is paid to the way in which various factors operate, it is possible 
to divide them into one of two categories, namely conditions or variables, by 
making a distinction between factors that are necessary for impact to occur and 
factors which affect the degree of impact. Factors falling in the category of 
conditions constitute the minimum criteria that are required to secure widespread 
and consistent impact across an organisation. In other words, without the presence 
of these factors there can be no impact at all. The findings of this study show that 
four factors fall within this category ie knowledge (k), legal conscientiousness 
(lc), an acceptance decision (ad) which is preferably made at an organisational 
level and competence (c) on the part of officials responsible for implementing the 
acceptance decision. The relationship of these factors with impact (i) can be 
expressed as the following formula - 
 
i = k + lc + ad + c 
 
The formula provides a way of examining whether there is impact. 
However, it will not yield information regarding the reasons for the state of impact 
because a range of other relevant internal and external barriers or enhancers will 
not be analysed. In order to obtain this information cognisance must be taken of 
the presence of such barriers or enhancers. These barriers or enhancers can be 
categorised as variables (v) because they differ from conditions in two ways. 
Firstly, whereas all the conditions must be present in order for impact to 
eventuate, the types of variables that occur are not consistent and cannot be 
predetermined. They arise as a result of the particular dynamics in a situation and 
will vary between studies. For example, time pressure and the nature of the 
decision may be relevant in one situation and not in another. Secondly, variables 
operate indirectly by exerting pressure on the conditions. They accordingly affect 
the degree of impact which eventuates as opposed to whether it eventuates. In 
order to factor in the effect of variables on impact, the formula must be expanded 
as follows –  
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i = (k + lc + ad + c) - v  
 
Conceptualising barriers as falling within different categories enables 
judicial impact studies to be structured around a two-stage enquiry. In the first 
stage the focus is on examining the presence of conditions by reference to the 
criteria that are associated with each condition. In the second stage the focus is 
shifted to identifying the occurrence of variables and the extent to which they 
undermine or enhance the manifestation of the conditions.  
A benefit of adopting a two-stage enquiry is that it will facilitate a more 
nuanced understanding of the dynamics involved in impact because the 
researcher’s attention can be appropriately focused on the function of the different 
types of factors. The distinction may have particular relevance for research which 
aims to identify methods for enhancing impact as the approach to conditions and 
variables will differ. Whereas the emphasis in respect of conditions will be on 
maximising their presence, the focal point for determining approaches to variables 
will most often be on minimising their influence.  
 
9.6 Limitations of the study 
The discussion above would not be complete without some commentary on the 
limitations of this thesis. Any researcher must make choices about the boundaries 
of the study. These choices inevitably result in limitations or signal caveats 
regarding the findings of the study. In this thesis at least two limitations are be 
noted. 
First, this thesis presents static findings in respect of a context that is 
extremely dynamic. This point has been alluded to in the preceding chapters. As 
noted in Chapter 7, some of the departmental initiatives regarding the 
dissemination of information on judgments may have a positive influence on 
levels of knowledge in the short to medium term. In Chapter 8 it is pointed out 
that legitimacy has a temporal dimension which results in fluctuations of 
legitimacy levels. In addition, the discussion in Chapter 8 refers to Bumin’s 
analysis of the developmental process of post communist constitutional courts in 
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which it is shown that as the courts consolidated institutionally they had a greater 
impact. The effect of institutional development is also relevant to the 
environmental departments considered in this thesis as the relative importance that 
is attached to certain of the findings set out in Chapter 6 may differ if 
circumstances change in the future. For example, since competence and staff 
turnover are identified as significant barriers to the reception of judgments, there 
is a potential for greater impact if these issues are addressed.   
The substantive findings of the study are therefore only applicable with any 
certainty to the study period. Few researchers have had the opportunity to consider 
the implications of this aspect in detail and there may be benefit in exploring it 
further in future studies.  
A second limitation of the study relates to the interviewee selection criteria. 
The requirement that interviewees have at least two years experience in an 
environmental department constituted a constraint to getting a consistently 
representative selection of interviewees from different ranks across the three 
departments. This constraint impeded the ability to undertake a comparative 
analysis of the extent to which responses by officials varied between the 
departments. Such an analysis may have provided additional information about 
how different factors influence acceptance decisions. 
 
9.7 Future research 
The scope of this thesis is modest and it has not touched on many areas which 
require further exploration. For example, it has been stressed that the factors 
which were selected for consideration were limited and that others could have 
been added. There are still many context-specific factors that we know little about. 
For instance, in South Africa, research undertaken by Ndletyana and 
Kamwangamalu provide an indication that the concept of ubuntu may be one 
which has much to offer for our understanding of conscientiousness and responses 
to judgments.
713
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 Dorothy Ndletyana ‘The impact of culture on team learning in a South African context’ 
(2003) 5 1 Advances in Developing Human Resources 84 and Nkonko M Kamwangamalu 
‘Ubuntu in South Africa: a sociolinguistic perspective to a pan-African concept’ (1999) 13 2 
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Without detracting from the importance of studying these aspects, a key 
area where further research is urgently required is how judicial impact studies can 
be advanced so that they themselves make a contribution to facilitating impact. To 
date judicial impact studies have been primarily concerned with determining 
whether courts generate an impact. Although the implication of these studies is 
that certain barriers exist to the optimal reception of judicial direction, they do not 
explore what is required to remove such barriers in any detail. This is an important 
gap because, in the absence of providing decision-makers with an understanding 
of how to address existing deficiencies, the insights which are offered by existing 
research are unlikely to meaningfully advance the impact of the courts or the 
contribute to the strengthening of democratic architectures.  
There is therefore a need to expand the research agenda beyond an 
assessment phase to an implementation phase which includes empirical 
investigations of methods for enhancing impact. The outcome of such research 
could potentially make a significant and pragmatic contribution to the enhancing 
the courts’ influence on bureaucratic decision-making because, as Zander and 
Zander point out in their study of transformational phenomena  - 
Transformation happens less by arguing cogently for something new 
than by generating active, ongoing practices that shift a culture’s 
experience of the basis for reality.
714
 
It may not be pos ible to take up this suggestion in impact studies that aim 
to understand the contribution of the courts to a particular area of policy change 
because such studies are issue-based and relate to atypical situations. Their 
findings are therefore often not capable of replication. However, the proposal is 
viable for impact studies that have an underlying purpose of understanding the 
efficacy of administrative law because the interest of the researcher is focused, not 
so much on the substantive issues emerging from judgments, but on the efficacy of 
the courts as an accountability mechanism. 
Although there is no definitive model for impact studies there is arguably 
sufficient existing research to begin designing and testing practical interventions. 
                                                                                                                                            
Critical Arts: A South-North Journal of Cultural & Media Studies 24.  Ndletyana at 90 
explains ‘ubuntu’ as follows – 
... a person is a person because of other people. ... The key values of Ubuntu are 
group solidarity, conformity, compassion, human dignity, and collective unity. 
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In some instances departments themselves may initiate interventions which can be 
used as a basis for study. For example, the national department in South Africa has 
recently implemented certain measures aimed at improving knowledge. In 2010 it 
published a benchbook on environmental crimes as part of an ongoing programme 
to build capacity amongst magistrates which includes a discussion on 
judgments.
715
 It has also recommenced the practice of drafting briefing notes on 
judgments which are distributed through Working Group IV. Documents such as 
these provide an opportunity for researchers to investigate the extent to which they 
contribute to improving knowledge. 
Admittedly in instances where departments have not initiated such steps 
there are several obstacles which face the researcher. Foremost among these is that 
researchers will require access to, and the co-operation of, the department in 
question. In addition some barriers lend themselves to such research more than 
others. For example, there is a large body of literature on knowledge management 
and communication that can be drawn on to identify appropriate means for 
addressing knowledge deficiencies. However, where factors such as political 
pressure are identified as significant barriers it will usually be difficult for the 
researcher to have any control over the implementation of suggested solutions.  
A further aspect that complicates both existing and future approaches to 
judicial impact studies is the multidisciplinary aspect which is inherent in 
investigations involving human and organisational behaviour. The findings in this 
thesis support others which stress the importance of considering a range of factors 
as well as the interrelationships between them. In practice this presents a 
significant challenge for individual researchers because no matter which core 
expertise a researcher has, others will be required. This thesis, for example, draws 
on literature from the disciplines of communications, knowledge management, 
management, law, psychology and political science. Multidisciplinary teams may 
therefore be of great value in future research.  
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Appendix I: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION  
 
The first set of questions aims to collect background information on your 
occupational information. 
 
1. In which department do you work? 
 
National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism  
Gauteng Provincial Department of Agriculture, Conservation 
and Environment 
 
Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Economic Affairs, 
Environment and Tourism 
 
 
 
2. What is your current post? ____________________________ 
 
EO PEO AD DD D CD DG/HOD Other (specify) 
        
 
 
3. What year did you start working in your current post? _______________ 
 
4. What year did you start working in the department? _________________ 
 
5. Did you previously work for another environmental government department?  
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
 
IF NO, SKIP QUESTIONS 6 – 10. 
 
 
6. IF YES, in which department did you work? 
 
National Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism  
Eastern Cape Provincial Department of Environment  
Free State Provincial Department of Environment  
Gauteng Provincial Department of Environment  
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Environment  
Limpopo Provincial Department of Environment  
Mumpalanga Provincial Department of Environment  
Northern Cape Provincial Department of Environment  
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North West Provincial Department of Environment  
Western Cape Provincial Department of Environment  
Other (please specify)  
 
 
7. What was your post in that department?  
 
EO PEO AD DD D CD DG/HOD Other (specify) 
        
 
8. What period were you employed by the department? _______________ 
 
9. Have you worked for any another environmental government departments?  
 
10. IF YES - 
a. Which department? ______________________________________ 
b. What period were you employed by the department? ___________ 
 
 
SECTION 2: POLICY PREFERENCES 
 
The next set of question aims to understand officials’ priorities.  
 
11. Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the 
environment and economic growth. Which one of them comes closer to 
your point of view? 
a. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes 
slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. __________________ 
b. Economic growth and creating jobs should be given the top priority, 
even if the environment suffers to some extent. _________________ 
c. Other answer (only if volunteered) 
___________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
12. How important do you think each of the following issues is in South 
Africa – very important, important, not very important or not important at 
all? 
 
 Very 
important 
Important Not very 
important 
Not 
important 
at all 
a. Housing for poor 
people 
    
b. Loss of biodiversity     
c. Air quality     
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d. Increasing electricity 
supply by building 
coal-fired power 
stations 
    
e. Water quality     
f. Managing the trade 
in endangered 
wildlife 
    
g. Waste management     
 
 
SECTION 3: ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACHES 
 
The next set of question aims to understand the approaches which officials in 
environmental departments adopt to environmental decisions. 
Please indicate your personal views in deciding the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each comment. Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, strongly disagree or don’t you know? 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
13. We should rather focus 
on managing 
environmental impacts 
than saying ‘no’ to an 
application for 
environmental 
authorisation. 
      
14. In EIA applications, 
officials should assess 
all impacts on the 
environment, such as 
water, even if another 
department also has 
control over that issue. 
      
15. The impact of a new 
development on 
existing competitors is 
not an environmental 
issue. 
      
16. The public have a right 
to participate in 
environmental 
applications and this 
should be supported, 
even if it delays 
finalizing an 
application. 
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17. Environmental 
departments do not 
need to consider an 
issue that has already 
been considered by 
another department (Eg 
desirability of a 
development in terms 
of townplanning 
legislation). 
      
18. All people are entitled 
to participate in 
environmental 
applications, even if 
they have vested 
interests. 
      
19. Landowner’s rights to 
develop a property 
should be limited if it is 
necessary to protect the 
environment.  
      
20. Protection of the 
environment is not so 
important as giving 
people housing. 
      
21. Procedural 
requirements such as 
giving reasons and 
public participation 
contribute to 
administrative delays 
without adding value. 
      
22. Environmental 
decisions must consider 
the implications of that 
decision for future 
generations.  
      
23. Officials are required to 
spend too much time 
on procedural matters 
which could be better 
spent protecting the 
environment. 
      
 
24. Where two or more constitutional rights are raised in an environmental 
application, for example the right to housing or property and the environment, 
what rules do you apply to manage this?  
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_________________________________________ 
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SECTION 4: PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS 
 
In this section, I am interested in what people feel about judges and the role of 
the courts. The statements below reflect comments that some people might make 
about the courts. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
comment. Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly 
disagree or don’t you know? 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
25. Judges do not know 
enough about 
environmental policy and 
issues to make good 
judgments. 
      
26. Because judges are 
highly independent they 
make fair decisions. 
      
27. Judges make findings on 
procedural issues and 
avoid making findings on 
substantive 
environmental issues. 
      
28. Judges’ decisions are 
consistent in 
environmental cases that 
are similar. 
      
29. Judges do not consider 
the implications of their 
decisions on 
government’s 
administrative load. 
      
30. Government experts 
should be allowed to get 
on with their work 
without being micro 
managed by the courts. 
      
31. We need judges to help 
us clarify the meaning 
and requirements of 
legislation.  
      
32. Judges play a useful role 
in explaining the conduct 
that is required of 
government officials. 
      
33. We need the courts to 
make sure that 
government does not 
abuse its powers. 
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34. The outcome of a court 
case is depends a lot on 
which judge is making 
the decision. 
      
35. Because NGOs have 
procedural rights and do 
not always have to pay 
costs if they loose a case, 
it is too easy for them to 
bring a case to court.  
      
36. Courts allow business 
and industry to abuse 
environmental legislation 
to fight commercial 
battles. 
      
37. Courts are generally 
sympathetic to cases 
which government brings 
to enforce compliance. 
      
 
 
38. How much confidence do you have in the following institutions or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to have an opinion? 
 
 A great 
deal 
Somewhat Only a 
little 
Hardly 
any 
Don’t 
know 
enough 
President      
Parliament      
SAPS      
Supreme Court of 
Appeal 
     
Human Rights 
Commission 
     
Constitutional Court      
National environmental 
department (DEAT) 
     
Provincial environmental 
departments (as a whole, 
not just your department) 
     
Local government      
High Courts      
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SECTION 5: AWARENESS AND LEGITIMACY  
 
In the next section, the questions aim to find out how much experience officials 
have of the judicial system. Please remember that I am looking for collective 
responses and if you have not had the experience required to answer the 
questions, please say so. 
 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Your answer 
can be strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree or 
don’t know. 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Don’t 
know 
39. The courts have the 
right to make decisions 
that  government 
officials have to abide 
by. 
      
40. Government officials 
should respect court 
decisions, regardless of 
whether they agree 
with them or not. 
      
41. Courts have the right to 
manage the abuse of 
power by officials. 
      
42. Sometimes one has to 
take matters into your 
own hands, rather than 
waiting for a court 
decision. 
      
 
 
Please answer true, false to the following statements, or don’t know if you have no 
experience of the obligations. 
 
 True False Don’t 
know 
43. Government officials must implement the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, 
even if the judgment relates to another environmental 
department. 
   
44. Government officials do not have to follow a judgment 
which was made by a High Court in a different 
province. 
   
45. Courts have the right to give specific instructions to an 
environmental department on how to administer an 
issue. 
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46. If a judge reviews a government official’s decision, that 
official must change his or her decision. 
   
 
 
47. Do you think court decisions are relevant to your work? 
 
YES NO 
 
48. Please explain your answer. ____________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________ 
 
49. Have you ever been involved in an environmental court case for your 
department? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
50. IF YES – 
  
a. Which case/s? _________________________________________ 
b. What was your role? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
c. How did you feel about the experience? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_____________________ 
 
 
51. Have you had the opportunity to find out about any judgments on the 
environment? 
 
YES NO 
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IF NO, ONLY ANSWER QUESTIONS 81 AND 86 - 107 
52. IF YES, how do you find out about judgments, if at all? (Please complete for 
each category) 
 
 Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never 
From my superiors     
From peers     
From colleagues in other 
departments 
    
Training sessions (please 
specify) 
    
Departmental memos/ 
circulars 
    
Consultants working for 
the department on 
departmental projects 
    
Reading law reports     
Intergovernmental 
committee (please specify) 
    
Summaries in professional 
newsletters 
    
Television     
Radio     
Newspapers     
Stakeholder submissions 
on applications 
    
Other (please specify)     
 
 
53. Does your department have consistent ways of sharing information on 
judgments and discussing judgments?  
 
YES NO 
 
 
54. IF YES – 
 
a. What are they? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
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b. Do you find them useful?  
_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
c. How do you think they could be improved? 
___________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
55. What would you consider the key points to be of the following judgments, or 
haven’t you heard about the judgment? (Please don’t be concerned if you do 
not know the name of the judgments – subsequent questions ask about the 
issues). 
 
 If you know about the judgment, 
what was the judgment about? (One 
sentence only is required). 
Don’t 
know 
Bareki NO and Another v 
Rencor Ltd and Others 
(‘Bareki case’) 
  
Director: Mineral 
Development, Gauteng 
Region and Another v Save 
the Vaal Environment and 
Others (‘SAVE case’) 
  
Government of the Republic 
of South Africa and others v 
Grootboom and others 
(‘Grootboom case’) 
  
Eagles Landing Body 
Corporate v Molewa NO and 
Others 
  
Fuel Retailers Association of 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Director-
General Environmental 
Management, Mpumalanga & 
13 Others (‘Fuel Retailers 
case’) 
  
HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v 
The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others (‘HTF 
case’) 
  
Hichange Investments (Pty) 
Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Pelts Products and 
Others 
  
MEC for Environment v 
Summerfield Brickworks 
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SLC Property Group (Pty) 
Ltd and another v The 
Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Economic 
Development (Western Cape) 
and another) 
  
 
 
56. FOR ANSWERS OTHER THAN DON’T KNOW IN QUESTION 55: 
Have you read any of these judgments yourself? _________If so which ones? 
 
 
 
 
57. Do you think the number of environmental court cases each year has 
increased, decreased or stayed the since the Constitution was introduced? 
Please indicate whether you think they have increased a lot, slightly increased, 
stayed the same, decreased slightly, decreased a lot or if you don’t know. 
 
Increased 
a lot 
Slightly 
increased 
Stayed 
the 
same 
Decreased 
slightly 
Decreased 
a lot 
Don’t 
know 
      
 
 
58. FOR RESPONSES OTHER THAN ‘DON’T KNOW’- Why do you think 
this has happened? 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
Bareki NO and Another v Rencor Ltd and Others  
Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and 
Another v Save the Vaal Environment and Others 
 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Grootboom and others 
 
Eagles Landing Body Corporate v Molewa NO and Others  
Fuel Retailers Association of SA (Pty) Ltd v Director-
General Environmental Management, Mpumalanga & 13 
Others 
 
HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism and Others 
 
Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Pelts Products and Others 
 
MEC for Environment v Summerfield Brickworks  
SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd and another v The Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Economic Development 
(Western Cape) and another) 
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59. How often do you think government wins environmental court cases that it 
takes to court – all of the time, most of the time, half of the time, less than half 
of the time, almost never, or don’t you know? 
 
All of the 
time 
Most of the 
time 
Half of 
the time 
Less than 
half of the 
time 
Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
      
 
60. How often do you think government wins environmental court cases where 
someone else takes government to court – all of the time, most of the time, 
half of the time, less than half of the time, almost never, or don’t you know? 
 
All of the 
time 
Most of the 
time 
Half of 
the time 
Less than 
half of the 
time 
Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
      
 
 
61. Amongst the national environmental department (DEAT) and the provincial 
environmental departments, which three departments do you think are the 
most involved in environmental court cases? 
 
 
National Department  
Gauteng  
Limpopo  
Western Cape  
Mpumalanga  
Eastern Cape  
KwaZulu Natal  
Free State  
Northern Cape  
North West  
Don’t know  
 
62. FOR RESPONSES OTHER THAN ‘DON’T KNOW’ - why do you think 
this is?  
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
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SECTION 6: LEGAL CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
 
The next set of questions is aimed at understanding the extent of experience that 
government officials have in court cases. 
  
Please indicate whether the following statements apply to you frequently, often, 
sometimes, rarely, never or whether you don’t know. 
 
 Frequently Often Sometimes Rarely Never Don’t 
know 
63. I think about court 
decisions when 
making decisions 
      
64. My superior checks 
that our 
administrative 
practices give effect 
to the requirements of 
judgments. 
      
65. Our senior 
management takes 
court decisions very 
seriously. (Please 
explain your answer) 
      
66. If our Minister/ MEC 
or senior management 
has a policy approach 
on an issue or 
application, I have to 
follow that approach 
– even if it goes 
against a court 
decision. 
      
67. If we disagree with a 
court decision, we 
appeal the decision 
rather than ignore it. 
      
68. My Minister/ MEC 
follows court 
decisions when 
considering appeals. 
      
69. Senior management 
responds to court 
decisions more 
negatively when they 
are mentioned by 
name in a court 
decision. 
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70. Have you ever found a situation where judgments seem to adopt different 
approaches to the same issue? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
71. IF YES , please give an example and explain how you responded. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
72. Have you ever disagreed with a judgment?  
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
73. IF YES – 
a. Which one? ___________________________________________ 
b. Tell me why you disagreed 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________ 
c. What did you do? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ 
 
74. Since 2004 there have been several judgments which discuss whether socio-
economic factors must be taken into account in environmental decisions. Do 
you know about these judgments?  
 
YES NO 
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75. IF YES –  
a. Can you tell me which ones you know about? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
________________________________________ 
b. Have you changed approach to the processing of applications in any 
way as a result of the judgments?  
YES NO 
 
c. Please explain why you have, or have not, changed your approach. 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
 
76. In Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and Another the courts considered the requirements for public 
participation. The court held that members of the public had the right to 
comment during both the EIA process and at the decision-making stage ie 
directly to an environmental department. The court also found that the 
approach of the Director-General was ‘fundamentally unsound’. Are you 
aware of the judgment? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
77. IF YES – 
a. Do you agree with the judgment?  
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________ 
b. How did your department respond to the judgment?  
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_______________________________ 
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78. Since the Earthlife judgment was handed down, there has been another 
judgment which disagrees with the Earthlife judgment. Are you aware of the 
judgment?  
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
79. IF YES, do you agree with the judgment? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
80. IF YES , please explain why you agree with the judgment. 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ 
 
81. How are you managing public participation at the moment?  
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
 
82. As you know many issues must be taken into account in environmental 
decisions. Sometimes these issues also fall within the responsibility of another 
department. For example, water issues may be relevant to an EIA application 
and DWAF administers the National Water Act. How do you handle these 
issues? Do you -  
 
a. Accept what DWAF says without 
considering the issue yourself? 
 
b. Consider what DWAF says but make 
your own decisions? 
 
c. Ignore what DWAF says and make 
your own mind up? 
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83. There have been several court decisions on the powers of an environmental 
department to develop and apply guidelines as decision-making tools. Are you 
aware of these judgments? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
84. IF YES –  
 
a. What do you think about the decisions ie do you agree or disagree with 
the judgments? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
__________________________________________ 
 
b. Have the judgments assisted the department in anyway? 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
85. Have you found any guidance from the courts regarding what is required from 
you when giving reasons for a decision? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
86. IF YES-  
a. Which court decisions? __________________________________ 
 _____________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________ 
b. Have the judgments influenced your approach in any way? ______ 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________ 
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SECTION 7: FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPACT 
 
 
86. If Cabinet approves the construction of a building for an international event 
and the court makes a decision that certain parts of the application process 
have to be redone which would result in the building not being completed in 
time for the event, how do you think your department would respond? 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
87. If the courts told you to reconsider a decision to refuse authorisation for the 
construction of a listed activity in a wetland with critically endangered species, 
what would you do? 
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ 
 
Please rate how much you think the following influence the extent to which you 
would comply with a court decision? (0 is not at all and 5 is a lot) 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
88. What senior management 
says 
      
89. The views of the legal 
department 
      
90. The protection of the 
environment 
      
91. Training       
92. Practicality       
93. The threat of litigation if I 
don’t comply 
      
94. The role of the court in a 
democracy 
      
95. Who the parties to the court 
case were 
      
96. If you believe the court 
decision is fair 
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How likely are you to not comply with a court decision in the following instances? 
Your response may be very likely, likely, not likely or would always comply. 
 
 
 Very 
likely 
Likely Not 
likely 
Would 
always 
comply  
97. If a court decision will result in 
additional administration  
    
98. If you disagree with it     
99. If government has lost the case     
100. If industry or NGOs win a case 
against government 
    
 
 
 
101. Do you know of any instances when your department has ignored a court 
decision because it disagrees with the decision? 
 
YES NO 
 
102. Do you know of any instances when an official has been told to make a 
decision which is contrary to a court decision? 
 
YES NO 
 
 
 
SECTION 8: GENERAL 
 
The last set of questions asks about you. The answers will be used only for 
analytical purposes. Please remember that the answers which you give will be 
treated confidentially. 
 
103. What language do you speak most at home? 
____________________________ 
104. How old are you? _____________________________ 
105. Gender 
 
Male  
Female  
 
106. Population group 
 
African White Coloured Indian Other 
(specify) 
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107. What is your highest level of education? 
 
Less than Grade 12 (matric)  
Grade 12 (matric)  
Diploma (please specify)  
Undergraduate degree (please specify)  
Postgraduate degree (please specify)  
Other (please specify)  
 
That is the end of the interview questions. Is there anything else you would like to 
add? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION. 
 
